7 Feminist and Gender Theories

Key Concepts
- Relations of Ruling
- Bifurcation of Consciousness
- Institutional Ethnography
- Standpoint Theory

Dorothy E. Smith

Key Concepts
- Standpoint Epistemology
- Black Feminist Thought
- Matrix of Domination

Patricia Hill Collins

Key Concepts
- Object Relations Theory

Nancy Chodorow
There is no original or primary gender a drag imitates, but gender is a kind of imitation for which there is no original.

—Judith Butler

A Brief History of Women’s Rights in the United States

1700s

American colonial law held that “by marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law. The very being and legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated into that of her husband under whose wing and protection she performs everything.”

By 1777, women are denied the right to vote in all states in the United States.

(Continued)
The brief timeline above underscores an obvious but all-too-often overlooked point: the experience of women in society is not the same as that of men. In the United States, women’s rights have expanded considerably since the nineteenth century, when women were denied access to higher education and the right to own property and vote. Despite major advances, there are still some troubling gender gaps in the United States, however. Women still suffer disproportionately, leading to what sociologists refer to as the “feminization of poverty,” where two out of every three poor adults are women. In addition, in contrast to countries such as Sweden where 47 percent of elected officials in parliament are women, in the United States only about 17 percent of the politicians in the House or Senate are women, placing the United States a lowly sixty-first worldwide in the global ranking of women in politics (Gender Gap Index 2009; International Women’s Democracy Center 2008; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2010).

Yet, it was not until 2005 that women in Kuwait were granted the right to vote and stand for election (see Table 7.1), and sadly, as of this writing, women in Saudi Arabia do not yet have those political freedoms. Indeed, in a recent study by Freedom House, Saudi Arabia ranked last in all five categories analyzed in terms of women’s equality, although in none of the seventeen societies of the Arab Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) studied do women enjoy the same citizenship and nationality rights as men.¹ In Saudi Arabia, women are segregated in public places, are not allowed to drive cars, and must be covered from head to toe.

¹For instance, in no country in the region is domestic violence outlawed, and some laws, such as those that encourage men who rape women to marry their victims, even condone violence against women. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 representing the least rights and 5 representing the most rights available, Freedom House (2009) rated Saudi Arabia as follows: Nondiscrimination and Access to Justice 1.4; Autonomy, Security, and Freedom of the Person 1.3; Economic Rights and Equal Opportunity 1.7; Political Rights and Civic Voice 1.2; Social and Cultural Rights 1.6.
to toe when in public. Men are entitled to divorce without explanation simply by registering a statement to the court and repeating it three times. By contrast, most women not only lack the right to divorce, but also, because their children legally belong to the father, to leave their husband means giving up their children (Freedom House 2009; PBS 2002).

What these latter cases also demonstrate is that the expansion of women’s rights does not proceed automatically and must not be taken for granted. Laws that discriminate against women were instituted in the United States in the nineteenth century; these laws had not existed in previous decades. On a global scale, nowhere was the precariousness of women’s rights more evident than it was when the Taliban radically rescinded them in Afghanistan (1996–2002). Under the rule of the Taliban, women who had previously enjoyed many rights were banished from the workforce, forbidden an education, and prohibited from leaving their homes unless accompanied by a close male relative (PBS 2002).

Table 7.1  International Women’s Suffrage Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Australia&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Canada&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Austria, Germany, Poland, Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Britain, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Argentina, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>China</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>India</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Malaysia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Iran, Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Western Samoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Kazakhstan, Moldova</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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</tbody>
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NOTE: Two countries do not allow their people, male or female, to vote: Brunei and the United Arab Emirates. Saudi Arabia is the only country with suffrage that does not allow women to vote.

<sup>a</sup>Australian women, with the exception of aboriginal women, won the vote in 1902. Aboriginals, male and female, did not have the right to vote until 1962.

<sup>b</sup>Canadian women, with the exception of Canadian Indian women, won the vote in 1917. Canadian Indians, male and female, did not win the vote until 1960.
In this chapter, we explore the works of five different analysts who take seriously the distinct social situation of women and men and examine it from a variety of theoretical viewpoints. We begin with the Canadian sociologist Dorothy E. Smith, who provocatively blends neo-Marxist, phenomenological, and ethnomethodological concepts and ideas. We then turn to the work of African American sociologist Patricia Hill Collins, who extends the work of Smith by formally situating the variable of race into the critical/phenomenological exploration of class and gender, while also borrowing significantly from postmodernism and recent work on the body and sexuality. We then turn to the psychoanalytic feminist Nancy Chodorow, who draws on both the Frankfurt School and Freud to explore various factors that serve to perpetuate sexism. Both of the final two theorists featured in this chapter challenge the prevailing “sex/gender” dichotomy, i.e., the notion that “sex” is the biological difference between “male” and “female” human animals, while “gender” is the social difference “between males’ and females’ roles or men’s and women’s personalities” (Connell 2002:33). Australian sociologist Raewyn Connell explains how in many ways men and boys are gatekeepers for gender equality. Finally, in accordance with postmodern lines of thought, the American philosopher Judith Butler challenges the very binary categories that we use to think about both gender and sexual orientation.2

That gender analysts bring to bear such a wide variety of theoretical approaches brings us to the question, why not discuss each of these theorists in the chapter on the theoretical tradition of which they are a part? Although this is certainly an option for professors and students, as you will see, the feminists whose works you will read in this chapter do not fit very neatly into a single theoretical tradition; rather, they provocatively draw from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary wells in order to fully address feminist concerns. In addition, grouping feminist theorists together in this chapter better enables us to compare and contrast these various approaches to gender.

Significant Others

Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986): The Second Sex

Simone de Beauvoir was born in Paris in 1908 to a bourgeois family. Like her famous companion, Jean-Paul Sartre, whom she met at the École Normale Supérieure, she was an acclaimed French existentialist philosopher who wrote fiction and memoirs, as well as philosophy. In her most influential book, The Second Sex (1949), de Beauvoir argued that women have been defined by men and that if they attempt to break with this, they risk alienating themselves. Specifically, following Hegel, de Beauvoir maintained that

2To be sure, feminism has never been a unified body of thought, and there are various ways that feminisms and feminist theorists can be contemplated. One of the most common is according to political/ideological orientation. According to this approach, which typically equates “feminism” with “feminist theory,” “liberal feminists” such as Betty Friedan (see Significant Others, p. 317), focus on how political, economic, and social rights can be fully extended to women within contemporary society, while “radical feminists” such as Andrea Dworkin (1946–2005) and Catharine MacKinnon (1946–), most famous for their proposal for a law that defined pornography as a violation of women’s civil rights (thereby allowing women to sue the producers and distributors of pornography in a civil court for damages), view women as an oppressed group, who, like other oppressed peoples, must struggle for their liberation against their oppressors—in this case, men. However, here we consider feminists largely in terms of their theoretical orientation rather than in terms of their political/ideological commitment, because we view the former as prior to the latter (Alexander 1987:7). As discussed in Chapter 1, theoretical presuppositions are, by definition, simply the most basic assumptions that theorists make as they go about thinking and writing about the world (ibid.:12).
“otherness is a fundamental category of human thought” (ibid.:xvii). Women are defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute; she is the “Other.” Simone de Beauvoir links woman’s identity as Other and her fundamental alienation to her body—especially her reproductive capacity. Childbearing, childbirth, and menstruation are draining physical events that tie women to their bodies and to immanence. The male, however, is not tied down by such inherently physical events (ibid.:19–29, as cited in Donovan 1985/2000:137). In the struggle described by Sartre as that between pour-soi and en-soi, men are cast in the role of the pour-soi (for itself), that is, the continual process of self-realization, or creative freedom; while women are cast in the role of en-soi (in-itself), in which, instead of choosing to engage in the authenticating project of self-realization, they consent to become an object, to exist as en-soi (ibid.:136). De Beauvoir urged women “to decline to be the Other, to refuse to be a party to the deal” (ibid.:xx). Akin to earlier feminists such as Charlotte Perkins-Gilman (see Edles and Appelrouth 2005/2010:ch.5), de Beauvoir encouraged women to strengthen their “masculine” rational faculties and critical powers, to exist as a pour-soi, that is, a transcendent subject who constitutes her own future by means of creative projects (Donovan:130). However, de Beauvoir fully recognized that this moral choice was fraught with anxiety, since “women’s independent successes are in contradiction with her femininity, since the ‘true woman’ is required to make herself object, to be the Other” (ibid.:246). De Beauvoir died on April 14, 1986.

**Betty Friedan (1921–2006): The Feminine Mystique**

Betty Friedan was born Betty Naomi Goldstein in Peoria, Illinois, in 1921. She graduated from Smith College in 1942 with a B.A. in psychology. In 1958, she surveyed her Smith classmates and found that a great many of them were, like her, deeply dissatisfied with their lives. She turned her findings into a book, *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), which became an immediate and controversial best seller. It sold more than three million copies, was translated into a number of languages, and ushered in a new era of consciousness-raising. Friedan’s central thesis was that women suffered under a pervasive system of delusions and false values under which they were urged to find personal fulfillment, even identity, vicariously through the husbands and children to whom they were expected cheerfully to devote their lives. This restricted role of wife–mother, whose spurious glorification by advertisers and others was suggested by the title of the book, led almost inevitably to a sense of unreality or general spiritual malaise in the absence of genuine, creative, self-defining work. In effect, then, Friedan extended de Beauvoir’s writing in a more popular form. In 1966, Friedan co-founded the National Organization for Women, a civil rights group dedicated to achieving equality of opportunity for women. It became the largest and probably the most effective organization in the women’s movement. Friedan also helped found the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws in 1969, and the National Women’s Political Caucus in 1971. Friedan’s other major works include *It Changed My Life: Writings on the Women’s Movement* (1963); *The Second Stage* (1981); and *The Fountain of Age* (1993), which focuses on the psychology of old age and urges a revision of society’s view that aging means loss and depletion. Betty Friedan died on February 5, 2006, in Washington, DC.
Dorothy E. Smith was born in the north of England in 1926. She worked at a variety of jobs and was a secretary at a publishing company before she decided to enhance her employment prospects by attaining a college degree. She began college at the London School of Economics in 1951, and received her bachelor’s degree in sociology in 1955. She and her husband then decided to both go on to graduate school at the University of California, Berkeley. Smith maintains that, although her years at Berkeley were in many ways the unhappiest of her life, she learned a lot, both inside and outside the classroom (University of California n.d.). Through “the experience of marriage, of immigration closely following marriage, . . . of the arrival of children, of the departure of a husband rather early one morning, of the jobs that became available” she learned about the discrepancy between social scientific description and lived experience (Smith 1987:65). Through courses in survey methods and mathematical sociology, she learned a type of sociological methodology that she would come to reject, but with which she would come to formulate her own opposing methodology. Through a wonderful course taught by Tamotsu Shibutani, she gained a deep appreciation for George Herbert Mead, which “laid the groundwork for a later deep involvement with the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty” (Institutional Ethnography n.d.).

After completing her doctorate in sociology in 1963, Smith worked as a research sociologist and lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley. At times, she was the only woman in the university’s department of sociology. Deeply moved by the newly emerging women’s movement, Smith organized a session for graduate students to “tell their stories” about gender inequities in academia (of which “there were many”) (ibid.).

By the late 1960s, Smith’s marriage had fallen apart, and, lacking daycare and family support, she returned home to England to raise her children and teach. She became a lecturer in sociology at the University of Essex, Colchester. Several years later, Smith accepted a full-time position at the University of British Columbia, and it was here that Smith’s feminist transformation, which had begun in Berkeley, deepened. Smith taught one of the first women’s studies courses; the lack of existing materials gave her impetus to “go from the kind of deep changes in my psyche that accompanied the women’s movement to writing those changes into the social” (ibid.). Smith also helped create a women’s action group that worked to improve the status of women “at all levels of the university”; she was involved in establishing a women’s research center in Vancouver outside the university that would provide action-relevant research to women’s organizations (ibid.). Smith also edited a volume providing a feminist critique of psychiatry (Women Look at Psychiatry: I’m Not Mad, I’m Angry, 1975) and began to reread Marx and integrate Marxist ideas into her work, as is reflected in her pamphlet Feminism and Marxism: A Place to Begin, a Way to Go (1977).3

In 1977, Smith became a professor in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. Here Smith published the works for which she is most well known, including The Everyday World as Problematic (1987), The Conceptual Practices of Power (1990), Texts, Facts, and Femininity (1990), Writing the Social (1999), and, most recently, Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People (2005). In these works, Smith exhorts a powerful feminist theory of what she calls relations of ruling, and she sets out her own approach, which she calls institutional ethnography, as a means for building knowledge as to how the relations of ruling operate from the standpoints of the people participating in them. These pivotal ideas will be discussed further below.

3Interestingly, Smith (1977:9) maintains that, although she worked as a socialist when she was a young woman in England, it was not until she reread Marx in the 1970s that she came to really understand what Marx meant.
Smith continues to be an active teacher and scholar. As professor emerita in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto and an adjunct professor in the Department of Sociology, University of Victoria, British Columbia, she continues to educate and inspire a new generation of scholars dedicated to institutional ethnography (see, for instance, Campbell and Manicom 1995).

**SMITH’S INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES AND CORE IDEAS**

Although Dorothy Smith has written on a wide variety of topics, including education, Marxism, the family, mental illness, and textual analysis, she is most well known as one of the originators of **standpoint theory**. Smith uses the notion of **standpoint** to emphasize that what one knows is affected by where one stands (one’s subject position) in society. We begin from the world as we actually experience it, and what we know of the world and of the “other” is conditional on that location (Smith 1987). Yet, Smith’s argument is not that we cannot look at the world in any way other than from our given standpoint. Rather, her point is that (1) no one can have complete, objective knowledge; (2) no two people have exactly the same standpoint; and (3) we must not take the standpoint from which we speak for granted. Instead, we must recognize it, be reflexive about it, and problematize it. Our situated, everyday experience should serve as a “point of entry” of investigation (Smith 2005:10).

Put in another way, the goal of Smith’s feminist sociology is to explicitly reformulate sociological theory by fully accounting for the standpoint of gender and its effects on our experience of reality. Interestingly, it was Smith’s particular standpoint as a female in a male-dominated world, and specifically as simultaneously a wife, mother, and sociology graduate student in the 1960s, that led her to the formulation of her notion of standpoint. By overtly recognizing the particular standpoint from which she spoke, Smith was bringing to the fore the extent to which the issue of standpoint had been unacknowledged in sociology. This point is quite ironic, really. Sociology was explicitly set out as the “scientific” and “objective” study of society when it first emerged as a discipline in the nineteenth century, but because its first practitioners were almost exclusively men, it implicitly assumed and reflected the relevancies, interests, and perspectives of (white, middle-class) males. “Its method, conceptual schemes and theories had been based on and built up within the male social universe” (Smith 1990a:23).

The failure to recognize the particular standpoints from which they spoke not only left sociologists unaware of the biases inherent to their position; in addition, it implicitly made the discipline of sociology a **masculine** sociology. In other words, by focusing on the world of paid labor, politics, and formal organizations ( spheres of influence from which women have historically been excluded) and erasing or ignoring women’s world of sexual reproduction, children, household labor, and affective ties, sociology unwittingly served as a vehicle for alienating women from their own lives (Seidman 1994:212–13). This is the irony mentioned previously: at the same time that

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4The term “feminist standpoint theory” was actually not coined by Smith. Rather, feminist standpoint theory (and hence “standpoint theory”) is traced to Sandra Harding (1986), who, based on her reading of the work of feminist theorists—of which the most important were Dorothy Smith, Nancy Hartsock, and Hilary Rose—used the term to describe a feminist critique beyond the strictly empirical one of claiming a special privilege for women’s knowledge, and emphasizing that knowledge is always rooted in a particular position and that women are privileged epistemologically by being members of an oppressed group (“epistemology” means how we know what we know, how we decide what is valid knowledge) (Smith 2005:8; see also Harding 2004).

5Although Smith did not focus on race, as you will shortly see, Patricia Hill Collins built on Smith’s work by illuminating how race is intertwined with gender and class standpoints.
sociology emerged as a provocative new discipline dedicated to explaining the inequalities and systems of stratification at the heart of various societies (especially apparent, for instance, in Marx and Weber), it created its own version of domination by shifting attention almost exclusively to one particular dimension of human social life—the masculine-dominated macrolevel public sphere—at the expense of another—the world of women.

In short, Smith underscores not only that the standpoint of men is consistently privileged and that of women devalued, but also that the standpoint of the (white) male upper class pervades and dominates other worldviews. This idea—that not all standpoints are equally valued and accessed in society—clearly reflects Smith’s critical/Marxist roots. As discussed previously, beginning with her pamphlet *Feminism and Marxism* (Smith 1977), Smith explicitly links her feminism with Marxism. She explains how “objective social, economic and political relations . . . shape and determine women’s oppression” (ibid.:12). She focuses on “the relations between patriarchy and class in the context of the capitalist mode of production” (Smith 1983:1) and emphasizes how “the inner experiences which also involved our exercise of oppression against ourselves were ones that had their location in the society outside and originated there” (Smith 1977:10).

Yet, Smith’s feminist theory is not just derived from an application of Marx to the issue of gender; rather, it reflects Smith’s phenomenological roots (see Chapter 6), as well. Specifically, Smith links a neo-Marxist concern about structures of domination with a phenomenological emphasis on consciousness and the active construction of the taken-for-granted world. She explicitly demonstrates the extent to which men and women bracket and view the world in distinctive ways, in conjunction with their distinct, biographically articulated lifeworlds. In her own case, for instance, Smith recognizes that she experienced “two subjectivities, home and university” that could not be blended, for “they ran on separate tracks with distinct phenomenal organization” (Smith 2005:11). “Home was organized around the particularities of my children’s bodies, faces, movements, the sound of their voices, the smell of their hair . . . and the multitudes of the everyday that cannot be enumerated,” while the “practice of subjectivity in the university excluded the local and bodily from its field” (ibid.:12). In this way, Smith (1987:83–84) notes that female-dominated work in the concrete world of the everyday demands one to be attuned to the sensory experiences of the body. “Here there are textures and smells. . . . It has to happen here somehow if she is to experience it at all” (ibid.:82). The abstract world of the professions, conversely, requires an individual to take this level of experience for granted.

Smith is particularly indebted to the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz (see Chapter 6). Recall that it was Schutz (1970:11, as cited in Smith 1987:83) who argued that we put various levels of our personality “in play” in various provinces of reality. Schutz used the term mitwelt relations to refer to relations in which individuals are experienced as “types” (e.g., the relationship between you and the person who delivers your mail), and he used the term umwelt relations to refer to more intimate face-to-face relations. According to Schutz, in contrast to mitwelt relations, in which others are experienced only indirectly, that is, as social “types,” in umwelt relations each person must be aware of the other’s body as a field of expression that fosters the development of intersubjectivity. Smith (1987:83) extends Schutz’s distinction between umwelt and mitwelt relations by asserting, “if men are to participate fully in the abstract mode of action, they must be liberated from having to attend to their needs in the concrete and particular.” That is, traditionally not only are umwelt relations more central in women’s lives, but also men relegate their umwelt relations to women (for instance, a boss has his secretary shop for an anniversary present for his wife and make his personal calls). Thus, Smith argues that “women’s work conceals from men the actual concrete forms on which their work depends” (ibid.:83–84).

This brings us to Smith’s concept of bifurcation of consciousness. Smith uses this term to refer to a separation or split between the world as you actually experience it and the
dominant view to which you must adapt (e.g., a masculine point of view). The notion of bifurcation of consciousness underscores that subordinate groups are conditioned to view the world from the perspective of the dominant group, since the perspective of the latter is embedded in the institutions and practices of that world. Conversely, the dominant group enjoys the privilege of remaining oblivious to the worldview of the Other, or subordinate group, since the Other is fully expected to accommodate to them. The “governing mode” of the professions, then, creates a bifurcation of consciousness in the actor: “It establishes two modes of knowing, experiencing, and acting—one located in the body and in the space that it occupies and moves into, the other passing beyond it” (ibid.:82).

Of course, bifurcation of consciousness reflects Smith’s own experience of living in “two worlds”: the dominant, masculine-oriented, “abstract” world of the sociologist, and the “concrete” world of wife and mother. The key point, as Smith (2005:11) notes, is that “the two subjectivities, home and university, could not be blended.” In this way, Smith’s concept of bifurcation of consciousness recalls W. E. B. Du Bois’s concept of “double consciousness,” which he used to describe the experiential condition of black Americans. In both cases, it is the oppressed person who must adapt to the “rules of the game” that do not reflect her interests or desires, even though, in both cases, the dual subjectivities provide a uniquely “clairvoyant” vantage point (in Du Bois’s terms). Thus, for instance, women in male-dominated professions (e.g., law enforcement, construction) acclimate themselves to sexist and even misogynistic talk about the female body that is a normal part of their everyday work environment. Not only do they learn to ignore the banter, but also, indeed, they might even chime in. However, because they must continually accommodate themselves to the dominant group in order to gain acceptance in a world that is not theirs, members of oppressed or minority groups become alienated from their “true” selves.

Thus far, we have discussed Smith’s dual neo-Marxist and phenomenological roots. There is also an important discursive bent in Smith’s work that has become especially apparent in the last decade, however. In conjunction with the poststructuralist turn (see Chapter 8), Smith emphasizes that in modern, Western societies, social domination operates through texts (such as medical records, census reports, psychiatric evaluations, employment files) that facilitate social control. Thus, Smith (1990b:6) describes relations of ruling as including not only forms such as “bureaucracy, administration, management, professional organization and media,” but also “the complex of discourses, scientific, technical, and cultural, that intersect, interpenetrate, and coordinate” them. Smith (1987:4) maintains that behind and within the “apparently neutral and impersonal rationality of the ruling apparatus” is concealed a “male subtext.” Women are “excluded from the practices of power within textually mediated relations of ruling” (ibid.). Thus, for instance, official psychiatric evaluations replace the individual’s actual lived experience with a means for interpreting it; the individual becomes a case history, a type, a disease, a syndrome, and a treatment possibility (Seidman 1994:216).

Smith goes on to suggest that because sociology too relies on these same kinds of texts, it too is part and parcel of the relations of ruling. The subject matter and topics of sociology are those of the ruling powers. Sociological knowledge receives its shape less from actualities and the lived experiences of real individuals than from the interests in control and regulation, by the state, professional associations, and bureaucratization (ibid.:216).

Most important, Smith does not just criticize modern, “masculinist” sociology; she provides an alternative to it. Inspired by Marx’s historical realism but also drawing on ethnography—which, as discussed in Chapter 6, considers that practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical sociological reasoning must not be taken for granted but rather

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be topics of empirical study (Garfinkel 1967:1)—Smith advocates a “sociology for women” that begins “where women are situated”: in the “particularities of an actual, everyday world” (Smith 1987:109). Smith’s sociology for women aims not to “transform people into objects” but to “preserve their presence as subjects” (ibid.:151). Smith (ibid.:143) argues that the “only route to a faithful telling that does not privilege the perspectives arising in the sites of her sociological project and her participation in a sociological discourse is to commit herself to an inquiry that is ontologically faithful, faithful to the presence and activity of her subjects and faithful to the actualities of the world that arises for her, for them, for all of us, in the ongoing co-ordering of our actual practices.”

Smith calls her particular approach institutional ethnography. Institutional ethnography is a method of elucidating and examining the relationship between everyday activities and experiences and larger institutional imperatives. Interestingly, the very term “institutional ethnography” explicitly couples an emphasis on structures of power (“institutions”) with the microlevel practices that make up everyday life (“ethnography”). Smith’s point, of course, is that it is in microlevel, everyday practices at the level of the individual that collective, hierarchical patterns of social structure are experienced, shaped, and reaffirmed. For instance, in one passage you will read, Smith explains how the seemingly benign, everyday act of walking her dog actually reaffirms the class system. As Smith “keeps an eye on her dog” so that it does its business on some lawns as opposed to others, she is, in fact, “observing some of the niceties of different forms of property ownership” (renters versus owners) (Smith 1987:155); she is participating in the existing relations of ruling. This point is illustrated in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1 Smith’s Concept of Institutional Ethnography: Walking the Dog

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7In her most recent book, Smith (2005) updates her terminology by replacing the notion of “a sociology for women” with that of “a sociology for people.” In other words, the notion of “a sociology for women” can be understood as reflecting a particular historical era in which feminists called attention to the fact that the standpoint of women was absent in the academy. Today, however, the more pertinent (and more postmodern) point is that we must begin wherever we are—that is, in terms not only of “gender,” but also of class, race, sexual orientation, ablebodiedness, and so on. This is institutional ethnography.
Smith’s theoretical approach is explicitly multidimensional, as can be readily seen in her central concepts (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). For instance, as discussed above, the term “institutional ethnography” explicitly reflects Smith’s dual emphasis on collective structures of ruling/the institutionalization of power and their actual workings at the level of the individual in everyday life. In terms of action, as shown in Figure 7.1, institutional ethnography can be said to reflect a rationalistic emphasis on practical action both at the level of the individual and at the collective level of the institution; however, clearly Smith’s phenomenological roots lead her to appreciate the nonrational motivation for action, as well. Above all, Smith emphasizes that taken-for-granted, subjective categories provide the backdrop for the pragmatic performances that constitute the everyday world and, in doing so, reaffirm the existing structural order. For instance, in the example above, it is only because of her internalization of taken-for-granted notions of class and private property that Smith knows how and where to walk her dog. In Schutz’s terms, she uses specific “recipes” (see Chapter 6) and taken-for-granted habits, which, by definition, work at the individual/nonrational level.

So, too, the term “standpoint” reflects Smith’s dual rational and nonrational approach to action and individual and collective approach to order, in that “standpoint” refers both to our objective (rational) position and our subjective (nonrational) position in the (collective) social hierarchy, and to our unique biographical (individual) situation. For instance, as shown in Figure 7.2, my “standpoint” as a mother is rooted at once in the meaning (including social status or honor) accorded to “mothers” in general in our society, as determined by the complexes of discourses that are part of relations of ruling (collective/nonrational), and the specific reward structure accrued to that position by the (collective/rational) institutions.
organizing and regulating society (collective/rational) as well. That said, above all, “stand-
point” reflects the specific attitudes, emotions, and values that I experience and internalize at
the level of the individual (individual/nonrational) as well as the habituated day-to-day expe-
rience, and the particular strategic advantages and disadvantages I am able to accrue through
this position and my mundane working existence (individual/rational).

Put in another way, Smith articulates not only how individuals unthinkingly “do” gender
(and class) in daily life at the individual/nonrational level, but also the subjective categories
that make this possible—that is, the taken-for-granted understandings of what it means to
be a “boy” or a “girl” that reflect the collective, nonrational realm. Akin to Schutz and
Berger and Luckmann (see Chapter 6) as well as the poststructuralists who emphasize dis-
course and are discussed in the next chapter, Smith continually emphasizes that gender
cannot be “done” at the individual level in everyday life without taken-for-granted conceptual-
izations at the collective level.

In a similar vein, that Smith’s concept “relations of ruling” encompasses both such forms
as “bureaucracy, administration, management, professional organization and media” and
scientific, technical, and cultural discourses, reflects the collective/rational and collective/
nonrational realms, respectively (see Figure 7.2). Specifically, that Smith (2005:227;
emphasis added) defines ruling relations as “objectified forms of consciousness and organi-
zation, constituted externally to particular places and people,” clearly reflects her collectiv-
istic orientation to order. And although Smith also underscores that ruling relations refer to
“that total complex of activities, differentiated into many spheres . . . through which we are
ruled and through which we, and I emphasize this we, participate in ruling” (Smith 1990a,
as cited in Calhoun 2003:316; emphasis in original), which indicates an acknowledgment of
individual agency, that “forms of consciousness are created that are properties of organiza-
tion or discourse rather than of individual subjects” (Smith 1987:3, emphasis added) clearly
reflects a collectivistic approach to order. This dual rational/nonrational approach to action
and collectivistic approach to order inherent in Smith’s concept of relations of ruling is
illustrated in Figure 7.2. Interestingly, then, taken together, Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate that
the multidimensionality of the concept of institutional ethnography is a function of its incor-
poration of the more individualistic concept of standpoint and the more collectivistic con-
cept of ruling relations.

Readings

Introduction to Institutional Ethnography

In this excerpt from her most recent book, Institutional Ethnography (2005), Smith
explicitly defines “institutional ethnography” and explains how she came to formulate
this unique method of inquiry. In addition, Smith explains the historical trajectory of
gender and relations of ruling—that is, how the radical division between spheres of action
and of consciousness of middle-class men and women came to emerge. As indicated pre-
viously, it is precisely this conceptualization of relations of ruling (or ruling relations) as
not simply modes of domination but also forms of consciousness that forms the crux of
Smith’s work.
Women’s Standpoint: Embodied Knowing vs the Ruling Relations

It’s hard to recall just how radical the experience of the women’s movement was at its inception for those of us who had lived and thought within the masculinist regime against which the movement struggled. For us, the struggle was as much within ourselves, with what we knew how to do and think and feel, as with that regime as an enemy outside us. Indeed we ourselves had participated however passively in that regime. There was no developed discourse in which the experiences that were spoken originally as everyday experience could be translated into a public language and become political in the ways distinctive to the women’s movement. We learned in talking with other women about experiences that we had and about others that we had not had. We began to name “oppression,” “rape,” “harassment,” “sexism,” “violence,” and others. These were terms that did more than name. They gave shared experiences a political presence.

Starting with our experiences as we talked and thought about them, we discovered depths of alienation and anger that were astonishing. Where had all these feelings been? How extraordinary were the transformations we experienced as we discovered with other women how to speak with one another about such experiences and then how to bring them forward publicly, which meant exposing them to men. Finally, how extraordinary were the transformations of ourselves in this process. Talking our experience was a means of discovery. What we did not know and did not know how to think about, we could examine as we found what we had in common. The approach that I have taken in developing an alternative sociology takes up women’s standpoint in a way that is modeled on these early adventures of the women’s movement. It takes up women’s standpoint not as a given and finalized form of knowledge but as a ground in experience from which discoveries are to be made.

It is this active and shared process of speaking from our experience, as well as acting and organizing to change how those experiences had been created, that has been translated in feminist thinking into the concept of a feminist standpoint—or, for me, women’s standpoint. However the concept originated, Sandra Harding (1988) drew together the social scientific thinking by feminists, particularly Nancy Hartsock, Hilary Rose, and myself, that had as a common project taking up a standpoint in women’s experience. Harding argued that feminist empiricists who claimed both a special privilege for women’s knowledge and an objectivity were stuck in an irresolvable paradox. Those she described as “feminist standpoint theorists” moved the feminist critique a step beyond feminist empiricism by claiming that knowledge of society must always be from a position in it and that women are privileged epistemologically by being members of an oppressed group. Like the slave in Hegel’s parable of the master-slave relationship, they can see more, further, and better than the master precisely because of their marginalized and oppressed condition. She was, however, critical of the way in which experience in the women’s movement had come to hold authority as a ground for speaking, and claiming to speak truly, that challenged the rational and objectified forms of knowledge and their secret masculine subject. Furthermore, feminist standpoint theory, according to Harding, implicitly reproduced the universalized subject and claims to objective truth of traditional philosophical discourse, an implicit return to the empiricism we claimed to have gone beyond.

The notion of women’s standpoint—or indeed the notion that women’s experience has special authority—has also been challenged by feminist theorists. It fails to take into account diversities of

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class and race as well as the various forms and modulations of gender. White middle-class heterosexual women dominated the early phases of the women’s movement in the 1960s and 1970s, but soon our, and I speak as one, assumptions about what would hold for women in general were challenged and undermined, first by working-class women and lesbians, then by African-North American, Hispanic, and Native women. The implicit presence of class, sexuality, and colonialism began to be exposed. Our assumptions were also challenged by women in other societies whose experience wasn’t North American, by women such as those with disabilities and older women whose experience was not adequately represented and, as the women’s movement evolved over time, by younger women who have found the issues of older feminists either alien or irrelevant.

The theoretical challenge to the notion of women’s standpoint has been made in terms of its alleged essentialism. It has been seen as essentialist because it excludes other bases of oppression and inequity that intersect with the category “women.” The critique of essentialism, however, assumes the use of the category “women” or “woman” to identify shared and defining attributes. While essentialism has been a problem in the theorizing of woman, it cannot be extended to all uses of such categories. In practice in the women’s movement, the category has worked politically rather than referentially. As a political concept, it coordinates struggle against the masculinist forms of oppressing women that those forms themselves explicitly or implicitly universalize. Perhaps most important, it creates for women what had been missing, a subject position in the public sphere and, more generally, one in the political, intellectual, and cultural life of the society.

Claiming a subject position within the public sphere in the name of women was a central enterprise of the women’s movement in its early days in the 1970s and 1980s. A powerful dynamic was created. While those making the claim first were white middle-class women, the new subject position in public discourse opened the way for others who had found themselves excluded by those who’d gone before. Their claims were positioned and centered differently, and their own experience became authoritative. It is indeed one of the extraordinary characteristics of the women’s movement that its continual disruption, its internal struggles against racism and white cultural dominance, its internal quarrels and angers, have been far from destructive to the movement. On the contrary, these struggles in North America and Europe have expanded and diversified the movement as women other than those with whom it originated gave their own experiences voice.

**Women’s Standpoint and the Ruling Relations**

Standpoint is a term lifted out of the vernacular, largely through Harding’s innovative thinking and her critique (1988), and it is used for doing new discursive work. Harding identifies standpoint in terms of the social positioning of the subject of knowledge, the knower and creator of knowledge. Her own subsequent work develops an epistemology that relies on a diversity of subject positions in the sociopolitical-economic regimes of colonialism and imperialism. The version of standpoint that I have worked with, after I had adopted the term from Harding (previously I’d written of “perspective” . . . ) is rather different. It differs also from the concept of a feminist standpoint that has been put forward by Nancy Hartsock in that it does not identify a socially determined position or category of position in society (or political economy). Rather, my notion of women’s (rather

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1Hartsock’s concern is to reframe historical materialism so that women’s experience and interests are fully integrated. Of particular importance to her is the adequate recognition of the forms of power that the women’s movement has named “patriarchal.” Women’s marginal position, structured as it is around the work associated with reproduction and the direct production of subsistence, locates women distinctively in the mode of production in general. For her, taking a feminist standpoint introduces a dimension into historical materialism neglected by Marx and his successors. She designs a feminist standpoint that has a specifically political import. It might, I suppose, be criticized as essentialist, but, if we consider not just North America and not just white middle-class professional North America, it’s hard to deny that Hartsock is characterizing a reality for women worldwide. In Canada a recent census report shows that while women’s participation in the paid labor force has increased substantially over the past thirty years, “women remain more than twice as likely as men to do at least 30 hours a week of cooking and cleaning” (Andersen 2003, A7) and are more involved in child care than men, particularly care of younger children.
than feminist) standpoint is integral to the design of what I originally called “a sociology for women,” which has necessarily been transformed into “a sociology for people.” It does not identify a position or a category of position, gender, class, or race within the society, but it does establish as a subject position for institutional ethnography as a method of inquiry, a site for the knower that is open to anyone.

As a method of inquiry, institutional ethnography is designed to create an alternate to the objectified subject of knowledge of established social scientific discourse. The latter conforms to and is integrated with what I have come to call the “ruling relations”—that extraordinary yet ordinary complex of relations that are textually mediated, that connect us across space and time and organize our everyday lives—the corporations, government bureaucracies, academic and professional discourses, mass media, and the complex of relations that interconnect them. At the inception of this early stage of late-twentieth-century women’s movement, women were excluded from appearing as agents or subjects with the ruling relations. However we might have been at work in them, we were subordinates. We were women whose work as mothers reproduced the same gendered organization that subordinated us; we were the support staff, store clerks, nurses, social workers doing casework and not administration, and so on. In the university itself, we were few and mostly marginal (two distinguished women in the department where I first worked in Canada had never had more than annual lectureships).

“Standpoint” as the design of a subject position in institutional ethnography creates a point of entry into discovering the social that does not subordinate the knowing subject to objectified forms of knowledge of society or political economy. It is a method of inquiry that works from the actualities of people’s everyday lives and experience to discover the social as it extends beyond experience. A standpoint in people’s everyday lives is integral to that method. It is integral to a sociology creating a subject position within its discourse, which anyone can occupy. The institutional ethnographer works from the social in people’s experience to discover its presence and organization in their lives and to explicate or map that organization beyond the local of the everyday.

The project of developing a sociology that does not objectify originated, as did so much in the women’s movement, in exploring experiences in my life as a woman. That exploration put into question the fundamentals of the sociology I had learned at length and sometimes painfully as an undergraduate and graduate school student. I was, in those early times, a sociologist teaching at the University of British Columbia, on the west coast of Canada, and a single parent with two small boys. My experience was of contradictory modes of working existence: on the one hand was the work of the home and of being a mother; on the other, the work of the academy, preparing for classes, teaching, faculty meetings, writing papers, and so on. I could not see my work at home in relation to the sociology I taught, in part, of course, because that sociology had almost nothing to say about it.

I learned from the women’s movement to begin in my own experience and start there in finding the voice that asserted the buried woman. I started to explore what it might mean to think sociologically from the place where I was in-body, living with my children in my home and with those cares and consciousness that are integral to that work. Here were the particularities of my relationships with my children, my neighbors, my friends, our rabbit (surprisingly fierce and destructive—my copy of George Herbert Mead’s *Mind, Self, and Society* bears scars inflicted by our long-eared pet’s teeth and claws), our two dogs, and an occasional hamster. In this mode, I was attentive to the varieties of demands that housekeeping, cooking, child care, and the multiple minor tasks of our local settings made on me. When I went to work in the university, I did not, of course, step out of my body, living with my children in my home and with those cares and consciousness that are integral to that work. Here were the particularities of my relationships with my children, my neighbors, my friends, our rabbit (surprisingly fierce and destructive—my copy of George Herbert Mead’s *Mind, Self, and Society* bears scars inflicted by our long-eared pet’s teeth and claws), our two dogs, and an occasional hamster. In this mode, I was attentive to the varieties of demands that housekeeping, cooking, child care, and the multiple minor tasks of our local settings made on me. When I went to work in the university, I did not, of course, step out of my body, but the focus of my work was not on the local particularities of relationships and setting but on sociological discourse read and taught or on the administrative work of a university department. Body, of course, was there as it had to be to get the work done, but the work was not organized by and in relation to it.

The two subjectivities, home and university, could not be blended. They ran on separate tracks with distinct phenomenal organization. Memory, attention, reasoning, and response were
organized quite differently. Remembering a dental appointment for one of the children wasn’t part of my academic consciousness, and if I wasn’t careful to find some way of reminding myself that didn’t depend on memory, I might have well forgot it. My experiences uncovered radical differences between home and academy in how they were situated, and how they situated me, in the society. Home was organized around the particularities of my children’s bodies, faces, movements, the sounds of their voices, the smell of their hair, the arguments, the play, the evening rituals of reading, the stress of getting them off to school in the morning, cooking, and serving meals, and the multitudes of the everyday that cannot be enumerated, an intense, preoccupying world of work that also cannot really be defined. My work at the university was quite differently articulated; the sociology I thought and taught was embedded in the texts that linked me into a discourse extending indefinitely into only very partially known networks of others, some just names of the dead; some the heroes and masters of the contemporary discipline; some just names on books or articles; and others known as teachers, colleagues, and contemporaries in graduate school. The administrative work done by faculty tied into the administration of the university, known at that time only vaguely as powers such as dean or president or as offices such as the registrar, all of whom regulated the work we did with students. My first act on arriving in the department office, after greeting the secretaries, was to open my mail and thus to enter a world of action in texts.

I knew a practice of subjectivity in the university that excluded the local and bodily from its field. Learning from the women’s movement to start from where I was as a woman, I began to attend to the university and my work there from the standpoint of “home” subjectivity. I started to notice what I had not seen before. How odd, as I am walking down the central mall of that university that opens up to the dark blue of the humped islands and the further snowy mountains to the north, to see on my left a large hole where before there had been a building! In the mode of the everyday you can find the connections, though you may not always understand them. In a house with children and dogs and rabbits, the connection between the destruction of the spine of my copy of Mind, Self, and Society and that rabbit hanging around in my workspace was obvious. But the hole where once there’d been a building couldn’t be connected to any obvious agent. The peculiar consciousness I practiced in the university began to emerge for me as a puzzlingly strange form of organization. If I traced the provenance of that hole, I’d be climbing up into an order of relations linking administrative process with whatever construction company was actually responsible for the making of the hole; I’d be climbing into a web of budgets, administrative decisions, provincial and federal government funding, and so on and so on. I’d be climbing into that order of relations that institutional ethnographers call the “ruling relations.” These could be seen as relations that divorced the subject from the particularized settings and relationships of her life and work as mother and housewife. They created subject positions that elevated consciousness into a universalized mode, whether of the social relations mediated by money or of those organized as objectivity in academic or professional discourse. Practicing embodiment on the terrain of the disembodied of those relations brought them into view. I became aware of them as I became aware of their presence and power in the everyday, and, going beyond that hole in the ground, I also began to think of the sociology I practiced in the everyday working world of the university as an organization of discursive relations fully integrated with them.

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Introduction to The Everyday World as Problematic

In this reading taken from The Everyday World as Problematic (1987), Smith further elucidates institutional ethnography using concrete examples from her own experience. As you will see, by starting from her own experience Smith does not mean that she engages only in a self-indulgent inner exploration with herself as sole focus and object. Rather, Smith means that she begins from her own original but tacit knowledge as well as from the acts by which
she brings this knowledge into her grasp (Calhoun 2003:320). As Smith states, “we can never escape the circles of our own heads if we accept that as our territory. . . . We aim not at a reiteration of what we already (tacitly) know, but at an exploration of what passes beyond that knowledge and is deeply implicated in how it is” (ibid.).

**The Everyday World as Problematic (1987)**

Dorothy Smith

**Institutional Ethnography:**
**A Feminist Research Strategy**

**Institutional Relations as Generalizers of Actual Local Experience**

Let me give an everyday example of what I mean by the “problematic of the everyday world.” When I take my dog for a walk in the morning, I observe a number of what we might call “conventions.” I myself walk on the sidewalk; I do not walk on the neighbors’ lawns. My dog, however, freely runs over the lawns. My dog also, if I am not careful, may shit on a neighbor’s lawn, and there are certainly some neighbors who do not like this. I am, of course, aware of this problem, and I try to arrange for my dog to do his business in places that are appropriate. I am particularly careful to see that he avoids the well-kept lawns because those are the ones I know I am most likely to be in trouble over should I/he slip up—which does happen occasionally. The neighborhood I live in is a mixture of single-family residences and rental units, and the differences between the well- and ill-kept lawns are related to this. On the whole, those living in rental units do not care so much about the appearance of their front lawn, whereas those who own their own residences are more likely to give care and attention to the grass and sometimes to the flower beds in front of the house.

So as I walk down the street keeping an eye on my dog I am observing some of the niceties of different forms of property ownership. I try to regulate my dog’s behavior with particular scrupulosity in relation to the property rights of the owners of single-family dwellings and am a little more casual where I know the house consists of rented apartments or bachelor units, or, as in one case, a fraternity house.¹

Customarily in sociology we talk about this behavior in terms of norms. Then we see my selection of a path of behavior for my dog as guided by certain norms held in common by myself and my neighbors. But something important escapes this. The notion of “norm” provides for the surface properties of my behavior, what I can be seen to be doing—in general preventing my dog from shitting on others’ lawns and being particularly careful where negative sanctions are more likely to be incurred. A description of the kind I have given is in this way transposed into a normative statement.

As a norm it is represented as governing the observed behavior. What is missing, however, is an account of the constitutive work that is going on. This account arises from a process of practical reasoning. How I walk my dog attends to and constitutes in an active way different forms of property as a locally realized organization. The normative analysis misses how this local course of action is articulated to social relations. Social relations here mean concerted sequences or courses of social action implicating more than

¹The more tender and civic-minded of my readers may like to know that two things have changed in my life since I wrote this. One is that I no longer have a dog of my own. I do, however, sometimes dog-sit my two sons’ dogs. The second is that we now have “poop ‘n’ scoop” laws in Toronto, so I have learned to overcome my rural-bred tendencies to let the shit lie where it falls.
one individual whose participants are not necessarily present or known to one another. There are social relations that are not encompassed by the setting in which my dog is walked, but they nonetheless enter in and organize it. The existence of single-family dwellings, of rental units, and the like has reference to and depends upon the organization of the state at various levels, its local by-laws, zoning laws, and so forth determining the “real estate” character of the neighborhood; it has reference to and depends upon the organization of a real estate market in houses and apartments, and the work of the legal profession and others; it has reference to and organizes the ways in which individual ownership is expressed in local practices that maintain the value of the property both in itself and as part of a respectable neighborhood. Thus this ordinary daily scene, doubtless enacted by many in various forms and settings, has an implicit organization tying each particular local setting to a larger generalized complex of social relations.

The language of the everyday world as it is incorporated into the description of that world is rooted in social relations beyond it and expresses relations not peculiar to the particular setting it describes. In my account of walking the dog, there are categories anchored in and depending for their meaning on a larger complex of social relations. The meaning of such terms as “single-family residence” and “rental units,” for example, resides in social relations organizing local settings but not fully present in them. The particularizing description gives access to that which is not particular since it is embedded in categories whose meaning reaches into the complex of social relations our inquiry would explicate. Ordinary descriptions, ordinary talk, trail along with them as a property of the meaning of their terms, the extended social relations they name as phenomena.

Thus taking the everyday world as problematic does not confine us to particular descriptions of local settings without possibility of generalization. This has been seen to be the problem with sociological ethnographies, which, however fascinating as accounts of people’s lived worlds, cannot stand as general or typical statements about society and social relations. They have been seen in themselves as only a way station to the development of systematic research procedures that would establish the level of generality or typicality of what has been observed of such-and-such categories of persons. Or they may be read as instances of a general sociological principle. This procedure has been turned on its head in an ingenious fashion in “grounded theory,” which proposes a method of distilling generalizing concepts from the social organization of the local setting observed whereupon the latter becomes an instance of the general principles distilled from it. The popularity of this device testifies to the extent to which the problem of generalizability is felt by sociologists. The single case has no significance unless it can in some way or another be extrapolated to some general statement either about society or some subgroup represented methodologically as a population of individuals, or connecting the local and particular with a generalizing concept of sociological discourse.

Beginning with the everyday world as problematic bypasses this issue. The relation of the local and particular to generalized social relations is not a conceptual or methodological issue, it is a property of social organization. The particular “case” is not particular in the aspects that are of concern to the inquirer. Indeed, it is not a “case” for it presents itself to us rather as a point of entry, the locus of an experiencing subject or subjects, into a larger social and economic process. The problematic of the everyday world arises precisely at the juncture of particular experience, with generalizing and abstracted forms of social relations organizing a division of labor in society at large.

I am using the terms “institutional” and “institution” to identify a complex of relations forming part of the ruling apparatus, organized around a distinctive function—education, health care, law, and the like. In contrast to such concepts as bureaucracy, “institution” does not identify a determinate form of social organization, but

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rather the intersection and coordination of more than one relational mode of the ruling apparatus. Characteristically, state agencies are tied in with professional forms of organization, and both are interpenetrated by relations of discourse of more than one order. We might imagine institutions as nodes or knots in the relations of the ruling apparatus to class, coordinating multiple strands of action into a functional complex. Integral to the coordinating process are ideologies systematically developed to provide categories and concepts expressing the relation of local courses of action to the institutional function (a point to be elaborated later), providing a currency or currencies enabling interchange between different specialized parts of the complex and a common conceptual organization coordinating its diverse sites. The notion of ethnography is introduced to commit us to an exploration, description, and analysis of such a complex of relations, not conceived in the abstract but from the entry point of some particular person or persons whose everyday world of working is organized thereby.

Institutional ethnography explores the social relations individuals bring into being in and through their actual practices. Its methods, whether of observation, interviewing, recollection of work experience, use of archives, textual analysis, or other, are constrained by the practicalities of investigation of social relations as actual practices. Note however that the institutional ethnography as a way of investigating the problematic of the everyday world does not involve substituting the analysis, the perspectives and views of subjects, for the investigation by the sociologist. Though women are indeed the expert practitioners of their everyday worlds, the notion of the everyday world as problematic assumes that disclosure of the extralocal determinations of our experience does not lie within the scope of everyday practices. We can see only so much without specialized investigation, and the latter should be the sociologist’s special business.

**Ideology, Institutions, and the Concept of Work as Ethnographic Ground**

The coordination of institutional processes is mediated ideologically. The categories and concepts of ideology express the relation of members’ actual practices—their work—to the institutional function. Ethnomethodology has developed the notion of accountability to identify members’ methods accomplishing the orderliness and sense of local processes. Members themselves and for themselves constitute the observability and reportability of what has happened or is going on, in how they take it up as a matter for anyone to find and recognize. Members make use of categories and concepts to analyze settings for features thus made observable. The apparently referential operation of locally applied categories and concepts is constitutive of the reference itself. When applied to the institutional context, the notion of accountability locates practices tying local settings to the nonlocal organization of the ruling apparatus. Indeed, the institutional process itself can be seen as a dialectic between what members do intending the categories and concepts of institutional ideology and the analytic and descriptive practices of those categories and concepts deployed in accomplishing the observability of what is done, has happened, is going on, and so forth. Thus local practices in their historical particularity and irreversibility are made accountable in terms of categories and concepts expressing the function of the institution. Members’ interpretive practices analyzing the work processes that bring the institutional process into being in actuality constitute those work processes as institutional courses of action.

Institutional ideologies are acquired by members as methods of analyzing experiences located in the work process of the institution. Professional training in particular teaches people how to recycle the actualities of their experience into the

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forms in which it is recognizable within institutional discourse. For example, when teachers are in training they learn a vocabulary and analytic procedures that accomplish the classroom in the institutional mode. They learn to analyze and name the behavior of students as “appropriate” or “inappropriate” and to analyze and name their own (and others’) responses. In responding to “inappropriate” behavior, they have been taught to avoid “undermining the student’s ego” and hence to avoid such practices as “sarcasm.” They should, rather, be “supportive.” This ideological package provides a procedure for subsuming what goes on in the classroom under professional educational discourse, making classroom processes observable-reportable within an institutional order. In this way the work and practical reasoning of individuals and the locally accomplished order that is their product become an expression of the non-local relations of the professional and bureaucratic discourse of the ruling apparatus.

The accountability procedures of institutions make some things visible, while others as much a part of the overall work organization that performs the institution do not come into view at all or as other than themselves. Local practices glossed by the categories of the discourse are provided with boundaries of observability beneath which a subterranean life continues. What is observable does not appear as the work of individuals, and not all the work and practices of individuals become observable. When my son was in elementary school, his homework one day was to write up an experiment he had done in science class that day. He asked me how to do it and I replied (not very helpfully), “Well, just write down everything you did.” He told me not to be so stupid. “Of course,” he said, “they don’t mean you write about everything, like about filling the jar with water from the tap and taking it to the bench.” Clearly there were things done around the doing of an experiment that were essential to, but not entered into or made accountable within, the “experimental procedure.” Its boundaries were organized conceptually to select from a locally indivisible work process, some aspects to be taken as part of the experiment and others to be discounted. All were done. All were necessary. But only some were to be made observable-reportable within the textual mode of the teaching of science. In like ways, institutional ideologies analyze local settings, drawing boundaries and the like. They provide analytic procedures for those settings that attend selectively to work processes, thus making only selective aspects of them accountable within the institutional order.


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**Patricia Hill Collins (1948–): A Biographical Sketch**

Patricia Hill Collins was born in 1948 and grew up in a working-class family in Philadelphia. She earned her B.A. from Brandeis University in 1969 and her M.A.T. from Harvard University in 1970. Collins worked as a schoolteacher and curriculum specialist before returning to graduate school and receiving her Ph.D. in sociology from Brandeis University in 1984. It was in teaching a course called “The Black Woman” to middle-school girls in 1970 that Collins realized not only the dearth of teaching materials by and about black women, but also the *significance* of this dearth. The exclusion of black women from intellectual discourses became the subject of her first book, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (1990), which won the Jessie Bernard Award of the American Sociological Association for significant scholarship in gender as well as the C. Wright Mills Award from the Society for the Study of Social Problems. In this highly acclaimed book (excerpts from which you will read below), Collins illuminates the rich, self-defined intellectual tradition of black women, which, she argues, has persisted
despite formal discursive exclusion. By positioning itself as documenting a tradition or
canon, *Black Feminist Thought* legitimates black women’s intellectual production as critical
social theory (P. Collins 1998:8).

Collins further explores black feminist thought in *Fighting Words: Black Women and the
Collins shows not only how elite discourses present a view of social reality that elevates the
ideas and actions of highly educated white men as normative and superior (ibid.:45), but
also how black feminist thought has remained dynamic and oppositional under changing
social conditions. In *Black Sexual Politics* (2004), Collins continues to firmly situate black
feminist thought in the critical tradition by underscoring that antiracist African American
politics in the post–civil rights era must soundly address questions of gender and sexuality.

Collins has taught at a number of universities, including Northern Kentucky University,
Tufts University, Boston College, and the University of Cincinnati, where she is Charles
Phelps Taft Emeritus Professor of Sociology within the Department of African American
Studies. Since 2005, she has also been a professor of sociology at the University of
Maryland. Collins’s most recent book, *From Black Power to Hip Hop: Essays on Racism,
Nationalism, and Feminism* (2006), explores how black nationalism works today in the
wake of changing black youth identity.

**Collins’s Intellectual Influences and Core Ideas**

Patricia Hill Collins’s work integrates elements of feminist theory, standpoint theory, critical
theory, Afrocentrism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism. Collins was particularly influ-
tenced by Dorothy Smith, as is evident in her concept of **standpoint epistemology**, which
she defines as the philosophic viewpoint that what one knows is affected by the standpoint
(or position) one has in society (“epistemology” means how we know what we know, how
we decide what is valid knowledge). Collins extends the critical/phenomenological/feminist
ideas of Dorothy Smith by illuminating the particular epistemological standpoint of black
women. Yet, Collins does not merely add the empirical dimension of “race” to Smith’s
feminist, critical/phenomenological framework. Rather, taking a poststructural/postmodern
turn, Collins emphasizes the “interlocking” nature of the wide variety of statuses—for
example, race, class, gender, nationality, sexual orientation—that make up our standpoint,
and, in the spirit of Foucault (see Chapter 8), she stresses that where there are sites of
domination, there are also potential sites of resistance.

Specifically, Collins (1998, 2004) explicitly situates her work within the critical tradition
(indeed, she conceptualizes standpoint theory and postmodernism as “examples of critical
“critical” is its commitment to “justice, for one’s own group and/or for that of other groups.”
Critical social theory illuminates the “bodies of knowledge and sets of institutional practices
that actively grapple with the central questions facing groups of people differently placed in
specific political, social, and historical contexts characterized by injustice” (ibid.). Yet, Collins rejects “additive” models of oppression that reflect a dichotomous (“top-
down”) way of thinking about domination rooted specifically in European masculinist
thought. Rather than simply elevate one group’s suffering over that of another, Collins maps

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8By following Craig Calhoun (1995) in considering postmodernism and standpoint theory as “exam-

ples of critical theory,” Collins (1998:254, n. 4) is rejecting the narrower (but perhaps more well-

known) definition of critical theory as simply the Frankfurt School tradition (see Chapter 3) or the

style of theorizing of Jürgen Habermas (see Chapter 9).
Collins uses the term **matrix of domination** to underscore that one’s position in society is made up of multiple contiguous standpoints rather than just one essentialist standpoint. Thus, in contrast to earlier critical accounts (e.g., the Frankfurt School—see Chapter 3) that assume that power operates from the top down by forcing and controlling unwilling victims to bend to the will of more powerful superiors, Collins (1990/2000:226) asserts that, “depending on the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed... Each individual derives varying amounts of penalty and privilege from the multiple systems of oppression which frame everyone’s lives.”

In addition, Collins emphasizes “that people simultaneously experience and resist oppression on three levels: the level of personal biography; the group or community level of the cultural context created by race, class, and gender; and the systemic level of social institutions” (Collins 1990/2000:227). At the level of the individual, she insists on “the power of the self-definition” (Collins 2004:306) and “self-defined standpoint” (Collins 1998:47), and that “each individual has a unique personal biography made up of concrete experiences, values, motivations, and emotions,” thereby reasserting both the subjectivity and agency absent in earlier critical models (e.g., the Frankfurt School). For Collins (ibid.:50), breaking silence represents a moment of insubordination in relations of power—“a direct, blatant insult delivered before an audience.”

The group or community level of the cultural context created by race, class, and gender is vital to Collins’s conceptualization of **black feminist thought**, which, like all specialized thought, reflects the interests and standpoint of its creators. Collins locates black feminist thought in the unique literary traditions forged by black women such as bell hooks, Audre Lorde, and Alice Walker, as well as in the everyday experience of ordinary black women. In addition, black feminist thought is rooted in black women’s intellectual tradition nurtured by black women’s community. As Collins (1990/2000:253) maintains,

> When white men control the knowledge validation process, both political criteria (contextual credibility and evaluation of knowledge claims) can work to suppress Black feminist thought. Therefore, Black women are more likely to choose an alternative epistemology for assessing knowledge claims, one using different standards that are consistent with Black women’s criteria for substantiated knowledge and with our criteria for methodology adequacy. . . .

In other words, Collins maintains that the experience of multiple oppressions makes black women particularly skeptical of and vulnerable to dominant paradigms of knowledge and thus more reliant on their own experiential sources of information. Black women “come to voice” and break the silence of oppression by drawing both from their own experiences and from the “collective secret knowledge generated by groups on either side of power”—that is, the black community and the black female community in particular (Collins 1990/2000:253).

In her recent *Black Sexual Politics* (2004:9–10), Collins takes an even more radical postmodern stance. Here she sees the complexity of “mutually constructing,” intertwined dimensions of race, class, gender, and sexuality as so great that she sets her sights not on “untangling the effects” of race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, age, and the like, but rather on simply illuminating them. The point of *Black Sexual Politics*, she says, is not “to tell readers what to think,” but rather “[to examine] what we might think about” (ibid.).
Black feminist thought offers individual African American women the conceptual tools to resist oppression. Black women have historically resisted, and continue to resist, oppression at individual, community, and institutional levels. A women’s blues tradition, the voices of contemporary African American woman writers and thinkers, and women’s everyday relationships with each other speak to the outpouring of contemporary black feminist thought in history and literature despite exclusion or marginalization in the hegemonic framework. By articulating the powerful but hidden dynamics of black feminist thought, Collins highlights the underlying assumed whiteness of both feminism and academia and reminds white women in particular that they are not the only feminists. In addition, however, black feminist thought disrupts the masculinist underpinnings of Afrocentrism. Collins maintains that in the same way that European theorists have historically prioritized class over race or gender, and feminists have prioritized gender over either race or class, Afrocentric scholarship, although formally acknowledging the significance of gender, relegates it as secondary to the more pressing fight against racism.

To be sure, Collins (1998:174) readily appreciates the guiding principles at the heart of Afrocentrism—most important, the emphases on reconstructing black culture, reconstituting black identity, using racial solidarity to build black community, and fostering an ethic of service to black community development. Yet, she is highly critical of the “unexamined yet powerful” gender ideology in black nationalist projects, particularly that of Afrocentrists such as Molefi Kete Asante (1942–), who seek to replace Eurocentric systems of knowledge with Afrocentric ways of knowing.11

As indicated above, the terms “matrix of domination” and “standpoint epistemology” are explicitly devised so as to reflect a multidimensional approach to order; that is, they pointedly work at the level of the social structure or group and the individual. However, above all, in the spirit of the critical tradition, it is to the collective level that Collins’s work is most attuned. For instance, while Collins’s term “self-defined standpoint” readily reflects agency at the level of the individual, interestingly, Collins (ibid.:47) maintains that she favors this term over bell hooks’s term “self-reflexive speech” because self-defined standpoint “ties Black women’s speech communities much more closely to institutionalized power relations.” Clearly, that “standpoint” refers to “historically shared group-based experiences” and that “groups have a degree of permanence over time such that group realities transcend individual experiences” reflects a prioritization of the collective realm (Collins 1990/2000:247; emphasis in original). As Collins (ibid.:249) states,
Groups who share common placement in hierarchical power relations also share common experiences in such power relations. Shared angles of vision lead those in similar social locations to be predisposed to interpret in comparable fashion.

To be sure, Collins readily acknowledges that the individual has “unique” experiences that are rooted in her inimitable social location, which reflects her cognizance of the level of the individual (see Figure 7.3). Here we see that the individual is not a proxy for the group, that, in contrast to what Marx supposed, oppressed groups do not possess a fixed or stagnant (or “essential”) identity. As Collins (1998:249) contends, “using the group as the focal point provides space for individual agency.” Nevertheless, Collins never loses sight of the “collective secret knowledge generated by groups on either side of power” from within which individual self-definition ensues (ibid.:49).

In terms of action, overall Collins’s theory reflects a collective/rationalistic view of power characteristic of critical theory, in that relations of power are perceived as a preexisting hierarchical structure external to the individual. However, at the same time, by emphasizing that these are relations of power and that this involves both collective, discursive codes and their internalization at the nonrational/individual level, Collins presents a nonrational approach to action as well. Of course, her emphasis on “shared angles of vision” as well as “self-defined standpoint” reflects the collective/nonrational realm and the individual/nonrational realms, respectively. Here we see the significance of “group consciousness, group self-definition and ‘voice’” (ibid.:251)—that is, the collective/nonrational realm. Explicitly challenging the materialist, structural Marxist point of view, standpoint theorists such as Collins argue that “ideas matter in systems of power” (ibid.:252). This multidimensional approach is illustrated in Figure 7.3.

Figure 7.3  Collins’s Basic Concepts and Theoretical Orientation
Introduction to *Black Feminist Thought*

In the following selection from Collins’s most highly acclaimed book, *Black Feminist Thought*, Collins exposes and discusses the tension for black women as agents of knowledge, acknowledging that “Black culture and many of its traditions oppress women” (Collins 1990/2000:230). However, she also warns against portraying black women either “solely as passive, unfortunate recipients of racial and sexual abuses” or as “heroic figures who easily engage in resisting oppression” (ibid.:238). In sum, Collins continually emphasizes the complexity of systems of both domination and resistance.

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**Black Feminist Thought** (1990)

Patricia Hill Collins

**Distinguishing Features of Black Feminist Thought**

Widely used yet increasingly difficult to define, U.S. Black feminist thought encompasses diverse and often contradictory meanings. . . .

Rather than developing definitions and arguing over naming practices—for example, whether this thought should be called Black feminism, womanism, Afrocentric feminism, Africana womanism, and the like—a more useful approach lies in revisiting the reasons why Black feminist thought exists at all. Exploring six distinguishing features that characterize Black feminist thought may provide the common ground that is so sorely needed both among African-American women, and between African-American women and all others whose collective knowledge or thought has a similar purpose. Black feminist thought’s distinguishing features need not be unique and may share much with other bodies of knowledge. Rather, it is the *convergence* of these distinguishing features that gives U.S. Black feminist thought its distinctive contours.

**Why U.S. Black Feminist Thought?**

Black feminism remains important because U.S. Black women constitute an oppressed group. As a collectivity, U.S. Black women participate in a *dialectical* relationship linking African-American women’s oppression and activism. Dialectical relationships of this sort mean that two parties are opposed and opposite. As long as Black women’s subordination within intersecting oppressions of race, class, gender, sexuality, and nation persists, Black feminism as an activist response to that oppression will remain needed.

In a similar fashion, the overarching purpose of U.S. Black feminist thought is also to resist oppression, both its practices and the ideas that justify it. If intersecting oppressions did not exist, Black feminist thought and similar oppositional knowledges would be unnecessary. As a critical social theory, Black feminist thought aims to empower African-American women within the context of social injustice sustained by intersecting oppressions. Since Black women cannot be fully empowered unless intersecting oppressions themselves are eliminated, Black

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feminist thought supports broad principles of social justice that transcend U.S. Black women’s particular needs.

Because so much of U.S. Black feminism has been filtered through the prism of the U.S. context, its contours have been greatly affected by the specificity of American multiculturalism (Takaki 1993). In particular, U.S. Black feminist thought and practice respond to a fundamental contradiction of U.S. society. On the one hand, democratic promises of individual freedom, equality under the law, and social justice are made to all American citizens. Yet on the other hand, the reality of differential group treatment based on race, class, gender, sexuality, and citizenship status persists. Groups organized around race, class, and gender in and of themselves are not inherently a problem. However, when African-Americans, poor people, women, and other groups discriminated against see little hope for group-based advancement, this situation constitutes social injustice.

Within this overarching contradiction, U.S. Black women encounter a distinctive set of social practices that accompany our particular history within a unique matrix of domination characterized by intersecting oppressions. Race is far from being the only significant marker of group difference—class, gender, sexuality, religion, and citizenship status all matter greatly in the United States (Andersen and Collins 1998). Yet for African-American women, the effects of institutionalized racism remain visible and palpable. Moreover, the institutionalized racism that African-American women encounter relies heavily on racial segregation and accompanying discriminatory practices designed to deny U.S. Blacks equitable treatment. Despite important strides to desegregate U.S. society since 1970, racial segregation remains deeply entrenched in housing, schooling, and employment (Massey and Denton 1993). For many African-American women, racism is not something that exists in the distance. We encounter racism in everyday situations in workplaces, stores, schools, housing, and daily social interaction (St. Jean and Feagin 1998). Most Black women do not have the opportunity to befriend White women and men as neighbors, nor do their children attend school with White children. Racial segregation remains a fundamental feature of the U.S. social landscape, leaving many African-Americans with the belief that “the more things change, the more they stay the same” (Collins 1998a, 11–43). Overlying these persisting inequalities is a rhetoric of color blindness designed to render these social inequalities invisible. In a context where many believe that to talk of race fosters racism, equality allegedly lies in treating everyone the same. Yet as Kimberle Crenshaw (1997) points out, “it is fairly obvious that treating different things the same can generate as much inequality as treating the same things differently” (p. 285).

Although racial segregation is now organized differently than in prior eras (Collins 1998a, 11–43), being Black and female in the United States continues to expose African-American women to certain common experiences. U.S. Black women’s similar work and family experiences as well as our participation in diverse expressions of African-American culture mean that, overall, U.S. Black women as a group live in a different world from that of people who are not Black and female. For individual women, the particular experiences that accrue to living as a Black woman in the United States can stimulate a distinctive consciousness concerning our own experiences and society overall. Many African-American women grasp this connection between what one does and how one thinks. Hannah Nelson, an elderly Black domestic worker, discusses how work shapes the perspectives of African-American and White women: “Since I have to work, I don’t really have to worry about most of the things that most of the white women I have worked for are worrying about. And if these women did their own work, they would think just like I do—about this, anyway” (Gwaltney 1980, 4). Ruth Shays, a Black inner-city resident, points out how variations in men’s and women’s experiences lead to differences in perspective. “The mind of the man and the mind of the woman is the same” she notes, “but this business of living makes women use their minds in ways that men don’t even have to think about” (Gwaltney 1980, 33).

A recognition of this connection between experience and consciousness that shapes the everyday lives of individual African-American women often pervades the works of Black women activists and scholars. In her autobiography, Ida B. Wells-Barnett describes how the
Feminist and Gender Theories

lynching of her friends had such an impact on her worldview that she subsequently devoted much of her life to the anti-lynching cause (Duster 1970). Sociologist Joyce Ladner’s discomfort with the disparity between the teachings of mainstream scholarship and her experiences as a young Black woman in the South led her to write *Tomorrow’s Tomorrow* (1972), a groundbreaking study of Black female adolescence. Similarly, the transformed consciousness experienced by Janie, the light-skinned heroine of Zora Neale Hurston’s (1937) classic *Their Eyes Were Watching God*, from obedient granddaughter and wife to a self-defined African-American woman, can be directly traced to her experiences with each of her three husbands. In one scene Janie’s second husband, angry because she served him a dinner of scorched rice, underdone fish, and soggy bread, hits her. That incident stimulates Janie to stand “where he left her for unmeasured time” and think. And in her thinking “her image of Jody tumbled down and shattered. . . . [S]he had an inside and an outside now and suddenly she knew how not to mix them” (p. 63).

Overall, these ties between what one does and what one thinks illustrated by *individual* Black women can also characterize Black women’s experiences and ideas as a *group*. Historically, racial segregation in housing, education, and employment fostered group commonalities that encouraged the formation of a group-based, collective standpoint. For example, the heavy concentration of U.S. Black women in domestic work coupled with racial segregation in housing and schools meant that U.S. Black women had common organizational networks that enabled them to share experiences and construct a collective body of wisdom. This collective wisdom on how to survive as U.S. Black women constituted a distinctive Black women’s standpoint on gender-specific patterns of racial segregation and its accompanying economic penalties.

The presence of Black women’s collective wisdom challenges two prevailing interpretations of the consciousness of oppressed groups. One approach claims that subordinate groups identify with the powerful and have no valid independent interpretation of their own oppression. The second assumes the oppressed are less human than their rulers, and are therefore less capable of interpreting their own experiences (Rollins 1985; Scott 1985). Both approaches see any independent consciousness expressed by African-American women and other oppressed groups as being either not of our own making or inferior to that of dominant groups. More importantly, both explanations suggest that the alleged lack of political activism on the part of oppressed groups stems from our flawed consciousness of our own subordination.

Historically, Black women’s group location in intersecting oppressions produced commonalities among individual African-American women. At the same time, while common experiences may predispose Black women to develop a distinctive group consciousness, they guarantee neither that such a consciousness will develop among all women nor that it will be articulated as such by the group. As historical conditions change, so do the links among the types of experiences Black women will have and any ensuing group consciousness concerning those experiences. Because group standpoints are situated in, reflect, and help shape unjust power relations, standpoints are not static (Collins 1998a, 201–28). Thus, common challenges may foster similar angles of vision leading to a group knowledge or standpoint among African-American women. Or they may not.

*Diverse Responses to Common Challenges Within Black Feminism*

A second distinguishing feature of U.S. Black feminist thought emerges from a tension linking experiences and ideas. On the one hand, all African-American women face similar challenges that result from living in a society that historically and routinely derogates women of African descent. Despite the fact that U.S. Black women face common challenges, this neither means that individual African-American women have all had the same experiences nor that we agree on the significance of our varying experiences. Thus, on the other hand, despite the common challenges confronting U.S. Black women as a group, diverse responses to these core themes characterize U.S. Black women’s group knowledge or standpoint.

Despite differences of age, sexual orientation, social class, region, and religion, U.S. Black
women encounter societal practices that restrict us to inferior housing, neighborhoods, schools, jobs, and public treatment and hide this differential consideration behind an array of common beliefs about Black women’s intelligence, work habits, and sexuality. These common challenges in turn result in recurring patterns of experiences for individual group members. For example, African-American women from quite diverse backgrounds report similar treatment in stores. Not every individual Black woman consumer need experience being followed in a store as a potential shoplifter, ignored while others are waited on first, or seated near restaurant kitchens and rest rooms, for African-American women as a collectivity to recognize that differential group treatment is operating.

Since standpoints refer to group knowledge, recurring patterns of differential treatment such as these suggest that certain themes will characterize U.S. Black women’s group knowledge or standpoint. For example, one core theme concerns multifaceted legacies of struggle, especially in response to forms of violence that accompany intersecting oppressions (Collins 1998d). Katie Cannon observes, “[T]hroughout the history of the United States, the interrelationship of white supremacy and male superiority has characterized the Black woman’s reality as a situation of struggle—a struggle to survive in two contradictory worlds simultaneously, one white, privileged, and oppressive, the other black, exploited, and oppressed” (1985, 30). Black women’s vulnerability to assaults in the workplace, on the street, at home, and in media representations has been one factor fostering this legacy of struggle.

Despite differences created by historical era, age, social class, sexual orientation, skin color, or ethnicity, the legacy of struggle against the violence that permeates U.S. social structures is a common thread binding African-American women. Anna Julia Cooper, an educated, nineteenth-century Black woman intellectual, describes Black women’s vulnerability to sexual violence:

I would beg . . . to add my plea for the Colored Girls of the South:—that large, bright, promising fatally beautiful class . . . so full of promise and possibilities, yet so sure of destruction; often without a father to whom they dare apply the loving term, often without a stronger brother to espouse their cause and defend their honor with his life’s blood; in the midst of pitfalls and snares, waylaid by the lower classes of white men, with no shelter, no protection. (Cooper 1892, 240)

Yet during this period Cooper and other middle-class U.S. Black women built a powerful club movement and numerous community organizations (Giddings 1984, 1988; Gilkes 1985).

Stating that a legacy of struggle exists does not mean that all U.S. Black women share its benefits or even recognize it. For example, for African-American girls, age often offers little protection from assaults. Far too many young Black girls inhabit hazardous and hostile environments (Carroll 1997). In 1975 I received an essay titled “My World” from Sandra, a sixth-grade student who was a resident of one of the most dangerous public housing projects in Boston. Sandra wrote, “My world is full of people getting rape. People shooting on another. Kids and grownups fighting over girlfriends. And people without jobs who can’t afford to get a education so they can get a job . . . winos on the streets raping and killing little girls.” Her words poignantly express a growing Black feminist sensibility that she may be victimized by racism, misogyny, and poverty. They reveal her awareness that she is vulnerable to rape as a form of sexual violence. Despite her feelings about her neighborhood, Sandra not only walked the streets daily but managed safely to deliver three siblings to school. In doing so she participated in a Black women’s legacy of struggle. Sandra prevailed, but at a cost. Unlike Sandra, others simply quit.

This legacy of struggle constitutes one of several core themes of a Black women’s standpoint. Efforts to reclaim U.S. Black women’s intellectual traditions have revealed Black women’s long-standing attention to additional core themes first recorded by Maria W. Stewart (Richardson 1987). Stewart’s perspective on intersecting oppressions, her call for replacing derogated images of Black womanhood with self-defined images, her belief in Black women’s activism as mothers, teachers, and Black community leaders, and her sensitivity to sexual politics are all core themes advanced by a variety of Black feminist intellectuals.

Despite the common challenges confronting African-American women as a group, individual
Black women neither have identical experiences nor interpret experiences in a similar fashion. The existence of core themes does not mean that African-American women respond to these themes in the same way. Differences among individual Black women produce different patterns of experiential knowledge that in turn shape individual reactions to the core themes. For example, when faced with controlling images of Black women as being ugly and unfeminine, some women—such as Sojourner Truth—demand, “Ain’t I a woman?” By deconstructing the conceptual apparatus of the dominant group, they challenge notions of Barbie-doll femininity premised on middle-class White women’s experiences (duCille 1996, 8–59). In contrast, other women internalize the controlling images and come to believe that they are the stereotypes (Brown-Collins and Sussewell 1986). Still others aim to transgress the boundaries that frame the images themselves. Jaminica, a 14-year-old Black girl, describes her strategies: “Unless you want to get into a big activist battle, you accept the stereotypes given to you and just try and reshape them along the way. So in a way, this gives me a lot of freedom. I can’t be looked at any worse in society than I already am—black and female is pretty high on the list of things not to be” (Carroll 1997, 94–95).

Many factors explain these diverse responses. For example, although all African-American women encounter institutionalized racism, social class differences among African-American women influence patterns of racism in housing, education, and employment. Middle-class Blacks are more likely to encounter a pernicious form of racism that has left many angry and disappointed (Cose 1993; Feagin and Sikes 1994). A young manager who graduated with honors from the University of Maryland describes the specific form racism can take for middle-class Blacks. Before she flew to Cleveland to explain a marketing plan for her company, her manager made her go over it three or four times in front of him so that she would not forget her marketing plan. Then he explained how to check luggage at an airport and how to reclaim it. “I just sat at lunch listening to this man talking to me like I was a monkey who could remember but couldn’t think,” she recalled. When she had had enough, “I asked him if he wanted to tie my money up in a handkerchief and put a note on me saying that I was an employee of this company. In case I got lost I would be picked up by Traveler’s Aid, and Traveler’s Aid would send me back” (Davis and Watson 1985, 86). Most middle-class Black women do not encounter such blatant incidents, but many working-class Blacks do. Historically, working-class Blacks have struggled with forms of institutionalized racism directly organized by White institutions and by forms mediated by some segments of the Black middle class. Thus, while it shares much with middle-class Black women, the legacy of struggle by working-class Blacks (Kelley 1994) and by working-class Black women in particular will express a distinctive character (Fordham 1993).

Sexuality signals another important factor that influences African-American women’s varying responses to common challenges. Black lesbians have identified heterosexism as a form of oppression and the issues they face living in homophobic communities as shaping their interpretations of everyday events (Shockley 1974; Lorde 1982, 1984; Clarke et al. 1983; Barbara Smith 1983, 1998; Williams 1997). Beverly Smith describes how being a lesbian affected her perceptions of the wedding of one of her closest friends: “God, I wish I had one friend here. Someone who knew me and would understand how I feel. I am masquerading as a nice, straight, middle-class Black ‘girl’” (1983, 172). While the majority of those attending the wedding saw only a festive event, Beverly Smith felt that her friend was being sent into a form of bondage. In a similar fashion, varying ethnic and citizenship statuses within the U.S. nation-state as well also shape differences among Black women in the United States. For example, Black Puerto Ricans constitute a group that combines categories of race, nationality, and ethnicity in distinctive ways. Black Puerto Rican women thus must negotiate a distinctive set of experiences that accrue to being racially Black, holding a special form of American citizenship, and being ethnically Latino.

Given how these factors influence diverse response to common challenges, it is important to stress that no homogeneous Black woman’s standpoint exists. There is no essential or archetypal Black woman whose experiences stand as normal, normative, and thereby authentic. An
essentialist understanding of a Black woman’s standpoint suppresses differences among Black women in search of an elusive group unity. Instead, it may be more accurate to say that a Black women’s collective standpoint does exist, one characterized by the tensions that accrue to different responses to common challenges. Because it both recognizes and aims to incorporate heterogeneity in crafting Black women’s oppositional knowledge, this Black women’s standpoint eschews essentialism in favor of democracy. Since Black feminist thought both arises within and aims to articulate a Black women’s group standpoint regarding experiences associated with intersecting oppressions, stressing this group standpoint’s heterogeneous composition is significant.

Moreover, in thinking through the contours of a Black women’s standpoint it is equally important to recognize that U.S. Black women also encounter the same challenges (and correspondingly different expressions) as women of African descent within a Black diasporic context. This context in turn is situated within a transnational, global context. The term diaspora describes the experiences of people who, through slavery, colonialism, imperialism, and migration, have been forced to leave their native lands (Funani 1998, 417). For U.S. Black women and other people of African descent, a diasporic framework suggests a dispersal from Africa to societies in the Caribbean, South America, North America, and Europe. Understandings of African-American womanhood thus reflect a distinctive pattern of dispersal associated with forced immigration to the United States and subsequent enslavement (Pala 1995). For U.S. Black women and other people of African descent, a diasporic framework suggests a dispersal from Africa to societies in the Caribbean, South America, North America, and Europe. Understandings of African-American womanhood thus reflect a distinctive pattern of dispersal associated with forced immigration to the United States and subsequent enslavement (Pala 1995). Since a diasporic framework is not normative, it should not be used to assess the authenticity of people of African descent in reference to an assumed African norm. Rather, Black diasporic frameworks center analyses of Black women within the context of common challenges experienced transnationally.

The version of Black feminism that U.S. Black women have developed certainly must be understood in the context of U.S. nation-state politics. At the same time, U.S. Black feminism as a social justice project shares much with comparable social justice projects advanced not only by other U.S. racial/ethnic groups (see, e.g., Takaki 1993), but by women of African descent across quite diverse societies. In the context of an “intercontinental Black women’s consciousness movement” (McLaughlin 1995, 73), women of African descent are dispersed globally, yet the issues we face may be similar. Transnationally, women encounter recurring social issues such as poverty, violence, reproductive concerns, lack of education, sex work, and susceptibility to disease (Rights of Women 1998). Placing African-American women’s experiences, thought, and practice in a transnational, Black diasporic context reveals these and other commonalities of women of African descent while specifying what is particular to African-American women.

Black Feminist Practice and Black Feminist Thought

A third distinguishing feature of Black feminist thought concerns the connections between U.S. Black women’s experiences as a heterogeneous collectivity and any ensuing group knowledge or standpoint.

As members of an oppressed group, U.S. Black women have generated alternative practices and knowledges that have been designed to foster U.S. Black women’s group empowerment. In contrast to the dialectical relationship linking oppression and activism, a dialogical relationship characterizes Black women’s collective experiences and group knowledge. On both the individual and the group level, a dialogical relationship suggests that changes in thinking may be accompanied by changed actions and that altered experiences may in turn stimulate a changed consciousness. For U.S. Black women as a collectivity, the struggle for a self-defined Black feminism occurs through an ongoing dialogue whereby action and thought inform one another.

U.S. Black feminism itself illustrates this dialogical relationship. On the one hand, there is U.S. Black feminist practice that emerges in the context of lived experience. When organized and visible, such practice has taken the form of overtly Black feminist social movements dedicated to the empowerment of U.S. Black women. Two especially prominent moments characterize Black feminism’s visibility. Providing many of the guiding ideas for today, the first occurred at
the turn of the century via the Black women’s club movement. The second or modern Black feminist movement was stimulated by the antiracist and women’s social justice movements of the 1960s and 1970s and continues to the present. However, these periods of overt political activism where African-American women lobbied in our own behalf remain unusual. They appear to be unusual when juxtaposed to more typical patterns of quiescence regarding Black women’s advocacy.

Given the history of U.S. racial segregation, Black feminist activism demonstrates distinctive patterns. Because African-Americans have long been relegated to racially segregated environments, U.S. Black feminist practice has often occurred within a context of Black community development efforts and other Black nationalist–inspired projects. Black nationalism emerges in conjunction with racial segregation—U.S. Blacks living in a racially integrated society would most likely see less need for Black nationalism. As a political philosophy, Black nationalism is based on the belief that Black people constitute a people or “nation” with a common history and destiny. Black solidarity, the belief that Blacks have common interests and should support one another, has long permeated Black women’s political philosophy. Thus, Black women’s path to a “feminist” consciousness often occurs within the context of antiracist social justice projects, many of them influenced by Black nationalist ideologies. In describing how this phenomenon affects Black women in global context, Andree Nicola McLaughlin contends, “[A]mong activist Black women, it is generally recognized that nationalist struggle provides a rich arena for developing a woman’s consciousness” (McLaughlin 1995, 80). To look for Black feminism by searching for U.S. Black women who self-identify as “Black feminists” misses the complexity of how Black feminist practice actually operates (Collins 1993a).

As critical social theory, Black feminist thought encompasses bodies of knowledge and sets of institutional practices that actively grapple with the central questions facing U.S. Black women as a group. Such theory recognizes that U.S. Black women constitute one group among many that are differently placed within situations of injustice. What makes critical social theory “critical” is its commitment to justice, for one’s own group and for other groups.

Within these parameters, knowledge for knowledge’s sake is not enough—Black feminist thought must both be tied to Black women’s lived experiences and aim to better those experiences in some fashion. When such thought is sufficiently grounded in Black feminist practice, it reflects this dialogical relationship. Black feminist thought encompasses general knowledge that helps U.S. Black women survive in, cope with, and resist our differential treatment. It also includes more specialized knowledge that investigates the specific themes and challenges of any given period of time. Conversely, when U.S. Black women cannot see the connections among themes that permeate Black feminist thought and those that influence Black women’s everyday lives, it is appropriate to question the strength of this dialogical relationship. Moreover, it is also reasonable to question the validity of that particular expression of Black feminist thought. For example, during slavery, a special theme within Black feminist thought was how the institutionalized rape of enslaved Black women operated as a mechanism of social control. During the period when Black women worked primarily in agriculture and service, countering the sexual harassment of live-in domestic workers gained special importance. Clear connections could be drawn between the content and purpose of Black feminist thought and important issues in Black women’s lives.

The potential significance of Black feminist thought goes far beyond demonstrating that African-American women can be theorists. Like Black feminist practice, which it reflects and which it seeks to foster, Black feminist thought can create collective identity among African-American women about the dimensions of a Black women’s standpoint. Through the process of rearticulation, Black feminist thought can offer African-American women a different view of ourselves and our worlds (Omi and Winant 1994, 99). By taking the core themes of a Black women’s standpoint and infusing them with new meaning. Black feminist thought can stimulate a new consciousness that utilizes Black women’s everyday, taken-for-granted knowledge. Rather than raising consciousness, Black feminist thought affirms, rearticulates, and provides a vehicle for expressing in public a consciousness that quite
often already exists. More important, this rearticulated consciousness aims to empower African-American women and stimulate resistance.

**Dialogical Practices and Black Women Intellectuals**

A fourth distinguishing feature of Black feminist thought concerns the essential contributions of African-American women intellectuals. The existence of a Black women’s standpoint does not mean that African-American women, academic or otherwise, appreciate its content, see its significance, or recognize its potential as a catalyst for social change. One key task for Black women intellectuals of diverse ages, social classes, educational backgrounds, and occupations consists of asking the right questions and investigating all dimensions of a Black women’s standpoint with and for African-American women. Historically, Black women intellectuals stood in a special relationship to the larger community of African-American women, a relationship that framed Black feminist thought’s contours as critical social theory.

This special relationship of Black women intellectuals to the community of African-American women parallels the existence of two interrelated levels of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The commonplace, taken-for-granted knowledge shared by African-American women growing from our everyday thoughts and actions constitutes a first and most fundamental level of knowledge. The ideas that Black women share with one another on an informal, daily basis about topics such as how to style our hair, characteristics of “good” Black men, strategies for dealing with White folks, and skills of how to “get over” provide the foundations for this taken-for-granted knowledge.

Experts or specialists who participate in and emerge from a group produce a second, more specialized type of knowledge. Whether working-class or middle-class, educated or not, famous or everyday, the range of Black women intellectuals discussed in Chapter 1 are examples of these specialists. Their theories that facilitate the expression of a Black women’s standpoint form the specialized knowledge of Black feminist thought. The two types of knowledge are interdependent. While Black feminist thought articulates the often taken-for-granted knowledge shared by African-American women as a group, the consciousness of Black women may be transformed by such thought. Many Black women blues singers have long sung about taken-for-granted situations that affect U.S. Black women. Through their music, they not only depict Black women’s realities, they aim to shape them.

Because they have had greater opportunities to achieve literacy, middle-class Black women have also had greater access to the resources to engage in Black feminist scholarship. Education need not mean alienation from this dialogical relationship. The actions of educated Black women within the Black women’s club movement typify this special relationship between one segment of Black women intellectuals and the wider community of African-American women:

It is important to recognize that black women like Frances Harper, Anna Julia Cooper, and Ida B. Wells were not isolated figures of intellectual genius; they were shaped by and helped to shape a wider movement of Afro-American women. This is not to claim that they were representative of all black women; they and their counterparts formed an educated, intellectual elite, but an elite that tried to develop a cultural and historical perspective that was organic to the wider condition of black womanhood. (Carby 1987, 115)

The work of these women is important because it illustrates a tradition of joining scholarship and activism. Because they often lived in the same neighborhoods as working-class Blacks, turn-of-the-century club women lived in a Black civil society where this dialogical relationship was easier to establish. They saw the problems. They participated in social institutions that encouraged solutions. They fostered the development of a “cultural and historical perspective that was organic to the wider condition of black womanhood.” Contemporary Black women intellectuals face similar challenges of fostering dialogues, but do so under greatly changed social conditions. Whereas racial segregation was designed to keep U.S. Blacks oppressed, it fostered a form of racial solidarity that flourished in all-Black neighborhoods. In contrast, now that Blacks live in economically heterogeneous neighborhoods, achieving the same racial solidarity raises new challenges.
Black Feminism as Dynamic and Changing

A fifth distinguishing feature of U.S. Black feminist thought concerns the significance of change. In order for Black feminist thought to operate effectively within Black feminism as a social justice project, both must remain dynamic. Neither Black feminist thought as a critical social theory nor Black feminist practice can be static; as social conditions change, so must the knowledge and practices designed to resist them. For example, stressing the importance of Black women’s centrality to Black feminist thought does not mean that all African-American women desire, are positioned, or are qualified to exert this type of intellectual leadership. Under current conditions, some Black women thinkers have lost contact with Black feminist practice. Conversely, the changed social conditions under which U.S. Black women now come to womanhood—class-segregated neighborhoods, some integrated, far more not—place Black women of different social classes in entirely new relationships with one another.

The changing social conditions that confront African-American women stimulate the need for new Black feminist analyses of the common differences that characterize U.S. Black womanhood. Some Black women thinkers are already engaged in this process. Take, for example, Barbara Omolade’s (1994) insightful analysis of Black women’s historical and contemporary participation in mammy work. Most can understand mammy work’s historical context, one where Black women were confined to domestic service, with Aunt Jemima created as a controlling image designed to hide Black women’s exploitation. Understanding the limitations of domestic service, much of Black women’s progress in the labor market has been measured by the move out of domestic service. Currently, few U.S. Black women work in domestic service in private homes. Instead, a good deal of this work in private homes is now done by undocumented immigrant women of color who lack U.S. citizenship; their exploitation resembles that long visited upon African-American women (Chang 1994). But, as Omolade points out, these changes do not mean that U.S. Black women have escaped mammy work. Even though few Aunt Jemimas exist today, and those that do have been cosmetically altered, leading to the impression that mammy work has disappeared, Omolade reminds us that mammy work has assumed new forms. Within each segment of the labor market—the low-paid jobs at fast-food establishments, nursing homes, day-care centers, and dry cleaners that characterize the secondary sector, the secretaries and clerical workers of the primary lower tier sector, or the teachers, social workers, nurses, and administrators of the primary upper tier sector—U.S. Black women still do a remarkable share of the emotional nurturing and cleaning up after other people, often for lower pay. In this context the task for contemporary Black feminist thought lies in explicating these changing relationships and developing analyses of how these commonalities are experienced differently.

The changing conditions of Black women’s work overall has important implications for Black women’s intellectual work. Historically, the suppression of Black feminist thought has meant that Black women intellectuals have traditionally relied on alternative institutional locations to produce specialized knowledge about a Black women’s standpoint. Many Black women scholars, writers, and artists have worked either alone, as was the case with Maria W. Stewart, or within African-American community organizations, the case for Black women in the club movement and in Black churches. The grudging incorporation of work on Black women into curricular offerings of historically White colleges and universities, coupled with the creation of a critical mass of African-American women writers such as Toni Morrison, Alice Walker, and Gloria Naylor within these institutional locations, means that Black women intellectuals can now find employment within academia. Black women’s history and Black feminist literary criticism constitute two focal points of this renaissance in Black women’s intellectual work (Carby 1987). Moreover, U.S. Black women’s access to the media remains unprecedented, as talk show hostess Oprah Winfrey’s long-running television show and forays into film production suggest.

The visibility provided U.S. Black women and our ideas via these new institutional locations has been immense. However, one danger
facing African-American women intellectuals working in these new locations concerns the potential isolation of individual thinkers from Black women’s collective experiences—lack of access to other U.S. Black women and to Black women’s communities. Another is the pressure to separate thought from action—particularly political activism—that typically accompanies training in standard academic disciplines or participating in allegedly neutral spheres like the “free” press. Yet another involves the inability of some Black women “superstars” to critique the terms of their own participation in these new relations. Blinded by their self-proclaimed Black feminist diva aspirations, they feel that they owe no one, especially other Black women. Instead, they become trapped within their own impoverished Black feminist universes. Despite these dangers, these new institutional locations provide a multitude of opportunities for enhancing Black feminist thought’s visibility. In this new context, the challenge lies in remaining dynamic, all the while keeping in mind that a moving target is more difficult to hit.

**U.S. Black Feminism and Other Social Justice Projects**

A final distinguishing feature of Black feminist thought concerns its relationship to other projects for social justice. A broad range of African-American women intellectuals have advanced the view that Black women’s struggles are part of a wider struggle for human dignity, empowerment, and social justice. In an 1893 speech to women, Anna Julia Cooper cogently expressed this worldview:

> We take our stand on the solidarity of humanity, the oneness of life, and the unnaturalness and injustice of all special favoritisms, whether of sex, race, country, or condition. . . . The colored woman feels that woman’s cause is one and universal; and that . . . not till race, color, sex, and condition are seen as accidents, and not the substance of life; not till the universal title of humanity to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is conceded to be inalienable to all; not till then is woman’s lesson taught and woman’s cause won—not the white woman’s nor the black woman’s, not the red woman’s but the cause of every man and of every woman who has writhed silently under a mighty wrong. (Loewenberg and Bogen 1976, 330–31)

Like Cooper, many African-American women intellectuals embrace this perspective regardless of particular political solutions we propose, our educational backgrounds, our fields of study, or our historical periods. Whether we advocate working through autonomous Black women’s organizations, becoming part of women’s organizations, running for political office, or supporting Black community institutions, African-American women intellectuals repeatedly identify political actions such as these as *a means* for human empowerment rather than ends in and of themselves. Thus one important guiding principle of Black feminism is a recurring humanist vision (Steady 1981, 1987) . . .

Perhaps the most succinct version of the humanist vision in U.S. Black feminist thought is offered by Fannie Lou Hamer, the daughter of sharecroppers and a Mississippi civil rights activist. While sitting on her porch, Ms. Hamer observed, “Ain’ no such thing as I can hate anybody and hope to see God’s face” (Jordan 1981, xi).

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**Nancy Chodorow (1944–): A Biographical Sketch**

Nancy Chodorow was born in 1944 in New York City. She earned her B.A. in social anthropology from Radcliffe University in 1966 and her Ph.D. in sociology from Brandeis University in 1974. She first taught women’s studies at Wellesley College in 1973, then taught at the University of California, Santa Cruz, from 1974 to 1986. Since 1986, she has been teaching at the University of California, Berkeley. From 1985 to 1993, Chodorow undertook training at the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute. Arguably the most important psychoanalytic feminist and reinterpreter of Freud, Chodorow is a practicing clinical

**Chodorow’s Intellectual Influences and Core Ideas**

Most students do not associate Sigmund Freud with feminist theory. This is for good reason. After all, it was Freud who developed such concepts as “penis envy”—the idea that women are, by nature, “envious” of men’s physiological superiority; and “double orgasm”—the idea that orgasm achieved by transferring the center of orgasm to the vagina is a more “mature” form of orgasm than that achieved through stimulation of the clitoris.

In recent decades, Freud’s concepts of “penis envy” and “double orgasm” have been soundly discredited. Scientists concur that the center of female sexuality is the clitoris; hence, there can be no such thing as “vaginal orgasm” or “double orgasm.” So, too, the notion that a woman’s personality is inevitably determined by her lack of a penis has no basis in fact. Indeed, as Chodorow points out, Freud’s concept of “penis envy” violates a fundamental rule of psychoanalytic interpretation—that traumas need explaining. Freud does not seek to find the source of penis envy in previous individual history; that is, he does not explain why females want a penis. He simply argues that “she sees one and she knows she wants one” (Chodorow 1989:173).

Thus, feminists routinely condemn Freud not merely for the scientific inaccuracy of his ideas, but also because of their sexist and misogynistic origins and implications. Phallocentric thinking, which focuses on the penis and assumes that women need men for sexual arousal and satisfaction, is simply self-evident to Freud because he takes female “passivity” as a given. Moreover, scholars such as Chodorow (ibid.:175) point out that “Freud did not content himself with simply making *ad hominem* claims about women. He actively threw down the political gauntlet at feminists.” When women psychoanalysts started to object to his characterizations of women, Freud answered with a subtle antiwoman put-down: women psychoanalysts were not afflicted with the negative characteristics of femininity but were the “exception.” Women psychoanalysts were not like other women, but were more “masculine” (ibid.:176).

Yet, feminist psychoanalysts such as Chodorow have not given up entirely on either Freud or psychoanalysis. On the contrary, Chodorow (ibid.:174) maintains that psychoanalysis is “first and foremost a theory of femininity and masculinity, a theory of gender inequality, and a theory of the development of heterosexuality.” She maintains that psychoanalytic theory and feminism coincide in that both presuppose that women and men are “made,” not “born”—that is, that biology alone does not explain sexual orientation or gender personality. In short, although intensely critical of Freud, psychoanalytic feminists such as Chodorow accept the basic Freudian idea that unconscious and innate erotic and aggressive drives do exist. But in contrast to Freud, they situate innate erotic drives in the context of interpersonal relations; they focus not so much on sexuality per se as on intimacy and separation, primarily in the family and especially between mother and child.

These revised Freudian ideas, broadly known as object relations theory, replace Freud’s emphasis on “pleasure-seeking” with an emphasis on “relationship-seeking.” Freud used the term “object relation” to emphasize that bodily drives are satisfied through a medium, or object. Object relations theory extends this point, emphasizing that the psychological life of the individual is created in and through relations with other human beings. Object relations theorists contend that humans have an innate drive to form and maintain relationships, and that this is the fundamental human need that forms a context against which other drives,
such as libidinal and aggressive drives, gain meaning. In sum, the term “object relations” refers to the self-structure that we internalize in early childhood, which functions as a blueprint for establishing and maintaining future relationships (Klee 2005). Object relations theorists emphasize that, during the first few years of life, certain innate potentials and character traits (e.g., the ability to walk and talk) develop in the presence of good object relations. The quality of these relations affects the quality of one’s linguistic and motor skills (ibid.). In addition, in stark contrast to traditional Freudian thought, object relations theorists emphasize that the child’s gender identity has little to do with the child’s own awareness of sexuality and reproduction (whether conscious or unconscious). Rather, gender identity is developed through a process involving (1) the establishment of a close, symbiotic relationship to the primary caretaker, which is generally the mother, in the first three years of life, followed by (2) the subsequent dissolution of that relationship through separation (differentiating oneself from one’s primary caretaker) and individuation (establishing one’s own skills and personality traits). Of course, this newly developed gender identity reflects and expresses not merely personal traits, but also the gender-specific ideals and inequities of the family/community into which she or he is born.

In this way, psychoanalytic feminists tackle one of the enduring conundrums that feminists face: the resiliency of gender roles. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, many feminists were profoundly optimistic about the power of socialization to change gendered patterns of behavior. They assumed that if boys and girls were socialized in similar ways (i.e., if girls were not trained to do “girl” things and boys were not trained to do “boy” things), stereotypical gender roles would not persist. Gender roles would become obsolete, and sexism at the microlevel would be largely eliminated. However, this has not been the case. Despite significant changes in socialization (e.g., the rise in girls’ sports and more gender-neutral activities in school), and much to the chagrin of many parents and teachers, there are still strongly gendered preferences among both boys and girls. Thus, psychoanalytic feminists seek to explain how gender patterns are reproduced independent of our conscious intentions (Chodorow 1978:34; Williams 1993:134).

Chodorow begins by noting that, because of the allocation of work roles, infants usually originally identify with the female parent. That is, the infant first develops a sense of his or her own selfhood in a close, one-on-one relationship with the mother, and qualities possessed by the mother are internalized.

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12Klee (2005) notes that while object relations theory might well be called “human-relations theory” because of its prioritization of human relationships, in fact, in childhood, we form relationships with “transitional objects,” such as stuffed animals, toys, and pets; later in life, some people form intense and even self-destructive relationships with food and alcohol, as well as with other people. “So the term object is more inclusive for our understanding of how humans form and preserve a sense of self, as well as relationships with others” (ibid.).
by the infant to form the beginnings of the child’s personality.

However, the particularly strong bonds formed with the mother and the relative absence of the father have important implications for the development of “normal” adult heterosexual identity. Boys achieve their adult sexual identity (i.e., become “men”) only by separating themselves from their mothers. This separation entails denying the world of emotional intimacy that she represents. That is, boys become men by defining themselves in opposition to the femininity of their mother. According to Chodorow, the consequence of this is that men have difficulty in dealing with emotional matters: they see acknowledgment of emotions as a sign of vulnerability and weakness. Moreover, social contempt for women (and, in its extreme form, misogyny) arises as boys deny their earliest emotional experiences with their mothers and particularly the sexually charged nature of their oedipal love for their mothers. The acknowledgment of emotions, in particular feelings of vulnerability, is considered “feminizing” and is threatening to their status as “real” men (Alsop, Fitzsimons, and Lennon 2002:59).

Girls, however, are never required to make a complete break with their mothers in order to achieve their adult sexual identity (i.e., to become “women”). Rather, society fosters the continuation of intense mother–daughter bonds into adulthood. However, not having been forced to emotionally separate from their mothers, women continue to long for the emotional intimacy provided by close relationships. This unconscious desire to form attachments to others leads women to suffer greater dependency needs, as their self-identity is tied to their relationships with others. According to Chodorow, this lack of differentiation explains why women become preoccupied with the very relational issues at the heart of motherhood: intimacy and a lack of ego separation. Women find their self-in-relation (in intimate relations with others), but because of their socialization into adult heterosexuality, men lack the emotional capabilities that women need in order to be fulfilled in relationships. Because masculinity is defined by separation and distance, women turn not to men but to motherhood to fulfill their unconscious desire for intimacy; they re-create the early infant–mother relationship by becoming mothers themselves. Of course, as women again mother (and fathers continue to eschew intimacy), the cycle continues on into another generation: a female self that is fundamentally a self-in-relation and a male self that is fundamentally a self-in-denial of relations (Gerhenson and Williams 2001:282).

To be sure, Chodorow is not the first sociologist to suggest that gender personality is shaped within the psychodynamics of the family. Talcott Parsons (see Chapter 2) also borrowed this idea from Freud. But, in contrast to Parsons, who Chodorow (1978:38) maintains “always sounds as though he wants to understand order to contribute to its maintenance,” Chodorow examines the family critically. She maintains that the strains in the family that Parsons (1943) describes (e.g., the “asymmetrical relation of the marriage pair” in the occupational structure, which leads men to oppress and dominate women, and women to “succumb to their dependency cravings through such channels as neurotic illness or compulsive domesticity”—see Chapter 2) are actually deep distortions that, far from being a
As both a psychoanalyst and a sociologist, Chodorow can be said to incorporate both individualistic and collectivist approaches to order in her work, explicitly melding the more individualistic tradition of psychoanalysis with the more collectivistic tradition of sociology. Specifically, Chodorow explicitly combines an individualistic emphasis on the psychological hurdles that a child must overcome in order to become an able “man” or “woman” with
an emphasis on the social and cultural milieu that preexists the individual and shapes the gender roles to which he or she conforms. So, too, in conjunction with object relations theory, Chodorow emphasizes the importance of the significant persons who are the object or target of another’s feelings of intentions (at the level of the individual); as a sociologist, though, she recognizes that the objects to which individuals attach themselves are sanctioned in preexisting social patterns (at the collective level).

In terms of action, Chodorow is primarily nonrationalistic in orientation. As a psychoanalyst, she underscores that people attach themselves to particular things because of unconscious desires, which, by definition, reflects the nonrational realm, since the unconscious is not open to strategic or other cost/benefit calculations. In addition, however, the normative gender patterns that children internalize in the process of social interaction also speak primarily to the nonrational realm.

In sum, as shown in Figure 7.4, it is Chodorow’s psychoanalytic framework that sets her apart from other feminists and results in her individualistic/nonrationalistic theoretical orientation. However, there are sociological roots to this theoretical orientation as well. Akin to symbolic interactionists (see Chapter 5), who also exhibit a primarily individualistic and nonrationalistic approach, her theory emphasizes how we learn to direct our desires in socially appropriate ways in social interaction (see Figure 7.4).

Of course, it is precisely this individualistic and nonrationalistic approach that infuriates nonpsychoanalytic feminists, particularly neo-Marxist feminists. These folks have no truck with either the individualistic or the nonrationalistic orientation that psychoanalytic feminism exhibits, for they see the (individualistic) emphasis on (nonrationalistic) unconscious motivation and psychic structures as an irritatingly long way from the (rationalistic/collectivistic) politico-economic roots of gender inequality and oppression. They consider macro-level social structures, power dynamics, and the political and economic basis of gender inequality far more important than “unconscious desires” and psychological developmental concerns. Collins (1990/2000:6) also criticizes Chodorow for relying so heavily on white, middle-class samples and promoting the notion of “a generic woman who is White and middle-class.”

**Reading**

**Introduction to The Reproduction of Mothering**

The following selection is extracted from Chodorow’s most highly acclaimed book, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (1978). The selection begins with a brief excerpt on the effects of early mothering and the preoedipal period. In this section, Chodorow outlines how the infant’s early relation to its mother profoundly affects not only its sense of self and its later object relationships, but also its feeling about women in general (ibid.:77). The next excerpt you will read focuses on mothering, masculinity, and capitalism. Here, Chodorow explains how women’s mothering in isolated nuclear families in contemporary capitalist societies “prepares men for participation in a male-dominant family and society [and] for their lesser emotional participation in family life” (ibid.:180–81). The final excerpt you will read is from the conclusion of the book. Chodorow criticizes conventional feminist and social psychological theories for relying too much on conscious intention and recaps her particular version of psychoanalytic theory, highlighting psychic organization and orientation.
The Reproduction of Mothering (1978)

Nancy Chodorow

THE RELATION TO THE MOTHER AND THE MOTHERING RELATION

The Effects of Early Mothering

The character of the infant’s early relation to its mother profoundly affects its sense of self, its later object-relationships, and its feelings about its mother and about women in general. The continuity of care enables the infant to develop a self—a sense that “I am.” The quality of any particular relationship, however, affects the infant’s personality and self-identity. The experience of self concerns who “I am” and not simply that “I am.”

In a society where mothers provide nearly exclusive care and certainly the most meaningful relationship to the infant, the infant develops its sense of self mainly in relation to her. Insofar as the relationship with its mother has continuity, the infant comes to define aspects of its self (affectively and structurally) in relation to internalized representations of aspects of its mother and the perceived quality of her care. (As I have indicated, to call this quality “perceived” brackets the variety of fantasies and transformations the infant may engage in to deal with its anxiety and ambivalence.) For instance, the experience of satisfactory feeding and holding enables the child to develop a sense of loved self in relation to a loving and caring mother. Insofar as the maternal relationship is unsatisfactory, or such that the infant feels rejected or unloved, it is likely to define itself as rejected, or as someone who drives love away. In this situation, part of infantile attention, and then the infantile ego, remains preoccupied with this negatively experienced internal relationship. Because this situation is unresolvable, and interferes with the ongoing need for love, the infant represses its preoccupation. Part of its definition of self and its affective energy thus splits off experientially from its central self, drawing to an internal object energy and commitment which would otherwise be available for ongoing external relationships.

The growing child’s psychic structure and sense of self thus comes to consist of unconscious, quasi-independent, divided experiences of self in affective (libidinal-attached, aggressive, angry, ambivalent, helpless-dependent) relation with an inner object world, made up originally of aspects of its relation to its mother.

The infant’s mental and physical existence depends on its mother, and the infant comes to feel that it does. It experiences a sense of oneness with her and develops a self only by convincing itself that it is in fact a separate being from her. She is the person whom it loves with egoistic primary love and to whom it becomes attached. She is the person who first imposes on it the demands of reality. Internally she is also important. The infant comes to define itself as a person through its relationship to her, by internalizing the most important aspects of their relationship. Its stance toward itself and the world—its emotions, its quality of self-love (narcissism), or self-hate (depression)—all derive in the first instance from this earliest relationship.

In later life a person’s early relation to her or his mother leads to a preoccupation with issues of primary intimacy and merging. On one psychological level, all people who have experienced primary love and primary identification have some aspect of self that wants to recreate these experiences, and most people try to do so. Freud talks about the turn to religion as an attempt to recreate the lost feeling of oneness. Michael Balint suggests that adult love relationships are an attempt to recreate primary intimacy and merging, and that the “tranquil sense of well-being” is their ultimate goal: “This primary tendency, I shall be loved always, everywhere, in every way, my whole body, my whole

SOURCE: Excerpts from The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender by Nancy Chodorow. Copyright © 1978 by The Regents of the University of California. Reprinted with permission from The University of California Press via Copyright Clearance Center.
being—without any criticism, without the slightest effort on my part—is the final aim of all erotic striving.”

The preoccupation with issues of intimacy and merging, however, can also lead to avoidance. Fear of fusion may overwhelm the attraction to it, and fear of loss of a love object may make the experience of love too risky. When a person’s early experience tells him or her that only one unique person can provide emotional gratifications—a realistic expectation when they have been intensely and exclusively mothered—the desire to recreate that experience has to be ambivalent.

Children wish to remain one with their mother, and expect that she will never have different interests from them; yet they define development in terms of growing away from her. In the face of their dependence, lack of certainty of her emotional permanence, fear of merging, and overwhelming love and attachment, a mother looms large and powerful. Several analytic formulations speak to this, and to the way growing children come to experience their mothers. Mothers, they suggest, come to symbolize dependence, regression, passivity, and the lack of adaptation to reality. Turning from mother (and father) represents independence and individuation, progress, activity, and participation in the real world: “It is by turning away from our mother that we finally become, by our different paths, grown men and women.”

These attitudes, and the different relations to mother and father, are generalized as people grow up. During most of the early period, gender is not salient to the child (nor does it know gender categories). However, the fact that the child’s earliest relationship is with a woman becomes exceedingly important for the object-relations of subsequent developmental periods; that women mother and men do not is projected back by the child after gender comes to count. Women’s early mothering, then, creates specific conscious and unconscious attitudes or expectations in children. Girls and boys expect and assume women’s unique capacities for sacrifice, caring, and mothering, and associate women with their own fears of regression and powerlessness. They fantasize more about men, and associate them with idealized virtues and growth.

Gender Differences in the Preoedipal Period

Family structure produces crucial differentiating experiences between the sexes in oedipal object-relations and in the way these are psychologically appropriated, internalized, and transformed. Mothers are and have been the child’s primary caretaker, socializer, and inner object; fathers are secondary objects for boys and girls. My interpretation of the oedipus complex, from a perspective centered on object-relations, shows that these basic features of family structure entail varied modes of differentiation for the ego and its internalized object-relations and lead to the development of different relational capacities for girls and boys.

The feminine oedipus complex is not simply a transfer of affection from mother to father and a giving up of mother. Rather, psychoanalytic research demonstrates the continued importance of a girl’s external and internal relation to her mother, and the way her relation to her father is added to this. This process entails a relational complexity in feminine self-definition and personality which is not characteristic of masculine self-definition or personality. Relational capacities that are curtailed in boys as a result of the masculine oedipus complex are sustained in girls.

Because of their mothering by women, girls come to experience themselves as less separate than boys, as having more permeable ego boundaries. Girls come to define themselves more in relation to others. Their internalized object-relational structure becomes more complex, with more ongoing issues. These personality features are reflected in superego development.

My investigation, then, does not focus on issues at the center of the traditional psychoanalytic account of the oedipus complex—superego formation, gender identity, the attainment of gender role expectations, differential valuations of the sexes, and the genesis of sexual orientation. It takes other issues as equally central. I will be concerned with traditional issues only insofar as my analysis of oedipal object-relations of boys and girls sheds new insight on the different nature of male and female heterosexual object-relations.

The clinical and cultural examples I have discussed all point to the conclusion that preoedipal
experiences of girls and boys differ. The girl’s preoedipal mother-love and preoccupation with preoedipal issues are prolonged in a way that they are not for the boy. With the exception of Whiting’s cross-cultural analysis, all the examples I cite are cases which their authors have taken to be noteworthy for their “abnormality” or “pathology.” However, the extent of such pathology varies (from preoccupation to mild neurosis to psychosis). More important, there is systematic variation in the form it takes depending on whether a person is female or male—on whether we are talking about mother-daughter or mother-son relationships. In all cases the pathology reflects, in exaggerated form, differences in what are in fact normal tendencies. The cases give us, as Freud suggests about neurosis in general, insight into what we would otherwise miss just because it is subtle, typical, and familiar. These cases, then, point to typical gender differences in the preoedipal period, differences that are a product of the asymmetrical organization of parenting which founds our family structure.

Because they are the same gender as their daughters and have been girls, mothers of daughters tend not to experience these infant daughters as separate from them in the same way as do mothers of infant sons. In both cases, a mother is likely to experience a sense of oneness and continuity with her infant. However, this sense is stronger, and lasts longer, vis-à-vis daughters. Primary identification and symbiosis with daughters tend to be stronger and cathexis of daughters is more likely to retain and emphasize narcissistic elements, that is, to be based on experiencing a daughter as an extension or double of a mother herself, with cathexis of the daughter as a sexual other usually remaining a weaker, less significant theme.

Other accounts also suggest that mothers normally identify more with daughters and experience them as less separate. Signe Hammer’s book, *Daughters and Mothers: Mothers and Daughters*, based on interviews with over seventy-five mothers, daughters, and grandmothers, describes how issues of primary identification, oneness, and separateness follow mother-daughter pairs from a daughter’s earliest infancy until she is well into being a mother or even grandmother herself.

Hammer’s study is certainly confirmed by my own discussions with a number of mothers of daughters and sons, first in a women’s group devoted to the discussion and analysis of mother-daughter relationships in particular and family relationships in general, and later with individual acquaintances. Finally, the resurfacing and prevalence of preoedipal mother-daughter issues in adolescence (anxiety, intense and exclusive attachment, orality and food, maternal control of a daughter’s body, primary identification) provide clinical verification of the claim that elements of the preoedipal mother-daughter relationship are maintained and prolonged in both maternal and filial psyche.

Because they are of different gender than their sons, by contrast, mothers experience their sons as a male opposite. Their cathexis of sons is more likely to consist from early on in an object cathexis of a sexual other, perhaps in addition to narcissistic components. Sons tend to be experienced as differentiated from their mothers, and mothers push this differentiation (even while retaining, in some cases, a kind of intrusive controlling power over their sons). Maternal behavior, at the same time, tends to help propel sons into a sexualized, genitally toned relationship, which in its turn draws the son into triangular conflicts.

Early psychoanalytic findings about the special importance of the preoedipal mother-daughter relationship describe the first stage of a general process in which separation and individuation remain particularly female developmental issues. The cases I describe suggest that there is a tendency in women toward boundary confusion and a lack of sense of separateness from the world. Most women do develop ego boundaries and a sense of separate self. However, women’s ego and object-relational issues are
concerned with this tendency on one level (of potential conflict, of experience of object-relations), even as on another level (in the formation of ego boundaries and the development of a separate identity) the issues are resolved.

That these issues become more important for girls than for boys is a product of children of both genders growing up in families where women, who have a greater sense of sameness with daughters than sons, perform primary parenting functions. As long as women mother, we can expect that a girl’s preoedipal period will be longer than that of a boy and that women, more than men, will be more open to and preoccupied with those very relational issues that go into mothering—feelings of primary identification, lack of separateness or differentiation, ego and body-ego boundary issues and primary love not under the sway of the reality principle. A girl does not simply identify with her mother or want to be like her mother. Rather, mother and daughter maintain elements of their primary relationship which means they will feel alike in fundamental ways. Object-relations and conflicts in the oedipal period build upon this preoedipal base.

Object Relations and the Female Oedipal Configuration

Mothering, Masculinity, and Capitalism

Women’s mothering in the isolated nuclear family of contemporary capitalist society creates specific personality characteristics in men that reproduce both an ideology and psychodynamic of male superiority and submission to the requirements of production. It prepares men for participation in a male-dominant family and society, for their lesser emotional participation in family life, and for their participation in the capitalist world of work.

Masculine development takes place in a family in which women mother and fathers are relatively uninvolved in child care and family life, and in a society characterized by sexual inequality and an ideology of masculine superiority. This duality expresses itself in the family. In family ideology, fathers are usually important and considered the head of the household. Wives focus energy and concern on their husbands, or at least think and say that they do. They usually consider, or at least claim, that they love these husbands. Mothers may present fathers to children as someone important, someone whom the mother loves, and may even build up their husbands to their children to make up for the fact that these children cannot get to know their father as well as their mother. They may at the same time undercut their husband in response to the position he assumes of social superiority or authority in the family.

Masculinity is presented to a boy as less available and accessible than femininity, as represented by his mother. A boy’s mother is his primary caretaker. At the same time, masculinity is idealized or accorded superiority, and thereby becomes even more desirable. Although fathers are not as salient as mothers in daily interaction, mothers and children often idealize them and give them ideological primacy, precisely because of their absence and seeming inaccessibility, and because of the organization and ideology of male dominance in the larger society.

Masculinity becomes an issue in a way that femininity does not. Masculinity does not become an issue because of some intrinsic male biology, nor because masculine roles are inherently more difficult than feminine roles, however. Masculinity becomes an issue as a direct result of a boy’s experience of himself in his family—as a result of his being parented by a woman. For children of both genders, mothers represent regression and lack of autonomy. A boy associates these issues with his gender identification as well. Dependence

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*I must admit to fudging here about the contributory effect in all of this of a mother’s sexual orientation—whether she is heterosexual or lesbian. Given a female gender identity, she is “the same as” her daughter and “different from” her son, but part of what I am talking about also presumes a different kind of cathexis of daughter and son deriving from heterosexuality. Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, Berkeley: UC Press, 1978.*
on his mother, attachment to her, and identification with her represent that which is not masculine; a boy must reject dependence and deny attachment and identification. Masculine gender role training becomes much more rigid than feminine. A boy represses those qualities he takes to be feminine inside himself, and rejects and devalues women and whatever he considers to be feminine in the social world.

Thus, boys define and attempt to construct their sense of masculinity largely in negative terms. Given that masculinity is so elusive, it becomes important for masculine identity that certain social activities are defined as masculine and superior, and that women are believed unable to do many of the things defined as socially important. It becomes important to think that women’s economic and social contribution cannot equal men’s. The secure possession of certain realms, and the insistence that these realms are superior to the maternal world of youth, become crucial both to the definition of masculinity and to a particular boy’s own masculine gender identification.

Freud describes the genesis of this stance in the masculine oedipal crisis. A boy’s struggle to free himself from his mother and become masculine generates “the contempt felt by men for a sex which is the lesser”—“What we have come to consider the normal male contempt for women.”

Both sexes learn to feel negatively toward their mother during the oedipal period. A girl’s negative feelings, however, are not so much contempt and devaluation as fear and hostility: “The little girl, incapable of such contempt because of her own identical nature, frees herself from the mother with a degree of hostility far greater than any comparable hostility in the boy.” A boy’s contempt serves to free him not only from his mother but also from the femininity within himself. It therefore becomes entangled with the issue of masculinity and is generalized to all women. A girl’s hostility remains tied more to her relationship to her mother (and/or becomes involved in self-depreciation).

A boy’s oedipus complex is directly tied to issues of masculinity, and the devaluation of women is its “normal” outcome. A girl’s devaluation of or hostility toward her mother may be a part of the process, but its “normal” outcome, by contrast, entails acceptance of her own femininity and identification with her mother. Whatever the individual resolution of the feminine oedipus complex, however, it does not become institutionalized in the same way.

Freud “explains” the development of boys’ contempt for mothers as coming from their perception of genital differences, particularly their mother’s “castration.” He takes this perception to be unmediated by social experience, and not in need of explanation. As many commentators have pointed out, it did not occur to Freud that such differential valuation and ensuing contempt were not in the natural order of things. However, the analysis of “Little Hans,” which provides the most direct (reported) evidence that Freud had for such an assumption, shows that in fact Hans’s father perpetuated and created such beliefs in his son—beliefs about the inferiority of female genitalia, denial of the feminine role in gestation and parturition, views that men have something and women have nothing, rather than having something different.

Karen Horney, unlike Freud, does take masculine contempt for and devaluation of women as in need of interactive and developmental explanation. According to her, these phenomena are manifestations of a deeper “dread of women”—a masculine fear and terror of maternal omnipotence that arises as one major consequence of their early caretaking and socialization by women. Psychoanalysts previously had stressed boys’ fears of their fathers. Horney argues that these fears are less severe and therefore less in need of being repressed. Unlike their fears of a mother, boys do not react to a father’s total and incomprehensible control over his child’s life at a time when the child has no reflective capacities for understanding: “Dread of the father is more actual and tangible, less uncanny in quality.” Moreover, since their father is male like them, boys’ fears of men do not entail admission of feminine weakness or dependency on women: “Masculine self-regard suffers less in this way.”

Dread of the mother is ambivalent, however. Although a boy fears her, he also finds her seductive and attractive. He cannot simply dismiss and ignore her. Boys and men develop psychological and cultural/ideological mechanisms to cope with their fears without giving up
women altogether. They create folk legends, beliefs, and poems that ward off the dread by externalizing and objectifying women: “It is not . . . that I dread her; it is that she herself is malignant, capable of any crime, a beast of prey, a vampire, a witch, insatiable in her desires . . . the very personification of what is sinister.” They deny dread at the expense of realistic views of women. On the one hand, they glorify and adore: “There is no need for me to dread a being so wonderful, so beautiful, nay, so saintly.” On the other, they disparage: “It would be too ridiculous to dread a creature who, if you take her all round, is such a poor thing.” . . .

**Psychodynamics of the Family**

**Gender Personality and the Reproduction of Mothering**

In spite of the apparently close tie between women’s capacities for childbearing and lactation on the one hand and their responsibilities for child care on the other, and in spite of the probable prehistoric convenience (and perhaps survival necessity) of a sexual division of labor in which women mothered, biology and instinct do not provide adequate explanations for how women come to mother. Women’s mothering as a feature of social structure requires an explanation in terms of social structure. Conventional feminist and social psychological explanations for the genesis of gender roles—girls and boys are “taught” appropriate behaviors and “learn” appropriate feelings—are insufficient both empirically and methodologically to account for how women become mothers.

Methodologically, socialization theories rely inappropriately on individual intention. Ongoing social structures include the means for their own reproduction—in the regularized repetition of social processes, in the perpetuation of conditions which require members’ participation, in the genesis of legitimating ideologies and institutions, and in the psychological as well as physical reproduction of people to perform necessary roles. Accounts of socialization help to explain the perpetuation of ideologies about gender roles. However, notions of appropriate behavior, like coercion, cannot in themselves produce parenting. Psychological capacities and a particular object-relational stance are central and definitional to parenting in a way that they are not to many other roles and activities.

Women’s mothering includes the capacities for its own reproduction. This reproduction consists in the production of women with, and men without, the particular psychological capacities and stance which go into primary parenting. Psychoanalytic theory provides us with a theory of social reproduction that explains major features of personality development and the development of psychic structure, and the differential development of gender personality in particular. Psychoanalysts argue that personality both results from and consists in the ways a child appropriates, internalizes, and organizes early experiences in their family—from the fantasies they have, the defenses they use, the ways they channel and redirect drives in this object-relational context. A person subsequently imposes this intrapsychic structure, and the fantasies, defenses, and relational modes and preoccupations which go with it, onto external social situations. This reexternalization (or mutual reexternalization) is a major constituting feature of social and interpersonal situations themselves.

Psychoanalysis, however, has not had an adequate theory of the reproduction of mothering. Because of the teleological assumption that anatomy is destiny, and that women’s destiny includes primary parenting, the ontogenesis of women’s mothering has been largely ignored, even while the genesis of a wide variety of related disturbances and problems has been accorded widespread clinical attention. Most psychoanalysts agree that the basis for parenting is laid for both genders in the early relationship to a primary caretaker. Beyond that, in order to explain why women mother, they tend to rely on vague notions of a girl’s subsequent identification with her mother, which makes her and not her brother a primary parent, or on an unspecified and uninvestigated innate femaleness in girls, or on logical leaps from lactation or early vaginal sensations to caretaking abilities and commitments.

The psychoanalytic account of male and female development, when reinterpreted, gives us a developmental theory of the reproduction of women’s mothering. Women’s mothering
reproduces itself through differing object-relational experiences and differing psychic outcomes in women and men. As a result of having been parented by a woman, women are more likely than men to seek to be mothers, that is, to relocate themselves in a primary mother-child relationship, to get gratification from the mothering relationship, and to have psychological and relational capacities for mothering.

The early relation to a primary caretaker provides in children of both genders both the basic capacity to participate in a relationship with the features of the early parent-child one, and the desire to create this intimacy. However, because women mother, the early experience and pre-oedipal relationship differ for boys and girls. Girls retain more concern with early childhood issues in relation to their mother, and a sense of self involved with these issues. Their attachments therefore retain more preoedipal aspects. The greater length and different nature of their preoedipal experience, and their continuing preoccupation with the issues of this period, mean that women’s sense of self is continuous with others and that they retain capacities for primary identification, both of which enable them to experience the empathy and lack of reality sense needed by a cared-for infant. In men, these qualities have been curtailed, both because they are early treated as an opposite by their mother and because their later attachment to her must be repressed. The relational basis for mothering is thus extended in women, and inhibited in men, who experience themselves as more separate and distinct from others.

The different structure of the feminine and masculine oedipal triangle and process of oedipal experience that results from women’s mothering contributes further to gender personality differentiation and the reproduction of women’s mothering. As a result of this experience, women’s inner object world, and the affects and issues associated with it, are more actively sustained and more complex than men’s. This means that women define and experience themselves relationally. Their heterosexual orientation is always in internal dialogue with both oedipal and preoedipal mother-child relational issues. Thus, women’s heterosexuality is triangular and requires a third person—a child—for its structural and emotional completion. For men, by contrast, the heterosexual relationship alone recreates the early bond to their mother; a child interrupts it. Men, moreover, do not define themselves in relationship and have come to suppress relational capacities and repress relational needs. This prepares them to participate in the affect-denying world of alienated work, but not to fulfill women’s needs for intimacy and primary relationships.

The oedipus complex, as it emerges from the asymmetrical organization of parenting, secures a psychological taboo on parent-child incest and pushes boys and girls in the direction of extrafamilial heterosexual relationships. This is one step toward the reproduction of parenting. The creation and maintenance of the incest taboo and of heterosexuality in girls and boys are different, however. For boys, superego formation and identification with their father, rewarded by the superiority of masculinity, maintain the taboo on incest with their mother, while heterosexual orientation continues from their earliest love relation with her. For girls, creating them as heterosexual in the first place maintains the taboo. However, women’s heterosexuality is not so exclusive as men’s. This makes it easier for them to accept or seek a male substitute for their fathers. At the same time, in a male-dominant society, women’s exclusive emotional heterosexuality is not so necessary, nor is her repression of love for her father. Men are more likely to initiate relationships, and women’s economic dependence on men pushes them anyway into heterosexual marriage.

Male dominance in heterosexual couples and marriage solves the problem of women’s lack of heterosexual commitment and lack of satisfaction by making women more reactive in the sexual bonding process. At the same time, contradictions in heterosexuality help to perpetuate families and parenting by ensuring that women will seek relations to children and will not find heterosexual relationships alone satisfactory. Thus, men’s lack of emotional availability and women’s less exclusive heterosexual commitment help ensure women’s mothering.

Women’s mothering, then, produces psychological self-definition and capacities appropriate to mothering in women, and curtails and inhibits these capacities and this self-definition in men. The early experience of being cared for by a
Feminist and Gender Theories

A woman produces a fundamental structure of expectations in women and men concerning mothers’ lack of separate interests from their infants and total concern for their infants’ welfare. Daughters grow up identifying with these mothers, about whom they have such expectations. This set of expectations is generalized to the assumption that women naturally take care of children of all ages and the belief that women’s “maternal” qualities can and should be extended to the nonmothering work that they do. All these results of women’s mothering have ensured that women will mother infants and will take continuing responsibility for children.

The reproduction of women’s mothering is the basis for the reproduction of women’s location and responsibilities in the domestic sphere. This mothering, and its generalization to women’s structural location in the domestic sphere, links the contemporary social organization of gender and social organization of production and contributes to the reproduction of each. That women mother is a fundamental organizational feature of the sex-gender system: It is basic to the sexual division of labor and generates a psychology and ideology of male dominance as well as an ideology about women’s capacities and nature. Women, as wives and mothers, contribute as well to the daily and generational reproduction, both physical and psychological, of male workers and thus to the reproduction of capitalist production.

Women’s mothering also reproduces the family as it is constituted in male-dominant society. The sexual and familial division of labor in which women mother creates a sexual division of psychic organization and orientation. It produces socially gendered women and men who enter into asymmetrical heterosexual relationships; it produces men who react to, fear, and act superior to women, and who put most of their energies into the nonfamilial work world and do not parent. Finally, it produces women who turn their energies toward nurturing and caring for children—in turn reproducing the sexual and familial division of labor in which women mother.

Social reproduction is thus asymmetrical. Women in their domestic role reproduce men and children physically, psychologically, and emotionally. Women in their domestic role as houseworkers reconstitute themselves physically on a daily basis and reproduce themselves as mothers, emotionally and psychologically, in the next generation. They thus contribute to the perpetuation of their own social roles and position in the hierarchy of gender.

Institutionalized features of family structure and the social relations of reproduction reproduce themselves. A psychoanalytic investigation shows that women’s mothering capacities and commitments, and the general psychological capacities and wants which are the basis of women’s emotion work, are built developmentally into feminine personality. Because women are themselves mothered by women, they grow up with the relational capacities and needs, and psychological definition of self-in-relationship, which commits them to mothering. Men, because they are mothered by women, do not. Women mother daughters who, when they become women, mother.

**Raewyn Connell (1944–): A Biographical Sketch**

Raewyn Connell (formerly R. W. or Bob Connell) was born in Australia in 1944. One of Australia’s most highly acclaimed sociologists, Connell has authored or coauthored a number of books, including *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture* (1977), *Class Structure in Australian History* (1980), *Gender and Power* (1987), *The Men and the Boys* (2000), and *Masculinities* (1995), which has been translated into thirteen languages and is among the most-cited research publications in the field. Connell’s most recent book, *Southern Theory* (2007), discusses theorists unfamiliar in the European canon of social science and explores the possibility of a genuinely global social science. Her ongoing work explores the relation between masculinities and neoliberal globalization, combining, in characteristic form, her concern
for large-scale social structures with recognition of personal experience and collective agency.

Connell received her doctorate in sociology from the University of Sydney, where she currently holds a university chair. She has also taught at the University of California at Santa Cruz, Macquarie University in Sydney, and Flinders University in Adelaide and has held visiting posts at the University of Toronto, Harvard University, and Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Connell’s work is widely cited in social science and humanities publications internationally. Four of her books have been listed among the ten most influential books in Australian sociology. She is frequently invited to give keynote addresses at conferences and seminars, and has done so at events in Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Senegal, and Britain. Connell has received the American Sociological Association’s award for distinguished contribution to the study of sex and gender, as well as the Australian Sociological Association’s award for distinguished service to sociology.

**Connell’s Intellectual Influences and Core Ideas**

Akin to Chodorow, Connell is concerned about the resiliency of gender roles, and the pattern of practices that allows men’s dominance over women. However, rather than use object relations theory to explain these practices, Connell expands on the work of the Italian journalist, communist, and political activist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), who coined the concept of “cultural hegemony” (See Significant Others box, Chapter 3, p. 88.) Building on Marx’s notion that “the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class,” and fascinated by the extraordinary ideological power of the Catholic Church in Italy, Gramsci used the term “cultural hegemony” to refer to how the ruling class maintains its dominance not primarily through force or coercion, but rather through the willing, “spontaneous” consent of the ruled. In a similar vein, Connell uses the term “hegemonic masculinity” to refer to the pattern of practices that allows men’s dominance over women to continue (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:832). Connell maintains that there are many kinds of masculinities but that there is always one that is hegemonic to the rest and marginalizes others in a gender system. This does not mean that hegemonic masculinity is either monolithic or static, but, rather, that it is the kind of masculinity that is in a superior position. No matter what, each culture will prefer one kind of masculinity over others. Significantly, however, Connell maintains that most men do not live in the model of hegemonic masculinity, and that masculinity (as femininity) has internal contradictions and historical ruptures, because what is hegemonic is determined in a mobile relation. Above all, Connell is concerned with the changing patterns of “hegemony”: the dominance of particular patterns of masculinity over others.

Connell’s conceptualization of “hegemonic masculinity” has the central advantage of locating male dominance not solely in the microlevel and the interpersonal dynamics of the family, but also in the macrolevel and the public sphere. “Hegemonic masculinity” recognizes not only the gendered character of bureaucracies and workplaces as well as educational institutions, including classroom dynamics and patterns of bullying, but also the media, for instance the interplay of sports and war imagery, as well as the virtual monopoly of men in certain forms of crime, including syndicated and white-collar crimes. In theoretical terms, Connell explicitly accounts for both the more “rational” dimensions of dominance (institutionalized bureaucracies) and the “nonrational” dimensions (e.g., sports and war imagery), as shown in Figure 7.5. As Connell and Messerschmidt (ibid.:846) state, “Cultural consent, discursive centrality, institutionalization and the marginalization or delegitimation of alternatives are widely documented features of socially dominant masculinities. . . . Hegemony
works in part through the production of exemplars of masculinity (e.g., professional sports stars), symbols that have authority despite the fact that most men and boys do not fully live up to them.”

This brings us to a second vital concept in Connell’s work: “patriarchal dividend.” Connell uses this term to refer both to the honor and prestige and to the more material dividends men accrue under patriarchy, the point being that this dividend is not uniformly distributed among men, but is, nevertheless, universally distributed among them. In other words, though men as a whole may gain from living in a patriarchal gender order, not all gain in the same way or to the same degree. Patriarchal systems are intertwined with a wide variety of other hierarchical relations (e.g., class, race, nation, region, generation, sexual orientation); consequently, not all men receive the same share of the patriarchal dividend.

As illustrated in Figure 7.5, in terms of the theoretical model used in this book, “patriarchal dividend” and “hegemonic masculinity” might be conceptualized as twin terms, the former highlighting the costs and benefits of the gender order as played out at the level of the individual; the latter highlighting, as indicated previously, dominant patterns of masculinity, at both the cultural and social structural levels. As Connell (2000, p. 11) states, “Masculinities are defined collectively in culture, and are sustained in institutions.” In other words, in terms of the question of order, Connell’s work is thoroughly multidimensional. As a sociologist and historian, Connell is most interested in “collective masculinities,” which she defines as
“the patterns of conduct our society defines as masculine” (ibid.). She emphasizes not only that there are different types of masculinities in different cultures and periods of history, but also “multiple masculinities” in any particular place and time (ibid.). At the same time, however, Connell goes to great lengths to explain “the active construction” of masculinity at the level of the individual (ibid.). Connell asserts that “the hegemonic form need not be the most common form of masculinity,” that masculinities are not fixed, and that significant contradictions exist not only at the level of the collective, but at the level of the individual—for instance, in contradictory desires (ibid.:11–13).

In terms of the question of action, as indicated previously, Connell explicitly accounts for both the more “rational” and “nonrational” dimensions of dominance at the level of the collective (for instance, institutionalized bureaucracies, and sports and war imagery), as well as both the conscious and the relatively unconscious costs and benefits that accrue from the patriarchal dividend at the level of the individual (for instance, intricate maneuvering in peer groups and competitive sports). Most importantly, Connell’s theoretical multidimensionality is rooted not only in her comprehensive analysis of distinct sorts of variables (e.g., the economy, the body, media), but also in her comprehensive analysis of a single variable across space and time. Thus, in the essay you will read below, she maintains that the disadvantages to men that accrue in the current gender order are “the conditions of the advantages. For instance, men cannot be the beneficiaries of women’s domestic labor and ‘emotion work’ without many of them losing intimate connections, for instance, with young children” (Connell 2005:1809).

Reading

Introduction to “Change Among the Gatekeepers”

In this essay, Connell makes three pivotal points regarding gender equality in the global arena. First, Connell argues that men are the “gatekeepers” to equality between men and women in many ways—that is, they have access to resources, authority, and skills that may all be important in social change. The point is that men who believe in gender equality can do a great deal. Second, Connell illuminates the diversity of masculinities and men’s movements worldwide. For instance, on the one hand, homosexual men are mobilizing in antidiscrimination campaigns, in the gay liberation movement, and in community responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. On the other hand, however, there are very large numbers of men engaged in preserving gender inequality. For instance, conservative religious organizations (Christian, Islamic, Buddhist) controlled by men sometimes completely exclude women; these organizations have often been used to oppose the emancipation of women. At the same time, “transnational media organizations, such as Rupert Murdoch’s conglomerate are equally active in promoting conservative gender ideology,” and “neoliberalism can function as a form of masculinity politics largely because of the powerful role of the state in the gender order” as well (Connell 2005:1816). Finally, Connell (ibid.:1803) points out that “we now have a far more sophisticated and detailed scientific understanding of issues about men, masculinities, and gender than ever before,” such that, though clearly given the diversity of masculinity politics it is unrealistic to expect worldwide consensus for gender equality, it is possible that gender equality might someday become hegemonic among men.
Equality between women and men has been a doctrine well recognized in international law since the adoption of the 1948 *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (United Nations 1958), and as a principle it enjoys popular support in many countries. The idea of gender equal rights has provided the formal basis for the international discussion of the position of women since the 1975–85 UN Decade for Women, which has been a key element in the story of global feminism (Bulbeck 1988). The idea that men might have a specific role in relation to this principle has emerged only recently.

The issue of gender equality was placed on the policy agenda by women. The reason is obvious: it is women who are disadvantaged by the main patterns of gender inequality and who therefore have the claim for redress. Men are, however, necessarily involved in gender-equality reform. Gender inequalities are embedded in a multidimensional structure of relationships between women and men, which, as the modern sociology of gender shows, operates at every level of human experience, from economic arrangements, culture, and the state to interpersonal relationships and individual emotions (Holter 1997; Walby 1997; Connell 2002). Moving toward a gender-equal society involves profound institutional change as well as change in everyday life and personal conduct. To move far in this direction requires widespread social support, including significant support from men and boys.

Further, the very gender inequalities in economic assets, political power, and cultural authority, as well as the means of coercion, that gender reforms intend to change, currently mean that men (often specific groups of men) control most of the resources required to implement women’s claims for justice. Men and boys are thus in significant ways gatekeepers for gender equality. Whether they are willing to open the gates for major reforms is an important strategic question.

In this article, I will trace the emergence of a worldwide discussion of men and gender-equality reform and will try to assess the prospects of reform strategies involving men. To make such an assessment, it is necessary to set recent policy discussions in the wider context of the cultural problematization of men and boys, the politics of “men’s movements,” the divided interests of men and boys in gender relations, and the growing research evidence about the changing and conflict-ridden social construction of masculinities.

In an article of this scope, it is not possible to address particular national agendas in detail. I will refer to a number of texts where these stories can be found. Because my primary concern is with the global character of the debate, I will give particular attention to policy discussions in UN forums. These discussions culminated in the 2004 meeting of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, which produced the first world-level policy document on the role of men and boys in relation to gender equality (UN Commission on the Status of Women 2004).

**Men and Masculinities in the World Gender Order**

In the last fifteen years, in the “developed” countries of the global metropole, there has been a great deal of popular concern with issues about men and boys. Readers in the United States may recall a volume by the poet Robert Bly, *Iron John: A Book about Men* (1990), which became
a huge best seller in the early 1990s, setting off a wave of imitations. This book became popular because it offered, in prophetic language, simple solutions to problems that were increasingly troubling the culture. A therapeutic movement was then developing in the United States, mainly though not exclusively among middle-class men, addressing problems in relationships, sexuality, and identity (Kupers 1993; Schwalbe 1996).

More specific issues about men and boys have also attracted public attention in the developed countries. Men’s responses to feminism, and to gender-equality measures taken by government, have long been the subject of debate in Germany and Scandinavia (Metz-Göckel and Müller 1985; Holter 2003). In anglophone countries there has been much discussion of “the new fatherhood” and of supposed changes in men’s involvement in families (McMahon 1999). There has been public agonizing about boys’ “failure” in school, and in Australia there are many proposals for special programs for boys (Kenway 1997; Lingard 2003). Men’s violence toward women has been the subject of practical interventions and extensive debate (Hearn 1998). There has also been increasing debate about men’s health and illness from a gender perspective (Hurrelmann and Kolip 2002).

Accompanying these debates has been a remarkable growth of research about men’s gender identities and practices, masculinities and the social processes by which they are constructed, cultural and media images of men, and related matters. Academic journals have been founded for specialized research on men and masculinities, there have been many research conferences, and there is a rapidly growing international literature. We now have a far more sophisticated and detailed scientific understanding of issues about men, masculinities, and gender than ever before (Connell 2003a).

This set of concerns, though first articulated in the developed countries, can now be found worldwide (Connell 2000; Pease and Pringle 2001). Debates on violence, patriarchy, and ways of changing men’s conduct have occurred in countries as diverse as Germany, Canada, and South Africa (Hagemann-White 1992; Kaufman 1993; Morrell 2001a). Issues about masculine sexuality and fatherhood have been debated and researched in Brazil, Mexico, and many other countries (Arilha, Unbehaum Ridenti, and Medrado 1998; Lerner 1998). A men’s center with a reform agenda has been established in Japan, where conferences have been held and media debates about traditional patterns of masculinity and family life continue (Menzu Senta 1997; Roberson and Suzuki 2003). A “traveling seminar” discussing issues about men, masculinities, and gender equality has recently been touring in India (Roy 2003). Debates about boys’ education, men’s identities, and gender change are active from New Zealand to Denmark (Law, Campbell, and Dolan 1999; Reinicke 2002). Debates about men’s sexuality, and changing sexual identities, are also international (Altman 2001).

The research effort is also worldwide. Documentation of the diverse social constructions of masculinity has been undertaken in countries as far apart as Peru (Fuller 2001), Japan (Taga 2001), and Turkey (Sinclair-Webb 2000). The first large-scale comparative study of men and gender relations has recently been completed in ten European countries (Hearn et al. 2002). The first global synthesis, in the form of a world handbook of research on men and masculinities, has now appeared (Kimmel, Hearn, and Connell 2005).

The rapid internationalization of these debates reflects the fact—increasingly recognized in feminist thought (Bulbeck 1998; Marchand and Runyan 2000)—that gender relations themselves have an international dimension. Each of the substructures of gender relations can be shown to have a global dimension, growing out of the history of imperialism and seen in the contemporary process of globalization (Connell 2002). Change in gender relations occurs on a world scale, though not always in the same direction or at the same pace.

The complexity of the patterns follows from the fact that gender change occurs in several different modes. Most dramatic is the direct colonization of the gender order of regions beyond the metropole. There has also been a more gradual recomposition of gender orders, both those of the colonizing society and the colonized, in the process of colonial interaction. The hybrid gender identities and sexualities now much discussed in the context of postcolonial societies are neither unusual nor new. They are a feature of the whole
history of imperialism and are visible in many contemporary studies (e.g., Valdes and Olavarria 1998).

Imperialism and globalization change the conditions of existence for gender orders. For instance, the linking of previously separate production systems changes the flow of goods and services in the gendered division of labor, as seen in the impact of industrially produced foods and textiles on household economies. Colonialism itself often confronted local patriarchies with colonizing patriarchies, producing a turbulent and sometimes very violent aftermath, as in southern Africa (Morrell 1998). Pressure from contemporary Western commercial culture has destabilized gender arrangements, and models of masculinity, in Japan (Ito 1992), the Arab world (Ghoussoub 2000), and elsewhere.

Finally, the emergence of new arenas of social relationship on a world scale creates new patterns of gender relations. Transnational corporations, international communications systems, global mass media, and international state structures (from the United Nations to the European Union) are such arenas. These institutions have their own gender regimes and may form the basis for new configurations of masculinity, as has recently been argued for transnational business (Connell 2000) and the international relations system (Hooper 2001). Local gender orders now interact not only with the gender orders of other local societies but also with the gender order of the global arena.

The dynamics of the world gender order affect men as profoundly as they do women, though this fact has been less discussed. The best contemporary research on men and masculinity, such as Matthew C. Gutmann’s (2002) ethnographic work in Mexico, shows in fine detail how the lives of particular groups of men are shaped by globally acting economic and political dynamics.

Different groups of men are positioned very differently in such processes. There is no single formula that accounts for men and globalization. There is, indeed, a growing polarization among men on a world scale. Studies of the “super-rich” (Haseler 2000) show a privileged minority reaching astonishing heights of wealth and power while much larger numbers face poverty, cultural dislocation, disruption of family relationships, and forced renegotiation of the meanings of masculinity.

Masculinities, as socially constructed configurations of gender practice, are also created through a historical process with a global dimension. The old-style ethnographic research that located gender patterns purely in a local context is inadequate to the reality. Historical research, such as Robert Morrell’s (2001b) study of the masculinities of the colonizers in South Africa and T. Dunbar Moodie’s (1994) study of the colonized, shows how a gendered culture is created and transformed in relation to the international economy and the political system of empire. There is every reason to think this principle holds for contemporary masculinities.

**SHIFTING GROUND: MEN AND BOYS IN GENDER-EQUALITY DEBATES**

Because of the way they came onto the agenda of public debate, gender issues have been widely regarded as women’s business and of little concern to men and boys. In almost all policy discussions, to adopt a gender perspective substantially means to address women’s concerns.

In both national and international policy documents concerned with gender equality, women are the subjects of the policy discourse. The agencies or meetings that formulate, implement, or monitor gender policies usually have names referring to women, such as Department for Women, Women’s Equity Bureau, Prefectural Women’s Centre, or Commission on the Status of Women. Such bodies have a clear mandate to act for women. They do not have an equally clear mandate to act with respect to men. The major policy documents concerned with gender equality, such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (United Nations [1979] 1989), often do not name men as a group and rarely discuss men in concrete terms.

However, men are present as background throughout these documents. In every statement about women’s disadvantages, there is an implied comparison with men as the advantaged group. In the discussions of violence against women, men are implied, and sometimes named, as the perpetrators. In discussions of gender and HIV/AIDS,
men are commonly construed as being “the problem,” the agents of infection. In discussions of women’s exclusion from power and decision making, men are implicitly present as the power holders.

When men are present only as a background category in a policy discourse about women, it is difficult to raise issues about men’s and boys’ interests, problems, or differences. This could be done only by falling into a backlash posture and affirming “men’s rights” or by moving outside a gender framework altogether.

The structure of gender-equality policy, therefore, created an opportunity for antifeminist politics. Opponents of feminism have now found issues about boys and men to be fertile ground. This is most clearly seen in the United States, where authors such as Warren Farreh (1993) and Christina Hoff Sommers (2000), purporting to speak on behalf of men and boys, bitterly accuse feminism of injustice. Men and boys, they argue, are the truly disadvantaged group and need supportive programs in education and health, in situations of family breakup, and so forth. These ideas have not stimulated a social movement, with the exception of a small-scale (though active and sometimes violent) “father’s rights” movement in relation to divorce. The arguments have, however, strongly appealed to the neoconservative mass media, which have given them international circulation. They now form part of the broad neoconservative repertoire of opposition to “political correctness” and to social justice measures.

Some policy makers have attempted to straddle this divide by restructuring gender-equality policy in the form of parallel policies for women and men. For instance, some recent health policy initiatives in Australia have added a “men’s health” document to a “women’s health” document (Schofield 2004). Similarly, in some school systems a “boys’ education” strategy has been added to a “girls’ education” strategy (Lingard 2003).

This approach acknowledges the wider scope of gender issues. But it also risks weakening the equality rationale of the original policy. It forgets the relational character of gender and therefore tends to redefine women and men, or girls and boys, simply as different market segments for some service. Ironically, the result may be to promote more gender segregation, not less. This has certainly happened in education, where some privileged boys’ schools have jumped on the “gender equality” bandwagon and now market themselves as experts in catering to the special needs of boys.

On the other hand, bringing men’s problems into an existing framework of policies for women may weaken the authority that women have so far gathered in that policy area. In the field of gender and development, for instance, some specialists argue that “bringing men in”—given the larger context in which men still control most of the wealth and institutional authority—may undermine, not help, the drive for gender equality (White 2000).

DIVIDED INTERESTS: SUPPORT AND RESISTANCE

There is something surprising about the worldwide problematizing of men and masculinities, because in many ways the position of men has not greatly changed. For instance, men remain a very large majority of corporate executives, top professionals, and holders of public office. Worldwide, men hold nine out of ten cabinet-level posts in national governments, nearly as many of the parliamentary seats, and most top positions in international agencies. Men, collectively, receive approximately twice the income that women receive and also receive the benefits of a great deal of unpaid household labor, not to mention emotional support, from women (Gierycz 1999; Godenzi 2000; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2003).

The UN Development Program (2003) now regularly incorporates a selection of such statistics into its annual report on world human development, combining them into a “gender-related development index” and a “gender empowerment measure.” This produces a dramatic outcome, a league table of countries ranked in terms of gender equality, which shows most countries in the world to be far from gender-equal. It is clear that, globally, men have a lot to lose from pursuing gender equality because men, collectively, continue to receive a patriarchal dividend.

But this way of picturing inequality may conceal as much as it reveals. There are multiple
dimensions in gender relations, and the patterns of inequality in these dimensions may be qualitatively different. If we look separately at each of the substructures of gender, we find a pattern of advantages for men but also a linked pattern of disadvantages or toxicity (Connell 2003c).

For instance, in relation to the gender division of labor, men collectively receive the bulk of income in the money economy and occupy most of the managerial positions. But men also provide the workforce for the most dangerous occupations, suffer most industrial injuries, pay most of the taxation, and are under heavier social pressure to remain employed. In the domain of power men collectively control the institutions of coercion and the means of violence (e.g., weapons). But men are also the main targets of military violence and criminal assault, and many more men than women are imprisoned or executed. Men’s authority receives more social recognition (e.g., in religion), but men and boys are underrepresented in important learning experiences (e.g., in humanistic studies) and important dimensions of human relations (e.g., with young children).

One could draw up a balance sheet of the costs and benefits to men from the current gender order. But this balance sheet would not be like a corporate accounting exercise where there is a bottom line, subtracting costs from income. The disadvantages listed above are, broadly speaking, the conditions of the advantages. For instance, men cannot hold state power without some men becoming the agents of violence. Men cannot be the beneficiaries of women’s domestic labor and “emotion work” without many of them losing intimate connections, for instance, with young children.

Equally important, the men who receive most of the benefits and the men who pay most of the costs are not the same individuals. As the old saying puts it, generals die in bed. On a global scale, the men who benefit from corporate wealth, physical security, and expensive health care are a very different group from the men who provide the workforce of developing countries. Class, race, national, regional, and generational differences cross-cut the category “men,” spreading the gains and costs of gender relations very unevenly among men. There are many situations where groups of men may see their interest as more closely aligned with the women in their communities than with other men. It is not surprising that men respond very diversely to gender-equality politics.

There is, in fact, a considerable history of support for gender equality among men. There is certainly a tradition of advocacy by male intellectuals. In Europe, well before modern gender-equality documents were written, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill published “The Subjection of Women” (1912), which established the presumption of equal rights; and the Norwegian dramatist Henrik Ibsen, in plays like A Doll’s House ([1923] 1995), made gender oppression an important cultural theme. In the following generation, the pioneering Austrian psychoanalyst Alfred Adler established a powerful psychological argument for gender equality (Connell 1995). A similar tradition of men’s advocacy exists in the United States (Kimmel and Mosmiller 1992). . . .

There is, however, also significant evidence of men’s and boys’ resistance to change in gender relations. The survey research reveals substantial levels of doubt and opposition, especially among older men. Research on workplaces and on corporate management has documented many cases where men maintain an organizational culture that is heavily masculinized and unwelcoming to women. In some cases there is active opposition to gender-equality measures or quiet undermining of them (Cockburn 1991; Collinson and Hearn 1996). Research on schools has also found cases where boys assert control of informal social life and direct hostility against girls and against boys perceived as being different. The status quo can be defended even in the details of classroom life, for instance, when a particular group of boys used misogynist language to resist study of a poem that questioned Australian gender stereotypes (Kenworthy 1994; Holland et al. 1998).

Some men accept change in principle but in practice still act in ways that sustain men’s dominance of the public sphere and assign domestic labor and child care to women. In strongly gender segregated societies, it may be difficult for men to recognize alternatives or to understand women’s experiences (Kandiyoti 1994; Fuller 2001; Meuser 2003). Another type of opposition to reform, more common among
men in business and government, rejects gender-equality measures because it rejects all government action in support of equality, in favor of the unfettered action of the market.

The reasons for men’s resistance include the patriarchal dividend discussed above and threats to identity that occur with change. If social definitions of masculinity include being the breadwinner and being “strong,” then men may be offended by women’s professional progress because it makes men seem less worthy of respect. Resistance may also reflect ideological defense of male supremacy. Research on domestic violence suggests that male batterers often hold very conservative views of women’s role in the family (Ptacek 1988). In many parts of the world, there exist ideologies that justify men’s supremacy on grounds of religion, biology, cultural tradition, or organizational mission (e.g., in the military). It is a mistake to regard these ideas as simply outmoded. They may be actively modernized and renewed.

**Grounds For Optimism: Capacities For Equality and Reasons For Change**

The public debates about men and boys have often been inconclusive. But they have gone a long way, together with the research, to shatter one widespread belief that has hindered gender reform. This obstacle is the belief that men cannot change their ways, that “boys will be boys,” that rape, war, sexism, domestic violence, aggression, and self-centeredness are natural to men.

We now have many documented examples of the diversity of masculinities and of men’s and boys’ capacity for equality. For instance, life-history research in Chile has shown that there is no unitary Chilean masculinity, despite the cultural homogeneity of the country. While a hegemonic model is widely diffused across social strata, there are many men who depart from it, and there is significant discontent with traditional roles (Valdes and Olavarria 1998). Though groups of boys in schools often have a dominant or hegemonic pattern of masculinity, there are usually also other patterns present, some of which involve more equal and respectful relations with girls.

Research in Britain, for instance, shows how boys encounter and explore alternative models of masculinity as they grow up (Mac an Ghaill 1994; O’Donnell and Sharpe 2000).

Psychological and educational research shows personal flexibility in the face of gender stereotypes. Men and boys can vary, or strategically use, conventional definitions of masculinity. It is even possible to teach boys (and girls) how to do this in school, as experiments in Australian classrooms have shown (Davies 1993; Wetherell and Edley 1999).

Changes have occurred in men’s practices within certain families, where there has been a conscious shift toward more equal sharing of housework and child care. The sociologist Barbara J. Risman (1998), who has documented such cases in one region of the United States, calls them “fair families.” It is clear from her research that the change has required a challenge to traditional models of masculinity. In the Shanghai region of China, there is an established local tradition of relative gender equality, and men are demonstrably willing to be involved in domestic work. Research by Da Wei Wei (Da 2004) shows this tradition persisting among Shanghai men even after migration to another country.

Perhaps the most extensive social action involving men in gender change has occurred in Scandinavia. This includes provisions for paternity leave that have had high rates of take-up, among the most dramatic of all demonstrations of men’s willingness to change gender practices. Øystein Holter sums up the research and practical experience: “The Nordic ‘experiment’ has shown that a majority of men can change their practice when circumstances are favorable. . . . When reforms or support policies are well-designed and targeted towards an on-going cultural process of change, men’s active support for gender-equal status increases” (1997, 126). Many groups of men, it is clear, have a capacity for equality and for gender change. But what reasons for change are men likely to see?

Early statements often assumed that men had the same interest as women in escaping from restrictive sex roles (e.g., Palme 1972). Later experience has not confirmed this view. Yet men and boys often do have substantial reasons to support change, which can readily be listed.

First, men are not isolated individuals. Men and boys live in social relationships, many with
women and girls: wives, partners, mothers, aunts, daughters, nieces, friends, classmates, workmates, professional colleagues, neighbors, and so on. The quality of every man’s life depends to a large extent on the quality of those relationships. We may therefore speak of men’s relational interests in gender equality.

For instance, very large numbers of men are fathers, and about half of their children are girls. Some men are sole parents and are then deeply involved in caregiving—an important demonstration of men’s capacity for care (Risman 1986). Even in intact partnerships with women, many men have close relationships with their children, and psychological research shows the importance of these relationships (Kindler 2002). In several parts of the world, young men are exploring more engaged patterns of fatherhood (Olavarria 2001). To make sure that daughters grow up in a world that offers young women security, freedom, and opportunities to fulfil their talents is a powerful reason for many men to support gender equality.

Second, men may wish to avoid the toxic effects that the gender order has for them. James Harrison long ago issued a “Warning: The Male Sex Role May Be Dangerous to Your Health” (1978). Since then health research has documented specific problems for men and boys. Among them are premature death from accident, homicide, and suicide; occupational injury; higher levels of drug abuse, especially of alcohol and tobacco; and in some countries at least, a relative unwillingness by men to seek medical help when it is needed. Attempts to assert a tough and dominant masculinity sustain some of these patterns (Sabo and Gordon 1995; Hurrelmann and Kolip 2002).

Social and economic pressures on men to compete in the workplace, to increase their hours of paid work, and sometimes to take second jobs are among the most powerful constraints on gender reform. Desire for a better balance between work and life is widespread among employed men. On the other hand, where unemployment is high the lack of a paid job can be a damaging pressure on men who have grown up with the expectation of being breadwinners. This is, for instance, an important gender issue in postapartheid South Africa. Opening alternative economic paths and moving toward what German discussions have called “multioptional masculinities” may do much to improve men’s well-being (Widersfruche 1998; Morrell 2001a).

Third, men may support gender change because they see its relevance to the well-being of the community they live in. In situations of mass poverty and underemployment, for instance in cities in developing countries, flexibility in the gender division of labor may be crucial to a household that requires women’s earnings as well as men’s. Reducing the rigidity of masculinities may also yield benefits in security. Civil and international violence is strongly associated with dominating patterns of masculinity and with marked gender inequality in the state. Movement away from these patterns makes it easier for men to adopt historically “feminine” styles of nonviolent negotiation and conflict resolution (Zalewski and Parpart 1998; Breines, Connell, and Eide 2000; Gockburn 2003). This may also reduce the toxic effects of policing and incarceration (Sabo, Rupees, and London 2001).

Finally, men may support gender reform because gender equality follows from their political or ethical principles. These may be religious, socialist, or broad democratic beliefs. Mill argued a case based on classical liberal principles a century and a half ago, and the idea of equal human rights still has purchase among large groups of men.

Grounds for Pessimism: The Shape of Masculinity Politics

The diversity among men and masculinities is reflected in a diversity of men’s movements in the developed countries. A study of the United States found multiple movements, with different agendas for the remaking of masculinity. They operated on the varying terrains of gender equality, men’s rights, and ethnic or religious identities (Messner 1997). There is no unified political position for men and no authoritative representative of men’s interests.

Men’s movements specifically concerned with gender equality exist in a number of countries. A well-known example is the White Ribbon Campaign, dedicated to mobilizing public opinion and educating men and boys for the prevention of men’s violence against women. Originating
in Canada, in response to the massacre of women in Montreal in 1989, the White Ribbon Campaign achieved very high visibility in that country, with support from political and community leaders and considerable outreach in schools and mass media. More recently, it has spread to other countries. Groups concerned with violence prevention have appeared in other countries, such as Men against Sexual Assault in Australia and Men Overcoming Violence (MOVE) in the United States. These have not achieved the visibility of the White Ribbon Campaign but have built up a valuable body of knowledge about the successes and difficulties of organizing among men (Lichterman 1989; Pease 1997; Kaufman 1999).

The most extensive experience of any group of men organizing around issues of gender and sexual politics is that of homosexual men, in antidiscrimination campaigns, the gay liberation movement, and community responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Gay men have pioneered in areas such as community care for the sick, community education for responsible sexual practices, representation in the public sector, and overcoming social exclusion, which are important for all groups of men concerned with gender equality (Kippax et al. 1993; Altman 1994).

Explicit backlash movements also exist but have not generally had a great deal of influence. Men mobilizing as men to oppose women tend to be seen as cranks or fanatics. They constantly exaggerate women’s power. And by defining men’s interests in opposition to women’s, they get into cultural difficulties, since they have to violate a main tenet of modern patriarchal ideology—the idea that “opposites attract” and that men’s and women’s needs, interests, and choices are complementary.

Much more important for the defense of gender inequality are movements in which men’s interests are a side effect—nationalist, ethnic, religious, and economic movements. Of these, the most influential on a world scale is contemporary neoliberalism—the political and cultural promotion of free-market principles and individualism and the rejection of state control.

Neoliberalism is in principle gender neutral. The “individual” has no gender, and the market delivers advantage to the smartest entrepreneur, not to men or women as such. But neoliberalism does not pursue social justice in relation to gender. In Eastern Europe, the restoration of capitalism and the arrival of neoliberal politics have been followed by a sharp deterioration in the position of women. In rich Western countries, neoliberalism from the 1980s on has has been followed by a sharp deterioration in the welfare state, on which far more women than men depend; supported deregulation of labor markets, resulting in increased casualization of women workers; shrunk public sector employment, the sector of the economy where women predominate; lowered rates of personal taxation, the main basis of tax transfers to women; and squeezed public education, the key pathway to labor market advancement for women. However, the same period saw an expansion of the human rights agenda, which is, on the whole, an asset for gender equality.

The contemporary version of neoliberalism, known as neoconservatism in the United States, also has some gender complexities. George W. Bush was the first U.S. president to place a woman in the very heart of the state security apparatus, as national security adviser to the president. And some of the regime’s actions, such as the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, were defended as a means of emancipating women.

Yet neoconservatism and state power in the United States and its satellites such as Australia remain overwhelmingly the province of men—indeed, men of a particular character: power oriented and ruthless, restrained by little more than calculations of likely opposition. There has been a sharp remasculinization of political rhetoric and a turn to the use of force as a primary instrument in policy. The human rights discourse is muted and sometimes completely abandoned (as in the U.S. prison camp for Muslim captives at Guantanamo Bay and the Australian prison camps for refugees in the central desert and Pacific islands).

Neoliberalism can function as a form of masculinity politics largely because of the powerful role of the state in the gender order. The state constitutes gender relations in multiple ways, and all of its gender policies affect men. Many mainstream policies (e.g., in economic and security affairs) are substantially about men without acknowledging this fact (Nagel 1998; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Connell 2003b).
This points to a realm of institutional politics where men’s and women’s interests are very much at stake, without the publicity created by social movements. Public-sector agencies (Jensen 1998; Mackay and Bilton 2000; Schofield, forthcoming), private-sector corporations (Marchand and Runyan 2000; Hearn and Parkin 2001), and unions (Gorman et al. 1993; Pranzway 2001) are all sites of masculinized power and struggles for gender equality. In each of these sites, some men can be found with a commitment to gender equality, but in each case that is an embattled position. For gender-equality outcomes, it is important to have support from men in the top organizational levels, but this is not often reliably forthcoming.

One reason for the difficulty in expanding men’s opposition to sexism is the role of highly conservative men as cultural authorities and managers. Major religious organizations, in Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, are controlled by men who sometimes completely exclude women, and these organizations have often been used to oppose the emancipation of women. Transnational media organizations such as Rupert Murdoch’s conglomerate are equally active in promoting conservative gender ideology.

A specific address to men is found in the growing institutional, media, and business complex of commercial sports. With its overwhelming focus on male athletes; its celebration of force, domination, and competitive success; its valorization of male commentators and executives; and its marginalization and frequent ridicule of women, the sports/business complex has become an increasingly important site for representing and defining gender. This is not traditional patriarchy. It is something new, welding exemplary bodies to entrepreneurial culture. Michael Messner (2002), one of the leading analysts of contemporary sports, formulates the effect well by saying that commercial sports define the renewed centrality of men and of a particular version of masculinity.

On a world scale, explicit backlash movements are of limited importance, but very large numbers of men are nevertheless engaged in preserving gender inequality. Patriarchy is defended diffusely. There is support for change from equally large numbers of men, but it is an uphill battle to articulate that support. That is the political context with which new gender-equality initiatives have to deal.

**WAYS FORWARD: TOWARD A GLOBAL FRAMEWORK**

Inviting men to end men’s privileges, and to remake masculinities to sustain gender equality, strikes many people as a strange or Utopian project. Yet this project is already under way. Many men around the world are engaged in gender reforms, for the good reasons discussed above.

The diversity of masculinities complicates the process but is also an important asset. As this diversity becomes better known, men and boys can more easily see a range of possibilities for their own lives, and both men and women are less likely to think of gender inequality as unchangeable. It also becomes possible to identify specific groups of men who might engage in alliances for change.

The international policy documents discussed above rely on the concept of an alliance between men and women for achieving equality. Since the growth of an autonomous women’s movement, the main impetus for reform has been located in women’s groups. Some groups within the women’s movement, especially those concerned with men’s violence, are reluctant to work with men or are deeply skeptical of men’s willingness to change. Other feminists argue that alliances between women and men are possible, even crucial. In some social movements, for instance, environmentalism, there is a strong ideology of gender equality and a favorable environment for men to support gender change (Connell 1995; Segal 1997).

In local and central government, practical alliances between women and men have been important in achieving equal-opportunity measures and other gender-equality reforms. Even in the field of men’s violence against women, there has been cooperation between women’s groups and men’s groups, for instance, in prevention work. This cooperation can be an inspiration to grassroots workers and a powerful demonstration of women and men’s common interest in a peaceful and equal society (Pease 1997; Schofield, forthcoming). The concept of alliance is itself important, in preserving autonomy for
women’s groups, in preempting a tendency for any one group to speak for others, and in defining a political role for men that has some dignity and might attract widespread support.

Given the spectrum of masculinity politics, we cannot expect worldwide consensus for gender equality. What is possible is that support for gender equality might become hegemonic among men. In that case it would be groups supporting equality that provide the agenda for public discussion about men’s lives and patterns of masculinity.

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**JUDITH BUTLER (1956–): A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Judith Butler was born in 1956 in Cleveland, Ohio. She received her B.A. in philosophy from Bennington College in 1978 and her Ph.D. in philosophy from Yale University in 1984. Butler has taught at Wesleyan and Johns Hopkins universities, and is currently professor of rhetoric and comparative literature at the University of California at Berkeley. Butler’s books include *Subjects of Desire* (1987), *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1989), *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”* (1993), and *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (1997), which analyzes name-calling as both a social injury and the way in which individuals are called into action for political purposes.

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**BUTLER’S INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES AND CORE IDEAS**

Whereas feminists committed to modern ideas about gender ask the question, “And what about women?,” postmodern feminists such as Judith Butler ask, “And what do you mean by ‘women’?” Butler (1990:145–47) rejects the very idea that “women” can be understood as a concrete category at all, construing gender identity instead as an unstable “fiction.” She criticizes modern feminists for remaining within the confines of traditional binary categories that in her view necessarily perpetuate sexism. In keeping with Foucault (see Chapter 8), Butler provides a “critical genealogy of gender categories in very different discursive domains” (1990/2006:xxxii). In short, while modern feminists, in separating (biologically determined) “sex” from (socially constructed) “gender,” had helped rupture the idea of a stable or essential self, Butler takes this rupture to an extreme by upending the alleged “biological” dimensions of sexuality. Far from seeing “desire” as a biological given, Butler (ibid.:70) maintains, “which pleasures shall live and which shall die is often a matter of which serve the legitimating practices of identity formation that take place within the matrix of gender norms.”

Specifically, Butler conceptualizes gendered subjectivity as a fluid identity and contends that the individual subject is never exclusively “male” or “female,” but rather is always in a state of contextually dependent flux. That is, gendered subjectivity is not something “fixed” or “essential” but a sustained set of acts, “a repetition and a ritual” (ibid.:xv). Consequently, Butler (1993) seeks to explain “the practice by which gendering occurs” (ibid.:231).

Indeed, it is the sustained, continual nature of gender performance that compels Butler to use the term *performativity* rather than “performance.” Performativity contests the very notion of a subject. Whereas the noun “performance” implies distinct, concrete, finished events, the term “performativity” reflects “culturally sustained temporal duration.” As Butler (ibid.:xv) states,
The view that gender is performative shows that what we take to be an internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body. In this way, it shows that what we take to be an “internal” feature of ourselves is one that we anticipate and produce through certain bodily acts, at an extreme, an hallucinatory effect of naturalized gestures.

So, too, the “culturally sustained” (rather than essentialist) nature of gender performances is evident in Butler’s discussion of performative acts, which she conceptualizes as “forms of authoritative speech . . . [or] statements that, “in uttering . . . exercise a binding power” (Butler 1993:224; emphasis added). As Butler maintains,

Implicated in a network of authorization and punishment, performatives tend to include legal sentences, baptisms, inaugurations, declarations of ownership, statements which not only perform an action, but confer a binding power on the action performed. If the power of discourse to produce that which it names is linked with the question of performativity, then the performative is one domain in which power acts as discourse. (ibid.:224; emphasis added)

In other words, for Butler, “what we take to be an internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body” (1990/2006.:xv). “Gender is a kind of persistent impersonation that passes as the real” (ibid.:xxxi). Just as in Kafka’s “Before the Law,” where one sits before the door of the law awaiting that authority to be distributed, so, too, gender is “an expectation that ends up producing the very phenomenon that it anticipates” (ibid.:xiv).

This brings us to the issue of queer theory. In addition to being a leading feminist theorist, Butler is one of the most important figures in queer theory. Queer theory emerged from gay/lesbian studies, which in turn emerged from gender studies, in the 1980s. Until the 1980s, the term “queer” had a derogatory connotation, meaning “odd” or “peculiar” or “out of the ordinary.” However, queer theorists, including Butler, appropriated this term, insisting that all sexual behaviors, all concepts linking sexual behaviors to sexual identities, and all categories of normative and deviant sexualities are social constructs, which create certain types of social meaning. In short, “sex is a norm” (Osborne and Segal 1993, interview with Judith Butler).

Thus, the undergirding emphasis in all these projects (gay/lesbian, queer, feminist) is that the categories of normative and deviant sexual behavior are not biologically but rather socially constructed. In contrast to those who see sexuality as biological and gender as a social construction, Butler sees sex as no more a natural category than gender. She conceptualizes gender norms as structuring biology and not the reverse, which informs the more conventional view.

Butler does not deny certain kinds of biological differences, but she seeks to explain the discursive and institutional conditions under which certain arbitrary biological differences become salient characteristics of sex (ibid.). She emphasizes that sexuality is a complex array of individual activity and institutional power, of social codes and forces, which interact to shape the ideas of what is normative and what is deviant at any particular moment, and which then result in categories as to “natural,” “essential,” “biological,” or “god-given.”

Photo 7.4 Divine
Harris Glenn Milstead (1945–1988), better known by his drag persona, Divine, who starred in several of John Waters’s films, including Hairspray, exemplifies performativity.
She seeks to show how a norm can actually materialize a body—that is, how the body is not only invested with a norm, but also in some sense animated by a norm or contoured by a norm (ibid.). Specifically, Butler describes a heterosexual matrix in which “proper men” and “proper women” are identified as heterosexual. She shows that the essential unity between biological sex, gender identification, and heterosexuality is not dictated by nature; indeed, this unity is an illusion mediated through cultural systems of meaning that underlie our understanding of material, anatomical differences. According to Butler, heterosexual normativity “ought not to order gender” (Butler 1990/2006:xiv; emphasis in original). The subversion of gender performances (e.g., drag performances) indicates nothing about sexuality or sexual practice. “Gender can be rendered ambiguous without disturbing or reorientating normative sexuality at all” (ibid.).

Thus, for instance, Butler points out that discrimination against gays is a function not of their sexuality, but rather of their failure to perform heterosexual gender norms. Because heterosexuality is based on a binary difference between male and female (a person is either one or the other), there is a socially constructed gender in which heterosexuality is central, which informs our understanding of biology.

Interestingly, then, akin to Harold Garfinkel’s “breaching” experiments, which exposed taken-for-granted normative expectations (see Chapter 6), cross-dressing, “kiss-ins,” gender parodies, and so on can be used to transgress and rebel against existing sexual categories. In short, queer politics seeks to explicitly challenge gender norms to show their lack of naturalness and inevitability and to celebrate transgressions from them (Alsop et al. 2002:96), while postmodern queer theorists seek to upend and “resignify” our gender expectations.

Butler’s theoretical orientation

As will be discussed further in Chapter 8, postmodernists tend to eschew metatheoretical frameworks as “essentializing.” However, it is difficult not to see postmodernists, including Butler, as nonrationalistic in their approach to action. That “there is no reality” anymore (only “hyperreality”—Baudrillard—see Chapter 8); that sex is not a “natural” category but constituted through social discourse; and that performances create subjectivities (see Butler, above) seems a profoundly nonrationalistic orientation to action. In contrast to Goffman, who, as we have seen (see Chapter 5), also at times used the term “performance” in a more rationalistic way (wittingly constructed, via calculation and even rehearsal), Butler argues that we become subjects from our performances. Subjectivity is a process of submitting ourselves to socially constituted norms and practices (ibid. 2002:98). This speaks to the nonrational realm (see Figure 7.6).

In terms of order, on the one hand, postmodernists such as Butler emphasize the role of structured “scripts,” discourses, and preexisting symbolic patterns that reflect a collective orientation. In addition, Butler exudes a neo-Marxist emphasis on hierarchical (class, gender, racial) structures, oppression, and corporate control, which also speaks to the collective realm (see Chapter 3). She shows how gender performances are tied to relations of ruling, in Smith’s terms. On the other hand, however, like Foucault (see Chapter 8), Butler insists that regulatory norms and discourses are never wholly determining. One could argue that, in the end, Butler’s work seems individualistic because she emphasizes that it is in interaction that subjectivities are formed. Moreover, in contrast to cultural Marxists (e.g., the
Frankfurt School), Butler optimistically asserts that because of the multiplicity of symbols that cannot all be obeyed coherently, we can “reconfigure” and “redeploy” symbols. However, again it must be emphasized that Butler would undoubtedly chafe at this label. First, because Butler goes to great lengths to show that performances are never isolated acts, but occur only within specific discursive contexts; and second, because she would chafe at any sort of metatheoretical label at all. The whole point of postmodernism is to do away with this kind of academic theoretical scaffolding. As shown in Figure 7.6, in keeping with the spirit of Butler, we place the notion of “performativity” at the center of our theoretical map, thereby indicating its fluid, multidimensional nature, while nevertheless acknowledging its nonrational bent.

**Reading**

**Introduction to “Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire”**

The following excerpt is from Butler’s most widely read and celebrated book, *Gender Trouble* (1990), which has sold more than 100,000 copies. Here you will see Butler challenge the presumed universality and unity of the concept of “woman” in feminist theory and, drawing on Foucault, dispute the predominant binary opposition of sex as a “biological” and gender as a “cultural” category.
One is not born a woman, but rather becomes one.

—Simone de Beauvoir

Strictly speaking, “women” cannot be said to exist.

—Julia Kristeva

Woman does not have a sex.

—Luce Irigaray

The deployment of sexuality . . . established this notion of sex.

—Michel Foucault

The category of sex is the political category that founds society as heterosexual.

—Monique Wittig

I. “WOMEN” AS THE SUBJECT OF FEMINISM

For the most part, feminist theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only initiates feminist interests and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom political representation is pursued. But politics and representation are controversial terms. On the one hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects; on the other hand, representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women. For feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed necessary to foster the political visibility of women. This has seemed obviously important considering the pervasive cultural condition in which women’s lives were either misrepresented or not represented at all.

Recently, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist theory and politics has come under challenge from within feminist discourse. The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding terms. There is a great deal of material that not only questions the viability of “the subject” as the ultimate candidate for representation or, indeed, liberation, but there is very little agreement after all on what it is that constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women. The domains of political and linguistic “representation” set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be acknowledged as a subject. In other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before representation can be extended.

Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent. Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms—that is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, control, and even “protection” of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, then the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as “the subject” of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its emancipation. This becomes politically problematic if that system can be shown to produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce subjects who are presumed to be masculine. In such cases, an uncritical appeal to such a system for the emancipation of “women” will be clearly self-defeating.

The question of “the subject” is crucial for politics, and for feminist politics in particular, because juridical subjects are invariably produced through certain exclusionary practices that do not “show” once the juridical structure of politics has been established. In other words, the political construction of the subject proceeds with certain legitimating and exclusionary aims, and these political operations are effectively concealed and naturalized by a political analysis that takes juridical structures as their foundation. Juridical power inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent; hence, politics must be concerned with this dual function of power: the juridical and the productive. In effect, the law produces and then conceals the notion of “a subject before the law” in order to invoke that discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise that subsequently legitimates that law’s own regulatory hegemony. It is not enough to inquire into how women might become more fully represented in language and politics. Feminist critique ought also to understand how the category of “women,” the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought.

Indeed, the question of women as the subject of feminism raises the possibility that there may not be a subject who stands “before” the law, awaiting representation in or by the law. Perhaps the subject, as well as the invocation of a temporal “before,” is constituted by the law as the fictive foundation of its own claim to legitimacy. The prevailing assumption of the ontological integrity of the subject before the law might be understood as the contemporary trace of the state of nature hypothesis, that foundationalist fable constitutive of the juridical structures of classical liberalism. The performative invocation of a nonhistorical “before” becomes the foundational premise that guarantees a presocial ontology of persons who freely consent to be governed and, thereby, constitute the legitimacy of the social contract.

Apart from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion of the subject, however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a common identity. Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, women, even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for anxiety. As Denise Riley’s title suggests, *Am I That Name?* is a question produced by the very possibility of the name’s multiple significations. If one “is” a woman, that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pregendered “person” transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained.

The political assumption that there must be a universal basis for feminism, one which must be found in an identity assumed to exist cross-culturally, often accompanies the notion that the oppression of women has some singular form discernible in the universal or hegemonic structure of patriarchy or masculine domination. The notion of a universal patriarchy has been widely criticized in recent years for its failure to account for the workings of gender oppression in the concrete cultural contexts in which it exists. Where those various contexts have been consulted within such theories, it has been to find “examples” or “illustrations” of a universal principle that is assumed from the start. The form of feminist theorizing has come under criticism for its efforts to colonize and appropriate non-Western cultures to support highly Western notions of oppression, but because they tend as well to construct a “Third World” or even an “Orient” in which gender oppression is subtly explained as symptomatic of an essential, non-Western barbarism. The urgency of feminism to establish a universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the appearance of feminism’s own claims to be representative has occasionally motivated the shortcut to a categorial or fictive universality of the structure of domination, held to produce women’s common subjugated experience.

Although the claim of universal patriarchy no longer enjoys the kind of credibility it once did, the notion of a generally shared conception of “women,” the corollary to that framework, has been much more difficult to displace. Certainly, there have been plenty of debates: Is there some commonality among “women” that preexists
their oppression, or do “women” have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone? Is there a specificity to women’s cultures that is independent of their subordination by hegemonic, masculinist cultures? Are the specificity and integrity of women’s cultural or linguistic practices always specified against and, hence, within the terms of some more dominant cultural formation? Is there a region of the “specifically feminine,” one that is both differentiated from the masculine as such and recognizable in its difference by an unmarked and, hence, presumed universality of “women”? The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive framework in which that specificity can be recognized, but in every other way the “specificity” of the feminine is once again fully decontextualized and separated off analytically and politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity, and other axes of power relations that both constitute “identity” and make the singular notion of identity a misnomer.

My suggestion is that the presumed universality and unity of the subject of feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of the representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. Indeed, the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from “women” whom feminism claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of identity politics. The suggestion that feminism can seek wider representation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the constitutive powers of their own representational claims. This problem is not ameliorated through an appeal to the category of women for merely “strategic” purposes, for strategies always have meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are intended. In this case, exclusion itself might qualify as such an unintended yet consequential meaning. By conforming to a requirement of representational politics that feminism articulate a stable subject, feminism thus opens itself to charges of gross misrepresentation.

Obviously, the political task is not to refuse representational politics—as if we could. The juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field of power; hence, there is no position outside this field, but only a critical genealogy of its own legitimating practices. As such, the critical point of departure is the historical present, as Marx put it. And the task is to formulate within this constituted frame a critique of the categories of identity that contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and immobilize.

Perhaps there is an opportunity at this juncture of cultural politics, a period that some would call “postfeminist,” to reflect from within a feminist perspective on the injunction to construct a subject to feminism. Within feminist political practice, a radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of identity appears to be necessary in order to formulate a representational politics that might revive feminism on other grounds. On the other hand, it may be time to entertain a radical critique that seeks to free feminist theory from the necessity of having to construct a single or abiding ground which is invariably contested by those identity positions or anti-identity positions that it invariably excludes. Do the exclusionary practices that ground feminist theory in a notion of “women” as subject paradoxically undercut feminist goals to extend its claims to “representation”?

Perhaps the problem is even more serious. Is the construction of the category of women as a coherent and stable subject an unwitting regulation and reification of gender relations? And is not such a reification precisely contrary to feminist aims? To what extent does the category of women achieve stability and coherence only in the context of the heterosexual matrix? If a stable notion of gender no longer proves to be the foundational premise of feminist politics, perhaps a new sort of feminist politics is now desirable to contest the very reifications of gender and identity, one that will take the variable construction of identity as both a methodological and normative prerequisite, if not a political goal.

To trace the political operations that produce and conceal what qualifies as the juridical subject of feminism is precisely the task of a
feminist genealogy of the category of women. In the course of this effort to question “women” as the subject of feminism, the unproblematic invocation of that category may prove to preclude the possibility of feminism as a representational politics. What sense does it make to extend representation to subjects who are constructed through the exclusion of those who fail to conform to unspoken normative requirements of the subject? What relations of domination and exclusion are inadvertently sustained when representation becomes the sole focus of politics? The identity of the feminist subject ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics, if the formation of the subject takes place within a field of power regularly buried through the assertion of that foundation. Perhaps, paradoxically, “representation” will be shown to make sense for feminism only when the subject of “women” is nowhere presumed.

II. THE COMPULSORY ORDER OF SEX/GENDER/DESIRE

Although the unproblematic unity of “women” is often invoked to construct a solidarity of identity, a split is introduced in the feminist subject by the distinction between sex and gender. Originally intended to dispute the biology-is-destiny formulation, the distinction between sex and gender serves the argument that whatever biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally constructed: hence, gender is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex. The unity of the subject is thus already potentially contested by the distinction that permits of gender as a multiple interpretation of sex.

If gender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes, then a gender cannot be said to follow from a sex in any one way. Taken to its logical limit, the sex/gender distinction suggests a radical discontinuity between sexed bodies and culturally constructed genders. Assuming for the moment the stability of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of “men” will accrue exclusively to the bodies of males or that “women” will interpret only female bodies. Further, even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically binary in their morphology and constitution (which will become a question), there is no reason to assume that genders ought also to remain as two. The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female one.

This radical splitting of the gendered subject poses yet another set of problems. Can we refer to a “given” sex or a “given” gender without first inquiring into how sex and/or gender is given, through what means? And what is “sex” anyway? Is it natural, anatomical, chromosomal, or hormonal, and how is a feminist critic to assess the scientific discourses which purport to establish such “facts” for us? Does sex have a history? Does each sex have a different history, or histories? Is there a history of how the duality of sex was established, a genealogy that might expose the binary options as a variable construction? Are the ostensibly natural facts of sex discursively produced by various scientific discourses in the service of other political and social interests? If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all.

It would make no sense, then, to define gender as the cultural interpretation of sex, if sex itself is a gendered category. Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical conception); gender must also designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established. As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and established as “prediscursive,” prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts. This construction of “sex” as the radically unconstructed will concern us again in the discussion.
of Lévi-Strauss and structuralism . . . [but] at this juncture it is already clear that one way the internal stability and binary frame for sex is effectively secured is by casting the duality of sex in a prediscursive domain. This production of sex as the prediscursive ought to be understood as the effect of the apparatus of cultural construction designated by gender. How, then, does gender need to be reformulated to encompass the power relations that produce the effect of a prediscursive sex and so conceal that very operation of discursive production?

Discussion Questions

1. Smith (1987:64) states, “So as I walk down the street keeping an eye on my dog I am observing some of the niceties of different forms of property ownership.” In what ways do you “do class” in your everyday life? In what ways do you “do gender”? How do your class and gender performances reaffirm forms of domination? To what extent do your gender performances reflect, reaffirm, or challenge normative heterosexuality, or what Butler calls the heterosexual matrix?

2. According to Smith (1987:68), “The role of women is central both in the work that is done and in the management of its routine daily order . . . whatever the relations between school achievement, career success, and the ‘intricate psychosocial processes’ of the family, the conscious, planned thoughtful work of women as mothers has been part of its actuality.” Discuss the extent to which “behind-the-scenes” women’s work is still taken for granted in both schools and the workplace today, including the class dimensions of this issue. Do you think that this aspect of gender roles has changed in the last twenty years? How so or why not? Do you think full gender equality can be achieved? Why or why not?

3. According to P. Collins (1990/2000:228), “A matrix of domination contains few pure victims or oppressors. Each individual derives varying amounts of penalty and privilege from the multiple systems of oppression which frame everyone’s lives.” Give concrete examples of moments or situations in which you have found yourself a “victim” and concrete examples of moments or situations in which you found yourself an “oppressor.” Explain how your examples reflect the matrix of domination at the level of personal biography, the community, and the systemic level of social institutions.

4. Discuss the neo-Marxist or critical dimensions of Smith, Collins, Chodorow, Connell, and Butler. In addition to critical theory, what other traditions and concepts does each draw from to produce her own distinct perspective?

5. Compare and contrast Butler’s conceptualization of “performativity” with Goffman’s dramaturgical theory (Chapter 5).