This chapter explores the characteristics of terrorism from above—state terrorism—committed by governments and quasi-governmental agencies and personnel against perceived enemies. State terrorism can be directed externally against foreign adversaries or internally against domestic enemies. Readers will explore the various types of state terrorism and acquire an appreciation for the qualities that characterize each state terrorist environment. A state terrorist paradigm will be discussed and cases will be examined to understand what is meant by terrorism as foreign policy and as domestic policy.

It is important to understand conceptually that political violence by the state is the most organized, and potentially the most far-reaching, application of terrorist violence. Because of the many resources available to the state, its ability to commit acts of violence far exceeds that perpetrated by dissident terrorists in scale and duration. Only communal dissident terrorism (group-against-group violence) potentially approximates the scale and duration of state-sponsored terror.1 Terrorism by states is characterized by official government support for policies of violence, repression, and intimidation. Such violence and coercion is directed against perceived enemies that the state has determined threaten its interests or security. Although the perpetrators of state terrorist campaigns are frequently government personnel acting in obedience to directives originating from government officials, those who carry out the violence are also quite often unofficial agents the government uses and encourages.

For example, some governments have adopted a strategy of using violent state-sponsored paramilitaries as an instrument of official state repression. The rationale behind supporting these paramilitaries is that they can be deployed to violently enforce state authority, and at the same time permit the state to deny responsibility for their behavior. Such deniability can be useful for propaganda purposes, because the government can officially argue that its paramilitaries represent a spontaneous grassroots reaction against their opponents.

The discussion in this chapter will review the following:

♦ Perspectives on terrorism by governments
♦ Domestic terrorism by the state
♦ Terrorism as foreign policy

Perspectives on Terrorism by Governments

Experts and scholars have designed a number of models to describe state terrorism. These constructs have been developed to identify distinctive patterns of state-sponsored terrorist
behavior. Experts agree that several models can be differentiated. For example, one describes state-level participants in a security environment as including the following:

- Sponsors of terrorism, meaning those states that actively promote terrorism and have been formally designated as rogue states or state sponsors under U.S. law.
- Enablers of terrorism, or those states that operate in an environment in which “being part of the problem means not just failing to cooperate fully in countering terrorism but also doing some things that help enable it to occur.”
- Cooperators in counterterrorism efforts, including unique security environments in which “cooperation on counterterrorism is often feasible despite significant disagreements on other subjects.”

Another model describes the scale of violence as including the following:

- In warfare, the conventional military forces of a state are marshaled against an enemy. The enemy is either a conventional or guerrilla combatant and may be an internal or external adversary. This is a highly organized and complicated application.
- In genocide, the state applies its resources toward the elimination of a scapegoat group. The basic characteristic of state-sponsored genocidal violence is that it does not differentiate between enemy combatants and enemy civilians; all members of the scapegoat group are considered enemies. Like warfare, this is often a highly organized and complicated application.
- Assassinations are selective applications of homicidal state violence, in which a person or a specified group is designated for elimination. This is a lower-scale application.
- Torture is used by some states as an instrument of intimidation, interrogation, and humiliation. Like assassinations, it is a selective application of state violence directed against a single person or a specified group of people. Although it is often a lower-scale application of state violence, many regimes will make widespread use of torture during states of emergency.

Understanding State-Sponsored Terrorism

Links between regimes and terrorism can range from very clear lines of sponsorship to very murky and indefinable associations. Governments inclined to use terrorism as an instrument of statecraft are often able to control the parameters of their involvement, so that they can sometimes manage how precisely a movement or an incident can be traced back to personnel.

Thus, state sponsorship of terrorism is not always a straightforward process. In fact, it is usually a covert, secret policy that allows states to claim deniability when accused of...
sponsoring terrorism. Because of these veiled parameters, a distinction must be made between **state patronage** and **state assistance**. These two subtly distinct concepts are summarized in Table 4.1.

### State Sponsorship: The Patronage Model

State patronage for terrorism refers to active participation in and encouragement of terrorist behavior. Its basic characteristic is that the state, through its agencies and personnel, actively takes part in repression, violence, and terrorism. Thus, state patrons adopt policies that initiate terrorism and other subversive activities—including directly arming, training, and providing sanctuary for terrorists.

**Patronage in Foreign Policy**

In the foreign policy domain, state patronage for terrorism occurs when a government champions a politically violent movement or group—a proxy—that is operating beyond its borders. Under this model, the state patron will directly assist the proxy in its cause and continue its support even when the movement or group has become known to commit acts of terrorism or other atrocities. When these revelations occur, patrons typically reply to this information with rationalizations. The patron will do one of four things:

- Accept the terrorism as a necessary tactic
- Deny that what occurred should be labeled as terrorism
- Deny that an incident occurred in the first place
- Issue a blanket and moralistic condemnation of all such violence as unfortunate

The 1981 to 1988 U.S.-directed guerrilla war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua incorporated elements of the state patronage model. Although it was not a terrorist war

### TABLE 4.1 STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM

State participation in terrorist and extremist behavior can involve either direct or indirect sponsorship and can be conducted in foreign or domestic policy domains. State patronage refers to relatively direct links between a regime and political violence. State assistance refers to relatively indirect links.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Type of Sponsorship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td><strong>Patronage</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International violence conducted on government orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case: Assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Shapoor Bakhtiar in France by Iranian operatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Domestic repression by government personnel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Case: Argentina’s Dirty War conducted by the military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
per se, the U.S. proxy did commit human rights violations. It is therefore a good case study of state patronage for a proxy that was quite capable of engaging in terrorist behavior. The most important component was U.S. support for anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries, known as the contras.

From December 1981 until July 1983, the contras were sustained by U.S. arms and funding. Without this patronage, they would not have been able to operate against the Sandinistas. Unfortunately for the United States, evidence surfaced that implicated the contras in numerous human rights violations. These allegations were officially dismissed or explained away.

**Patronage in Domestic Policy**

In the domestic policy domain, state patronage of terrorism occurs when a regime engages in direct violent repression against a domestic enemy. Patronage is characterized by the use of state security personnel in an overt policy of political violence. State patrons typically rationalize policies of repression by arguing that they are necessary to

- Suppress a clear and present domestic threat to national security
- Maintain law and order during times of national crisis
- Protect fundamental cultural values that are threatened by subversives
- Restore stability to governmental institutions that have been shaken, usurped, or damaged by a domestic enemy

The Syrian government’s 1982 suppression of a rebellion by the Muslim Brotherhood is an apt case study. The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movement very active in several North African and Middle Eastern countries. Beginning in the early 1980s, it initiated a widespread terrorist campaign against the Syrian government. In 1981, the Syrian army and other security units moved in to crush the Muslim Brotherhood in Aleppo and the city of Hama, killing at least 200 people. Syrian president Hafez el-Assad increased security restrictions and made membership in the organization a capital offense. In 1982, another Muslim Brotherhood revolt broke out in Hama. The Syrian regime sent in troops and tanks, backed by artillery, to put down the revolt; they killed approximately 25,000 civilians and destroyed large sections of the city.

**State Sponsorship: The Assistance Model**

State assistance for terrorism refers to tacit participation in and encouragement of terrorist behavior. Its basic characteristic is that the state, through sympathetic proxies and agents, implicitly takes part in repression, violence, and terrorism. In contrast to state patrons of terrorism, state assisters are less explicit in their sponsorship, and links to state policies and personnel are more ambiguous. State assistance includes policies that help sympathetic extremist proxies engage in terrorist violence, whereby the state will indirectly arm, train, and provide sanctuary for terrorists.

**Assistance in Foreign Policy**

In the foreign policy domain, state assistance for terrorism occurs when a government champions a politically violent proxy operating beyond its borders. Under this model, the assistance will be indirect, and the state may or may not continue its support if the movement or group becomes known for committing acts of terrorism or other atrocities. When the proxy’s terrorism
becomes known, state assisters typically weigh political costs and benefits when crafting a reply to the allegations. The ambiguity that the assister has built into its links with the proxy is intended to provide deniability when accused of complicity.

The contra insurgency against the Sandinistas was introduced as a case study of the state patronage model—with the caveat that it was not per se a terrorist war. The later phases of the war are also a good example of the state assistance model.

Several incidents undermined congressional support for the Reagan administration’s policy in Nicaragua. In December 1982, Congress passed the Boland Amendment, which forbade the expenditure of U.S. funds to overthrow the Sandinista government. In late 1984, a second Boland Amendment forbade all U.S. assistance to the contras. These legislative measures were the catalyst for a highly covert effort to continue supplying the contras. The most effective effort to circumvent the congressional ban was the resupply network set up by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, an official of the National Security Council. Lt. Col. North successfully set up a resupply program that shipped large amounts of arms to the contras. This program was intended to wait out congressional opposition to arming the contras and was successful, because in June 1986 Congress approved $100 million in aid for the contras. Congressional support for this disbursement was severely shaken when a covert American cargo plane was shot down inside Nicaragua, an American mercenary was captured, and the press published reports about Lt. Col. North’s operations. This combination of factors—known as the Iran-Contra Scandal—ended congressional support for the contra program.

Assistance in Domestic Policy

In the domestic policy domain, state assistance for terrorism occurs when a regime engages in indirect violent repression against an enemy. Under this model, the assistance is characterized by the use of sympathetic proxies. This can occur in an environment where the proxy violence coincides with that of state security personnel. Thus, the overall terrorist environment may include both state patronage (direct repression) and state assistance (indirect repression). State assisters typically rationalize policies of indirect repression by adopting official positions that

- Blame an adversary group for the breakdown of order and call on the people to assist the government in restoring order
- Argue that the proxy violence is evidence of popular patriotic sentiment to suppress a threat to national security
- Call on all parties to cease hostilities but focus blame for the violence on an adversary group
- Assure everyone that the government is doing everything in its power to restore law and order but that the regime is unable to immediately end the violence

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, which lasted from 1965 to 1969, is a good example of state assistance for an ideologically extremist movement. Launched by national leader Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, it was a mass movement that mobilized the young postrevolution generation. Its goal was to eliminate what it called revisionist tendencies in society and create a newly indoctrinated revolutionary generation. The
period was marked by widespread upheaval and disorder. Maoists mobilized millions of young supporters in the Red Guards, who waged an ideological struggle to eliminate what were known as the Four Olds: Old Ideas, Old Culture, Old Customs, and Old Habits. The Red Guards were the principal purveyors of the Cultural Revolution and were strongly encouraged to attack the Four Olds publicly and with great vigor. This led to widespread turmoil. For approximately 18 months, beginning in early 1967, the Red Guards seized control of key government bureaucracies. Because they had no experience in government operations, the government ceased to operate effectively. It was not until violent infighting within the Red Guards began that Mao ordered an end to the Cultural Revolution and deployed the People’s Liberation Army to restore order. Chapter Perspective 4.1 explores another example of chaos as liberation in Zimbabwe.

**CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 4.1**

**Chaos as Liberation: State Repression in Zimbabwe**

The southern Africa country of Zimbabwe was designated as the British colony of Southern Rhodesia in 1923. In 1965, it declared itself the independent nation of Rhodesia, an act that was unrecognized and denounced by Great Britain and other nations. Rhodesia’s constitution established political domination by the country’s white minority, thus creating a system of racial oligarchy.

Because of the inherently racial disparities of the Rhodesian system, the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on the country. These sanctions, coupled with a guerrilla war waged by several rebel factions, led to the first free elections in 1979, and the renaming of Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.

Robert Mugabe, the leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), became the country’s prime minister, and later president. He initially promised democracy and economic growth, but in fact never permitted significant opposition to his rule. In 2000, Mugabe began a policy of land redistribution, in which pro-Mugabe Zimbabweans (many of them veterans of the guerrilla war) were allowed to seize farmland owned by white farmers. White farmers owned large estates (a condition from the colonial past), and Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector regularly produced a surplus for export. Many of the land seizures were violent, and a large number of white farmers emigrated. Because of the seizures and the emigration, the agricultural sector came close to collapse, what had once been a food exporting country become a food importing nation, and the economy was severely damaged. At the same time, all opposition to Mugabe and ZANU-PF—largely from poor Zimbabwean city dwellers—was suppressed.

In 2002, Mugabe held an election that was designed to ensure his reelection over the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDU). In 2005, another election was held that was widely condemned as unfair and rigged, and involved intimidating MDU supporters. When he was reelected, Mugabe, who was 81 at the time, pledged to rule until he was 100. He also threatened the opposition by warning that all protests would be suppressed by his security forces, and suppressed violently because the MDU is inherently violent.
Domestic Terrorism by the State

State terrorism as domestic policy refers to a state's politically motivated application of force inside its own borders. Military, law enforcement, and other security institutions are used to suppress perceived threats and can be supplemented by unofficial paramilitaries and death squads. The purpose of domestically focused terrorism is to demonstrate the supreme power of the government and to intimidate or eliminate the opposition. In environments where the central government perceives its authority to be seriously threatened, this force can be extreme.

South Africa during the final years of apartheid, the system of racial separation, is a good example. When confronted by a combination of antiapartheid reformist agitation, mass unrest, and terrorist attacks, the South African government began a covert campaign to root out anti-apartheid leaders and supporters. This included government support for the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party in its violence against the multiethnic and multiracial African National Congress (ANC). The South African government also assigned security officers to command death squads called Askaris, who assassinated ANC members both inside South Africa and in neighboring countries.

Legitimizing State Authority

Every type of regime seeks to legitimize its authority and maintain its conception of social order. How this is done often depends on the political environment at a particular point in a nation’s history, and is done with varying degrees of restraint. Stable democracies with strong constitutional traditions are usually characterized by measured restraint. Regimes with weak constitutional traditions, or those in a period of national crisis, often show little or no restraint. Examples of state domestic authority can be summarized as follows:

♦ Democracy is a system of elected government in which authority is theoretically delegated by the people to elected leaders. Under this model, a strong constitution grants authority for elected leaders to govern the people and manage the affairs of government. The power of the state is clearly delimited.

♦ Authoritarianism is a system of government in which authority and power come from the state rather than being delegated by the people to elected leaders. Law, order, and state authority are emphasized. Authoritarian regimes can have elected leaders, but these leaders have authoritarian power and often rule for indefinite periods. Constitutions do not have enough authority to prohibit abuses by the state.

♦ Totalitarianism is a system under which all national authority originates from the government, which enforces its own vision of an ordered society.

Also in 2005, ZANU-PF began a major program of social engineering against the poor urban Zimbabweans, apparently in retaliation for their supporting the MDU. Zimbabwean security personnel and ZANU-PF operatives systematically ordered the demolition of urban poor neighborhoods, with the intention of driving residents into the countryside and thereby creating pro-Mugabe strongholds in the cities. Many residents became homeless and some died.
Several models illustrate the manner in which state authority is imposed and the degree of coercion that is used to enforce governmental authority. Sources of state authority differ depending on which model characterizes each regime.

Table 4.2 illustrates these models of domestic state authority by summarizing sources of state authority and giving examples of these environments.

**State Domestic Authority**

The following discussion is a domestic state terrorist model adapted from one designed by Peter C. Sederberg. It defines and differentiates broad categories of domestic state terrorism that are useful in critically analyzing the motives and behaviors of terrorist regimes. They signify the varied qualities of state-sponsored terrorism directed against perceived domestic enemies:

- Unofficial repression: vigilante domestic state terrorism
- Repression as policy: overt and covert official state terrorism
- Mass repression: genocidal state terrorism

### TABLE 4.2  STATE DOMESTIC AUTHORITY

Several models illustrate the manner in which state authority is imposed and the degree of coercion that is used to enforce governmental authority. Sources of state authority differ depending on which model characterizes each regime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models of State Authority</th>
<th>Sources of State Authority</th>
<th>Examples of Authority Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Secondary role of security institutions; strong constitution and rule of law</td>
<td>United States, Western Europe, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Central role of official security institutions; strong constitution possible</td>
<td>Egypt, Myanmar (Burma), Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarianism</td>
<td>Central role of official security institutions</td>
<td>China, North Korea, Taliban Regime, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda under Idi Amin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crazy states</td>
<td>Central roles of official and unofficial security institutions</td>
<td>Government with constrained authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government with minimally constrained authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government with unconstrained authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government with unconstrained authority, or unconstrained paramilitaries, or both</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unofficial Repression: Vigilante Domestic State Terrorism

Vigilante terrorism is political violence perpetrated by nongovernmental groups and individuals. These groups can receive unofficial support from agents of the state.

Why do regimes encourage vigilante violence? What are the benefits of such support? From the perspective of the state, what are the values being safeguarded by the vigilantes? Vigilante violence committed on behalf of a regime is motivated by the perceived need to defend a demographic group or cultural establishment. The overall goal of vigilante state terrorism is to violently preserve the preferred order. In a classic terrorist rationalization process, the end of an orderly society justifies the means of extreme violence.

The vigilante terrorists, sometimes alongside members of the state security establishment, unofficially wage a violent suppression campaign against an adversarial group or movement. Such a campaign occurs when civilians and members of the state’s security forces perceive that the state is threatened. This can occur in warlike environments or when an alternative social movement or ideology challenges the established order. Civilians and members of the security establishment who participate in vigilante violence adhere to a code of duty and behavior, and thus believe that their actions are absolutely justifiable. Nongovernmental vigilantes often organize themselves into para-militaries and operate as death squads. Death squads have committed many documented massacres and atrocities, including assassinations, massacres, disappearances, and random terrorist attacks.

Repression as Policy: Official Domestic State Terrorism

State-sponsored repression and political violence were practiced regularly during the 20th century. Many regimes deliberately adopted domestic terrorism as a matter of official policy, and directives ordering government operatives to engage in violent domestic repression frequently originated with ranking government officials.

Why do regimes resort to official policies of domestic violence? What are the benefits of such programs? From the perspective of the state, who are the people who deserve this kind of violent repression? The goals of official state terrorism are to preserve an existing order and to maintain state authority through demonstrations of state power. Regimes that officially selected violent repression as a policy choice rationalized their
behavior as a legitimate method of protecting the state from an internal threat. Two manifestations of official state terrorism in the domestic domain must be distinguished: overt and covert.

Overt official state terrorism refers to the visible application of state-sponsored political violence. A policy of unconcealed and explicit repression against a domestic enemy, is common in totalitarian societies, such as Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, Khmer Rouge Cambodia, and Taliban Afghanistan.

Covert official state terrorism refers to the secretive application of state-sponsored political violence. A policy of concealed and implicit repression against a domestic enemy, it is common in countries with extensive secret police services, such as President Hafez el-Assad’s Syria, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, General Augusto Pinochet’s Chile, and Argentina during the Dirty War.

Official state terrorism is not always directed against subversive elements. It is sometimes conducted to cleanse society of an undesirable social group. These groups are perceived as purveyors of a decadent lifestyle or immoral values, or as otherwise unproductive drains on society. Chapter Perspective 4.2 discusses how extremist regimes have solved this problem by engaging in so-called social cleansing and ethnic cleansing.

CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 4.2

Cleansing Society

Among the euphemisms used by propagandists to characterize state-initiated domestic terrorism, perhaps the most commonly applied is cleansing society. Conceptually, an image is constructed that depicts an undesirable group as little more than a virus or bacterium that has poisoned society. The removal of this group is deemed a necessary remedy for the survival of the existing social order.

This imagery has been invoked repeatedly by extremist regimes. An example from Fascist Italy illustrates this point:

“Terror? Never,” Mussolini insisted, demurely dismissing such intimidation as “simply . . . social hygiene, taking those individuals out of circulation like a doctor would take out a bacillus.”

For society to solve its problems, the bacterium represented by the group must be removed. Acceptance of this characterization makes domestic terrorism palatable to many extremist regimes. The following cleansing programs are recent examples of this imagery.
Social Cleansing

Social cleansing refers to the elimination of undesirable social elements. These undesirable elements are considered to be blights on society and can include street children, prostitutes, drug addicts, criminals, homeless people, transvestites, and homosexuals. In Colombia, undesirable social elements are commonly referred to as disposables.

Social cleansing has occurred in a number of countries. The term was probably coined in Latin America, where social cleansing took on the attributes of vigilante state domestic terrorism in Brazil, Guatemala, Colombia, and elsewhere. Participants in cleansing campaigns have included members of the police and death squads. In societies where social cleansing has occurred, the disposables have been killed, beaten, and violently intimidated.

Ethnic Cleansing

The term ethnic cleansing was coined during the war in Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia. It refers to the expulsion of an ethno-national group from a geographic region as a means to create an ethnically pure society. During the war in Bosnia, Serb soldiers and paramilitaries initiated a cycle of ethnic cleansing. They officially and systematically expelled, killed, raped, and otherwise intimidated Bosnian Muslims to create Serb-only districts. The most intensive campaigns occurred in 1992 and 1993. As the war progressed, Croats and Bosnians also engaged in ethnic cleansing, so that there were periods during the war in which all three groups cleansed areas populated by members of the other groups.

Since the war in Bosnia, the term has become widely used to describe present and past campaigns to systematically and violently remove ethno-national groups from geographic regions.

Note


Mass Repression: Genocidal Domestic State Terrorism

The word genocide was first used by Dr. Raphael Lemkin in 1943 and first appeared in print in his influential book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, published in 1944. It is derived from the Greek word genos, meaning race or tribe, and the Latin-derived suffix cide, meaning killing. Genocide is first and generally defined as the elimination of a group as a matter of state policy or communal dissident violence by one group against another. The second refers to campaigns of substate, group-against-group terrorism.

Whether perpetrated at the state or communal level, genocide is considered an unacceptable social policy and an immoral application of force. It has been deemed a crime under
international law since 1946, when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution 96(I). In 1948, the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Under Article 2 of the convention, genocide is formally defined as follows:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as:

a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.\(^{13}\)

Why do regimes resort to genocidal policies against their fellow countrymen? What are the benefits to a regime of eliminating a particular group? From the perspective of the state, why do some groups deserve to be eliminated? One practical reason for terrorist regimes is that scapegoating a defined enemy is a useful strategy to rally the nation behind the ruling government. The goal is to enhance the authority and legitimacy of the regime by targeting internal enemies for genocidal violence.

States have available to them, and frequently marshal, enormous resources to use against an undesired group. Such resources can include the military, security services, civilian paramilitaries, legal systems, private industry, social institutions, and propaganda resources. When the decision is made to eliminate or culturally destroy a group, state resources can be brought to bear with devastating efficiency. Chapter Perspective 4.3 discusses a case in point, Iraq’s genocidal Anfal campaign against its Kurdish population in 1988.
The Anfal Campaign: Genocidal State Terrorism in Iraq

During the regime of Saddam Hussein, political power in Iraq was highly centralized in the Ba’ath Party, which Hussein led. The Ba’ath Party, one faction of which governs Syria under the leadership of Bashar el-Assad, is secular, Arab, and nationalist. In Iraq, Ba’athist functionaries were personally loyal to Hussein and commanded key government institutions, the military, and the security services. Hussein and the Ba’ath Party legitimized state authority through force of arms. Dissent was severely repressed and rebellion was dealt with mercilessly. Iraqi armed forces were unleashed to quell rebellions among the so-called Marsh Arabs in the country’s southeastern region and among its Kurdish population in the north.

Iraq’s Anfal campaign was an instance of genocidal state terrorism waged against the Iraqi Kurdish minority from February to September 1988.

Had history been kinder to the Kurds, they might have established their own sovereign nation of Kurdistan. Unfortunately, Kurdistan is a geographic region politically divided between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The Iraqi Kurds have historically sought political self-governance in their region. Some Iraqi Kurds seeking complete independence resorted to armed insurrection. Iraqi policy during its suppression campaigns against Kurdish rebellions was brutal and included the use of poison gas.

In 1987, Saddam Hussein’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid was assigned the task of securing Iraqi governmental authority in Kurdistan. His carefully planned campaign was code-named al-Anfal, or the spoils, named for passages in the Quran that describe the Prophet Muhammed’s revelations after his first great victory and advise the prophet to severely punish unbelievers when necessary. When the Anfal campaign was launched, it had eight phases, during which civilians were uprooted, many killed en masse. Males in particular were singled out for death. During the campaign, Iraq dropped chemical weapons, including mustard gas and nerve agents, on Kurdish villages.\(^a\) One attack was described as follows:

> The planes dropped bombs. They did not produce a big noise. A yellowish cloud was created and there was a smell of rotten parsley or onions. There were no wounds. People would breathe the smoke, then fall down and blood would come from their mouths.\(^b\)

Between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds may have died.\(^c\) After the campaign, that particular round of the Kurdish rebellion was quelled, and approximately 2.5 million Iraqi Kurds were forced into exile. It is a good case study of how regimes in which state power is centralized in a ruling body may use terrorism and other violent repression to maintain domestic authority.

As a postscript, Ali Hassan al-Majid, nicknamed Chemical Ali and The Butcher of Kurdistan for his actions in the Anfal campaign, was captured by U.S. troops in August 2003 and condemned to death by an Iraqi court in June 2007.
Colonial Cambodia was governed as part of French Indochina, which also included what are now the countries of Laos and Vietnam. In 1944, Vietnamese nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh rebelled against the French colonial regime, which had essentially collaborated with Japanese occupiers during World War II. Cambodian intellectuals and activists joined with the Vietnamese during their resistance against the French. One Cambodian activist was Pol Pot, who joined the underground Indochinese Communist Party in about 1946.

When the French withdrew after their defeat in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam, Cambodia became a republican monarchy ruled by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Many of the Cambodians who participated in anti-French agitation during World War II were nationalist communists. Some of them gathered abroad after the war and established strong ideological bonds. Pol Pot lived and studied for 4 years in France, where he was an unremarkable student but met with other Indochinese activists and became a dedicated Marxist revolutionary. When he returned to Cambodia in 1953, he became a member of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, which was Communist. In 1960, the Cambodian Communist Party was founded. Pol Pot became its leader in 1963 and soon fled with his followers into the jungle after Prince Sihanouk suppressed Communist Party activities.

**Notes**


**Genocidal state terrorism** occurs, then, when the resources of a nation are mobilized to eliminate a targeted group. The group can be a cultural minority—such as a racial, religious, or ethnic population—or a designated segment of society—such as believers in a banned ideology or a socioeconomically unacceptable group. When ideological or socio-economic groups are singled out, the resulting environment is one in which members of the same ethnic or religious group commit genocide against fellow members, a practice known as autogenocide (self-genocide). This occurred during the reign of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, which Chapter Perspective 4.4 explores.

**Chapter Perspective 4.4**

**The Khmer Rouge: Genocidal State Terrorism in Cambodia**

Colonial Cambodia was governed as part of French Indochina, which also included what are now the countries of Laos and Vietnam. In 1944, Vietnamese nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh rebelled against the French colonial regime, which had essentially collaborated with Japanese occupiers during World War II. Cambodian intellectuals and activists joined with the Vietnamese during their resistance against the French. One Cambodian activist was Pol Pot, who joined the underground Indochinese Communist Party in about 1946.

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Unlike vigilante and official state terrorism, the scale of violence during campaigns of state-sponsored genocidal terrorism can be virtually unlimited. In some cases, no check whatsoever is placed on what violence can be used against an adversary group, and the targeted group may suffer casualties in the many thousands or millions.

It is important to understand that the elimination of a group does not necessarily entail their physical extermination. The state’s goal might also be to destroy a culture. This can be accomplished through forced population removals or prohibitions against practicing religious, linguistic, or other measures of cultural identification.

Most cases of state genocide are not examples of a precipitous policy under which the security services or paramilitaries are suddenly unleashed against a targeted group. More commonly, the methodology and purpose behind genocidal policies require a coordinated series of events, perhaps in phases over months or years. During these phases, cultural or other measures of identification can be suppressed in a number of ways—perhaps with the ultimate goal of physical extermination.

Table 4.3 identifies several examples of state-sponsored genocidal campaigns directed against domestic groups. Table 4.4 identifies several paramilitaries that have operated in Latin America with the support of government security services.

Table 4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Campaign Name</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
<td>Cambodian</td>
<td>Forced population removals, prohibitions against cultural practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>Forced population removals, prohibitions against cultural practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was in the jungle in the mid-1960s that the guerrilla movement known as the Khmer Rouge (Red Khmers, given that most Cambodians are ethnic Khmers), led by Pol Pot, took up arms. The Khmer Rouge was an extreme left-wing movement that sought to completely redesign and restructure society. In 1967, it staged an armed rebellion that was put down by Sihanouk’s forces. In 1970, a civil war broke out after a right-wing coup—led by Cambodian Prime Minister Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak—toppled the Sihanouk government. Prince Sihanouk eventually joined Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge to fight against the new regime. Khmer Rouge forces were swelled with new recruits when U.S. forces bombed and invaded Cambodia in 1970. Despite massive U.S. assistance, the Lon Nol government suffered one defeat after another at the hands of the Khmer Rouge.

In January 1975, the Khmer Rouge seized the capital of Phnom Penh, now swollen by 2 million refugees, renamed the country Democratic Kampuchea, set the calendar to Year Zero, and began a 4-year reign of state domestic terror. Their first act was to depopulate Phnom Penh through mass evacuations of the inhabitants to the countryside. There, they toiled in the fields to build the Khmer Rouge’s vision of an ideal communist society. The era of the Killing Fields had begun, when hundreds of thousands of Cambodians (possibly as many as 2 million) died in the countryside from executions, starvation, and arduous forced labor.

Notes


During the 20th century, states used military forces to pursue policies of aggression, conquest, and cultural or ethnic extermination. In the latter half of the century, and especially in the latter quarter, many governments used terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. As a policy option, state-sponsored terrorism is a logical option, because states cannot always deploy conventional armed forces to achieve strategic objectives. As a practical matter for many governments, it is often not logistically, politically, or militarily feasible to confront an adversary directly. For example, few states can hope to be victorious in a conventional military confrontation with the United States—as Saddam Hussein’s well-entrenched Iraqi army learned.
both in Kuwait during the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the U.S.-led invasion of March and April 2003. Terrorism thus becomes a relatively acceptable alternative for states pursuing an aggressive foreign policy against a superior adversary.

Governments use terrorism and other confrontational propaganda because, from their point of view, it is an efficient way to achieve strategic objectives. As a practical matter for aggressive regimes, state terrorism in the international domain is advantageous in several respects:

- **State terrorism is inexpensive.** The costs of patronage and assistance for terrorist movements are relatively low. Even poor nations can strike and injure a prosperous adversary in a single spectacular incident.
- **State terrorism has limited consequences.** State assisters that are clever can distance themselves from culpability for a terrorist incident. They can cover their involvement, disclaim responsibility, and thus escape possible reprisals or other penalties.
- **State terrorism can be successful.** Weaker states can raise the stakes beyond what a stronger adversary is willing to bear. Aggressor states that wish to remain anonymous can likewise successfully destabilize an adversary in a proxy movement. They can do so with one or more spectacular incidents or by assisting in a campaign of terror.

To simplify matters for our discussion, we will discuss the following four policy frameworks. They signify the varied qualities of state-sponsored terrorism in the international domain:

1. Moral support: politically sympathetic sponsorship
2. Technical support: logistically supportive sponsorship
3. Selective participation: episode-specific sponsorship
4. Active participation: joint operations

### TABLE 4.4 VIGILANTE TERRORISM: THE CASE OF THE PARAMILITARIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paramilitary Group</th>
<th>Benefactor</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Self-Defense Groups (AUC)</td>
<td>Colombian security services, Colombian landholders</td>
<td>Marxist FARC rebels and suspected supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Patrols (CAP)</td>
<td>Guatemalan security services, Guatemalan landholders</td>
<td>Marxist rebels and suspected supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiapas Paramilitaries</td>
<td>Possibly Mexican security force members; Mexican landholders</td>
<td>Zapatistas and suspected supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (Triple-A)</td>
<td>Argentine security services</td>
<td>Leftists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.5 summarizes these policy frameworks by placing them within the context of state patronage and state assistance for terrorism.

**Moral Support: Politically Sympathetic Sponsorship**

*Politically sympathetic sponsorship* occurs when a government openly embraces the main beliefs and principles of a cause. This embrace can range in scope from political agreement with a movement’s motives, though not its tactics, to complete support for both. Such support may be delivered either overtly or covertly. Although politically sympathetic governments act as ideological role models for their championed group, such support is often a way for the state to pursue its national agenda.

Iran’s support for several violent movements in the Middle East is an example of unambiguous policy of mentorship for groups known to have engaged in acts of terrorism. Iran

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**TABLE 4.5** STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM: THE FOREIGN POLICY DOMAIN

State participation in terrorism in the international domain can involve several types of backing for championed causes and groups, which can range in quality from relatively passive political sympathy to aggressive joint operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of State Backing</th>
<th>Type of Sponsorship</th>
<th>Patronage</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politically sympathetic (moral support)</td>
<td>Overt political support and encouragement for a championed group’s motives or tactics</td>
<td>Case: Official Arab governments’ political support for the objectives of the PLO</td>
<td>Implicit political support and encouragement for a championed group’s motives or tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistically supportive (technical support)</td>
<td>Direct state support, such as sanctuary, for a championed cause to the group</td>
<td>Case: Jordanian facilitation of PLO fedayeen bases inside Jordan for raids on Israel prior to Black September</td>
<td>The provision of state assistance to a group, such as providing matériel (military hardware)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episode-specific (selective participation)</td>
<td>Direct involvement by government personnel for a specific incident or campaign</td>
<td>Case: Yugoslavia’s deployment of Yugoslav Army units to Bosnia during the Bosnian civil war</td>
<td>The provision of state assistance to a group or movement for a specific goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint operations (active participation)</td>
<td>Operations carried out by government personnel jointly with its proxy</td>
<td>Case: The American-South Vietnamese Phoenix Program during the war in Vietnam</td>
<td>Indirect state support for a proxy using allied personnel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
consistently provided politically sympathetic and logistically supportive sponsorship for several movements, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas. All of these organizations adopted religious revolutionary ideologies—including strong anti-Israel goals—which created a sense of revolutionary common cause among religious hardliners in Iran.

**Technical Support: Logistically Supportive Sponsorship**

Logistically supportive sponsorship occurs when a government provides aid and comfort to a championed cause. This can include directly or indirectly facilitating training, arms resupply, safe houses, or other sanctuary for the movement. These options are relatively passive types of support that allow state sponsors of terrorism to promote an aggressive foreign policy agenda but deny their involvement in terrorist incidents.

An excellent case study is the foreign policy Syria adopted during the rule of Hafez el-Assad. During that time, from February 1971 to June 2000, Syria fought two wars against Israel, strongly backed the Palestinian cause, occupied the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, and supported the Lebanese militias Amal and Hezbollah. Assad’s regime could certainly be aggressive in the international domain, but despite this activism Syria was rarely linked directly to terrorist incidents. “There is no evidence that either Syria or Syrian government officials have been directly involved in the planning or execution of international terrorist attacks since 1986.”

**Selective Participation: Episode-Specific Sponsorship**

Episode-specific sponsorship refers to government support for a single incident or series of incidents. For this type of operation, the government will provide as much patronage or assistance as is needed. Sometimes members of the proxy will carry out the incident, and at other times agents of the state sponsor will.

One example of episode-specific support was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. Two hundred seventy people were killed, all 259 passengers and crew and 11 persons on the ground. In November 1991, the United States and Great Britain named two Libyan nationals as the masterminds of the bombing, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhima—were alleged to be agents of Libya’s Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO). This was a significant allegation, because the JSO was repeatedly implicated in numerous acts of terrorism, including killing political rivals abroad, laying mines in the Red Sea, attacking Western interests in Europe, and providing logistical support and training facilities for terrorists from around the world. Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi denied any involvement of the Libyan government or its citizens.

**Active Participation: Joint Operations**

Joint operations are when government personnel carry out campaigns in cooperation with a championed proxy. Close collaboration is typical, with the sponsor providing primary operational support for the campaign. Joint operations are often undertaken during a large-scale and ongoing conflict.

An example is the Phoenix Program, a campaign conducted during the Vietnam War to disrupt and eliminate the administrative effectiveness of the Viet Cong, the communist guerrilla
movement recruited from among southern Vietnamese. It was a 3-year program that focused on
the infrastructure of the Viet Cong. Both American and allied South Vietnamese squads were to
wage the campaign by pooling intelligence information and making lists of persons to be targeted.
The targets were intended to be hard-core communist agents and administrators, and they were
supposed to be arrested rather than assassinated.

In practice, although the communists were significantly disrupted, many innocent
Vietnamese were swept up in the campaign. Also, “despite the fact that the law provided only
for the arrest and detention of the suspects, one-third of the ‘neutralized agents’ were reported
dead.” Corruption was rampant among South Vietnamese officials.

Thus, terrorism and sponsorship for subversive movements are methods of statecraft that
many types of governments have adopted, from stable democracies to aggressive and revolu-
tionary regimes. It is certainly true that democracies are less likely to engage in this behavior
than aggressively authoritarian states. However, democracies have been known to resort to
terrorist methods when operating within certain security or political environments.

Chapter Perspective 4.5 discusses the officially defined threat inherent in the authoritarian
government of Saddam Hussein that precipitated the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

**CHAPTER PERSPECTIVE 4.5**

**Calculation or Miscalculation? Weapons of
Mass Destruction and the Iraq Case**

One of the most disturbing scenarios involving state-sponsored terrorism is the
delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to motivated terrorists by an
aggressive authoritarian regime. This scenario was the underlying rationale given for
the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and several allies.

In January 2002, U.S. president George W. Bush identified Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea as an _axis of evil_, and promised that the United States “will not permit the
world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive
weapons.” In June 2002, President Bush announced during a speech at the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point that the United States would engage in preemptive
warfare if necessary.

Citing Iraq’s known possession of weapons of mass destruction in the recent past,
and its alleged ties to international terrorist networks, Bush informed the United
Nations in September 2002 that the United States would unilaterally move against
Iraq if the UN did not certify that Iraq no longer possessed WMDs. Congress autho-
rized an attack on Iraq in October 2002. UN weapons inspectors returned to Iraq in
November 2002. After a 3-month military buildup, Iraq was attacked on March 20,
2003, and Baghdad fell to U.S. troops on April 9, 2003.

The Bush administration had repeatedly argued that Iraq still possessed a signifi-
cant arsenal of WMDs at the time of the invasion, that Hussein’s regime had close ties
to terrorist groups, and that a preemptive war was necessary to prevent the delivery of
these weapons to Al Qaeda or another network. Although many experts discounted
links between Hussein’s regime and religious terrorists, it was widely expected that WMDs would be found. Iraq was known to have used chemical weapons against Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 and against Iraqi Kurds during the Anfal campaign of 1987 (discussed in Chapter Perspective 4.4).

In actuality, UN inspectors identified no weapons of mass destruction before the 2003 invasion, and U.S. officials found none during the occupation of Iraq. Additionally, little evidence was uncovered to substantiate allegations of strong ties between Hussein’s Iraq and Al Qaeda or similar networks. The search for WMDs ended in December 2004, and an inspection report submitted to Congress by U.S. weapons-hunter Charles A. Duelfer essentially “contradicted nearly every prewar assertion about Iraq made by Bush administration officials.”

Policy makers and experts bear two fundamental questions for critical analysis and debate:

- Did the reasons given for the invasion reflect a plausible threat scenario?
- Was the invasion a well-crafted policy option centered on credible political, military, and intelligence calculations?

Note


Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced readers to the terror from above that characterizes state-sponsored terrorism and outlined the nature of state terrorism. The purpose of this discussion was to identify and define several state terrorist environments, to differentiate state terrorism in the foreign and domestic policy domains, and to provide cases in point for these concepts.

Readers were introduced to public and private agencies that monitor state terrorism. The U.S. Department of State’s list of sponsors of state terrorism is a useful compilation of information about states active in the foreign policy domain. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are private activist organizations with extensive databases on state terrorism in the domestic policy domain.

The state terrorism paradigm identified several approaches experts use to define and describe state terrorism. Included in this discussion was a comparison of the underlying characteristics of the state patronage and state assistance models of terrorism. The patronage model is characterized by situations in which regimes act as active sponsors of, and direct participants in, terrorism. Under the assistance model, regimes tacitly participate in violent extremist behavior and indirectly sponsor terrorism.

The discussion of state terrorism as foreign policy applied a model that categorized terrorism in the foreign domain as politically sympathetic, logistically supportive, episode specific, or joint operations. Each category described different aspects in the scale of support and directness of involvement by state sponsors. Several examples clarified the behavioral distinctions across categories.
In the domestic policy domain, several models of state domestic authority and legitimacy were identified and summarized, and their sources of authority and centers of power contrasted. The models were democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and crazy states. Because the methodologies of state domestic terrorism differ from case to case, several models provided a useful approach to understanding the characteristics of particular terrorist environments. These models were vigilante, overt official, covert official, and genocidal state domestic terrorism.

**DISCUSSION BOX**

This chapter’s Discussion Box is intended to stimulate critical debate about the application of authoritarian methods by democratic governments and the justifications these governments use for such methods.

**Authoritarianism and Democracy**

Democracies are constrained by strong constitutions from summarily violating the rights of citizens. Most democracies have due process requirements in place when security services wish to engage in surveillance, search premises, seize evidence, or detain suspects. However, when confronted by serious security challenges, democracies have resorted to authoritarian security measures. Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all adopted aggressive policies to suppress perceived threats to national security.

For example:

In the United States, periodic anticommunist Red Scares occurred when national leaders reacted to the perceived threat of communist subversion. Government officials reacted by adopting authoritarian measures to end the perceived threats. The first Red Scare occurred after the founding of the Communist Party—USA in 1919, and a series of letter bombs were intercepted. President Woodrow Wilson allowed Attorney General R. Mitchell Palmer to conduct a series of raids—the so-called Palmer Raids—against Communist and other leftist radical groups. Offices of these groups were shut down, leaders were arrested and put on trial, and hundreds were deported.

A second Red Scare occurred in the 1930s and led to the creation of the House Un-American Activities Committee and the passage of the Smith Act in 1940, which made advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government a federal crime. In the late 1940s, high-profile investigations, such as that of Alger Hiss, were common and communists were prosecuted.

A third Red Scare occurred in the 1950s, when Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin held a series of hearings to expose communist infiltration in government, industry, and Hollywood. Hundreds of careers were ruined and many people were blacklisted, that is, barred from employment.

In Northern Ireland, the British government has periodically passed legislation granting British forces authoritarian powers to combat terrorism by the IRA. One such
law was the 1973 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act, which permitted the military to temporarily arrest and detain people and to search homes without warrants. Under the act, the army detained hundreds of people and searched more than 250,000 homes. This sweep was actually fairly successful, because thousands of weapons were found and seized.

Discussion Questions

1. Are authoritarian methods morally compatible with democratic principles and institutions?
2. Under what circumstances are authoritarian policies justifiable and necessary, even in democracies with strong constitutional traditions?
3. Many have labeled the postwar Red Scare investigations in the United States as witch hunts. Were these investigations nevertheless justifiable, considering the external threat from the Soviet Union?
4. The British security services detained hundreds of innocent people and searched the homes of many thousands of non-IRA members. Considering the threat from the IRA, were these inconveniences nevertheless justifiable?
5. Assume for a moment that some security environments justify the use of authoritarian measures by democracies. What kind of watchdog checks and balances are needed to ensure that democracies do not move toward permanent authoritarianism?

Key Terms and Concepts

The following topics were discussed in this chapter and can be found in the glossary:

- African National Congress (ANC)
- al-Megrahi, Abdel Basset
- Anfal campaign
- Apartheid
- Askaris
- Assassination
- Auto-genocide
- Ba’ath Party
- Blacklisting
- Boland Amendment
- Contras
- Crazy state
- Death squads
- Episode-specific sponsorship
- Ethnic cleansing
- Fhima, Lamen Khalifa
- Four Olds, The
- Genocidal state
- Genocidal state terrorism
- Genocide
- Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
- House Un-American Activities Committee
- Hussein, Saddam
- Inkatha Freedom Party
- Jamahiriya Security Organization (JOSO)
- Joint operations
- Khmer Rouge
- Khomeini, Ayatollah
- Ruhollah
- Kurds
- Logistically supportive sponsorship
- McCarthy, Senator
- Joseph
- Muslim Brotherhood
- Official state terrorism
- Palmer Raids
- Pan Am Flight 103
- Paramilitaries
- Phoenix Program
- Politically sympathetic sponsorship
- Pol Pot
Terrortism on the Web

Log on to the Web-based student study site at www.sagepub.com/martinessstudy for additional web sources and study resources.

Web Exercise

Using this chapter’s recommended Web sites, conduct an online investigation of state terrorism.

1. Are there certain governmental or institutional profiles that distinguish repressive regimes from nonrepressive regimes?
2. Read the mission statements of the monitoring organizations. Do they reflect objective and professionally credible approaches for monitoring the behavior of states?
3. In your opinion, how effective are these organizations?

For an online search of state terrorism, readers should activate the search engine on their Web browser and enter the following keywords:
“State Terrorism”
“Terrorist States”

Recommended Readings

The following publications provide discussions on state-sponsored terrorism.