This treatise on the study of cross-cultural differences between modern societies starts with an examination of the various ways in which culture has been conceptualized. Approaches to the concept and study of culture have varied between academic disciplines, and sometimes even within them. The goal of this analysis is not to provide one right perspective. Culture can be whatever a scholar decides it should be. What we need is not a single best theoretical definition of culture but clear empirical operationalizations of each approach: Researchers need to explain exactly how they propose to measure culture in accordance with their conceptualizations, diverse as they may be.
1.1. The “Unpackaging” of Culture

Psychologists who compare individuals from different nationalities or ethnic groups often observe differences between them on the dependent variables that they study. In such cases, they may show that various psychological variables, as well as age, gender, educational level, and more, produce a statistical effect that seems to account for the differences. But what if some of the variance remains unexplained? In that case, it was common practice until recently to refer to an obscure residual called “culture.” Originally, the concept of culture seemed even more opaque to researchers who compared organizations in different countries.

In the words of Child (1981), “In effect, national differences found in characteristics of organizations or their members have been ascribed to . . . national differences, period” (p. 304).

To a cultural anthropologist, culture is neither obscure, nor a residual. It is a social phenomenon that manifests itself quite clearly, even if the manifestations are not always easy to explain. Anthropologists consider culture an important phenomenon that warrants its own field of study. They do not view it as a single variable; being an extremely complex system, it is to be analyzed in terms of its components and their relationships. Although cross-cultural psychologists and organizational behavior experts accepted this logic relatively late, by now they too have grasped the need to unpack culture rather than approach it as a monolithic block. This chapter and the next prepare the reader for the third one, which represents an unpackaging exercise. We must start with a philosophical warning at the very outset of our journey. We will not try to find out what is in the package because that would be futile. Culture is not a specific material object that has its own objective existence. It is underpinned by real phenomena that, however, we perceive and analyze subjectively. Therefore, the best that we can do in a discussion of the nature of culture is to explore the subjective conceptualizations of various scholars. Then, we can discuss the contents of the package labeled “culture” as they have been seen by cross-cultural experts.

1.2. Meaning of the Word Culture and Definitions of the Concept

The origin of the Latin word cultura is clear. It is a derivative of the verb colo (infinitive colere), meaning “to tend,” “to cultivate,” and “to till,” among other things (Tucker, 1931). It can take objects such as ager, hence agricultura, whose literal meaning is “field tilling.” Another possible object of the verb colo is animus (“character”). In that case, the expression would refer to the cultivation of the human character. Consequently, the Latin noun cultura can be associated with education and refinement.

The etymological analysis of “culture” is quite uncontroversial. But in the field of anthropology, the situation is much more complex. Definitions of culture abound and range from very complex to very simple. For example, a complex definition was proposed by Kroeber and Parsons (1958): “transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior” (p. 583). An even less easily comprehensible definition was provided by White (1959/2007): “By culture we mean an extrasomatic, temporal continuum of things and events dependent upon symboling” (p. 3). Often cited is also a definition by Kluckhohn (1951):

Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their
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The essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values. (p. 86, no. 5)

But that is not all. Geertz (1973) noted sarcastically that “in some twenty-seven pages of his chapter on the concept, Kluckhohn managed to define culture in turn as . . . [what follows is 11 different definitions]; and turning, perhaps in desperation, to similes, as a map, as a sieve, and as a matrix” (p. 5). This lack of clarity and consensus about anthropologists’ main object of study may be one of the reasons that, in the words of Cochran and Harpending (2009), the social sciences—and especially anthropology—“haven’t exactly covered themselves in glory” (p. ix).2 It also explains why to many researchers and practitioners, culture is “the c-word, mysterious, frightening and to be avoided” (Berry, 1997, p. 144). Some have even denied the utility of the concept (Barber, 2008b).

At the other extreme is a well-known simple and narrow definition: Culture is shared mental software, “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede, 2001). The group or category can be a national society but Hofstede believes that his definition applies also to other collectives, such as regions, ethnicities, occupations, organizations, or even age groups and genders.

According to Jahoda (1984), “culture” is the most elusive term in the vocabulary of the social sciences and the number of books devoted to the topic would fill many library shelves. A practical solution was proposed by Segall (1984), who believed that it was not worth the effort to enhance the concept’s clarity or attempt to articulate a universally acceptable definition. In his view, cultural analysts should abandon the struggle to conceptualize culture. Instead, they should “turn to the real business at hand,” which is to “intensify the search for whatever ecological, sociological and cultural variables might link with established variations in human behavior” (p. 154).

Segall’s call for pragmatism in cross-cultural analysis is laudable. Theoretical debates about the meaning that “should” be attributed to the concept of culture are pointless. There is no absolute reason why one abstract theoretical concept of it should be better than another. However, disagreements have been voiced not only with respect to abstract definitions of culture but also concerning specific matters, such as whether artifacts should or should not be considered part of culture (see the debate between Jahoda, 1984, and Rohner, 1984). The answer to a question of this kind can have practical consequences: It may determine what should or should not be studied for the purpose of a dissertation on culture or be published in a journal devoted to culture.

Culture can be pragmatically defined by the contents and boundaries of the interests of the scholars who study it. Even better, we should look at what is in the focus of their interests. A culturologist may study climatic differences (for instance, van de Vliert, 2009), although climate is unlikely to be viewed by anybody as part of culture. Yet, that researcher would not be interested in climate per se, but in how it affects variation in values, beliefs, and behaviors, which could be considered elements or expressions of culture.

Defining the contents and boundaries of culture may also be necessary for the purposes of clarity and avoidance of confusing statements. According to Jahoda (1984), if culture is seen as including behaviors, it is incorrect to say that culture causes behavior because that would be a circular explanation. Likewise, Fischer and Schwartz (2011) discuss the question of whether culture determines values. This makes sense only if values are not viewed as part of culture; otherwise the debate would be like the question of whether light produces photons.
Therefore, it might be useful that those who present cultural analyses explain how they conceptualize culture, specifying its contents and boundaries. This could help avoid a situation described by Child (1981), who pointed out that there is a danger of inferring culture as a national phenomenon from virtually any contrasts that emerge from a comparison of organizations in different countries: “Even if such contrasts are unambiguously national in scope, they could possibly be due to other non-cultural phenomena such as national wealth, level of industrialization, or even climate” (p. 328).

A comment by Fischer (2009) illustrates another practical reason to define culture. In his view, if researchers do not focus on the shared aspect of culture (see 2.1.), there is no need to investigate agreement among the members of a national culture who provide information to a researcher. But if one adopts a definition of culture in which sharedness is emphasized, such an investigation becomes necessary.

Leung and van de Vijver (2008) discuss two approaches to culture: holistic and causal. The first approach is taken by those who view culture as consisting of inseparable phenomena that cannot cause each other. Those who prefer the second approach may say that one cultural characteristic shapes another. If this is so, cultural researchers may need to explain how they conceive of culture: holistically or causally.

There are also other reasons for defining culture. Some methodologists working in the domain of cross-cultural psychology have treated culture as a variable resembling some kind of noise that needs to be reduced or eliminated. Poortinga and van de Vijver (1987) suggested a procedure for explaining measured differences between societies by introducing various relevant variables, each of which explains part of the observed variance, until the effect of culture disappears: “The consequence of our argument is that a cross-cultural psychologist is not interested in the variable culture per se, but only in specific context variables that can explain observed differences on some dependent variable” (p. 272), and “In the ideal study the set of context variables will be chosen in such a way that the remaining effect for culture will be zero” (p. 272). This begs the question of what variables can explain differences between groups of people but are not part of their cultures.3

Some of the clearly external variables with respect to culture—also known as “exogenous” or “extraneous”—are climate, geographic location, and pathogen prevalence. But what about national wealth, main type of economy, or degree of democracy? Are these cultural variables or not? According to van de Vijver and Leung (1997a), gross national product, educational systems, and even health care institutions are culture-related variables (p. 4). Is this position acceptable?

Javidan and Houser (2004) describe two possible views: that a society’s wealth should not be confused with its culture and that wealth is an integral part of its culture. The position that we adopt may determine our research methodology. If wealth is an extraneous variable, a researcher may decide to partial it out of cultural measures using statistical tools. If wealth is viewed as an integral part of culture, there is no need to control for it when cultural variables and the relationships between them are measured. Thus, the solution is a matter of subjective choice.

1.3. Culture As Is Versus Culture As It Would Be

Further to the previous point, Schmitt, Allik, McCrae, and Benet-Martinez (2007) indicate that studies of Big Five personality traits usually correct for age and gender differences. Hofstede (2001) reports raw dimension indices as well as indices after correcting for age. Are such operations logical?
In cross-cultural analysis, data that are adjusted in this way are not more correct than raw data. They simply provide a different image of a particular culture: how it would look if certain conditions changed. Imagine that we are comparing nation A and nation B on “thrift” as a value. We find that people in A value thrift more. However, we also find that people in A are older and that older people are thriftier in principle. If age is controlled for, the thrift-related differences between the two nations disappear. What should our conclusion be? Should we categorize nation A as having a thriftier national culture? Or should we say that it exhibits the characteristics of age culture, not national culture, because if its members were younger they would be more profligate?

The answer depends on how we prefer to view and compare cultures. We can look at actual snapshots of them, reflecting their real characteristics at a specific point in time. Alternatively, we can choose to work with hypothetical constructs: cultures as they would be under certain hypothetical conditions that may become real some day. For instance, if two societies have different demographic structures today, these differences might disappear in the future.

The first approach is the easier solution. The second may be attractive in some situations but it is less practical. Controlling for various variables by means of statistical tools does not guarantee that the statistically obtained situation depicts what we would observe in reality if culture A did not differ from culture B on the variable we have controlled for.

1.4. Classifications of the Concepts of Culture

Concepts of culture can fall into a number of different categories. These classifications cannot be easily contrasted in terms of good versus bad or true versus false. They simply reflect diverse perspectives, all of which may have some merits. Cultural analysts should decide which perspective best suits the purpose of their research and explain it to their audiences.

Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, and Lai (1999) described two types of culture: residing inside individuals and outside them. The first type is what Triandis (1972) called subjective culture or what Hofstede (2001) referred to as software of the human mind: beliefs, values, and internalized interaction patterns. The second type consists of the man-made environment and can include everything that people have created, including institutions and art.

Rohner (1984) discusses two other distinctions in the conceptualization of culture. First, there is a contrast between culture as a system of behaviors versus culture as a set of meanings. Second, there are scholars, called realists, who attribute an independent existence to culture, versus others, called nominalists, who view it as a subjective human construct.

Because these categories are not easy to grasp, they require special attention.

1.4.1. SUBJECTIVE CULTURE: MENTAL SOFTWARE

Subjective culture is viewed as something invisible that resides in people’s minds. In his 1980 book, Geert Hofstede introduced his metaphor of culture as mental programming or software of the mind. However, Hofstede (2001) noted that not all elements of collective mental programming should be viewed as culture. For instance, collective and individual identities may not be classifiable as cultural elements. They provide an answer to the question “Where do I belong” (p. 10) or “Who/what are we?” and “Who/what am I?” According to Hofstede (2001), populations that share similar cultural values may sometimes fight each other if they have adopted different identities. It
may also be useful to distinguish religious denominations (and thus religious identities) from cultures. This point will be discussed in 2.6.3.

1.4.2. OBJECTIVE CULTURE: INSTITUTIONS AND ARTIFACTS

Objective culture can be conceptualized as created by individuals and residing outside them. Art objects, clothing, work instruments, and residential constructions are examples of visible cultural artifacts that have an objective existence; these are studied mainly by ethnographers. Institutions, such as marriage systems, and laws (including inheritance systems, taboos, etc.), and political or religious bodies, are instances of invisible elements of objective culture. Traditionally, these were studied mostly by anthropologists and historians; today, political scientists and sociologists are interested in the institutions of modern nations.

1.4.3. CULTURE AS A SYSTEM OF BEHAVIORS

According to Brown (1991), “culture consists of the conventional patterns of thought, activity, and artifact that are passed on from generation to generation” (p. 40). Thus, if a society demonstrates a recognizable pattern of activity, such as rice cultivation, that is part of its culture. Not all anthropologists agree with this view, though. Murdock (1940) dissociated behavior from the scope of culture, stating that the former does not automatically follow the latter, “which is only one of its determinants” (p. 366). The following statement by Haviland (1990) summarizes the views of many anthropologists:

Recent definitions [of culture] tend to distinguish more clearly between actual behavior on the one hand, and the abstract values, beliefs, and perceptions of the world that lie behind that behavior on the other. To put it another way, culture is not observable behavior, but rather the values and beliefs that people use to interpret experience and generate behavior, and that is reflected in their behavior. (p. 30)

Whether behaviors should or should not be considered part of culture is of course a matter of abstract conceptualization. On a more practical note, the question is whether cross-cultural analysts who attempt to explain cultural differences should compare behaviors, in addition to whatever else they study, or not. The answer to this question can only be positive.

1.4.4. CULTURE AS A SET OF MEANINGS

American anthropologist Clifford Geertz is the best-known proponent of the view that meanings are central to the concept of culture (Geertz, 1973). This reflects one of the main preoccupations of Western field anthropologists in the past: They had to make sense of the incomprehensible symbols, rituals, and other practices in the preliterate and preindustrial societies that they studied. But the meanings-based definition has been accepted by cross-cultural psychologists as well. Pepitone and Triandis (1987) define culture as “shared meanings that are encoded into the norms that constitute it” (p. 485).

Taken to an extreme, this position may severely reduce the perceived content and scope of culture while also clashing with the idea of cross-cultural analysis: “Culture is treated as a symbolic universe of gestures and their micro-interpretation within specific contexts, whereas the broader brushstrokes of cross-cultural comparisons are suspect” (Liu et al., 2010, p. 452). Culture, as treated in the vast literature on it, is certainly not just a system of meanings. Yet,
there are multiple reasons to be interested in the meanings that a particular culture attaches to a given concept or behavior. One is purely academic. Without a good understanding of meanings, a researcher may not know how to design a study. Let us assume that we are interested in comparing national suicide rates. What exactly constitutes suicide? Jumping off the top of a skyscraper in an act of despair would probably be viewed as suicide all over the world. Yet, so-called suicide attacks are considered combat casualties by their perpetrators.

There are also practical reasons to seek cultural meanings. According to Cheung and Leung (1998), most Chinese score high on American depression scales. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that they need clinical assistance. Endorsement of items that suggest depression in a Western context does not always reveal the same condition in China. Following this logic, an American clinician who does not understand depression in a Chinese context would not be very useful to Chinese patients, whereas cross-cultural analysts would have trouble comparing the depressiveness of Americans and Chinese.

Maseland and van Hoorn (2011) noted that according to various surveys, people in predominantly Muslim countries value democracy more than other people, yet their societies are less democratic. They attempted to explain this apparent paradox in terms of the so-called principle of diminishing marginal utility: People value highly that of which they have little. But an analysis of Muslim attitudes toward democracy can be very misleading unless it starts from what people in the Muslim nations mean by democracy. According to a nationally representative study by the Pew Research Center (2010a), the percentages of people who completely agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home are 22 in Jordan, 22 in Egypt, and 47 in Pakistan. Also, 82% in Pakistan, 75% in Egypt, and 68% in Jordan said that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to employment than women (in Western countries, these percentages ranged from 14 to 20). Another nationally representative study by the Pew Research Center (2010b) revealed that 82% of Egyptians and Pakistanis and 70% of Jordanians were in favor of stoning people who commit adultery, while 86% of Jordanians, 84% of Egyptians, and 76% of Pakistanis supported the death penalty for apostates who leave the Muslim religion. Obviously, these populations have a very different concept of democracy when compared to Europeans and Americans.

On the other hand, the explicit meaning that the members of a particular culture attach to a cultural phenomenon may be too simplistic or superficial to be of much use for its understanding. Jews and Muslims do not have a convincing story about the meaning of the pork taboo; they will either simply refer to their Holy Scriptures, which ban the consumption of pork, or say that the pig is a dirty animal, although chickens and cattle are not cleaner (Harris, 1992). Cases of this kind raise an interesting dilemma. How do we make sense of the observed phenomenon: Should we seek its original meaning or attempt to attach a new meaning to it in the modern context? If we adopt the first option, we might accept Harris’s (1992) explanation: Unlike grass-grazing animals, pigs were costly to raise in the Middle East and were therefore banned. But today, the meaning of the ban may be quite different: It can be viewed as a means of instilling self-control and discipline, similar to the practice of fasting, or as a group identity reinforcer.

1.4.5. CULTURE AS AN INDEPENDENTLY EXISTING PHENOMENON

When cultural anthropologists say that culture has an independent existence, what they mean is that it can be studied independently of its carriers: the human beings. White (1959/2007) provides an
analogy with language: Linguists study languages, not the people that speak them. This conceptualization of culture is appropriate for the purpose of what many anthropologists were interested in. They studied various social institutions, inheritance systems, kinship terminologies, color terms, taboos, and religions. The individual did not matter in those studies. They were keyed at the supra-individual level.

Today, the collection of individual values, beliefs, attitudes, and even aspects of personality, followed by aggregation to the societal level, is a legitimate approach in culturology, if not the main one. But the issue of the independence of culture is still relevant, albeit in a completely different sense. For many scholars, cultural or psychological constructs such as individualism, uncertainty avoidance, or neuroticism have an independent existence of their own and can therefore be objectively delineated and described in one single best way. Starting from this perspective, the goal of the researcher is to discover these objectively existing phenomena, just like a seafarer who stumbles upon a new island. For example, Welzel (2010) refers to a debate on the “true character of individualism” (p. 153). This implies that individualism is an entity independent of the minds of the researchers who study it and the goal of the researchers is to find its true nature. One study of individualism is supposed to reveal truer results than another.4

1.4.6. CULTURE AS A SUBJECTIVE HUMAN CONSTRUCT

Two of the authors of the main product of Project GLOBE (a comparison of the societal and organizational cultures of 61 societies presented in 9.17. and 9.18.) make the following point (House & Hanges, 2004):

There are researchers and methodologists that hold a measurement philosophy in which constructs are believed to be completely bounded by the methods by which they are measured. This measurement philosophy, called operationalism, was extremely influential during the 1940s and the 1950s. Operationalism was first proposed by Bridgman . . . , a Nobel prize-winning physicist, but made famous in the social sciences by B. F. Skinner and others. According to Bridgman, a construct is “nothing more than a set of operations.” In other words, concepts such as intelligence, motivation, and even culture are synonymous with the way that they are measured. For example, Boring’s . . . definition of intelligence (i.e. “intelligence is what tests test”) is a classic illustration of the belief that constructs are bounded by the way they are measured. (p. 100)

The operationalist approach is explained in greater detail in 5.4.1.

1.5. Conclusions About the Conceptualization of Culture

It is possible to integrate and reconcile some, though not all, of the above-mentioned positions on the nature of culture and its definitions. The scientific study of culture should have a practical orientation but this cannot be achieved without defining culture; therefore discussions on the concept of culture are not quite useless. The goal of such discussions should not be to arrive at one right and commonly accepted definition that will once and for all lay the issue to rest. Rather, we should stay open to diverse conceptualizations of culture, provided they are clearly explained by their proponents and make sense to others.

Consequently, the question of whether culture is a system of behaviors, meanings, mental characteristics, or artifacts, or of all
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of these, cannot and need not be answered categorically. It can be conceptualized one way or another. All approaches can lead to useful results in cross-cultural analysis.

“Culture” is a construct. In the words of Levitin (1973), a construct is “not directly accessible to observation but inferable from verbal statements and other behaviors and useful in predicting still other observable and measurable verbal and non-verbal behavior” (p. 492). A construct can also be thought of as a complex mental idea that reflects objectively existing phenomena. There are many subjective ways of thinking of and describing an objective reality. Constructs are not the reality itself but imaginary models that we build in order to organize it in a way that makes sense to us and, we hope, to other people.

How culture is conceptualized and studied may depend on the constraining effect of a researcher’s cultural background. This form of ethnocentrism has been recognized by authors of general treatises on scientific inquiry (Kuhn, 1962; Merton, 1949/1968), and cultural experts (Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). Extreme forms of that phenomenon are undesirable, but we have to learn to live with moderate manifestations of it and accept the idea that there is no culture-free social science just as there is no absolutely unbiased journalism. Even the choice of a particular topic and the disregard for another theme by a scholar or a journalist may suggest individual preferences that are associated with values. The fact that these investigators will present their own selection of stories, told in their own manner, should be viewed as normal as long as other voices are also allowed to be heard. Which of these is the true or real one is a meaningless question. It is like asking whether a description of grief by a Russian is more real than a description of sorrow by an Arab. Thus, culture can be construed in different ways, depending on a researcher’s cultural background, professional affiliation, or idiosyncratic preferences, as well as a currently predominant fashion or other social factors.

One popular approach to the conceptualization of culture is the onion metaphor (Hofstede, 2001). This is a simplified didactic tool for beginners in the field. Like an onion, culture can be seen as having different layers: visible and invisible. At the surface are various practices that can be observed and compared. At the core of the onion is the mental software that people are not fully aware of. It normally takes a significant scientific effort to extract the contents of that core and understand how they relate to those of the outer layers.

At a more advanced level, culture could be viewed as an amalgamation of potentially related and relatively durable societal characteristics that describe an identifiable human population, such as a nation or ethnic group. More restrictive definitions are possible, yet impractical. For instance, conceiving of culture as something shared by the members of a particular population that distinguishes them from another population creates serious practical problems for researchers (see 2.1. and 2.6.1.). On the other hand, analyses of national indicators are required by the reality of the world that we live in, never mind that nations are not homogeneous and discrete entities in terms of values, beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors (see 2.6.1.). Ultimately, the concept of culture may be replaced by the concept of “societal indicators,” whereas the search for a precise definition of what exactly culture is or is not can be replaced by a search for useful indicators for analysis in order to understand and explain practically important issues.

Notes

1. In the early 1980s, Adler (1983) advised against the treatment of culture as a residual but stated that it could be viewed “as an independent or as a dependent variable” (p. 37). At the turn of the 20th century, van de Vijver and Leung (1997a) had to inform their readers that
“culture is too global a concept to be meaningful as an explanatory variable, however, and should be replaced by its constituents” (p. 3). Singelis et al. (1999) noted that cross-cultural studies in psychology had often been criticized precisely because culture was treated as a single package, although it can be unraveled into numerous variables, any of which might account for the observed differences between the populations that a researcher has studied; consequently, it is necessary to unpack culture. Almost a decade later, Leung (2008) still deemed it necessary to give the same advice: “In other words, researchers need to unpack culture into a set of elements.” (p. 60).

Treating culture as a single categorical variable (for instance, “American” versus “Japanese”) and using it as an explanation for any phenomenon is as pointless and confusing as doing the same with other categorical variables, for instance, “man” versus “woman.” In fact, these are identification labels, not factors that can cause anything. If one finds any difference between a male population and a female population on a variable of interest, such as aggressiveness, ascribing the difference to being “male” versus “female” does not elucidate anything about the nature of that difference. Differences in aggression are not produced by different labels but by differences in genes, hormones, patterns of upbringing, and so on. Only studies of such characteristics, expressed as numerical variables, can shed light on differences in aggression or other phenomena between individuals or groups.

2. The low status of the social sciences was noted also by Magala (2005).

3. In his treatise on cross-cultural analysis, Parker (1997) advocated controlling for factors that are "(1) exogenous to the dependent variable yet (2) independent to the theory under study” (p. 13). It is needless to say that selecting such factors would involve a lot of subjectivity since any theory that is still in the process of being studied empirically is inevitably subjective. Being aware of this problem, Parker (1997) noted that each discipline within the social sciences often treats the others’ variables as exogenous to their variables of interest.

4. Consider also the following statement about personality factors by Paunonen et al. (1996): “But those findings do not mean that other factors, equally real and equally important, do not exist, be it in North American, European, or other cultures. The problem is that people have yet to provide a convincing search for those other factors. For a variety of reasons having to do not only with variable selection but also with the methodology of factor analysis . . . , it is our belief that the number five is probably a lower bound to the true number of factors at this level of the personality hierarchy” (p. 351, italics added). The words real, exist, search, and true number suggest that these authors see personality factors as having an existence of their own and an unknown fixed number. These real factors are lurking in the dark and waiting for researchers to find them with appropriate search engines.

5. The following example can serve as an illustration. Schwartz and Sagiv (1995) demonstrated that Schwartz’s value structure theory was essentially supported at the individual level throughout the countries from which Schwartz’s samples were drawn. However, Schwartz and Sagiv also published national estimates of deviations from the hypothesized structure. One such estimate—“deviations of value locations” (Table 2, p. 99) correlates with Hofstede’s individualism index as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correlation (p-value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers’ samples</td>
<td>-0.68** (n = 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students’ samples</td>
<td>-0.60** (n = 26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: Here and throughout the book, ** stands for correlation significant at the .01 level; * stands for correlation significant at the .05 level.)

GLOBE’s in-group collectivism index (see 9.17.) yields positive correlations of a similar magnitude with the deviation measures. This demonstrates that although Schwartz’s theory finds some universal empirical support, it is closest to the value structures in the minds of the respondents in the individualist nations. As Schwartz’s project evolved from the work of Milton Rokeach (Schwartz, 2011), it is not surprising that a Western perspective can be discerned in it.

Of note, Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) acknowledged that their perspective was partly shaped by their Dutch and Bulgarian backgrounds.