Uruguay is situated on the southeast Atlantic coast of South America. Although poor economic conditions led to labor unrest in the late 1950s, Uruguay, unlike many Latin American countries, had a political tradition of liberal democracy. It was, in fact, the most politically progressive country in South America. When militant unionists demonstrated in the capital city of Montevideo in 1962, a confrontation with the police led the government to denounce the labor activists as Marxists and revolutionaries. Out of this confrontation, the National Liberation Movement—better known as the Tupamaros—was formed. They named themselves after Tupac Amaru, the greatest Incan leader to resist the Spanish conquistadores, who was executed in 1572.

The Tupamaros were young, idealistic, middle-class rebels. Their enemy was the Uruguayan “oligarchy,” and their constituency was the Uruguayan people. They styled themselves as Marxists and sought to redirect government priorities to redistribute wealth and political power to the working class. They sought broad-based public support from among the urban workers and unionists and had a fairly large and active cadre of above-ground supporters. Early in their movement, the Tupamaros realized that they could not directly confront the Uruguayan security forces, so they adopted Carlos Marighella’s strategy of waging an “urban guerrilla,” or terrorist, war with the immediate objective of forcing the government to adopt repressive measures, thereby causing the general population to rise up in revolt.

The Tupamaros operated widely in Montevideo, received worldwide media attention, and are the only urban rebel movement to have come close to establishing “liberated zones” inside a major city. About 2,000 fighters were counted at the peak of their war. In the beginning, Tupamaro targets were selective, and they refrained from indiscriminate bombings or shootings. They robbed banks, exploded bombs, and kidnapped prominent Uruguayans for ransom. Later, they began to kill security officers and assassinate officials. In 1972, the Tupamaros kidnapped Sir Geoffrey Jackson, the British ambassador to Uruguay, holding him prisoner in a “people’s prison” for eight months. When the British Foreign Office refused to negotiate for his release, the Tupamaros seemed to be at a loss about what to do—killing Jackson or releasing him without a ransom would accomplish nothing. They finally released him when 100 Tupamaros dramatically escaped from prison during a riot.

As anticipated, the Uruguayan government did respond harshly—but not with the outcome theorized by Marighella. When the police could not contain the Tupamaros,
they resorted to the systematic use of torture as a way to intimidate supporters and eliminate Tupamaro cells. Beatings, rapes, electric shocks, sleep deprivation, murder, and other methods were applied to extract information about Tupamaro operatives and sympathizers. They were successful, and mass arrests followed. When aboveground Tupamaro supporters failed to win any appreciable support at the election polls and the labor unionists whom they had championed refused to support them, the Tupamaros were eventually wiped out. Interestingly, popular support for government repression of the Tupamaros was widespread among Uruguayans.

The legacy of the Tupamaros was significant. They became a model for other armed dissidents in the 1960s and 1970s. Many young rebels in Latin America adopted their urban-based application of Marighella’s strategy. Outside of Latin America, the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, and Weather Underground in the United States all imitated the Tupamaros.

In the end, however, they were unable to accomplish any of the goals they fought for in Uruguay. In fact, their campaign was responsible for temporarily destroying democracy in the only country in Latin America that had never experienced a repressive dictatorship.

This chapter discusses the characteristics of “terrorism from below”—dissident terrorism—committed by nonstate movements and groups against governments, ethno-national groups, religious groups, and other perceived enemies. Readers will probe the different types of dissident terrorism and develop an understanding of the qualities that differentiate each dissident terrorist environment. A dissident terrorist paradigm will be discussed, and cases in point will be applied to illustrate what is meant by antistate terrorism and communal terrorism.

It is important to understand that political violence by nonstate actors has long been viewed as a necessary evil by those who are sympathetic to their cause. Revolutionaries, terrorists, and assassins have historically justified their deeds as indispensable tactics that are necessary to defend a higher cause. The methods used to defend the higher cause can range in intensity from large-scale “wars of national liberation”—such as the many anticolonial wars of the 20th century—to individual assassins who strike down enemies of their cause. In the United States, for example, when Confederate sympathizer John Wilkes Booth assassinated President Abraham Lincoln during a play at Ford’s Theater in Washington, D.C., he leaped from Lincoln’s balcony to the stage after shouting, “Sic semper tyrannis!” (“Thus be it ever to tyrants!”).

The U.S. Department of State publishes an annual report that identifies and describes an official list of foreign terrorist organizations. Table 5.1 reproduces a typical list of these organizations.

Why do people take up arms against governments and social systems? What weapons are available to the weak when they make the decision to confront the
Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f, which requires the Department of State to provide an annual report to Congress on terrorism, requires the report to include, inter alia, information on terrorist groups and umbrella groups under which any terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of any U.S. citizen during the preceding five years; groups known to be financed by state sponsors of terrorism about which Congress was notified during the past year in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act; and any other known international terrorist group that the Secretary of State determined should be the subject of the report. The list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) below is followed by a list of other selected terrorist groups also deemed of relevance in the global war on terrorism.

**Foreign Terrorist Organizations**

17 November
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Ansar al-Islam (AI)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)
HAMAS
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
Hizballah
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI)
Al-Jihad (AJ)
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kongra-Gel (KGK)
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al-Qa’ida
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)
Shining Path (SL)
Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR)
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)


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strong? Do the ends of antistate dissident rebels justify their chosen means? As discussed in Chapter 3, state repression and exploitation are frequently cited as grievances to explain why nonstate actors resort to political violence. These grievances are often ignored by state officials, who refuse to act until they are forced to do so.

An example illustrating this grievance-related concept is the rebellion in Mexico waged by rebels calling themselves the Zapatista National Liberation Front (Ejercito
Zapatista de Liberación Nacional). The Zapatistas were leftists who championed the cause of Indians native to Mexico’s Chiapas state, where starvation and disease were endemic and where the government had long supported large landowners in their exploitation of poor Indian peasants. In January 1994, the Zapatistas began attacking Mexican army troops and police stations in Chiapas. During this initial campaign, approximately 145 people were killed before the rebels retreated into the jungle to continue the conflict. A low-intensity guerrilla insurgency continued, with the government gradually agreeing to address the grievances of all of Mexico’s 10 million Indians. By 2001, the Zapatistas had evolved into an aboveground political movement lobbying for the civil rights of Mexico’s Indians and poor peasants. A key reason for the Zapatistas’ success was their ability to adopt a “Robin Hood” image for their movement, and thereby garner support from many Mexicans.

The discussion in this chapter will review the following:

♦ The Rebel as Terrorist: A Dissident Terrorism Paradigm
♦ Operational Shifts: The New Morality and the Rise of Terrorist Cells
♦ Warring Against the State: Antistate Dissident Terrorism
♦ Warring Against a People: Communal Terrorism

The Rebel as Terrorist: A Dissident Terrorism Paradigm

As discussed in Chapter 4, a paradigm is “a pattern, example, or model”1 that is logically developed to represent a concept. Policy experts and academics have designed a number of models that define dissident terrorism. For example, one model places dissident terrorism into a larger framework of “three generalized categories of political action”2 that include the following:

♦ Revolutionary terrorism—the threat or use of political violence aimed at effecting complete revolutionary change
♦ Subrevolutionary terrorism—the threat or use of political violence aimed at effecting various changes in a particular political system (but not aimed at abolishing it)
♦ Establishment terrorism—the threat or use of political violence by an established political system against internal or external opposition3

Other models develop specific types of dissident terrorism, such as single issue, separatist, and social revolutionary terrorism.4 Likewise, insurgent terrorism has been defined as violence “directed by private groups against public authorities [that] aims at bringing about radical political change.”5 One comprehensive definition of “nonstate domestic” terrorism describes it as “illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or nonhuman objects,”6 conducted under the following five conditions, assuming that the violence
revolutions. The goals of revolutionary dissidents are to destroy an existing order through armed conflict and to build a relatively well-designed new society. This vision for a new society can be the result of nationalist aspirations, religious principles, ideological dogma, or some other goals.

Revolutionaries view the existing order as regressive, corrupt, and oppressive; their envisioned new order will be progressive, honest, and just. Revolutionary dissident terrorists are not necessarily trying to create a separate national identity; they are activists seeking to build a new society on the rubble of an existing one. Many Marxist revolutionaries, for example, have a general vision of a Communist Party–led egalitarian classless society with centralized economic planning. Many Islamic revolutionaries also have a grand vision—that of a spiritually pure culture that is justly based on the application of shari’a, or God’s law. The latter case is exemplified by the Hezbollah (Party of God) organization in Lebanon, which is actively agitating for its own vision of a spiritually pure Lebanon; to that end, Hezbollah has its own political movement, armed militia, and social services. Various factions of the Muslim Brotherhood also advocate a rather clear program.

As a practical matter, revolutionary dissidents are often outnumbered and outgunned by the established order. Their only hope for victory is to wage an unconventional war to destabilize the central authority. Terrorism thus becomes a pragmatic tactical option to disrupt government administration and symbolically demonstrates the weakness of the existing regime.

Good case studies for the selection of terrorism as a legitimate tactic are found in the Marxist revolutionary movements in Latin America during the 1950s to the
1980s. For example, during the Cuban Revolution, which began in 1956, rebels operating in rural areas waged classic hit-and-run guerrilla warfare against the Batista government’s security forces. Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara led these rural units. In urban areas, however, terrorist attacks were commonly carried out by the rebels, who successfully disrupted government administration and thereby undermined public confidence in Batista’s ability to govern. This model was repeated throughout Latin America by Marxist revolutionaries (usually unsuccessfully), so that urban terrorism became a widespread phenomenon in many countries during this period. Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian revolutionary and author of *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, detailed the logic of urban terrorism in the Latin American context.9 The Latin American case and the *Mini-Manual* will be explored further in Chapter 7.

Nihilist Dissident Terrorism: Revolution for the Sake of Revolution

Nihilism was a 19th-century Russian philosophical movement of young dissenters who believed that only scientific truth could end ignorance. They believed that religion, nationalism, and traditional values (especially family values) were at the root of ignorance. Nihilists had no vision for a future society, asserting only that the existing society was intolerable. Nihilism was, at its core, a completely negative and critical philosophy. The original nihilists were not necessarily revolutionaries, but many anarchists (including Petr Kropotkin and Sergei Nechayev) adapted basic nihilist philosophy to anarchist activism.

Modern nihilist dissidents exhibit a similar disdain for the existing social order but offer no clear alternative for the aftermath of its destruction. The goal of modern nihilists is to destroy the existing order through armed conflict with little forethought given to the configuration of the new society; victory is defined simply as the destruction of the old society. Nihilist dissidents, like revolutionary dissidents, define the existing order as regressive, corrupt, and oppressive. Unlike revolutionaries, nihilists believe that virtually anything is better than the current establishment, so that destruction of the establishment alone becomes the ultimate goal. Many modern nihilists do have a vague goal of “justice,” but they offer no clear vision for building a just society other than destroying the existing social order.

Because nihilist dissidents have no clear postrevolution societal design, they have been relegated to the political fringes of society. They have never been able to lead broad-based revolutionary uprisings among the people and have never been able to mount sustained guerrilla campaigns against conventional security forces. Thus, the only armed alternative among hard-core nihilists has been to resort to terrorism. Examples of modern nihilist dissident terrorists include the leftist Red Brigade in Italy and Weather Underground Organization in the United States, each of which had only a vaguely Marxist model for postrevolutionary society. These cases will be explored further in Chapters 7 and 12, respectively. Another example is the Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal, who had no postrevolution vision. Arguably, Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network fits the nihilist dissident model, because “from the
moment it was established during the chaos of the Afghan war, the aim of Al Qaeda was to support, both militarily and financially, oppressed Muslims around the world.10

Although Al Qaeda has a generalized goal of defending Islam and fomenting a pan-Islamic revival, the group offers no specific model for how the postrevolution world will be shaped, and its long-term goals are not clearly defined.

**Nationalist Dissident Terrorism: The Aspirations of a People**

Nationalist dissidents champion the national aspirations of groups of people who are distinguished by their cultural, religious, ethnic, or racial heritage. The championed people generally live in an environment in which their interests are subordinate to the interests of another group or a national regime. The goal of nationalist dissidents is to mobilize a particular demographic group against another group or government. They are motivated by the desire for some degree of national autonomy, such as democratic political integration, regional self-governance, or complete national independence.

Nationalist sentiment has been commonplace—particularly during the 19th and 20th centuries—and can arise in many social or political environments. For example, the championed group may be a minority living among a majority group, such as the Basques of northern Spain. Or it may be a majority national group living in a region that is politically dominated by the government of another ethnic group, such as the domination of Tibet by the Chinese. The group may be a minority with a separate cultural and linguistic identity, such as the French Canadians in Quebec. Some national groups have a distinct cultural, ethnic, and regional identity that exists within the borders of several countries, such as the Kurds, whose Kurdistan region is divided among Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.

Although many nationalist dissident factions incorporate ideological or religious agendas into their movements, the core component of their activism is their ethno-national or other identity. For instance, not all Vietnamese nationalists were communists. Those who were led by Ho Chi Minh certainly were communists, but their wars against the Japanese, French, Americans, and South Vietnamese were ultimately fought to unify Vietnam. Likewise, Muslim rebels in the Southwest Asia Kashmir region have fought a long jihad or holy war against India with the support of Pakistan, but their underlying goal is regional independence from India rather than solidarity with international Islamists.

Many nationalist dissidents have used terrorism to achieve their goals. This has often been a practical option, because their opponents have overwhelming military and political superiority and would quickly defeat them during a guerrilla or conventional conflict. An example of this type of strategy is that adopted by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos) in Northern Ireland. In other contexts, the armed opposition must operate in urban areas, which always favors the dominant group or regime because of the impossibility of maneuver, the concentration of security forces, and sometimes the lack of mainstream support from the championed group. An example of this type of environment is the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna, or ETA) organization in the Basque region of northern Spain. These
are logical operational policies, because for nationalists, “the basic strategy is to raise the costs to the enemy occupiers until they withdraw.”

Chapter Perspective 5.1 explores a troubling practice found among many revolutionary, nihilist, and nationalist paramilitaries and rebel groups. It is the phenomenon of recruiting and training so-called child soldiers.

**Photo 5.2** The IRA at work. A photograph of members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army as they prepare for a mission.

Source: Hulton Archive/Getty Images.

Child Soldiers

One disturbing—and common—trend among paramilitaries and other armed groups has been the conscription of children as fighters. **Child soldiers** are a serious humanitarian issue, with “children as young as six . . . being used in combat by government and rebel forces in civil wars throughout the world.” Around the world, nearly 300,000 children—both boys and girls—have been recruited as fighters in at least 33 armed conflicts. For example,

- In Liberia, rebel leader Charles Taylor formed a unit called the Small Boy Unit during the 1990s. Boys were regularly ordered to commit human rights violations as a method to terrorize civilians.
- In Sierra Leone during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Revolutionary United Front abducted thousands of children, and organized those under the age of 15 into Small Boy Units and Small Girl Units.
In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have conscripted boys as young as nine years old. Tamil Tigers have been known to “pull the biggest children out of classes, raid orphanages, and go to homes to demand that families turn over teenage sons and daughters.”

In Mozambique, during its civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Renamo rebel movement used child soldiers extensively.\

In Colombia, both right-wing progovernment paramilitaries and left-wing antigovernment guerrillas conscript children and teenagers.

In Burundi during the 1990s and early 2000s, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy kidnapped hundreds of boys for military service in their movement.

Paramilitaries and rebel movements have assigned child soldiers to heavy combat on the front lines. Some children are drugged prior to entering into combat and have been known to commit atrocities under orders.

Notes


c. Iadicola and Shupe (in note 1 above).

d. The anarchic war in Sierra Leone is discussed further in Chapter 9.


f. Iadicola and Shupe (note 1 above).


Photo 5.3  Child soldiers in training. Adults drill armed young boys at a stadium in Angola.

Source: Hulton Archive/Getty Images.
TABLE 5.2 SELF-PERCEPTION OR SELF-DECEPTION? DISSIDENT TERRORISTS AS FREEDOM FIGHTERS

Dissident terrorists adopt organizational names that characterize themselves as righteous defenders of a group or principle. These monikers are always positive representations that project the “higher purpose” of the group. The following categories and examples illustrate the self-perception of armed dissident groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liberation Fighters</th>
<th>Military Units</th>
<th>Defensive Movements</th>
<th>Retribution Organizations</th>
<th>Inconsequential Alliances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basque</td>
<td>Alex Boncayo Brigade</td>
<td>Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
<td>Revolutionary Justice Organization</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyô (Supreme Truth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatherland</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
<td>Revolutionary People’s Struggle</td>
<td>International Justice Group</td>
<td>Middle Core Faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberation</td>
<td>New People’s Army</td>
<td>Jewish Defense League</td>
<td>Black September</td>
<td>Orange Volunteers</td>
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<td>Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<td>Palestine</td>
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<td>Islamic Jihad</td>
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<td>Revolutionary</td>
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<td>People’s Liberation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Revolutionaries, Nihilists, and Nationalists: Freedom Fighters?

Table 5.2 gives examples of how terrorists perceive themselves. Regardless of their ideology, methodology, or goals, there is unanimity in positive self-perception—terrorists perceive themselves as members of an enlightened fighting elite. The names adopted by terrorist organizations reflect this self-perception, but as indicated in Table 5.2, organizational names often have nothing to do with the reality of the group’s actual composition.

Operational Shifts: The New Morality and the Rise of Terrorist Cells

The dissident terrorist paradigm is a good model for understanding the environments, motives, and behaviors of modern terrorism. Categorizing the goals and strategies of dissident terrorists as revolutionary, nihilistic, or nationalistic is a useful method for understanding dissident violence. However, one must remember that terrorism is an evolutionary phenomenon, and terrorist environments are never static. Terrorist methodologies and organizational configurations undergo changes over time. In the modern era, these methodologies and organizational configurations have continued to evolve.
Toward the end of the 20th century, two important developments came to characterize the terrorist environment, moving it into a new phase: a new morality and organizational decentralization.

The New Dissident Terrorist Morality

The morality of dissident terrorism in the latter decades of the 20th century differed from 19th-century anarchist terrorism and other violent movements. The new generation did not share the same moralistic scruples of the previous generation. Terrorism in late 19th- and early 20th-century Russia, for example, was “surgical” in the sense that it targeted specific individuals to assassinate, specific banks to rob, and specific hostages to kidnap. In fact, not only did the Social Revolutionary Party in Russia (founded in 1900) engage in an extensive terrorist campaign in the early 20th century, but its tactics actually became somewhat popular because its victims were often government officials who were hated by the Russian people.

In contrast, during the postwar era the definitions of who an enemy was, what a legitimate target could be, and which weapons to use became much broader. This redefining of what constitutes a legitimate target, and the appropriate means to attack that target, led to a new kind of political violence. Late 20th-century dissident terrorism was “new” in the sense that it was “indiscriminate in its effects, killing and maiming members of the general public . . ., arbitrary and unpredictable . . ., refus[ing] to recognize any of the rules or conventions of war . . . [and] not distinguish[ing] between combatants and non-combatants.”12 Operationally, the new terrorist morality can be spontaneous and quite gruesome. For example, in March 2004 four American private contractors were killed in an ambush in the Iraqi city of Fallujah. Their corpses were burned, dragged through the streets, and then displayed from a bridge.

When terrorists combine this new morality with the ever-increasing lethality of modern weapons, the potential for high casualty rates and terror on an unprecedented scale is very real. As noted in previous chapters, this combination was put into practice in September 2001 in the United States, March 2004 in Spain, and July 2005 in Great Britain and Egypt. It was especially put into practice during the long-term terrorist suicide campaign in Israel during the Palestinians’ intifadeh. Should terrorists obtain high-yield weapons—such as chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons—the new morality would provide an ethical foundation for their use.

Chapter Perspective 5.2 explores the new terrorist morality within the context of Chechen terrorism in Russia. The Chechen Republic is located in the Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. Also known as Chechnya, it has a long history of opposition to Russian rule that dates to the 18th century. In the modern era, the region has been at war since 1994.

Terrorist Cells and Lone Wolves: New Models for a New War

A newly predominant organizational profile—the cell—also emerged as the 20th century drew to a close. Terrorist organizations had traditionally been rather clearly
Chechen Terrorism in Russia

During the pending collapse of the Soviet Union, a group of Chechens perceived an opportunity for independence, and in 1991 declared the new Chechen Republic of Ichkeria to be independent from Russia. Their rationale was that they were no different from the Central Asian, Eastern European, and Baltic states that had also declared their independence. The Russian Federation refused to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and in 1994 invaded with 40,000 troops. The Chechens resisted fiercely, inflicting severe casualties on Russian forces, and in 1996 Russia agreed to withdraw its troops after approximately 80,000 Russians and Chechens had died.

Tensions mounted again in 1999 as Russian troops prepared to reenter Chechnya. In September 1999, several blocks of apartments were destroyed by terrorist explosions in Dagestan and Moscow; hundreds were killed. The Russian army invaded Chechnya, thus beginning a protracted guerrilla war that has also witnessed repeated Chechen terrorist attacks in Russia. Although guerrillas inside Chechnya were mostly suppressed, approximately 100,000 Russians and Chechens died during the second invasion.

Because Chechnya is a Muslim region, Russian authorities have tried to link their conflict with the global war on terrorism. At the same time, some Chechen fighters have become Islamists and sought support from the Muslim world. Russian president Vladimir Putin repeatedly voiced a strong and aggressive tone against Chechen terrorists, stating on one occasion that “Russia doesn’t conduct negotiations with terrorists—it destroys them.”

During the Russian occupation, Chechen separatists waged an ongoing terrorist campaign on Russian soil. Their attacks have been dramatic and deadly. Examples of the quality of their attacks include the following incidents:

On October 23–26, 2002, approximately 50 Chechen terrorists seized about 750 hostages during the performance of a musical in a Moscow theater. During the 57-hour crisis, the Chechens wired the theater with explosives and threatened to destroy the entire building with everyone inside. Several of the female terrorists also wired themselves with explosives. Russian commandos eventually pumped an aerosol anesthetic, or “knockout gas” (possibly manufactured with opiates), into the theater, and 129 hostages died, most of them from the effects of the gas, which proved to be more lethal than expected in a confined area. All of the Chechens were killed by the commandos as they swept through the theater during the rescue operation.

On February 6, 2004, a bomb in a Moscow subway car killed 39 people and wounded more than 100.

On August 24, 2004, two Russian airliners crashed, virtually simultaneously. Investigators found the same explosive residue at both crash sites. Chechen suicide bombers were suspected, and a group calling itself the Islambouli Brigades of Al Qaeda claimed responsibility.

On August 31, 2004, a woman detonated a bomb near a Moscow subway station, killing herself and nine other people and wounding 100. The Islambouli Brigades of Al Qaeda claimed responsibility.
structured, many with hierarchical command and organizational configurations. They commonly had aboveground political organizations and covert “military wings.”

During the heyday of group-initiated New Left and Middle Eastern terrorism from the 1960s to the 1980s, it was not unusual for dissident groups to issue formal communiqués. These communiqués would officially claim credit for terrorist incidents committed on behalf of championed causes, and formal press conferences were held on occasion.

The “vertical” organizational models began to be superseded by less structured “horizontal” models during the 1990s. These cell-based movements have indistinct command and organizational configurations. Modern terrorist networks are often composed of a “hub” that may guide the direction of a movement but that has little direct command and control over operational units. The operational units are typically autonomous or semiautonomous cells that act on their own, often after lying dormant for long periods of time as “sleepers” in a foreign country. The benefit of this type of organizational configuration is that if one cell is eliminated or its members are captured, they can do little damage to other independent cells. This configuration also permits aboveground supporters to have “deniability” over the tactics and targets of the cells.

A good example of how a cell can be as small as a single individual—the lone wolf model—is the case of Richard C. Reid, a British resident who converted to Islam. Reid was detected by an alert flight attendant and overpowered by passengers on December 22, 2001, when he attempted to ignite plastic explosives in his shoe on a Boeing 767, carrying 198 passengers and crew from Paris to Miami. Reid was apparently linked to Al Qaeda and had been trained by the organization in Afghanistan. He was sentenced to life imprisonment after pleading guilty before a federal court in Boston.

### Warring Against the State: Antistate Dissident Terrorism

A good deal of “terrorism from below” is antistate in nature. It is directed against existing governments and political institutions, attempting to destabilize the existing
order as a precondition to building a new society. As discussed previously, antistate dissidents can have a clear vision of the new society (revolutionary dissidents), a vague vision of the new society (nihilist dissidents), national aspirations (nationalist dissidents), or a profit motive (criminal dissidents). Regardless of which model fits a particular antistate movement, their common goal is to defeat the state and its institutions.

Intensities of Conflict: Antistate Terrorist Environments

With few exceptions, antistate terrorism is directed against specific governments or interests and occurs either within the borders of a particular country or where those interests are found in other countries. Thus, antistate terrorist environments are defined by the idiosyncrasies of each country, each dissident movement, and each terrorist organization. The histories of every nation give rise to specific antistate environments that are unique to their societies. The following examples from North America and Europe illustrate this point.

In the United States, leftist terrorism predominated during the late 1960s through the late 1970s, at the height of the anti–Vietnam War and people’s rights movements. Acts of political violence—such as bank robberies, bombings, and property destruction—took place when some Black, White, and Puerto Rican radicals engaged in armed protest. This changed in the 1980s, when the leftist remnants either gave up the fight or were arrested. Around this time, right-wing terrorism began to predominate when some racial supremacists, religious extremists, and antigovernment members of the Patriot movement adopted strategies of violence.\footnote{14}

In the United Kingdom, the terrorist environment was shaped by the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland. This conflict was characterized by both antistate and communal violence from 1969 until the peace settlement implemented in 1999. The nationalist Provisional IRA\footnote{15} was responsible for most acts of antistate political violence directed against British administration in Northern Ireland. During the same period, Protestant Loyalist terrorism tended to meet the criteria for communal terrorism rather than antistate terrorism, as Loyalist paramilitaries targeted pro-IRA Catholics rather than symbols of governmental authority. The IRA responded in kind, so that more than 3,500 people were killed on both sides by 1999, when a cease-fire was implemented.\footnote{16}

In West Germany from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s, the leftist Red Army Faction (RAF) engaged in a large number of bank robberies, bombings, assassinations, and other acts of antistate violence aimed at destabilizing the West German government. The RAF also targeted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence in West Germany, primarily focusing on U.S. military personnel. After the fall of the communist Eastern Bloc in 1989 and the reunification of Germany, RAF-style leftist terrorism waned. Around this time, rightist neo-Nazi violence increased—much of it directed against non-German Gastarbeiter, or “guest workers.” The perpetrators of this violence were often young skinheads and other neofascist youths. Many of these rightist attacks occurred in the region that formerly comprised East Germany.
In Italy, the leftist Red Brigade was responsible for thousands of terrorist incidents from the early 1970s through the mid-1980s. Originating in the student-based activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Red Brigade members were young urban terrorists whose terrorist campaign can best be described as a nihilist attempt to undermine capitalism and democracy in Italy. By the late 1980s, Italian police had eliminated Red Brigade cells and imprisoned their hard-core members. During this period, Italian neo-nazis also engaged in terrorist violence, eventually outlasting the leftist campaign, and they remained active into the 1990s.

In Spain, antistate terrorism has generally been nationalistic or leftist. General Francisco Franco, who seized power after leading the fascist revolt against the Republican government during the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, ruled as a right-wing dictator until his death in 1975. Small, violent leftist groups have appeared in Spain—such as the Anti-Fascist Resistance Group of October First and the Maoist Patriotic and Anti-Fascist Revolutionary Front. Without question the most prominent antistate dissident group in Spain is the national and vaguely Marxist ETA. ETA was founded in 1959 to promote the independence of the Basque region in northern Spain. The Basques are a culturally and linguistically distinct people who live in northern Spain and southwestern France. Although ETA adopted terrorism as a tactic in response to the Franco government’s violent repression of Basque nationalism, “of the more than 600 deaths attributable to ETA between 1968 and 1991, 93 percent occurred after Franco’s death.” ETA was rife with factional divisions—at least six ETA factions and subfactions were formed—but their terrorist campaign continued, despite the granting of considerable political rights by the Spanish government and the loss of popular support for ETA among the Basque people. A right-wing terrorist group, Spanish National Action (Accion Nacional Espanola) was formed as a reaction to ETA terrorism.

Sometimes antistate dissident movements, because of their history and political environment, take on elements of both antistate and communal conflict. In Israel, for example, the Palestinian nationalist movement is made up of numerous organizations and movements that have mostly operated under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded by Yasir Arafat and others in 1959. From its inception, the PLO has sought to establish an independent Palestinian state. Because they claim the same territory as the state of Israel, the PLO and its affiliates have attacked targets inside Israel and abroad. Until recently, Palestinian armed resistance was characterized by a series of dramatic hit-and-run raids, hijackings, bombings, rocket attacks, and other acts of violence. Israeli and Jewish civilians were often targeted. On May 15, 1974, for example, 16 Jewish teenagers were killed and 70 wounded when three Palestinian terrorists seized a school and demanded that Israel free 23 Palestinian prisoners; all of the gunmen were killed when Israeli soldiers stormed the school.

Since September 28, 2000, Palestinian resistance has taken on the characteristics of a broad-based uprising—and communal terrorism. On that date, Israeli General Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The Temple Mount is sacred to both Muslims and Jews. Muslims believe that the prophet Mohammed ascended to heaven from the site, upon which was constructed the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Jews
believe that the patriarch Abraham prepared to sacrifice his son on the Temple Mount in accordance with God's wishes, and that Judaism's First and Second Temples were located at the site. After Sharon's visit, which was perceived by Palestinians to be a deliberate provocation, enraged Palestinians began a second round of massive resistance, known as the “shaking off,” or intifadeh. The new dissident environment included violent demonstrations, street fighting, and suicide bombings. The violence was regularly characterized by bombings, shootings, and other attacks against civilian targets. On March 27, 2002, for example, 29 people were killed and 100 injured when a suicide bomber attacked a hotel in the Israeli city of Netanya. Thus, the Palestinian nationalist movement arguably entered a phase distinguished by the acceptance of communal dissident terrorism as a strategy.

**Defeat Is Unthinkable: The Terrorists’ Faith in Victory**

Why do small groups of individuals violently confront seemingly invincible enemies? Why do they engage powerful foes by force of arms when their envisioned goal is often illogical or unattainable? From the perspective of antistate dissidents, their armed struggle is never in vain. They believe that their cause is not only *likely* to end in victory, but that victory is in fact *inevitable*. From the perspective of outside observers of terrorist groups and terrorist campaigns, terrorists are almost certainly fighting a losing battle with a slim-to-none likelihood of eventual victory, and yet the terrorists persist in their war.

Although antistate dissident terrorists avoid direct confrontation out of a pragmatic acceptance of their comparative weakness, they nevertheless believe in the ultimate victory of their cause. They have a utopian vision that not only justifies their means but also (in their worldview) guarantees the triumph of their idealized ends. Violent confrontation in the present—often horrific in scope—is acceptable because of the promised good at the end of the struggle. Religious antistate dissidents believe that God will assure them final victory. A 1996 pronouncement by an Egyptian terrorist organization, the Islamic Group (al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya), stated,

> They plot and plan and God too plans . . . but the best of planners is God . . . [The Islamic Group will] pursue its battle . . . until such time as God would grant victory—just as the Prophet Muhammed did with the Quredish until God granted victory over Mecca.20

Nonreligious antistate dissidents also hold an enduring faith in final victory. Some have adopted a strategy similar to the urban terrorist (or “urban guerrilla”) model developed by Carlos Marighella. According to Marighella’s strategy, rebels should organize themselves in small cells in major urban areas. He argued that terrorism, when correctly applied against the government, will create sympathy among the population, which in turn forces the government to become more repressive, thus creating an environment conducive to a mass uprising.21 Although this model has failed repeatedly (the people tend not to rise up, and repressive states usually crush the opposition), it exemplifies the faith held by antistate dissidents in their victory scenarios—no matter how far-fetched those scenarios may be. Thus,
comparatively small in number, limited in capabilities, isolated from society and dwarfed by both the vast resources of their enemy and the enormity of their task, secular terrorists necessarily function in an inverted reality where existence is defined by the sought-after, ardently pursued future rather than the oppressive, angst-driven and incomplete present.22

Chapter Perspective 5.3 summarizes the coalitional features of the Palestinian movement. Attention should be given to the PLO and its role as an umbrella for numerous ideological factions.

**CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 5.3**

**The Palestinian Movement**

Some antistate dissident environments are long-standing and have generated many contending factions. A good example of this phenomenon is the Palestinian movement. Palestinian activism against the state of Israel has as its ultimate goal the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The antistate strategies of most of these groups have been replaced by a broad-based communal dissident environment known as the intifadeh, or uprising. The following organizations have been prominent in the Palestinian nationalist movement.a

**Palestine Liberation Organization**

Formed in 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is not a religious movement, but rather a secular nationalist umbrella organization comprising numerous factions. Its central and largest group is Al Fatah, founded by PLO chairman Yasir Arafat in October 1959. The PLO is the main governing body for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank. **Force 17** is an elite unit that was originally formed in the 1970s as a personal security unit for Yasir Arafat. It has since been implicated in paramilitary and terrorist attacks. The **Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades** is a “martyrdom” society of fighters drawn from Al Fatah and other factions; it includes suicide bombers.

**Abu Nidal Organization**

Led by Sabri al-Banna, the **Abu Nidal Organization** (ANO) is named for al-Banna’s nom de guerre. The ANO split from the PLO in 1974 and is an international terrorist organization, having launched attacks in 20 countries at the cost of 900 people killed or wounded. The ANO has several hundred members and a militia in Lebanon. It has operated under other names, including Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Council, and Black September. The ANO has operated from bases in Libya, Lebanon, and Sudan.

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**

The **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (PFLP) was founded in 1967 by George Habash. It is a Marxist organization that advocates a multinational Arab revolution. With
about 800 members, the PFLP was most active during the 1970s but has continued to commit acts of terrorism. The PFLP is responsible for dramatic international terrorist attacks. Its hijacking campaign in 1969 and 1970, its collaboration with West European terrorists, and its mentorship of Carlos the Jackal arguably established the model for modern international terrorism.

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command**

Ahmad Jibril formed the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC)** in 1968 when he split from the PFLP because he considered the PFLP to be too involved in politics and not sufficiently committed to the armed struggle against Israel. The PFLP-GC has several hundred members, is probably directed by Syria, and is responsible for many cross-border attacks against Israel.

**Palestine Liberation Front**

The **Palestine Liberation Front** split from the PFLP-GC in the mid-1970s and further split into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Abu Abbas, who committed a number of attacks against Israel. It is a small organization, with about 50 members.

**Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine**

The **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine** split from the PFLP in 1969 and further split into two factions in 1991. It is a Marxist organization that believes in ultimate victory through mass revolution. With about 500 members, it has committed primarily small bombings and assaults against Israel, including border raids.

**Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakt al-Muqaqama al-Islamiya, or Hamas, meaning “zeal”)**

Hamas is an Islamic fundamentalist movement founded in 1987, with roots in the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas is a comprehensive movement rather than simply a terrorist group, providing social services to Palestinians while at the same time committing repeated acts of violence against Israeli interests. Its armed groups operate as semi-autonomous cells and are known as the **Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade** (named for a famous **jihadi** in the 1920s and 1930s). Hamas has always been at the forefront of the communal dissident **intifadeh**.

**Palestine Islamic Jihad**

The **Palestine Islamic Jihad** is not a single organization but a loose affiliation of factions. It is an Islamic fundamentalist revolutionary movement that seeks to promote jihad, or holy war, to form a Palestinian state. It is responsible for assassinations and suicide bombings. Like Hamas, it is actively promoting the **intifadeh**.

**Note**

a. Most of these data were found in *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996*. U.S. Department of State, 1997, pp. 41 ff.
Dissident terrorism is not always directed against a government or national symbols. It is often directed against entire population groups—people who are perceived to be ethno-national, racial, religious, or ideological enemies. Because the scope of defined enemies is so broad, it is not unusual for this type of terrorism to be characterized by extreme repression and violence on a massive scale. Often deeply rooted in long cultural memories of conflict, communal terrorism sometimes descends into genocidal behavior because while the rival combatants often lack the weapons of destruction available to the major powers, they often disregard any recognized rules of warfare, killing and maiming civilians through indiscriminate car bombings, grenade attacks and mass shootings.23

Communal terrorism is essentially “group against group” terrorism, whereby sub-populations of society wage internecine (i.e., mutually destructive) violence against each other. As with other types of terrorist violence, it occurs in varying degrees of intensity and in many different contexts. Sometimes it can occur on a massive scale, such as the periodic outbreaks of genocidal violence between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi, which have killed hundreds of thousands. At other times—and on a lower scale of intensity—a politically dominant ethnic or racial group may seek to terrorize a subordinate ethnic or racial group into submission, as occurred in the American South from 1882 to 1930 when more than 3,000 Southern African Americans were lynched (publicly murdered) by white mobs and vigilantes.24 The scale of violence frequently surprises the world, for these conflicts “often do not command the headlines that rivet world attention on international wars and guerrilla insurgencies, but they frequently prove more vicious and intractable.”25

There are many sources of communal violence, and it is useful to review a few broad categories and illustrative cases in point. These categories—ethno-nationalist, religious, and ideological—are explored in the following discussion.

**Ethno-Nationalist Communal Terrorism**

Ethno-nationalist communal terrorism involves conflict between populations that have distinct histories, customs, ethnic traits, religious traditions, or other cultural idiosyncrasies. Numerous adjectives have been used to describe this type of dissident terrorism, including “separatist, irredentist, . . . nationalist, tribal, racial, indigenous, or minority.”26 It occurs when one group asserts itself against another group—many times to “defend” its cultural identity. This defensive rationale for violent communal behavior is not uncommon and has been used in communal conflicts in Bosnia, the Caucasus, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and elsewhere. In these conflicts, all sides believe themselves to be vulnerable and use this perception to rationalize engaging in terrorist violence.

Regionally, Africa leads in the number of ethno-nationalist communal conflicts, with long-term discord in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, the Horn of
Africa, Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, South Africa, and elsewhere. Typical of the African conflicts is the case of the fighting that occurred during the apartheid era in South Africa between the nationalist African National Conference (ANC) and the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party. South and Central Asia probably ranks second, with ethnic and nationalist sentiment strongest in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka. The Middle East has several simmering conflicts, such as the Kurdish and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. East Asia and Southeast Asia also have several armed movements that represent ethnic and nationalist sentiments, such as the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines (which has signed a cease-fire but has some renegade fighters) and the Kachin Independence Army in Myanmar (Burma). Latin America has occasionally experienced ethno-nationalist communal violence, with the worst in scale in recent decades occurring during Guatemala’s anti-Indian racial violence, which caused approximately 200,000 deaths before officially ending in 1996, after 35 years of genocidal communal conflict. Western Europe, aside from simmering discord in the Basque region of Spain, has been relatively free of ethno-nationalist violence since World War II, as has North America (with the exception of violence in Chiapas, Mexico, during the 1990s).

The scale of ethno-nationalist communal violence can vary considerably from region to region, depending on many different factors—such as unresolved historical animosities, levels of regional development, and recurrent nationalist aspirations. It can be waged across national borders (as in the Congo-Rwanda-Burundi region of East Africa), inside national borders (as in Afghanistan), within ethnically polarized provinces (as in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory of Azerbaijan), at the tribal level (as in Liberia), and even at the subtribal clan level (as in Somalia).

Examples of ethno-nationalist communal conflict have occurred in the following countries and regions:

Corsica. France has ruled Corsica since 1796. Migrants from the French mainland have settled in Corsica since its annexation to France. Since the 1960s, separatists from groups such as the Front for the National Liberation of Corsica have attacked the interests of French mainlander businesses, homes, and offices.

Nigeria. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has experienced recurrent outbreaks of ethnic, tribal, and religious violence. The overwhelmingly Muslim north and west is populated mostly by Fulanis, Hausas, and Yorubas. The largely Christian south comprises mostly Ibos. During the 1967–1970 civil war, approximately 1 million people died when Ibo separatists unsuccessfully tried to establish the nation of Biafra in southern Nigeria. About 200 people were killed in Kano in northern Nigeria when ethnic and religious riots broke out after the American bombing of Afghanistan began in October 2001.

New Caledonia. In the French overseas territory of New Caledonia, a South Pacific island group east of Australia, Melanesian nationalists sought independence during the 1980s and early 1990s. Violent confrontations occurred between pro-independence and anti-independence Melanesians, as well as European (mostly French) residents.
Religious Communal Terrorism

Sectarian violence refers to conflict between religious groups. It is sometimes one element of discord in a broader conflict between ethno-national groups. Many of the world’s ethnic populations define their cultural identity partly through their religious beliefs, so that violence committed by and against them has both ethnic and religious qualities. This linkage is common in regions where ethnic groups with dissimilar religious beliefs have long histories of conflict, conquest, and resistance. In Sri Lanka, for example, the ongoing civil war between the Hindu Tamils and the Buddhist Sinhalese has been exceptionally violent, with massacres and indiscriminate killings a common practice.

Two examples further illustrate this point:

Nagorno-Karabakh Territory, Azerbaijan. After the Soviet bloc collapsed in 1989, fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh territory of the Caucasus nation of Azerbaijan pitted majority Orthodox Christian Armenians in the territory against minority Muslim Azeri Turks. This conflict is both ethnic and religious, with the Armenians receiving military support for their national aspirations from the Republic of Armenia, which eventually occupied 20% of Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azeris have received support from the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Yugoslavia. Some intra-ethnic internecine conflict occurs because of combined nationalist aspirations and regional religious beliefs. The breakup of Yugoslavia led to internecine fighting, the worst of which occurred in Bosnia in 1992–1995. During fighting between Orthodox Christian Serbs, Muslim Bosnians, and Roman Catholic

Photo 5.4  Tamil Tigers on parade. Members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam stand for review.
Source: Hulton Archive/Getty Images.
Croats, *ethnic cleansing*—the forcible removal of rival groups from claimed territory—was practiced by all sides. Significantly, all three religious groups are ethnic Slavs.

In both of the foregoing cases, regional nationalism was suppressed under the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. However, neither the Soviets nor national hero and ruler Josip Broz Tito’s style of Yugoslav nationalist communism could eliminate centuries of ethnic and religious differences. When these regimes ended, those differences led to brutal communal violence.

*Israel.* In Israel, religion is used by both Jewish and Muslim militants to justify communal violence. For example, militant members of the Jewish settler community have regularly engaged in violence against Palestinians, usually retaliatory in nature. The religious nature of many of these attacks has been encouraged by members of radical organizations such as the late Rabbi Meir Kahane’s *Kach* (“thus”) movement, which has advocated the expulsion of all Arabs from biblical Jewish territories. Settlers generally rationalize their attacks as reprisals for Palestinian attacks and sometimes cite Jewish religious traditions as a basis for their actions. This kind of justification was used after an attack in 1983; when settlers killed an eleven-year-old Palestinian girl in the city of Nablus on the West Bank, a religious text was used in their defense. The chief rabbi of the Sephardic Jewish community referred to the talmudic text, which justified killing an enemy if one can see from a child’s eyes that he or she will grow up to be your enemy.  

Thus, intractable religious sentiment exists on both sides of the conflict in Israel and Palestine, with Islamic extremists waging a holy war to expel Jews and Jewish settler extremists seeking to reclaim biblical lands and expel Arabs.

Not all religious communal terrorism occurs in an ethno-nationalist context. For example, religious campaigns are sometimes directed against perceived blasphemy to “purify” a religious belief. Religious fundamentalists of many religions have been known to chastise, denounce, and attack members of their own faiths for failing to follow the spiritual path of the fundamentalists. The perceived transgressors can be members of the same ethno-national group who are members of the same religion as the fundamentalists. Thus, the Algerian fundamentalist *Armed Islamic Group* waged a brutal religious communal war against its countrymen that took 75,000 lives during the 1990s. Similarly, the Egyptian fundamentalist Islamic Group, a cell-based organization, targeted fellow Muslims and Egyptian government officials, as well as Coptic Christians.  

Examples of religious communal conflict have occurred in the following countries and regions:  

*Northern Ireland.* In Northern Ireland, communal dissident terrorism between Catholic nationalists (Republicans) and Protestant unionists (Loyalists) became a regular occurrence during unrest that began in 1969. Targets included civilian leaders, opposition sympathizers, and random victims. From 1969 to 1989, of the
2,774 recorded deaths, 1,905 were civilians; of the civilian deaths, an estimated 440 were Catholic or Protestant terrorists. Between 1969 and 1993, 3,284 people died. During this period, Loyalist paramilitaries killed 871 people, Republican paramilitaries killed 829 people, and British forces killed 203 people.

**Sudan.** In Sudan, long-term animosity exists between the mostly Arabized Muslim north and mostly Black Christian and animist (traditional religions) south. Civil war has been a feature of Sudanese political life since its independence in 1956, generally between progovernment Muslim groups and antigovernment Christian and animist groups. The war has been fought by conventional troops, guerrilla forces, undisciplined militias, and vigilantes. In addition, the Sudanese government began arming and encouraging Arabized militants in the Darfur region to attack Black Muslims. Tens of thousands died in this conflict, which approached genocide in scale.

**Lebanon.** In Lebanon, bloody religious communal fighting killed more than 125,000 people during the 16-year Lebanese civil war that began in 1975. Militias were formed along religious affiliations, so that Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and Druze all contended violently for political power. Palestinian fighters, Syrian troops, and Iranian revolutionaries were also part of this environment, which led to the breakdown of central government authority.

**Ideological Communal Terrorism**

**Ideological communal terrorism** in the post–World War II era reflected the global rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. The capitalist democratic West competed with the authoritarian communist East for influence in the postcolonial developing world and in countries ravaged by invading armies during the war. A common pattern was for civil wars to break out after European colonial powers or Axis armies were driven out of a country. These civil wars were fought by indigenous armed factions drawn from among the formerly occupied population. In China, Yugoslavia, Malaysia, and elsewhere, communist insurgents vied with traditional monarchists, nationalists, and democrats for power. Civilian casualties were high in all of these conflicts.

Examples of ideological communal conflict have occurred in the following countries and regions:

**Greece.** The five-year-long civil war in Greece from 1944 to 1949 was a complicated and brutal affair that in the end took at least 50,000–65,000 lives. It involved fighting among conventional troops, guerrilla groups, gendarmerie (armed police), and armed bands. The Greek Communist Party, which had led a resistance group during World War II, fought against the Greek government in several phases after liberation in 1944. The Greek Communist Party eventually lost, in the only attempted communist takeover in postwar Europe to be defeated by force of arms.

**Angola.** In Angola, former anti-Portuguese allies fought a long conflict after independence in 1975. The ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is a
Marxist-Leninist movement whose ideology promotes a multicultural and nationalistic (rather than ethnic or regional) agenda. Its principal adversary is National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), mostly made up of the Ovimbundu tribal group. Because the MPLA leadership identified with the international ideological left, the Soviet Union, Cuba, the United States, and South Africa supported either the MPLA or UNITA. This is a rare example of conflict between a multicultural ideological movement and a regional ethnic movement.

Indonesia. In Indonesia, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was implicated in an October 1965 abortive coup attempt. While the army rounded up PKI members and sympathizers, many Indonesians took to the streets to purge the communist presence. During a wave of anticommunist communal violence, much of it done by gangs supported by the government, roughly 500,000 communists, suspected communists, and political opponents to the government were killed.

Ideology has been used repeatedly in the 20th century to bind together nations or distinctive groups. It has become, in many conflicts, a means to discipline and motivate members of a movement. When applied to rationalize behavior in communal conflicts, the effect can be devastatingly brutal.

Chapter Summary

This chapter provided readers with an understanding of the nature of dissident terrorism. The purpose of this discussion was to identify and define several categories of dissident behavior, to classify antistate dissident terrorism, to describe types of communal dissident terrorism, and to provide examples of these concepts.

The dissident terrorist paradigm identified several categories of dissident terrorism. Included in this model were revolutionary, nihilist, and nationalist dissident terrorism. These environments were defined and discussed with the underlying recognition that they are ideal categorizations, and it should be remembered that some terrorists will exhibit characteristics of several categories. It should also be understood that new models became more common as the 20th century drew to a close—the cell organizational structures and “lone wolf” attacks are now integral elements of the modern terrorist environment.

Antistate dissident terrorism was defined as terrorism directed against existing governments and political institutions, attempting to destabilize the existing environment as a precondition to building a new society. Several antistate terrorist environments were presented as cases in point for understanding why violent antistate agitation may arise. The cases included the United States, several European societies, and a look at the nexus of antistate and communal violence in Israel. The seemingly irrational faith in ultimate victory despite overwhelming odds was examined; this faith in the inevitability of success is at the center of antistate dissident campaigns.

Communal terrorism was defined as “group against group” terrorism, wherein subpopulations of society wage internecine violence against each other. Several environments were discussed to illustrate differences in motivations, manifestations of violence, and environments conducive to communal conflict. The categories that
were evaluated were ethno-nationalist, religious, and ideological communal terrorism. Cases in point were identified that illustrated each concept.

In Chapter 6, readers will explore religious motives for terrorist behavior. The discussion will focus on specific case studies as well as the contexts for armed religious dissident movements. Reasons for religious violence will also be evaluated.

Key Terms and Concepts

The following topics were discussed in this chapter and can be found in the glossary/index:

| Abbas, Abu                                      | nihilism                              |
| Abu Nidal Organization                         | nihilist dissident terrorism          |
| Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades                        | Palestine Islamic Jihad               |
| Al Fatah                                       | Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)      |
| antistate terrorism                            | Palestine Liberation Organization     |
| Arafat, Yasir                                  | (PLO)                                 |
| Armed Islamic Group                            | Popular Front for the Liberation of   |
| cells                                          | Palestine (PFLP)                      |
| child soldiers                                 | Popular Front for the Liberation of   |
| communal terrorism                             | Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC). |
| Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine | Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos) |
| dissident terrorism                            | Red Army Faction (RAF)                |
| ethno-nationalist communal terrorism           | Red Brigade                            |
| Force 17                                       | religious communal terrorism          |
| Freedom Birds                                  | revolutionary dissident terrorism     |
| Hamas                                         | sectarian violence                    |
| ideological communal terrorism                 | Sic semper tyrannis                   |
| Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade                     | Social Revolutionary Party            |
| Kach                                          | Tupamaros                              |
| lone wolf model                                | Weather Underground Organization      |
| nationalist dissident terrorism                | Zapatista National Liberation Front    |

DISCUSSION BOX

The Tamil Tigers

This chapter’s Discussion Box is intended to stimulate critical debate about the legitimacy of using guerrilla and terrorist tactics by dissident movements.

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is an island nation in the Indian Ocean off the southeast coast of India. Its population is about 74% Sinhalese and 18% Tamil; the rest of the population is a mixture of other ethnic groups.a

In April 1987, more than 100 commuters were killed when terrorists—most likely Tamil Tigers—exploded a bomb in a bus station in the capital city of Colombo. This
type of attack was typical in a long war of independence fought by the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) against the Sri Lankan government. The Tamil
Tigers were founded in 1976. They champion the Tamil people of Sri Lanka—Hindus
who make up 18% of the population—against the majority Buddhist Sinhalese.

The goal of the movement is to carve out an independent state from Sri Lanka,
geographically located in the north and east of the island. To accomplish this goal,
the Tamil Tigers have used conventional, guerrilla, and terrorist tactics during the
conflict and have attacked government, military, and civilian targets. A unit known
as the Black Tigers specializes in terrorist attacks, often committing suicide in the
process. Sinhalese forces and irregular gangs have often used extreme violence to
repress the Tamil uprising.

About half the members of the Tiger movement have been teenagers. Indoctrination of potential Tigers includes spiritual purity, nationalist militancy,
and a glorification of death. At the conclusion of training and indoctrination, young
Tiger initiates are given a vial of cyanide, which is worn around the neck and
intended to be taken if capture is inevitable. Songs, poetry, and rituals glorify the
Tamil people and nation. A higher morality is systematically instilled in Tigers. The
Tamil Tigers have been very shrewd with public relations, making extensive use of
media such as video and the Internet; they have also established a foreign service
presence in numerous countries. They also apparently became adept at transna-
tional organized crime, raising revenue for the cause by trading in arms and drugs.

Estimates of the membership of the Tamil Tigers range from 6,000 to 15,000
fighters. They are well organized and disciplined. Women, called Freedom Birds,
have taken on important leadership positions, as Tamil male leaders became casualties. About one third of the movement’s members are women.

Some Tamil Tiger attacks have been spectacular. In May 1991, a Tamil girl de-
tonated a bomb, killing herself and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In 1996,
Tigers surrounded and annihilated a government base, killing all 1,200 troops. Also
in 1996, a Tiger bomb at Colombo’s Central Bank killed scores and injured 1,400
others. In 1997, the new Colombo Trade Center was bombed, causing 18 deaths and
more than 100 injuries. The Tamil Tigers operate a small naval unit of speedboats
(the Sea Tigers) that interdict Sri Lankan shipping. Fighting has centered repeatedly
on the Jaffna peninsula in the north, with both sides capturing and losing bases.

By 1997, the war had claimed at least 58,000 military and civilian lives, includ-
ing 10,000 Tigers. By 2002, the combatants had fought to a stalemate. In early
2002, both sides agreed to Norwegian mediation to negotiate terms for a lasting
peace settlement. Several hundred thousand Tamils have fled the island, with more
than 100,000 living in India and about 200,000 living in the West.

Discussion Questions

♦ Is terrorism a legitimate tactic in a war for national independence? Does the
quest for national freedom justify the use of terrorist tactics?

♦ When a cause is considered just, is it acceptable to use propaganda to depict
the enemy as uncompromisingly corrupt, decadent, and ruthless, regardless of
the truth of these allegations?
The following Web sites provide links to dissident revolutionary organizations, movements, and information.

Al Fatah: www.fateh.net

Foreign Terrorist Organizations: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/ (under Country Reports on Terrorism, click on year, then Terrorist Groups chapter)

Irish Northern Aid (Noraid): http://inac.org

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: www.eelam.com

Terrorist Profiles: web.nps.navy.mil/~library/tgp/tgpmain.htm

Note: To assist you with the Web exercise below, and to enable you to better master the course and book material, be sure to visit the book’s Study Site:

http://www.sagepub.com/Martin2Study

Web Exercise

Using this chapter’s recommended Web sites, conduct an online investigation of dissident terrorism.

1. How would you describe the self-images presented by dissident movements?

2. Based on the information given by the monitoring organizations, are some dissident movements seemingly more threatening than others? Less threatening? Why?

3. Compare the dissident Web sites to the monitoring agencies’ sites. Are any of the dissident groups unfairly reported by the monitoring agencies?
For an online search of dissident terrorism, readers should activate the search engine on their Web browser and enter the following keywords:

“Terrorist Organizations (or Groups)”

“Revolutionary Movements”

The names of specific dissident organizations

Recommended Readings

The following publications provide discussions on dissident activism, protest movements, and violence.


Notes


15. The Provisional IRA was formed in 1969 when radicals broke from the official IRA, which was more political than military.


19. Also known as the Quaraysh, who were the tribe that the prophet Muhammed was born into. Muhammed split from his tribe to gather together his Muslim followers in 622 during “the migration” (hijrah). The Quaraysh never forgave him for leaving the tribe and became his most formidable foes. The Muslims were eventually victorious over the Quaraysh. See Armstrong, Karen. Islam: A Short History. New York: Modern Library, 2000, pp. 13–23.


30. Copts are Orthodox Christians whose presence in Egypt predates the Arab conquest.

31. Central Intelligence Agency (note 28 above) and Podesta (note 23 above).


34. Some northerners are ethnic Arabs, but many are not. Nevertheless, non-Arab Muslims have been heavily influenced by their Arab neighbors and fellow Muslims and hence have developed an “Arabized” culture.

35. The Axis powers were an alliance of Germany, Japan, Italy, and their allies.

36. Podesta (note 23 above).