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Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 2008; 39; 178

DOI: 10.1177/0022022107313861

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SELF-CONSTRUALS ACROSS CULTURES

Beyond Independence–Interdependence

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This article reviews the literature on cross-cultural assessment of self-construals and proposes to refine their conceptualization by incorporating principles derived from self-categorization theory and a critique of cross-cultural research. A Sixfold Self-Construal Scale is devised to measure six subcategories of self-construal: the personal self, relational horizontal and relational vertical selves, collective horizontal and collective vertical selves, and humanity-bound self-construal. The instrument's reliability and factor structure are tested in four student samples ($N = 855$) from the United Kingdom, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Convergent validity of the Sixfold Self-Construal Scale is tested with measures of Group Identification, Inclusion of the Other in the Self, the Schwartz value survey, and comparison of national mean scores. Results support the reliability, validity, and sensitivity of the scale in all samples.

Keywords: self-construals; Arab; Self-Construal Scale; culture

The *self* is often defined by social psychologists as an overarching, cognitive, and dynamic self-schema, “a collection of at least semi-related and highly domain-specific knowledge structures” (S. T. Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 182). It is seen as an underlying matrix of information clusters about the self, and which contains significant information that relates to the individual person as a physical entity interacting with, and surviving in a particular environment. The self is said to organize and direct a wide variety of psychological and social phenomena, regulating intentional behavior and permitting the person to function effectively in his or her social world. As such, *self-construal* refers to the way these knowledge structures are constructed within a fluid, flexible, and dynamic matrix.

However, if we consider that

people in any given cultural context gradually develop through socialization a set of cognitive, emotional and motivational processes that enable them to function well—(naturally, flexibly, and adaptively)—in the types of situations that are common and recurrent in the cultural context, (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997, p. 1245)

it is reasonable to assume that the way the self matrix is construed in one cultural setting would differ from the way it is construed in any other one.

It was with this in mind that Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed a distinction between an independent self-construal (which is closely associated with research on the self in Western psychology) and an interdependent self-construal. As they put it,

AUTHORS' NOTE: This research was supported in part by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (Ford Foundation), the Karim Rida Said Foundation, and the UNESCO Fellowship Bank scheme. We are grateful to Ronald Fisher, Vivian Vignoles, and Mirona Gheorghiu for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. Charles Harb, Social and Behavioral Sciences Department, American University of Beirut, PO Box 11-0236/SBS Department, Beirut, Lebanon; e-mail: charles.harb@aub.edu.lb.

JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 39 No. 2, March 2008 178-197

DOI: 10.1177/0022022107313861

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people in different cultures may hold divergent construals of the self, others and the interdependence of the two, and these divergent views of the independent and interdependent selves can have a systematic influence on various aspects of cognition, emotion and motivation. (p. 224)

The *independent self* is thus perceived as a bounded, coherent, stable, and free entity, the focus being on the individual rather than on the social unit of which the individual is part; on the other hand, the *interdependent self* is perceived as a connected, fluid, flexible, and committed being who is bound to others. Markus and Kitayama provided an extensive review of relevant literature, but they did not publish any form of measurement.

MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS

As various self-construal scales became available (e.g., Gudykunst Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, & Heyman, 1996; Singelis, 1994), research investigating self-construals across cultures has flourished from the mid-1990s onward. The two main routes to measuring self-construal across cultures have been through the elicitation of free descriptions of self (e.g., the Twenty Statements Test [TST]; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) and through the use of Likert-type attitude item scales (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994). Results have tended to support the independent–interdependent differentiation, which more often than not has followed the nation-level individualism–collectivism dimensions of Hofstede (1980, 2001): Members of Asian “collectivist” cultures are often shown to have a predominantly interdependent self, and members of Western “individualist” cultures are often shown to have a more independent self-construal (e.g., Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Lai, 1999; Singelis & Brown, 1995). Some authors contest this conclusion (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), but failure to find such differences is frequently attributable to lack of control for responses bias and attention to necessary distinctions between individual-level and nation-level measurement. For instance, Schimmack, Oishi, and Diener (2005) showed that where methodological defects of this type are controlled for, the data analyzed by Oyserman et al. (2002) do reveal the predicted contrast between Western independence and Asian interdependence. Furthermore, both the TST and Likert-type attitude item scales face serious conceptual and empirical challenges to their validity and reliability (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2005; Smith, Bond, & Kağıtçıbaşı, 2006).

THE TST: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT

A key finding of cross-cultural research is the need for contextualization when administering measures to an individual for whom interdependence is important. Members of “collectivist” cultures tend to focus more on the context in which a behavior or psychological process is taking place, a tendency that Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) labeled “situationism or contextualism” (see also Haberstroh, Oyserman, Schwarz, Kuhnen, & Ji, 2002; Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1997).

A consequence of this focus is that individuals with interdependent self-construals may have difficulty describing themselves in absolute terms without any contextual or situational references. Cousins (1989) administered the TST to American and Japanese respondents and noted that abstract categorizations of the self seemed unnatural or artificial to Japanese participants because they reflect a claim of being a separate individual whose nature is not constrained by specific situations and roles. This problem was further underlined by Singelis

and Brown's (1995) finding that persons with interdependent self-construals were more influenced in their behavior by the context of the situation than were persons with independent or less interdependent self-construals. More recently, Kühnen, Hannover, and Schubert (2001) have shown that independent self-construals coincide with the tendency to process stimuli unaffected by their context. On the other hand, interdependent self-construals facilitate context-bound thinking.

As A. P. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett (1998) put it,

the problem is that these methods [use of TST and other free descriptions of self] are predicated on the existence of a self that is bounded and stable, transcending relationships and situations. Such methods may not be valid for studying the shifting, relational, contextualized self that is hypothesized to characterize those living in East Asian cultural contexts. In many East Asian contexts, identifying and asserting a distinctive, invariant, context-free self is not a common activity. (p. 927).

LIKERT SCALES

The first problem associated with the available Likert-type scales (e.g., Gudykunst et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994) concerns the phrasing and content of self-construal scale items. Close inspection reveals much overlap between self-construal scale items and those included in individualism–collectivism scales (e.g., Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995). Existing individual-level individualism–collectivism scales measure value tendencies that should not be contained within a self-construal scale because values concern what is good or desirable, whereas self-construals are self-descriptions. The overlap between these scales entangles these theoretically distinct concepts, and a new scale with items reflecting the propositions of Markus and Kitayama (1991) more closely is therefore desirable.

A second problem arises from the structural instability and reliability of self-construal scales when used across cultures (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). These scales have only rarely been employed beyond East Asian and North American samples (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002), and few authors have conducted structural analyses to verify the validity of their measures. Harb (1999) found low reliability and a poor factor structure of Singelis's (1994) self-construal scale in a sample of about 900 Lebanese respondents, even after controlling for various collinearity problems. Other results from Turkey, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom (Redford, 2001), Germany, and Brazil (Schäfermeier, 2004) also show either poor reliability and/or structural inequivalence of items across cultures. Furthermore, in a large scale study using Singelis's (1994) measure among students in 30 nations, significant cross-cultural instability in the structure of the scale was reported (Georgas, Berry, van de Vijver, Kağıtçıbaşı, & Poortinga, 2006). Finally, Levine et al. (2003) concluded from a meta-analysis of published self-construal research that "the data presented here demonstrate the serious and persistent flaws in existing self-construal scales . . . the intended two-factor measurement fails to fit the data, fails badly, and fails consistently" (p. 247).

This leads to the third and perhaps most serious problem, namely, the need for adequate contextualization. Most self-construal scales follow the conceptual contrast of "Me as independent, unique" versus "Me as connected to my *group*." But if we are to acknowledge that interdependent individuals are more sensitive to context, then specifying which group one refers to will have a direct and significant effect on responses. Bochner (1994) found that individuals from collectivist cultures produced significantly more TST group membership descriptions than "collectivistic" or "individualistic" ones. Rhee, Uleman,

and Lee (1996) found that the individual-level meanings of collectivism and individualism varied significantly by in-group and by nation. Consequently, self-construal scales need to provide references to specific group membership, and such differentiations are bound to affect conceptions of self-construals across cultures. Because different groups elicit different levels of involvement, the specific group that an interdependent scale item refers to is likely to affect responses. Contextualization of item referent can yield significant improvements to thinking about self-construals and their measurement.

RECENT CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS

In recent years, several researchers have proposed a differentiation of the self along three dimensions: personal, relational, and collective (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Y. Kashima et al., 1995; E. S. Kashima & Hardie, 2000; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Triandis, 1989¹). Specifically, Brewer and Gardner (1996) proposed a distinction between three sources of self-representation: the personal, the interpersonal, and the collective. The central claim of their proposition is that,

at the individual level, the personal self is the differentiated, individuated self-concept most characteristic of studies of the self in Western psychology. At the interpersonal level, the relational self is the self concept derived from connections and role relationships with significant others. This corresponds most closely to the interdependent self as defined by Markus and Kitayama (1991). Finally, at the group level, is the collective self, which corresponds to the concept of social identity as represented in social identity theory and self-categorization theory. (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987, p. 84)

This proposition is the assimilated product of various theoretical trends in social and cross-cultural psychology. On one hand, it is largely inspired by the construction of self proposed by Markus and Kitayama (1991), whereas on the other hand, it is deeply rooted in the self-categorization theories of Turner and his associates (Turner et al., 1987). There is an apparent convergence between research into construals of the self across cultures and research into categorizations of the self within groups (Smith & Long, 2006). Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed an interdependent self-construal to counterbalance the individual-focused model of the self in Western psychological research. On the other hand, social identity and self-categorization theories emerged as a reaction to the individual focus of research in mainstream social psychology and developed a special emphasis on intergroup relationships and group dynamics. Both developments occurred independently, with one focusing on the self in its cultural context and the other on the self in its group context.

Between the self as a personal individuated unit and the self as a social category lie different levels of inclusiveness, characterized by varying shades of relationship between the individual and the group. The most important feature of the new theoretical proposition is its focus on a wider circle of relations around the focal self. Self-construals retain the central features of Markus and Kitayama's (1991) propositions, with differences across cultures closely related to the degree with which one is related or connected to others. However, the focus moves toward the larger network of interrelationships and groups in which the self is embedded and which shape its construction. This leads naturally to consideration of the processes of self-categorization.

Self-categorization theory states that the cognitive representations of the self take the form of cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as identical in contrast to

some other class of stimuli (Turner et al., 1987). This “cognitive redefinition of the self from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes” (Turner, 1984, p. 528) produces a “shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). This collective self, which emerges as part of normal variation in self-definition, makes possible the emergent collective processes of social life, with the self functioning as the conduit by which these collective processes mediate human cognition (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).

Turner et al. (1987) argue that self-categorizations exist as a hierarchical system of classification, forming different levels of abstraction related by means of class inclusion. Although in principle an endless variety of hierarchical levels of inclusiveness exists (e.g., “I as psychologist,” “I as scientist,” etc.), Turner et al. (1987) focused on three levels of self-categorization: the personal (individual), the social (group), and the human (species). These self-categorizations rest on different comparison processes. Although personal identity is based on interpersonal comparisons (e.g., “me” vs. “not me”), social identity categorization is based on intergroup comparisons (e.g., “us” vs. “them”). In sum,

there is a social categorical level reflecting group memberships and collective similarities as well as a personal level reflecting individual differences in the in-group. Self-categorisation varies in level of inclusiveness, and there is variation in behaviour as a function of changes in relative salience. (Turner & Onorato, 1999, p. 26)

Although self-categorization theory has been extensively tested by social psychologists, it has only rarely attracted the attention of cross-cultural researchers.

In linking these separate literatures, we note that the central tenet of Markus and Kitayama's (1991) differentiation rests on the level of connectedness between the individual and various others, whereas a central feature of self-categorization theory lies in the differing levels of inclusiveness of self-categorizations. A rough synthesis indicates that the more the focal self is connected to the various levels of inclusiveness, the more the construal is “interdependent.” On the other hand, the more the focal self strives to be unique and separate, the more the construal is “independent.” When comparing the self-construal and self-categorization literatures, Brewer and Gardner (1996) note the contrast within each between two levels of social selves—those that derive from interpersonal relationships and those that derive from membership in larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories. Both interpersonal and collective identities are social extensions of the self, but they differ as to whether the social connections are personalized attachments or impersonal bonds derived from a common identification with some symbolic group or social category. Prototypic interpersonal identities are those derived from intimate dyadic relationships such as parent–child, lovers, and friendships, but they can also be derived from membership in small face-to-face groups that are essentially networks of such dyadic relationships (e.g., family); on the other hand, collective social identities do not require personal relationships among group members (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). More recently, Brewer and Chen (2007) have argued that to understand fully the conglomerate referred to as individualism–collectivism, we need not only to distinguish individual, relational, and collective identities but also to differentiate between the self-construals and values that relate to those identities. This is wholly consistent with the present perspective.

By bringing together the various propositions so far presented, we can envisage self-representations at four possible levels of inclusiveness (see Figure 1). At the personal or

Figure 1: The Four Levels of Inclusiveness

individuated level is the “personal self,” most characteristic of Western studies of the self and closely related to Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) independent self. The personal self strives to differentiate from others, with unique and independent self-representations. Second is the relational or interpersonal self that is construed through dyadic relationships or through small groups made up of significant dyadic interactions (e.g., family). The third level of inclusiveness is the collective self, in which the self is construed as an interchangeable exemplar of larger in-groups (e.g., political or religious memberships). The collective self would incorporate the norms or roles associated with a particular in-group, without necessarily negotiating the scripts of interaction that are typically present for the relational self. The final level of inclusiveness involves the supra structure of “humanity,” in which the self is defined by its belonging to the human species as differentiated from other living organisms on the planet. This overarching category transcends the norms and properties associated with social interactions (both relational and collective) and rests on a universal representation.

LEVELS OF INCLUSIVENESS: GROUP TYPOLOGIES

Considering that different groups yield different dynamics, it is surprising that little attention has been devoted to investigating typologies of groups. Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting (1999) and Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier (1995) attempted to remedy this situation. Having asked respondents to produce a set of all possible identities, they ended up with a large set of 64 items, the cluster analysis of which lacked a theoretical direction. Perhaps one of the main reasons they faced difficulties in these studies stems from the

bottom-up methodology they adopted. Although exploratory research benefits greatly from a bottom-up approach, a theoretical frame is needed to strengthen focus. A post hoc identification of emerging clusters is strictly dependent on the exhaustiveness of the investigated list of identities and fluctuates in terms of the patterned responding of the selected samples. However, a theory-driven identification of group typology can use the integrated levels of inclusiveness presented in this article as a springboard for further exploration. Inspection of the clusters identified by Deaux et al. (1995) permits a delineation of groups in terms of their closeness or remoteness from the focal self, in a way that is closely linked to the relational and collective dimensions identified above.

RELATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE GROUPS

In distinguishing between relational and collective selves, the key variable is the group with which the self is connected: The size and intimacy of that group will determine whether it is relational (e.g., a set of dyadic relationships) or collective (in-group membership). For example, the group "friends" by virtue of its small size and intimacy would be a relational group, whereas religious affiliation would be a collective one. Members of relational groups will experience a strong and direct effect on their construal of self by virtue of the dyadic dynamics that necessitate the negotiation of adequate scripts of interaction, and thus form the most immediate circle of associations around the focal self. Furthermore, individuals (e.g., father) and small in-groups (e.g., family) will have a similar impact; both being instances of relational self-categorizations. The collective self on the other hand involves larger groups, within which associations are relatively loose, with relationships depending less on negotiated scripts and more on inferred group characteristics, norms, or roles. To be sure, it is possible that when someone thinks of a larger social category, they may sometimes also visualize specific known individuals whom they know more personally from within that category; however, it is not these dyadic relationships that *define* the group identity. Self-categorization theory acknowledges our ability to switch our focus of attention momentarily in just such ways. Nonetheless, the findings of existing studies are clear: Thinking of oneself collectively as opposed to relationally has distinctive consequences (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001).

HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL DIMENSIONS

Although types of group and their relation to the self will vary in size and intimacy, they will also be differentiated in terms of whether they emphasize hierarchy or equality. The distinction between vertical and horizontal relationships permeates each of the cross-cultural theories currently available. Not only did Hofstede's (1980) nation-level dimensions include power distance but also subsequent refinement of the concept of individualism–collectivism led Triandis (1995) to propose a vertical and horizontal dimensions of individualism and collectivism. Similarly, at the individual level, Schwartz's (1992) survey of values includes some that emphasize hierarchy (e.g., power and tradition) and some that do not (e.g., hedonism or stimulation), whereas at the nation level, he identifies an opposition between egalitarianism and hierarchy. These vertical versus horizontal cultural differentiations are likely to be translated at the individual level into analogous social dynamics and consequently to seep into self-construals and identities. Specifically, certain groups are more likely to have a hierarchical structure (e.g., political or military groupings), whereas others are more likely to rest on egalitarian values (e.g., friends, leisure clubs).

VERTICAL-HORIZONTAL AND RELATIONAL-COLLECTIVE SELVES

Vertical versus horizontal differentiations will not translate to all levels of self-construal. Of the four levels identified earlier, only the relational and the collective dimensions are likely to be affected. The personal self achieves self-definition in terms of unique traits and independence. Such a perspective cannot harbor hierarchy within itself, as both hierarchy and equality do not exist in the absolute, but emerge when two entities are in relation with one another. In other words, because hierarchy and equality are *relationship* characteristics, they cannot be associated with a bounded unique set of personal attributes. It is only when the personal self is engaged in interpersonal or intergroup comparisons that vertical/horizontal properties of relatedness can emerge.

HYPOTHESES

It is thus possible to propose a sixfold differentiation of self-construals: the personal, the relational (vertical and horizontal), the collective (vertical and horizontal), and the humanity-bound self-concepts. The present study reports the development and validity testing of an instrument to measure these types of self-construal across cultures.

Evidence for validity was sought through an exploration of the scale's nomological net. First, it was hypothesized that the strength of each type of self-construal would be predicted by the degree of identification with the type of grouping to which it is relevant. Second, it was hypothesized that each type of self-construal would be predicted by the degree to which respondents rated the relevant type of grouping as included within one's self. Third, it was predicted that each type of self-construal would be associated with relevant prevailing values. Finally, it was predicted that mean self-construal scores from each nation sampled would accord with relevant prior characterizations of cultural differences.

Values differ from self-construals in that the former refer to guiding principles in one's life (Schwartz, 1992, 1994), whereas the latter refer to the construal of self in its relation to others. As such, our guiding principles are likely to be determined by the groups we associate ourselves with and vice versa. Ip and Bond (1995) found associations between TST responses and Schwartz's (1992) values, whereas Cukur, Guzman, and Carlo (2004) found consistently positive but modest correlations between Schwartz values and Singelis et al.'s (1995) measures of horizontal and vertical self-construal among students from Turkey, the Philippines, and the United States.

Schwartz (1992) proposed that values arise in response to three fundamental human needs, those related to the survival of the individual, those relating to coordination with others, and those relating to the welfare and needs of groups. These three groups of needs provide the basis for predicting which values will be endorsed by those with each type of self-construal. It was hypothesized that the personal individuated self would correlate most strongly with endorsement of those values that promote the individual's own goals, such as self-direction, achievement, and power. On the other hand, relational self-construals would correlate most strongly with values that promote one's goals in relations with close others and in-groups, such as conformity and benevolence (for the vertical dimension) and hedonism and stimulation (for the horizontal dimension). Furthermore, collective self-construals would be expected to correlate most strongly with socially oriented values such as tradition and security.

Schwartz's model provides no basis for predicting humanity self-construal. Research in Canada has identified respondents who reject categorizing persons in terms of ethnicities

or categories and see each person as an individual within the human race (Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997). On this basis, we predict humanity self-construal would be correlated most strongly with universalism.

Arab cultures display strong vertical structures and strong family relationships (Barakat, 1993; Hofstede, 2001), whereas British culture is characterized by strong individualism and relatively low power distance (Hofstede, 2001). Consequently, British students are predicted to display greater endorsement of personal and horizontal relational self-construals than their Arab counterparts, whereas the latter are predicted to endorse greater vertical and collective self-construals than do British participants. Furthermore, the selected Lebanese sample has greater ethnic, political, and religious heterogeneity than the student samples selected in Jordan or Syria, and has been more strongly exposed to Western influences. The Lebanese student sample scores are therefore predicted to be intermediate between British scores and the scores for Jordan and Syria. No predictions are entered as to where humanity scores would be highest, because there is no prior basis for doing so.

METHOD

SCALE CONSTRUCTION

Markus and Kitayama (1991) linked several aspects of independent and interdependent self-construal with existing social, cognitive, motivational, and emotional paradigms. To increase content validity, the selection of items for the new measure did not include any peripheral associations or variables that are loosely linked to self-construal, but was limited to the core aspects and properties that are referred to in Markus and Kitayama's (1991) seminal article. As such, five items were selected and are listed below²:

- I think of myself as connected (linked) to _____
- I control my behavior to accommodate the wishes (interests) of _____
- I am affected by events that concern (relate) to _____
- I am aware of the needs, desires, and goals of _____
- I feel I have a strong relationship with _____

These items tap the connectedness of individuals to certain groups in their environment, and it is this degree of association that differentiates between an independent and an interdependent self-construal. Furthermore, the others and groups to which the person is connected will indicate the participants' various self-construals, for example, whether their self-construal is predominantly geared toward a vertical or horizontal, relational or collective self. Although humanity and personal self do not require specification of targets, both relational and collective subcategories necessitate the use of prototypical exemplars. The group "friends" was used as an exemplar of horizontal-relational construal, "family" was used as an exemplar of vertical-relational construal, "students at my university" was used as an exemplar of horizontal-collective construal, and "social grouping" was used as an exemplar of vertical-collective construal. The latter category was defined at the outset of the questionnaire as "any of the following: political group/party, governmental institution, or religious affiliation." Thus, participants rated on 7-point Likert-type scales the extent to which each of the five self-construal questions applied to each of the six categories of construal, with anchors from *to a very small extent* to *to a very large extent*. In the case of personal self-construals, the referents were phrased in terms of "Myself," with a qualifying

phrase where it was needed to maintain linguistic coherence. For instance, the first of the items numbered above read "I think of myself as connected (linked) to myself (I am a unique person separate from others)," whereas the fifth read "I feel I have a strong relationship with myself (I act as an independent person)."

The Sixfold Self-Construal Scale is a flexible instrument. For example, if one's self-construal is individualistic and thus unrelated to others, the respondent is likely to score negligibly on the group categorizations (relational and collective items) and score higher on the "I am independent and unique" items. Furthermore, self-construals are not necessarily exclusive or bipolar. Participants can sample different subcategories to various degrees, depending on the culture in which they are embedded as well as their own personal characteristics. In other words, a high score on more than one subcategory is entirely probable. The new instrument was simultaneously developed and phrased in both the Arabic and English languages, then put through both a translation-back translation procedure and a bilingual committee approach to ensure linguistic equivalence (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).

The next step in validating the new scale was to check for concurrent criterion validity, by determining whether the six self-construal scores are associated with relevant preexisting indicators. Because there are no reliable and valid self-construal scales that reflect the theoretical modifications proposed, the best way to assess concurrent criterion validity is by analyzing the relation between the six self-construals and scores for closely related concepts. The link between self-construal and social identification is a central tenet of self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). Aron and Aron's (1996) model of "Inclusion of Others in the Self" (IOS) concerns the individual's wish to expand their sense of self by including other persons within it. Predicted links between IOS and Brewer and Gardner's tripartite model of self-construal have been formulated (Aron & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001). To achieve measures of these concepts, respondents were asked how strongly they identified with each group category and also how much the others in each category were included in one's self. For instance, one of the items for horizontal-relational self-construal was, "I am aware of the needs, desires, and goals of my friends." The equivalent identity item was, "My identity is mostly defined by my belonging to my friends." For the inclusion-of-others items, respondents chose one of a series of pairs of overlapping circles to indicate the degree to which particular others were included in their own self-construal. The questionnaire thus comprised the 30 newly developed self-construal items, 6 modified Group Identification items originally devised by Brown et al. (1992), 6 modified items from the IOS Scale (Aron & Aron, 1996; Aron & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001), and the Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992). The Brown et al. items showed Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients of .87 (Brown et al., 1992), and their predictive validity was established in that study and in many subsequent studies by social identity researchers (e.g., Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). The modified identity scale's reliability analysis in the present study showed Cronbach's alpha coefficients above .80 across samples and subcategories with the exception of the personal identity category where reliability coefficients varied between .64 and .70. The IOS items' format prevents classic reliability analyses, but the IOS's construct validity has been established (e.g., Aron & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001). The reliability of the Schwartz value types has been found to vary between different samples, but they do show predictive validity (Smith & Schwartz, 1997).

PROCEDURE

The survey was administered to a total of 855 participants from Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the United Kingdom. British students were invited to complete the questionnaire

TABLE 1
Sample Demographics and Scale Reliabilities

	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Lebanon</i>	<i>Syria</i>	<i>Jordan</i>
<i>N</i>	170	227	232	226
Mean age (<i>SD</i>)	20.7 (3.0)	19.6 (1.5)	20.2 (2.3)	20.8 (1.6)
Range	17-45	17-30	17-22	17-27
Percentage male	33.5	48.5	17	19
Self-construals				
Personal self	.73	.73	.70	.68
Relational-vertical	.86	.85	.80	.79
Relational-horizontal	.83	.81	.83	.83
Collective-horizontal	.89	.87	.82	.83
Collective-vertical	.92	.89	.85	.91
Humanity	.84	.87	.80	.83

through incentive schemes such as research credit ($n = 55$) and through door-to-door distribution of questionnaires within student residences ($n = 115$; 20% response rate, a typical level for this procedure). By contrast, student participants in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria completed the questionnaire during class time, after the researcher had secured the necessary approval. A total of 170 British students from the University of Sussex, 227 Lebanese students from the American University of Beirut, 226 Jordanian students from Amman University, and 232 Syrian students from the University of Damascus participated in this study.

RESULTS

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and demographic details of the samples, as well as Cronbach's alpha reliabilities for each of the subscales. Reliabilities within each sample were very good, varying between a single low of .68 to a high of .92. Five subscales out of six had all reliability coefficients above .79, whereas the Personal subscale had acceptable reliability with the minor exception of the sample from Jordan. These coefficients are much better than have been typical for most other self-construal instruments and meet the requirement of achieving equal reliability across samples (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).

A six-component exploratory factor analysis with principal axis factoring extraction and equamax rotation was conducted on the 30 items of the Sixfold Self-Construal Scale in each of the four samples. Bartlett's test of sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure were adequate for all samples. This indicates that the correlation matrices are factorable, although measures of sampling adequacy found on the anti-image correlation matrices were well above .5, thus indicating that none of the variables needed exclusion from the analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Table 2 shows the factor loadings for the six specified factors of the rotated component matrix within each sample, as well as the total percentage of variance explained. The factor analyses yielded almost perfect rotation matrices; out of the 720 cells displayed in Table 2, only one item loaded more strongly on a different factor than the intended one.

A multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was also performed through LISREL on the Sixfold Self-Construals Scale across samples, using the sample size weighted averaged covariance matrix. This analysis gives equal weight to each individual sample and can be interpreted as a cultural general solution. The fit indices showed reasonable support for the

TABLE 2
Factor Loadings for Self-Construct Items in Each Sample

	L1	L2	L3	L4	L5	L6	J1	J2	J3	J4	J5	J6	U.K.1	U.K.2	U.K.3	U.K.4	U.K.5	U.K.6	SI	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6
VR_1	.76	.19	.07	.11	-.01	.09	.73	.10	.07	.05	-.04	.08	.61	.45	.00	-.04	.12	.08	.80	.17	-.02	.07	-.01	.05
VR_2	.67	.04	.12	.13	-.10	-.13	.48	.10	.10	.09	.06	-.10	.87	.06	.09	.14	-.02	.00	.41	.15	.21	.15	.04	.00
VR_3	.78	.18	.04	.00	-.02	.17	.62	.23	-.12	.06	.04	.24	.66	.30	.02	-.09	.01	.06	.38	.22	-.05	.06	.10	.18
VR_4	.66	.23	-.03	.12	-.05	.16	.58	.28	-.02	.07	.17	.20	.53	.39	.09	.06	.09	.08	.55	.18	.15	.20	.04	.08
VR_5	.74	.21	.02	.09	.06	.12	.78	.08	.14	.06	-.03	.14	.61	.47	.03	-.06	.10	.06	.84	.10	.07	.06	.02	.02
HR_1	.22	.64	.16	.08	.09	-.04	.08	.74	.05	.04	.06	.03	.19	.72	.05	.18	.05	.11	.16	.62	.03	.07	.05	-.04
HR_2	.17	.36	.36	.19	.04	-.29	.16	.46	.18	.18	.05	-.12	.58	.09	.23	.27	-.06	-.03	.16	.67	.29	.17	-.02	.00
HR_3	.22	.71	.18	.08	.10	-.08	.23	.77	.02	.12	.09	.04	.40	.57	.19	.09	-.01	.10	.80	.04	.10	.09	.09	.20
HR_4	.10	.73	.11	.11	.04	.09	.10	.66	.13	.03	.20	.08	.29	.61	.24	.22	.00	.06	.11	.53	.20	.15	-.07	.01
HR_5	.19	.81	.06	.14	.09	.03	.18	.75	.16	.04	.03	.15	.25	.78	.11	.13	.10	-.01	.27	.64	.14	.06	.08	-.04
VC_1	.09	.13	.70	.04	.09	.02	.02	.19	.52	.16	.12	-.12	.02	.19	.70	.23	.21	-.02	.09	.12	.60	.07	.12	.04
VC_2	-.03	-.02	.75	.16	.15	-.20	.06	.08	.61	.26	.13	-.25	.21	-.16	.61	.32	.17	-.13	.06	.13	.68	.27	.14	.09
VC_3	.11	.17	.72	.13	.21	-.03	.17	.20	.54	.29	.17	-.13	.16	.05	.82	.22	.04	.04	.03	.23	.62	.19	.28	.13
VC_4	-.03	.15	.66	.16	.09	.08	-.04	.04	.69	.20	.21	-.01	-.01	.16	.72	.16	.22	.02	-.01	.08	.66	.19	.05	-.03
VC_5	.08	.20	.76	.16	.08	.09	.12	.10	.77	.15	.05	-.17	.07	.20	.76	.23	.22	-.02	.14	.13	.65	.14	.20	-.04
HC_1	.06	.12	.12	.78	.08	.02	.03	.06	.08	.79	.08	-.10	-.06	.23	.18	.73	.22	-.02	.21	.04	.11	.65	.21	-.04
HC_2	.21	-.08	.23	.69	.12	-.20	.15	.11	.29	.73	.09	-.15	.21	-.08	.20	.75	.18	-.13	.07	.20	.17	.75	.14	-.03
HC_3	.15	.12	.07	.73	.19	.04	.06	.15	.15	.85	.01	-.06	.15	.11	.33	.76	.14	.05	.04	.32	.16	.67	.16	.00
HC_4	.00	.15	.13	.76	.19	.09	.06	.09	.28	.75	.11	-.10	-.05	.18	.32	.65	.25	.03	.09	.09	.19	.67	.11	-.04
HC_5	.09	.18	.15	.83	.08	.02	.14	.02	.29	.78	.15	.04	.02	.18	.22	.79	.33	.01	.11	-.02	.19	.59	.24	-.09
HUM_1	-.06	.01	.08	.15	.74	.00	-.11	.19	-.05	.06	.68	.02	-.08	.14	.10	.13	.69	.11	.11	.05	.09	.14	.80	.02
HUM_2	-.02	-.04	.16	.00	.76	-.01	-.05	.11	.20	.00	.73	-.05	.21	-.23	.23	.17	.54	-.03	.07	.03	.15	.10	.75	.04
HUM_3	.03	.08	.08	.07	.78	.06	.16	.13	.03	.03	.77	.01	.15	-.07	.10	.07	.73	.10	-.05	.08	.06	.18	.71	.11
HUM_4	-.06	.14	.03	.20	.66	.08	.05	-.07	.17	.17	.65	.12	-.07	.11	.15	.25	.59	.01	-.01	-.10	.18	.06	.35	.06
HUM_5	.00	.16	.19	.18	.72	.03	.10	.05	.22	.10	.69	.02	-.02	.13	.15	.25	.79	.03	.08	.11	.11	.28	.53	.02
Pers_1	-.04	-.09	-.10	-.01	.07	.57	-.19	.05	-.19	.11	.09	.33	-.03	-.05	-.01	-.02	.15	.72	-.19	-.06	.12	-.01	-.03	.60
Pers_2	-.02	-.06	-.04	.08	-.06	.68	.13	-.10	-.16	-.06	-.02	.61	.00	.03	-.05	.05	-.01	.69	.05	-.03	.08	-.07	.08	.60
Pers_3	.21	.13	.12	-.12	.05	.58	.09	.13	.00	-.11	.01	.63	.07	.03	-.02	-.02	.01	.51	.26	.12	.01	-.02	.02	.52
Pers_4	.19	.16	-.02	-.05	.03	.51	.17	.13	-.09	-.02	-.04	.62	.06	.30	.04	.03	-.04	.35	.36	.05	-.05	-.06	.16	.49
Pers_5	.07	-.08	.06	.10	.05	.63	.05	-.03	-.10	.00	.08	.64	.01	.07	.02	-.07	.07	.71	.01	.04	-.08	.00	.05	.69
% var			57%						53%						59%						49%			

NOTE: VR = Relational-Vertical; HR = Horizontal-Relational; VC = Vertical-Collective; HC = Horizontal-Collective; HUM = Humanity; Pers = Myself. L = Lebanon, J = Jordan, and S = Syria. Numbers are questionnaire item numbers. % var = percentage variance explained.

hypothesized model, $\chi^2(1946) = 3,678.71$, $p < .01$ with the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .053, and the comparative fit index (CFI) = .96. Values lower than .08 for the RMSEA and values larger than .95 for the CFI are indicative of excellent fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999). Individual country CFA analyses were also carried out and demonstrated good data fit in each sample with the following: Lebanon's $\chi^2(332) = 768.67$, $p < .01$, RMSEA = .072, and CFI = .93; Jordan's $\chi^2(332) = 659$, $p < .01$, RMSEA = .065, and CFI = .93; United Kingdom's $\chi^2(332) = 671.9$, $p < .01$, RMSEA = .072, and CFI = .94; and Syria's $\chi^2(332) = 577.1$, $p < .01$, RMSEA = .058, and CFI = .94.

This excellent set of results, both in terms of reliability and of scale structure, gives confidence in the developed scales. Consequently, the 30 items were combined into six indices measuring the six proposed categories of self-construal across cultures.

CONCURRENT CRITERION VALIDITY

As a test of concurrent criterion validity, the correlation matrix between self-construals, Group Identification, and Inclusion of Others should yield the highest correlations between the related subcategories of each scale. Table 3 displays pan-cultural correlation matrices between self-construals, IOS, Social Identification, and values. The correlations here presented pan-culturally yielded comparable results when conducted separately within each sample. As predicted, with a single exception, all self-construal subscales do correlate highest with their equivalent dimension within the Group Identification and IOS subscales, as shown in bold on the diagonals of the correlation matrix. The anomalous correlation between personal self-construal and personal inclusion of others was computed as a correlation with the *noninclusion* of all others. This may account for the low value obtained. Noninclusion of others is not a necessary component of seeing oneself as an independent actor.

Correlations between the self-construal subcategories and value types were substantially weaker, although many are still significant. Because Schwartz value types are not discrete entities, but groupings of values adjacent to one another, there are gradual transitions in the interrelatedness of values with measures of self-construals. Nonetheless, as predicted, self-direction, achievement, and power values showed the strongest correlations with personal self-construal. Likewise, conformity correlated most strongly with vertical-relational self-construal, stimulation and hedonism correlated most strongly with horizontal-collective self-construal, and universalism correlated most strongly with humanity self-construal. Dependent t tests (Steiger, 1980) showed that these predicted correlations are significantly higher than the highest nonpredicted correlations presented in Table 3. The results for benevolence, tradition, and security were less close to prediction, with equally strong correlations found with several types of self-construal.

Table 4 presents the intercorrelations between the six self-construals. Dependent t tests indicate that the correlations between the horizontal and vertical relational dimensions are significantly higher than correlations between the relational dimensions and the collective ones (all four comparisons are significant at $p < .01$). Similarly, the correlations between the horizontal and vertical collective dimensions are significantly higher than correlations between the collective dimensions and the relational ones. These findings indicate that the horizontal and vertical aspects of the relational and collective dimensions are more closely bound within these dimensions than across them. The differentiation of relational and collective self-construal is more important than that between vertical and horizontal self-construal.

Table 5 presents means and standard deviations for self-construals in each sample. A between-subjects MANCOVA was performed on the six self-construals: relational vertical,

TABLE 3
Correlations for Self-Construals, Inclusion of Others,
Group Identification and Values

	<i>Self-Construal Scales</i>					
	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Vertical-Relational</i>	<i>Horizontal-Relational</i>	<i>Vertical-Collective</i>	<i>Horizontal-Collective</i>	<i>Humanity</i>
Inclusion of others						
Personal	.07*	-.32**	-.30**	-.45*	-.36**	-.42**
VR	-.04	.64**	.18**	.17**	.13*	.09**
HR	.03	.14**	.57**	.07**	.11**	.02
VC	-.13**	.09**	.04	.67**	.24**	.26**
HC	-.08*	.12**	.14**	.28**	.53**	.22**
Humanity	-.01	.06	.05	.20**	.15**	.63**
Social identification						
Personal	.53**	.07	.03	-.09**	-.06	-.03
VR	.04	.70**	.24**	.16**	.15**	.09**
HR	.02	.29**	.70**	.11**	.22**	.06
VC	-.11**	.21**	.14**	.75**	.36**	.24**
HC	-.15**	.14**	.13**	.37**	.67**	.30**
Humanity	-.06	.09**	.06	.29**	.30**	.67**
Values						
Self-direction	.20***	-.06	.12***	-.03	-.01	.09**
Achievement	.13***	.11**	.10**	.11**	.08*	.10**
Power	.14***	-.01	.03	-.03	-.03	-.16***
Conformity	-.05	.38***	.02	.22***	.23***	.21***
Benevolence	.01	.25***	.29***	.18***	.20***	.27***
Stimulation	.19***	-.07	.22***	-.02	.02	.07*
Hedonism	.18***	-.04	.23***	-.16***	-.09*	-.17***
Tradition	-.14***	.24***	-.07*	.24***	.24***	.23***
Security	-.05	.24***	.03	.18***	.23***	.21***
Universalism	.08	.08*	.09*	.14***	.15***	.38***

NOTE: Sample size range 842 < *N* < 855, because of missing values.

p* < .05. *p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

TABLE 4
Intercorrelations of the Self-Construals

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Self-Construal Scales</i>				
	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Vertical-Relational</i>	<i>Horizontal-Relational</i>	<i>Vertical-Collective</i>	<i>Horizontal-Collective</i>
VR	.07*				
HR	.09*	.38**			
VC	-.12**	.25**	.22**		
HC	-.12**	.22**	.28**	.49**	
Humanity	.01	.13**	.14**	.39**	.37**

NOTE: Sample size range 851 < *N* < 855, because of missing values.

p* < .05. *p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

relational horizontal, collective vertical, collective horizontal, humanity, and personal self, with age as a covariate.³ The independent variable, country, was at four levels (United Kingdom, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan). Results for evaluation of assumptions of normality, homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices, linearity, and multicollinearity were satisfactory. The age

TABLE 5
Sample Means

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Self-Construal Scales</i>					
	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Vertical-Relational</i>	<i>Horizontal-Relational</i>	<i>Vertical-Collective</i>	<i>Horizontal-Collective</i>	<i>Humanity</i>
United Kingdom	5.87 (0.89)	5.90 (1.02)	5.78 (0.87)	3.22 (1.40)	3.01 (1.23)	3.83 (1.16)
Lebanon	5.79 (1.04)	5.93 (0.98)	5.20 (0.98)	3.57 (1.41)	2.93 (1.20)	3.90 (1.34)
Syria	5.15 (1.34)	6.19 (1.04)	4.95 (1.18)	4.41 (1.31)	3.66 (1.21)	4.65 (1.32)
Jordan	5.50 (1.16)	6.14 (0.93)	5.13 (1.10)	3.56 (1.62)	3.32 (1.18)	4.34 (1.33)

NOTE: Figures in brackets give standard deviations.

covariate was adequately reliable for covariance analysis. With the use of Pillai's trace criterion, the combined dependent variables were significantly related to age, $F(6,740) = 3.669$, $p < .01$; partial $\eta^2 = .029$, and to the independent variable of country, $F(18,2226) = 12.276$, $p < .001$; partial $\eta^2 = .096$.

Tests of between-subject effects indicated that age had a significant effect only on relational-horizontal self-construal, $F(1,745) = 9.89$, $p < .01$, with a partial eta squared of $\eta^2 = .013$. Younger participants exhibited higher levels of horizontal relational self-construal than older participants. On the other hand, all effects of country on the dependent variables were significant. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni post hoc corrections for multiple comparisons between nations on the six dimensions of self-construals yielded the following results:

Personal self-construal. Rank order of means indicates that the U.K. sample scored highest on the personal dimension, followed by Lebanon, Jordan, and finally Syria. Pairwise comparison of adjusted means with Bonferroni corrections indicated that the Syrian sample scored significantly lower than all three samples, with no other differences showing significance.

Relational-vertical. Rank order of means indicates that the Syrian sample scored highest, followed by Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom. Pairwise comparisons of mean differences with Bonferroni corrections indicated that there was a significant adjusted mean difference between the U.K. sample and both Syria and Jordan, with no other differences significant.

Relational-horizontal. Rank order of means indicates that the U.K. sample scored highest, followed by Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections indicated that the U.K. sample's adjusted mean on relational-horizontal self-construal is significantly different from all other samples. No other differences are significant.

Collective-vertical. Rank order of means indicates that the U.K. sample scored lowest, followed by Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections indicated that the Syrian sample scores significantly higher than all other samples, with no other significant differences.

Collective-horizontal. Yet again, Arab samples (Lebanon excepted) tended to display the predicted higher collective scores, with the Syrian sample scoring highest, followed by the Jordanian sample. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections indicated that the Syrian sample scored significantly higher than both the United Kingdom and Lebanon,

whereas Jordan scored significantly higher than Lebanon. The difference between Lebanon and United Kingdom is not significant.

Humanity. Both Jordanian and Syrian samples display greater humanity self-construal than both the Lebanese and British samples. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections indicate that there are no significant mean differences between Jordan and Syria or between United Kingdom and Lebanon. On the other hand, the two clusters of British–Lebanese and Jordanian–Syrian differ significantly in their adjusted means on humanity self-construal.

In sum, the MANCOVA analyses and pairwise comparisons confirm the hypotheses, with Syrian and Jordanian samples showing greater endorsement of vertical and collective dimensions of self-construal than their British counterparts and the latter showing greater relational-horizontal and personal self-construals. These results are consistent with existing characterizations of nation-level cultural differences (e.g., Hofstede, 2001). As expected, the Lebanese sample showed a profile of self-construals somewhere between those of the Syrians and Jordanians on one hand and the British on the other.

DISCUSSION

Developments in psychological research have modified our conceptions of the self as a closed island of intrapsychic attributes toward a more dynamic, cognitive, and socially connected entity. By differentiating between independent and interdependent self-construals, cross-cultural researchers have initiated movement toward a universal perspective. In light of more recent findings, the present research further differentiates self-construals across cultures into six subcategories: the personal, the relational-horizontal and relational-vertical, the collective-horizontal and collective-vertical, and the humanity-bound levels of self-construal. These distinctions were derived from two separate theoretical traditions: cross-cultural research on the self and self-categorization theory. Consequently, the conceptual propositions that were advanced took account of the social groups to which the individual belongs and of the cultural matrices in which that individual is embedded. To test this theoretical refinement, this study presented a sixfold self-construal instrument and analyzed its reliability, factor structure, and convergent criterion validity cross-culturally. Convergent criterion validity was confirmed, and the new scale thus appears to be a reliable, valid, and robust measure of self-construals in the samples investigated.

Three aspects of the results require comment. First, issues concerning translation, control of sample and culture characteristics, potential order effects, and within-scale control variables were all taken into account in the present research. However, by selecting participants from university populations, the external validity of the results is reduced. The extent to which the new scale can be applied across different persons, settings, and times and the extent to which the results can be generalized to broader populations must necessarily await further investigation and adaptation.

Second, although the sixfold self-construal instrument was focused on the properties of connectedness to others as proposed by Markus and Kitayama (1991), it could also be of interest to sample the population of self-construal definitions more widely. For instance, it has been assumed in the past that independent self-construal implies greater agency, whereas interdependence is seen as a more passive going along with others. Questioning this assumption, Kağıtçıbaşı (2005) has proposed that agency and relatedness are orthogonal to one another. The separate measures of individual and collective efficacy that would be required to tap Kağıtçıbaşı's dimension of agency could be added. Indeed, Hardin, Leong, and Bhagwat

(2004) were able to identify an assertiveness factor distinct from other aspects of independence within the solution that they obtained among U.S. responses to the Singelis (1994) Self-Construal Scale.

Finally, although the self-construal model developed in this research proposes generic categories such as relational-vertical or collective-horizontal, the instrument deploys only exemplars of each category. How would scores change across cultures if different exemplars were used? The clustering of types of grouping obtained by Deaux et al. (1995) in the United States suggests that the choice of relational and collective exemplars may not be critical. However, the distinction between vertical and horizontal groupings may be less consistent. Perhaps the most controversial element of the present self-construal scale lies in the selection of family as the vertical-relational exemplar. Family dynamics are arguably culture dependent, with different structures emerging in different cultural contexts (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2005). When investigating student samples, "family" may be a useful and cross-culturally available relational group with somewhat hierarchical dynamics because students either live with their family of origin or have only recently departed from doing so. This exemplar would not be necessarily suitable for nonstudent populations, and subsequent investigators using the relational-vertical dimension will need to choose a target exemplar judiciously.

The development of individual-level measures of self-construal has undoubtedly benefited cross-cultural psychology. Nonetheless, there is a growing consensus that the limitations of existing scales require a new generation of measures. The present measure derives most directly from Markus and Kitayama's (1991) formulation, but can claim strong reliability, robust factor structure, and convergent criterion validity in samples quite different from those with which Markus and Kitayama were originally concerned. It shares with other recent measures such as that of E. S. Kashima and Hardie (2000) the need to differentiate relational and collective self-construals. However, it also provides some support for the empirical independence of vertical and horizontal forms of relational and collective self-construal from one another. The self-construal scale's cultural utility depends on how well it discriminates between various cultural groups. Comparisons between British, Lebanese, Jordanian, and Syrian participants did yield significant differences on almost all predicted relationships. Although British participants endorsed both personal and relational-horizontal self-construals more strongly, Arab participants endorsed vertical and collective self-construals more strongly. Furthermore, these contrasts were stronger between United Kingdom on one hand and Jordan and Syria on the other hand. Further research will be required to determine why humanity self-construal was highest in Jordan and Syria.

The present research provides a first step in testing the psychometric properties and validity of the Sixfold Self-Construal Scale. Further validation research through the use of a wider sampling of cultures and the use of nonstudent populations would increase confidence in both the conceptual and psychometric properties of the Sixfold Self-Construal Scale.

Furthermore, future research can focus on investigating the association between the various subcategories of self-construal that have been identified and other social psychological variables, thus contributing to the further unraveling of the interrelations between culture, self, and social behavior.

NOTES

1. Triandis (1989) also proposed a distinction between three types of self, but his typology does not map precisely onto the present proposal.

2. A sixth item "choices in my life are influenced by" was originally included but subsequently removed because of both conceptual and psychometric problems.

3. Furthermore, MANOVAs were conducted that also included gender as an additional factor. There were significant gender by nation interactions, with significant gender differences on relational self-construals among British participants and no gender differences within the Arab samples. These differences do not affect the conclusions reported here. Details are available from the first author.

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