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Chapter 1 provides:

- An overview of the theoretical contours that have shaped the academic fields of criminology and media studies during the modern period.
- A discussion of the ‘media effects’ debate; its origins, its epistemological value and its influence on contemporary debates about media, crime and violence.
- An analysis of the theories – both individual (behaviourism, positivism) and social (anomie, dominant ideology) – which have dominated debates about the relationship between media and crime within the academy.
- An analysis of the theories (pluralism, left realism) which have emerged from within the academy but which have explicitly addressed the implications of theory for practitioners and policy-makers.
- An exploration of new, emerging theories which can broadly be called ‘postmodern’, including cultural criminology.

**KEY TERMS**

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It’s a cold November night as I pull up on their turf, heading towards my destiny. A sense of dread comes over me as I approach the abandoned warehouse. There’s no going back now. I’m in too deep. I have to see this through to the end, no matter what. The silence is eerie – only broken by my rapid heartbeat which shows no signs of slowing. I pause to check the gun, knowing that this is the moment I’ve been chasing for three years, ever since the day they took everything from me. It’s payback time.

NOW!! I kick the door down and burst in. They don’t expect me, they’re just sitting round a table smoking and drinking. Round after round flies, empty cartridges hit the floor and the screams of the wounded ring out.
Some of them go down, others scatter across the floor. I dive behind some boxes to my right, taking a moment to recompose myself. I see blood spilling from my left shoulder. The adrenaline’s kicked in, there’s no pain and no time to think about it now. Rage engulfs my mind and I come out running. Bullets fly all around my head but I keep shooting. I’m hit again. My chest fills with lead. Everything’s going black and I know it’s all over. Those infuriating little words fill the screen once more. GAME OVER!

(Thanks to Michael Jewkes for permission to use this.)

Every day newspaper headlines scream for our attention with stories about crime designed to shock, frighten, titillate and entertain. Politicians of every political party campaign on law and order issues, reducing complex crime problems to easily digestible ‘sound bites’ for the forthcoming news bulletins on radio and television. Crime is ubiquitous in film genres from the Keystone Cops of the 1920s to the gangster-chic flicks of today. Video and computer games such as Grand Theft Auto and The Getaway (narrated above) allow us vicariously to indulge in violent criminal acts, while contemporary popular music such as rap and hip hop frequently glorify crime and violence both in the music itself and in the street gang style adopted by the artists. The Internet has fuelled interest in all things crime-related, providing both a forum for people to exchange their views on crime and facilitating new ways to commit crimes such as fraud, theft, trespass and harassment. ‘Reality’ television shows, in which the police and television companies form unique partnerships to try to catch offenders, are proliferating in number, as are those which employ a ‘hidden camera’ to record unwitting citizens being robbed, defrauded or otherwise swindled by ‘cowboy’ traders. Soap operas regularly use stories centred around serious and violent crime in order to boost ratings, and the court trial has become a staple of television drama. Television schedules are crammed with programmes about the police, criminals, prisoners and the courts, and American detective shows from Murder, She Wrote to CSI: Crime Scene Investigation are syndicated around the world. How do we account for their popularity? Why are we – the audience – so fascinated by crime and deviance? And if the media can so successfully engage the public’s fascination, can they equally tap into – and increase – people’s fears about crime? Is the media’s interest in – some would say, obsession with – crime harmful? What exactly is the relationship between the mass media and crime?

Students and researchers of both criminology and media studies have sought to understand the connections between media and crime for well over a century. It’s interesting to note that, although rarely working together, striking parallels can be found between the efforts of criminologists and media theorists to understand and ‘unpack’ the relationships between crime, deviance and criminal justice on the one hand, and media and popular culture on the other. Indeed, it is not just at the interface between crime and media that we find similarities...
between the two disciplines. Parallels between criminology and media studies are evident even when we consider some of the most fundamental questions that have concerned academics in each field, such as ‘what makes a criminal?’ and ‘why do the mass media matter?’ The reason for this is that as criminology and media studies have developed as areas of interest, they have been shaped by a number of different theoretical and empirical perspectives which have, in turn, been heavily influenced by developments in related fields, notably sociology and psychology, but also other disciplines across the arts, sciences and social sciences. Equally, academic research is almost always shaped by external forces and events from the social, political, economic and cultural worlds. Consequently we can look back through history and note how major episodes and developments – for example, Freud’s ‘discovery’ of the unconscious, or the exile of Jewish intellectuals to America at the time of Nazi ascendancy in Germany – have influenced the intellectual contours of both criminology and media studies in ways that, at times, have synthesized the concerns of each. In addition, the interdisciplinary nature of both subject areas and their shared origins in the social sciences, has meant that, since the 1960s when they were introduced as degree studies at universities, a number of key figures working at the nexus between criminology and media/cultural studies have succeeded in bringing their work to readerships in both subject areas – Steve Chibnall, Stanley Cohen, Richard Ericson, Stuart Hall and Jock Young to name just a few.

The purpose of this first chapter is to introduce some of this cross-disciplinary scholarship and to develop a theoretical context for what follows in the remainder of the book. The chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of all the theoretical perspectives that have shaped media research and criminology in the modern era – an endeavour that could fill at least an entire book on its own. Instead, it will draw from each tradition a few of the major theoretical ‘pegs’ upon which we can hang our consideration of the relationship between media and crime. These approaches are presented in an analogous fashion with an emphasis on the points of similarity and convergence between the two fields of study (but remember that, in the main, scholars in media studies have worked entirely independently of those in criminology, and vice versa). In addition, the theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter are presented in the broadly chronological order in which they were developed, although it is important to stress that theories do not simply appear and then, at some later date, disappear, to be replaced by something altogether more sophisticated and enlightening. While we can take an overview of the development of an academic discipline and detect some degree of linearity in so far as we can see fundamental shifts in critical thinking, this linearity does not mean that there were always decisive breaks in opinion as each theoretical phase came and went. In fact, there is a great deal of overlap in the approaches that follow, with many points of correspondence as well as conflict. Nor does it necessarily indicate a coherence of
opinion within each theoretical position or, even any real sense of progress in our understanding and knowledge of certain issues. As Tierney puts it:

There is always a danger of oversimplification when trying to paint in some historical background, of ending up with such broad brushstrokes that the past becomes a caricature of itself, smoothed out and shed of all those irksome details that confound an apparent coherence and elegant simplicity. (1996: 49)

However, notwithstanding the fact that what follows is of necessity selective, condensed and painted with a very broad brush, this chapter seeks to locate the last 40 years of university-taught media studies and criminology within over 100 years of intellectual discourse about the theoretical and empirical connections between media and crime. The theoretical perspectives that will be discussed in this chapter include strain theory and anomie; Marxism, critical criminology and the dominant ideology approach; pluralism and ideological struggle; realism and reception analysis; and postmodernism and cultural criminology.

However, it is with one of the most enduring areas of research that our discussion of theory begins: that of media ‘effects’.

Media ‘effects’

One of the most persistent debates in academic and lay circles concerning the mass media is the extent to which media can be said to cause anti-social, deviant or criminal behaviour: in other words, to what degree do media images bring about negative effects in their viewers? The academic study of this phenomenon – ‘effects research’ as it has come to be known – developed from two main sources: mass society theory and behaviourism. Although deriving from different disciplines – sociology and psychology respectively – these two approaches find compatibility in their essentially pessimistic view of society and their belief that human nature is unstable and susceptible to external influences. This section explores the combined impact of mass society theory and psychological behaviourism and outlines how they gave rise to the notion that has become something of a truism: that media images are responsible for eroding moral standards, subverting consensual codes of behaviour and corrupting young minds.

It is often taken as an unassailable fact that society has become more violent since the advent of the modern media industry. The arrival and growth of film, television and, latterly, computer technologies, have served to intensify public anxieties but there are few crime waves which are genuinely new phenomena, despite the media’s efforts to present them as such. For many observers, it is a matter of ‘common sense’ that society has become increasingly characterized by
crime – especially violent crime – since the advent of film and television, resulting in a persistent mythology that the two phenomena – media and violent crime – are ‘naturally’ linked. Yet as Pearson (1983) illustrates, the history of respectable fears goes back several hundred years, and public outrage at perceived crime waves has become more intensely focused with the introduction of each new media innovation. From theatrical productions in the 18th century, the birth of commercial cinema and the emergence of cheap, sensationalistic publications known as ‘Penny Dreadfuls’ at the end of the 19th century, to jazz and ‘pulp fiction’ in the early 20th century, popular fears about the influence of visual images on vulnerable minds have been well rehearsed in this country and elsewhere. Anxieties were frequently crystallised in the notion of ‘the crowd’ and it became a popular 19th-century myth that when people mass together they are suggestible to outside influences and become irrational, even animalistic (Murdock, 1997; Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001). The most influential exponent of this view was Gustave Le Bon, a French royalist writing at the time of the revolution, who believed that when a man forms part of a crowd he ‘descends several rungs in the ladder of civilisation’ (Le Bon, 1895/1960: 32). Le Bon himself alluded to the persuasive powers of the media of the day when he said that:

Crowds being only capable of thinking in images are only to be impressed by images. It is only images that attract them and become motives for action … Nothing has a greater effect on the imagination of crowds than theatrical representations … Sometimes the sentiments suggested by the images are so strong that they tend, like habitual suggestions, to transform themselves into acts. (1895/1960: 68)

This statement was one of the first public airings of a view that rapidly gained credibility with the significant advancements in photography, cinema and the popular press which occurred at the turn of the 20th century. Put simply, it became increasingly common for writers and thinkers to mourn the passing of a literate culture, which was believed to require a degree of critical thinking, and bemoan its replacement, a visual popular culture which was believed to plug directly into the mind without need for rational thought or interpretation (Murdock, 1997).

Mass society theory

Fears about ‘the crowd’ precipitated mass society theory, which developed in the latter years of the 19th century and early 20th century, becoming firmly established as a sociological theory after the Second World War. Mass society theory usually carries negative connotations, referring to the masses or the ‘common people’ who are characterized by their lack of individuality, their
alienation from the moral and ethical values to be gained from work and religion, their political apathy, and their taste for 'low' culture. In most versions of the theory, individuals are seen as uneducated, ignorant, potentially unruly and prone to violence (McQuail, 2000). The late 19th and early 20th centuries marked a period of tremendous turbulence and uncertainty, and mass society theorists held that social upheavals associated with industrialization, urbanization and the Great War had made people feel increasingly vulnerable. Within this atomized society, two important strands of thought can be detected. First, it was believed that as communities fragmented and traditional social ties were dismantled, society became a mass of isolated individuals cut adrift from kinship and organic ties and lacking moral cohesion. An increase in crime and anti-social behaviour seemed inevitable, and as mass society took hold – in all its complex, over-bureaucratized incomprehensibility – citizens turned away from the authorities who were seen as remote, indifferent and incompetent. Instead they sought solutions to crime at a personal, community-orientated, 'micro' level, which included vigilantism, personal security devices and, in some countries, guns. The second significant development that emerged from conceptualizations of mass society was that the media were seen as both an aid to people's psychic survival under difficult circumstances (McQuail, 2000) and as a powerful force for controlling people's thoughts and diverting them from political action.

Mass society theory has been described as more a diagnosis of the sickness of the times than a fully coherent social theory (McQuail, 2000); a fact borne out by the paradox that it views society as both 'atomized' and centrally controlled, and individuals as similar and undifferentiated, yet isolated and lacking social cohesion. However, the importance of mass society theory in the current context is that it gave rise to a number of theoretical and empirical models claiming that the mass media can be used subversively as a powerful means of manipulating vulnerable minds.

**Behaviourism and positivism**

In addition to mass society theory, models of media effects have been strongly influenced by a second strand of research – behaviourism – an empiricist approach to psychology pioneered by J.B. Watson in the first decade of the 20th century. Deriving from a philosophy known as **positivism**, which emerged from the natural sciences and regards the world as fixed and quantifiable, behaviourism represented a major challenge to the more dominant perspective of **psychoanalysis**. Shifting the research focus away from the realm of the mind with its emphasis on introspection and individual interpretation, behavioural psychologists argued that an individual’s identity was shaped by their responses to the external environment which formed stable and recognizable patterns of behaviour that could
be publicly observed. In addition to emulating the scientific examination of relations between organisms in the natural world, Watson was inspired by Ivan Pavlov, who was famously conducting experiments with dogs, producing ‘conditioned responses’ (salivating) to external stimuli (a bell ringing). The impact of these developments led to a belief that the complex structures and systems that make up human behaviour could be observed and measured in a generalizable manner so that predictions of future behaviour could be made. In addition to stimulus-response experiments in psychology and the natural sciences, developments were occurring elsewhere which took a similar view of human behaviour. For example, the modern education system was being established with learning being seen as something to be tested and examined. The consumerist society was also just beginning to take hold amid rising levels of affluence, and advertisers were to become regarded as the ‘hidden persuaders’ who could influence people to purchase consumer goods almost against their better judgement.

Meanwhile, in criminology, the search for objective knowledge through the positive application of science was also having a significant impact. The endeavour to observe and measure the relationship between ‘cause and effect’ led to a belief that criminality is not a matter of free will, but is caused by a biological, psychological or social disposition over which the offender has little or no control. Through gaining knowledge about how behaviour is determined by such conditions – be they genetic deficiencies or disadvantages associated with their social environments – it was believed that problems such as crime and deviance could be examined and treated. The most famous name in positivist criminology is Cesare Lombroso, who published *The Criminal Man* (1876) and *The Female Offender* (Lombroso and Ferrero, 1895), outlining his commitment to the notion that the causes of crime are to be found in individual biology. An Italian physician whose ideas were much influenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution, Lombroso studied the bodies of executed criminals and came to the conclusion that law-breakers were physically different to non-offenders. He claimed that criminals were atavistic throwbacks to an earlier stage of biological development and could be identified by physical abnormalities such as prominent jaws, strong canine teeth, sloping foreheads, unusual ear size and so on. Although in more recent years positivist forms of criminology have become theoretically more sophisticated (see, for example, the work of Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985), Lombroso’s rather crude approach to biological criminology is still evident today, particularly in popular media discourses about women and children who commit serious and violent crime (see Chapters 4 and 5).

While criminologists in the early decades of the 20th century were concerning themselves with isolating the variables most likely to be found in criminals as distinct from non-criminals, media researchers were also developing new theories based on positivist assumptions and behaviourist methods. The notion
that all human action is modelled on the condition reflex, so that one’s action is precipitated by responses to stimuli in one’s environment rather than being a matter of individual agency, made the new media of mass communications an obvious candidate for concern. In the context of research into media effects, this approach most often resulted in experiments being carried out under laboratory conditions to try to establish a direct causal link between media images of a violent or potentially harmful nature and resultant changes in actual behaviour, notably an inclination among the research participants to demonstrate markedly agitated or aggressive tendencies.

One of the most famous series of experiments was that conducted by Albert Bandura and colleagues at Stanford University, California in the 1950s and 1960s, in which children were shown a film or cartoon depicting some kind of violent act and were then given ‘Bobo’ dolls to play with [these were large inflatable dolls with weighted bases to ensure that they wobble but do not stay down when struck]. Their behaviour towards the dolls was used as a measure of the programme’s effect, and when the children were observed behaving aggressively [compared to a control group who did not watch the violent content] it was taken as evidence that a direct relationship existed between ‘screen violence’ and juvenile aggression. Although these studies were undoubtedly influential and, indeed, have attained a certain notoriety, they are hugely problematic. Despite the ‘scientific’ status they claim, behaviourist methods have been rejected by most contemporary media scholars on the grounds of their great many flaws and inconsistencies. Bandura and his colleagues have been widely discredited for, among other things: failing to replicate a ‘real life’ media environment; reducing complex patterns of human behaviour to a single factor among a wide network of mediating influences and therefore treating children as unsophisticated ‘lab rats’; being able to measure only immediate responses to media content and having nothing to say about the long-term, cumulative effects of exposure to violent material; using dolls that were designed to frustrate; praising or rewarding children when they behaved as ‘expected’; and overlooking the fact that children who had not been shown any film stimulus were nevertheless found to behave aggressively towards the Bobo doll if left with it – and especially if they felt it was expected of them by the experimenter. (For a more extensive critical review of these experiments and later research inspired by Bandura, see Gauntlett, 1995: 17–23.)

This first major phase of media research is sometimes called functionalism because its advocates were interested in accounting for the functions of the mass media, or what the media do to people. Effects research is also sometimes collectively termed the hypodermic syringe model because the relationship between media and audiences is conceived as a mechanistic and unsophisticated process, by which the media ‘inject’ values, ideas and information directly into the passive receiver, producing direct and unmediated ‘effects’ which, in turn,
have a negative influence on thoughts and actions. Anxieties about media effects have traditionally taken one of three forms. The first is a moral or religious anxiety that exposure to the popular media encourages lewd behaviour and corrupts established norms of decency and moral certitude. A second anxiety, from the intellectual right, is that the mass media undermine the civilizing influence of high culture (great literature, art and so on) and debase tastes. A third concern, which has traditionally been associated with the intellectual left, was that the mass media represent the ruling élite, and manipulate mass consciousness in their interests. This view was given a particular impetus by the emergence of fascist and totalitarian governments across Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, which used propaganda to great effect in winning the hearts and minds of the people. The belief that the new media of mass communications were among the most powerful weapons of these political regimes was given academic attention by members of the Frankfurt School – a group of predominantly Jewish scholars who themselves fled Hitler’s Germany for America.

A famous example from America that appears to support mass society theory’s belief in an omnipresent and potentially harmful media and behaviourism’s assumptions about the observable reactions of a susceptible audience, concerns the radio transmission of H.G. Wells’s *War of the Worlds* on Halloween Night in October 1938. The broadcast was a fictitious drama concerning the invasion of aliens from Mars, but many believed they were listening to a real report of a Martian attack. While the broadcast was on air, panic broke out. People all over the US prayed, cried, fled their homes and telephoned loved ones to say emotional farewells (Cantril, 1940, in O’Sullivan and Jewkes, 1997). One in six listeners were said to have been very frightened by the broadcast, a fear that was exacerbated by the gravitas of the narrator, Orson Wells, and by the cast of ‘experts’ giving orders for evacuation and attack. As one listener said: ‘I believed the broadcast as soon as I heard the professor from Princeton and the officials in Washington’ (1997: 9). The example of the *War of the Worlds* broadcast provides a powerfully resonant metaphor for the belief that the modern media are capable of exerting harmful influences, of triggering mass outbreaks of negative social consequence and of causing damaging psychological effects. However, to characterize the episode as ‘proof’ of the hypodermic syringe effect of the media would be very misleading. The relationship between stimulus and response was not simple or direct because, quite simply, the panic experienced by some listeners was not without context. It was the time of the Depression, and American citizens were experiencing a prolonged period of economic unrest and widespread unemployment and were looking to their leaders for reassurance and direction. War was breaking out in Europe and many believed that an attack by a foreign power was imminent (1997). It is of little surprise, then, that the realistic quality of the broadcast – played out as an extended news report in which the radio announcer appeared to be actually witnessing terrible events
unfolding before him – powerfully tapped into the feelings of insecurity, change and loss being experienced by many American people, to produce a panic of this magnitude.

**The legacy of ‘effects’ research**

Scholars in the UK have, for many years, strongly resisted attempts to assert a direct, causal link between media images and deviant behaviour. The idea of isolating television, film or any other medium as a variable and ignoring all the other factors that might influence a person’s behaviour, is considered too crude and reductive an idea to be of any epistemological value. Much effects research cannot adequately address the subtleties of media meanings, the polysemy of media texts (that is, they are open to multiple interpretations), the unique characteristics and identity of the audience member, or the social and cultural context within which the encounter between media text and audience member occurs. It mistakenly assumes that we all have the same ideas about what constitutes ‘aggression’, ‘violence’ and ‘deviance’, and that those who are susceptible to harmful portrayals can be affected by a ‘one-off’ media incident, regardless of the wider context of a lifetime of meaning-making (Boyd-Barrett, 2002). It also ignores the possibility that influence travels the opposite way; that is, that the characteristics, interests and concerns of the audience may determine what media producers produce.

But despite the obvious flaws in effects research, behaviourist assumptions about the power of the media to influence criminal and anti-social behaviour persist, especially – and somewhat ironically – in discussions within the popular media, which are frequently intended to bring pressure on governments and other authorities to tighten up controls on other elements of the media. For example, it is surprising to witness how much contemporary popular discourse about the power of the media rests on assumptions that are very close to those underpinning the hypodermic syringe model. Such assumptions draw on distinctly Lombrosian ideas about the kinds of individuals most likely to be affected by harmful media content (see below). In addition, they dovetail neatly with mass society theorists’ fears that institutions such as the family and religion are losing their power to shape young minds, and that socialization happens instead via external forces such as the **mass media**. Whether assessing the effects of advertising, measuring the usefulness of political campaigns in predicting voting behaviour, deciding film and video classifications or introducing software to aid parents in controlling their children’s exposure to certain forms of Internet content, much policy in these areas is underpinned by media-centric, message-specific, micro-orientated, positivist, authoritarian, short-term assumptions of human behaviour.
The ongoing political debate about censorship and control of the media tends to periodically reach an apotheosis when serious, high-profile crimes occur, especially those perpetrated by children or young people. For example, following the tragic death of two-year-old James Bulger at the hands of two older boys in February 1993, there was a great deal of speculation in the popular press that the murderers had watched and imitated *Child’s Play 3*, a mildly violent ‘video nasty’ about a psychopathic doll. Despite there being no evidence that the boys ever saw the film, and consistent denials from the police that there was a connection, the insidious features of *Child’s Play 3* were soon ingrained in the public consciousness. Television presenter Anne Diamond summed up the feelings of the ‘common-sense brigade’ in her tabloid newspaper column:

Our gut tells us they *must* have seen the evil doll Chucky. They *must* have loved the film. And they *must* have seen it over and over again, because some of the things they did are almost exact copies of the screenplay … We all know that violence begets violence.

(*Mirror, 1 December 1993, quoted in Petley, 1997: 188*)

This appeal to common sense (‘we all know …’) is a perennial feature of what has come to be known as the ‘copycat’ theory of crime and is seen by its adherents as natural and unassailable. However, it is instructive here to remember Gramsci’s definition of the term ‘common sense’: ‘a reservoir of historically discontinuous and disjointed ideas that functions as the philosophy of nonphilosophers,’ a folklore whose fundamental distinction is its ‘fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential character’ (Gramsci, 1971: 419). Others, meanwhile, have demonstrated how the unquestioned truths which we accept as common sense are, in fact, culturally derived mythologies specific not only to individual cultures but also to particular points in time (see, for example, Barthes, 1973; Foucault, 1977; Geertz, 1983).

The link between screen violence and real-life violence was given a gloss of academic respectability when, in the aftermath of the Bulger case, Professor Elizabeth Newson, head of the Child Development Unit at Nottingham University, produced a report that was endorsed by 25 psychologists, paediatricians and other academics. Despite extensive and sustained publicity in the media, it turned out that Newson’s report was just nine pages long, contained no original research, and concluded – as these things inevitably do – that more research was needed (McQueen, 1998). But despite the highly-questionable evidence for the potentially harmful effects of media content, the proposition that media portrayals of crime and violence desensitize the viewer to ‘real’ pain and suffering, and may excite or arouse some people to commit similar acts, persists in the popular imagination where it is rarely applied universally, but tends to be tinged with a distinct class-edged bias. Echoes of both mass society theory and
criminological positivism can be detected in most discourses about crime and the media where there lingers a notion of an inferior class hampered by some degree of mental deficiency that precludes them from being able to distinguish between media images and real life. For example, middle-class columnists like Anne Diamond do not consider their own children to be at risk from television and video content (computer technologies are somewhat different because of their interactive nature), but rather it is the offspring of the already threatening 'under-class' who pose the greatest threat to society. This view, appealing to common-sense notions of 'intelligent people' versus the dark shapeless mass that forms the residue of society, also has a gendered bias. The contemporary culture of blame is frequently directed at the 'monstrous offspring' of 'bad mothers', a construction that combines two contemporary folk devils and taps into cultural fears of the 'other', which will be explored further in Chapters 4 and 5. Consequently, when particularly horrific crimes come to light, the knee-jerk reaction of a society unwilling to concede that depravity and cruelty reside within its midst, is frequently to turn to the familiar scapegoat of the mass media to attribute blame.

Another version of this approach, which also has its roots in mass society theory, concerns a broader preoccupation with the globalization of cultural forms and products and, in particular, the American origin of much popular global culture. Television, cinema, video and latterly the Internet, have come in for particular criticism by those who view anything American in origin as intrinsically cheap, trashy and alien to British culture and identity. Fears dating back more than a century concerning the fragmentation of traditional hierarchies of class and taste, together with the secularization and democratization of society, have become crystallised in the view that the popular visual media are slowly corrupting the 'British' way of life by importing values that are altogether more vulgar and trashy from the other side of the Atlantic. The concerns of the Frankfurt School theorists Adorno and Horkheimer about the debasement of 'high' culture by 'low' popular cultural forms found synthesis in the UK with elitist expressions of concern about the youth culture surrounding American-style 'milk bars' in post-War Britain. Since that time, a variety of moral panics have reached these shores only months after their appearance in America, and a wide range of phenomena – rock and roll music, mugging, dangerous dogs, car-jacking, satanic child abuse, gun crime and gang warfare – have been characterized by our media as essentially 'un-British'; an unwelcome and alien crime-wave from the US (see Chapter 3).

**Strain theory and anomie**

By the 1960s academic scholars were turning their backs on positivist, behaviourist research. Media researchers viewed behaviourism as attributing too
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much power to the media and underestimating the importance of the social contexts of media consumption, the social structures which mediate the relationship between the state and the individual, and the sophistication and diversity of the audience. Similarly, positivist approaches to explaining crime in terms of its individual, biological roots were giving way to more sociologically informed approaches which originated in the work of the Chicago School in the 1920s and 1930s. The overriding concern of Chicago School sociology, and those who were influenced by it, was to understand the role of social environment and social interaction on deviant and criminal behaviour. In other words, it was recognized that where people grow up and who they associate with is closely linked to their likelihood of involvement in crime and anti-social behaviour.

Limitations of space preclude a full discussion of sociological approaches to crime here, but one important early theory that has a bearing on the present discussion of the relationship between media and crime is Robert Merton’s (1938) strain theory, or ‘anomie’. Merton borrowed the term ‘anomie’ (meaning ‘normlessness’) from Durkheim and followed the Chicago School in rejecting individualistic explanations of crime and looking instead to social and structural factors. Like mass society theory, strain theory takes as its starting point a decline of community and social order and its replacement by alienation and disorder. Whole sections of society are cut adrift, unable to conform to the norms that traditionally bind communities together. Yet, within this state of normlessness, society as a whole remains more or less intact. As Durkheim (1893/1933) notes, social cohesion persists despite periodic economic crises (such as rapid increases in prosperity for some sections of society and the concomitant impoverishment of others in relative terms). Social cohesion may be partly accounted for by the pursuit of common objectives, and anomie draws attention to the goals that people are encouraged to aspire to, such as a comfortable level of wealth or status. The majority of people will conform to the socially acceptable means of attaining those goals; for example, hard work and a commitment to traditional, consensual values. Through socialization, most come to accept both the goals and the legitimate means of achieving them; a process summed up in the notion of the ‘American Dream’. But an overemphasis on either the cultural goals or the institutionalized means of attaining them can lead to social strains, and anomie usually describes a situation where a society places strong emphasis on a particular goal, but far less emphasis on the appropriate means of achieving that goal. It is this imbalance that can lead some individuals who Merton terms ‘innovators’ to pursue nonconformist or illegal paths to achieve the culturally sanctioned goals of success and wealth.

Merton’s theory – which paved the way for much of the later research on delinquent subcultures (Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 1960) as well as the contemporary notion of relative deprivation (Lea and Young, 1984; 1993; Young, 1992) – proved attractive in so far as it appeared to offer a way of reducing crime
by improving the legitimate life chances of those who otherwise might pursue culturally-approved goals by illegitimate means. However, one of the key factors involved in the internalization of cultural goals is the mass media which, it might be argued, instil in people needs and desires that may not be gratifiable by means other than criminal. In particular, it has been suggested that advertising exploits anomie by offering a false sense of community to those isolated and fragmented from society (Osborne, 2002). It is they who, in an era of rampant media-fuelled global consumerism, are arguably most likely to pursue society’s rewards by innovative means. Some do so in desperation: in his classic 1972 study of the clashes between mods and rockers in the 1960s, Stanley Cohen claims that the participants were driven in part by their anguished feelings of alienation from the mass consumer culture directed at the new wave of ‘teenagers’. It has also been suggested that much youth crime is committed out of a sense of ‘calculating hedonism’; the pursuit of excitement and an attempt to assert control in the face of the banality and boredom of everyday life (a theory that chimes with the new cultural criminology, see below; cf. Fenwick and Hayward, 2000; cf. Morrison, 1995).

For others, the anomic drive might be less concerned with feelings of desperation and more to do with conspicuous consumption and the desire for peer approval. In her study of street robbery, Elizabeth Burney notes that the outstanding characteristic of young street offenders is their ‘avid adherence to a group “style”, which dictates a very expensive level of brand-name dressing, financed by crime’ (1990: 63). Elsewhere, I have noted a similar tendency among young men serving long prison sentences who attain anomic gratification by keeping up to date with the latest, and most expensive, designs in footwear (Jewkes, 2002). A further application of the theory is found in the debate about the effects of viewing violence, reviewed earlier in this chapter, where it is frequently suggested that it is vulnerable, marginalized members of society who are most susceptible to harmful consequences instigated by glamorized portrayals of violence by the mass media (2002). Coleman and Norris (2000) even suggest that strain theory may help to explain serial killing, a phenomenon that is usually associated with modern America. Using Leyton’s (1989) study of multiple murderers, they argue that the growth of the American economy since the 1960s has resulted in a commensurate rise in the numbers of serial killings. Inevitably, some sections of the population will be excluded from the general rise in living standards which, in a culture that glorifies violence, may lead some disaffected individuals to a [usually misdirected] desire for revenge.

Anomie has fallen in and out of favour with remarkable fluidity over the years, but from its nadir in the 1970s when Rock and McIntosh referred to the ‘exhaustion of the anomie tradition’ (in Downes and Rock, 1988: 110) it has recently enjoyed something of a revival thanks to two diverse phenomena. The first is the emergence of interest, within both criminology and cultural studies,
in transgressive forms of excitement, ranging from extreme sports to violent crime, as a means of combating the routinized alienation that besets contemporary life [activities that are central to the approach known as 'cultural criminology'; see below]. The second is the growth of electronic communications, such as the Internet, which seem to offer a solution to the problems of dislocation by fostering a sense of community across time and space. In the world of virtual reality, anomie is both ‘a condition and a pleasure’ [Osborne, 2002: 29].

**Marxism, critical criminology and the ‘dominant ideology’ approach**

It is clear from the discussion so far that the mid-20th century saw a change in focus from the individual to society. This paradigm shift led to the predominance of Marxist-inspired models of media power and, in particular, to the writings of Karl Marx (1818–83) himself and Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937). Their theories of social structure led to the development of an approach known as the ‘dominant ideology’ or ‘media-as-hegemony’ model, which was taken up enthusiastically by both criminologists and media researchers in the 1960s and dominated academic discussions of media power for over 20 years.

**Marxism** proposes that the media – like all other capitalist institutions – are owned by the ruling bourgeois élite and operate in the interests of that class, denying access to oppositional or alternative views. Although the media were far from being the mass phenomena in Marx’s lifetime that they are today, their position as a key capitalist industry, and their power to widely disseminate messages which affirm the validity and legitimacy of a stratified society, made his theories seem very relevant at a later time when the mass media was going through a combined process of expansion, deregulation and concentration of ownership and control. Gramsci developed Marx’s theories to incorporate the concept of *hegemony*, which has played a central role in theorizing about the media’s portrayal of crime, deviance, and law and order. In brief, hegemony refers to the process by which the ruling classes win approval for their actions by consent rather than by coercion. This is largely achieved through social and cultural institutions such as the law, the family, the education system and the mass media. All such institutions reproduce everyday representations, meanings and activities in such a way as to render the class interests of those in power into an apparently natural, inevitable and hence unarguable general interest with a claim on everybody. In short, media representations may support or (more rarely) challenge the dominant definitions of a situation, and they can extend, legitimize, celebrate or criticize the prevailing discourses at any given time. The media thus play a crucial role in the winning of consent for a social
system, its values and its dominant interests, or in the rejection of them. This is an important refinement of Marx’s original formulation, for Gramsci dispensed with the idea that people passively take on the ideas *in toto* of the ruling élite (a position usually termed ‘false consciousness’), and instead established a model of power in which different cultural elements are subtly articulated together to appeal to the widest possible spectrum of opinion.

The writings of Marx and Gramsci inform the theoretical organization of much of the most important and influential work which emerged within the social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, although Marx himself had little to say about crime, the rediscovery of his theories of social structure gave impetus to a new ‘radical’ criminology that sought to expose the significance of structural inequalities upon crime and, crucially, upon *criminalization*. Also drawing heavily on labelling theory, which posits that crime and deviance are not the product of either a ‘sick individual’ or a ‘sick society’ but that ‘deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label’ (Becker, 1963: 8), a new generation of radical criminologists such as Taylor, Walton and Young (who, in 1973, published the hugely influential *The New Criminology*) took this proposition and gave it a Marxist edge, arguing that the power to label people as deviants or criminals and prosecute and punish them accordingly was a function of the state. In other words, acts are defined as criminal because it is in the interests of the ruling class to define them as such, and while the powerful will violate laws with impunity, working-class crimes will be punished.

Inspired by the ‘new criminology’, a number of further ‘radical’ studies emerged which drew attention to the criminogenic function of the state and the role of the media in orchestrating public panics about crime and deflecting concerns away from the social problems that emanate from capitalism. This work became known as *critical criminology* and of particular importance is Stuart Hall et al.’s *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* (1978), which remains one of the most important texts on the *ideological* role of the media in defining and reporting crime and deviance. In media research, the work of the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG) is also of note. The GUMG produced a series of studies based on empirical and semiotic analysis (collectively known as the *Bad News* books and now collected in one edition; see Philo, 1995) looking at bias in television news coverage of industrial conflicts, political disputes and acts of war. The central finding in these studies is that television news represses the diversity of opinions in any given situation, reproduces a dominant ideology (based on, for example, middle-class, anti-dissent and pro-family views) and silences contradictory voices. Another important perspective that influenced studies of media power throughout the 1980s and beyond was the *political economy* approach, which claims that the undisputed fact of increasing concentration of media ownership in recent years makes Marx’s analysis all the more relevant to contemporary debates about the power of the media.
[McQueen, 1998]. Political economy focuses on relations between media and other economic and political institutions and argues that, since the mass media are largely privately owned, the drive for profit will shape their output and political position. Concentration of ownership, it is suggested, leads to a decline in the material available [albeit that there are more channels in which to communicate], a preoccupation with ratings at the expense of quality and choice, and a preference for previously successful formulae over innovation and risk-taking. The net result of these processes is that the material offered is reduced to the commercially viable, popular, easily understood and largely unchallenging (Golding and Murdock, 2000). Some writers go as far as to suggest that the 'dumbing down' of culture is part of a wider manipulative strategy on the part of the military-industrial complex to prevent people from engaging in serious political thought or activity. For example, Noam Chomsky’s ‘propaganda-model’ demonstrates how certain stories are underrepresented in the media because of powerful military-industrial interests. In a content analysis of the New York Times he shows how atrocities committed by Indonesia in East Timor received a fraction of the coverage devoted to the Khmer Rouge killings in Cambodia. Chomsky claims that the reason for this imbalanced coverage is that the weaponry used to slaughter the people of East Timor was supplied by America, Britain and Holland (Herman and Chomsky, 1992; see also Pilger, 1999).

Although not without their critics, these bodies of work were among the first to systematically and rigorously interrogate the role of the mass media in shaping our understanding, not only of crime and deviance, but also of the processes of criminalization. The common theme in all these studies is that information flows from the top down, with the media representing the views of political leaders, military leaders, police chiefs, judges, prominent intellectuals, advertisers and big business, newspaper owners and vocal opinion leaders. At the same time, they reduce the viewer, reader or listener to the role of passive receiver, overshadowing his or her opinions, concerns and beliefs. Thus, a hierarchy of credibility is established in which the opinions and definitions of powerful members of society are privileged, while the ‘ordinary’ viewer or reader is prevented by lack of comparative material from engaging in critical or comparative thinking (Ericson et al., 1987).

This structured relationship between the media and its ‘powerful’ sources has important consequences for the representation of crime, criminals and criminal justice, particularly with respect to those whose lifestyle or behaviour deviates from the norms established by a white, male, heterosexual, educationally privileged élite. For example, in the aforementioned Policing the Crisis, Hall and his colleagues demonstrate how hegemony is achieved through the media. In brief, the book details how the press significantly over-reacted to the perceived threat of violent crime in the early 1970s and created a moral panic about ‘mugging’, but only after there had been an intensification of police mobilization against
black offenders. The net result of these forces – public fear and hostility fuelled by sensationalized media reporting and heavy-handed treatment of black people by the police – combined to produce a situation where more black people were arrested and put before the courts, which in turn set the spiral for continuing media attention. But as Hall et al. explain, this episode can be set against a backdrop of economic and structural crisis in 1970s’ Britain, whereby the disintegration of traditional, regulated forms of life led to a displaced reaction onto black and Asian immigrants and their descendants. The central thesis of the book is that by the 1970s, the consent that might previously have been won by the ruling classes was being severely undermined, and the state was struggling to retain power. The birth of the ‘law and order’ society, evidenced in the development of a pre-emptive escalation of social control directed at a minority population, served to divert public attention from the looming economic and structural crisis, crystallize public fears in the figure of the black mugger, create a coherent popular discourse that sanctioned tougher penal measures, and ultimately justify the drift towards ideological repression. All these developments were disclosed, supported and made acceptable by a media that had become one of the most important instruments in maintaining hegemonic power (Hall et al., 1978).

Critics of the hegemonic approach suggest that it overstates the intent of powerful institutions to deceive the public. They argue that it is not the case that media industries maintain a policy of deliberately ignoring or marginalizing significant portions of their audience. The tendency of professional communicators to perpetuate the taken-for-granted assumptions of consensus politics is not something that is necessarily overt, deliberate or even conscious, and certainly can rarely be described with any certainty as conspiracy. Rather, it may be attributed to an underlying frame of mind that characterizes news organizations (Halloran, 1970). In other words, journalists are like those who work within any organization or institution in that they are gradually socialized into the ways and ethos of that environment and come to recognize the appropriate ways of responding to the subtle pressures which are always there but rarely become overtly apparent. In a news room these ‘ways of responding’ range from the individual reporter’s intuitive ‘hunch’ through perceptions about what constitutes a ‘good story’ and ‘giving the public what it wants’ to more structured ideological biases, which predispose the media to focus on certain events and turn them into ‘news’ (Cohen, 1972/2002; see also Chapter 2). But hegemonists maintain that alternative definitions of any given situation may not get aired simply because there is no longer the spread of sources that there once was. The ownership and control of the mass media is concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer individuals, and there is a reliance among editors on a relatively limited pool of expert and readily available sources. These official sources and accredited ‘experts’, together with the journalists themselves, thus become the ‘primary definers’ of much news and information; a kind of deviance-defining élite
(Ericson et al., 1987). Consequently, according to proponents of the ‘dominant ideology’ approach, there is an increasing risk that culturally dominant groups impose patterns of belief and behaviour which conflict with those of ethnic, cultural and religious minorities. Feminists have argued that gender inequalities in society are also reproduced ideologically by a patriarchal media industry; an issue that will be examined further in Chapter 5.

The legacy of the Marxist dominant ideology approach

As we have seen, the dominant ideology approach has successfully highlighted the extent to which those in power manipulate the media agenda to harness support for policies that criminalize those with least power in society. But Marxist inspired criminologies have also been useful in raising awareness of the crimes of the powerful themselves; in other words, the offences committed by corporations, business people, governments and states. Critical criminologists whose intellectual roots lie in Marxism, such as Steven Box, have noted that the media rarely covers ‘white collar’ or ‘corporate’ crime unless it has a ‘big bang’ element and contains several features considered conventionally newsworthy (see Chapter 2). This reluctance to portray corporate wrongs contrasts with the manufacturing of ‘street’ crime waves and reflects a pervasive bias in the labelling of criminals. Although this inclination extends beyond the media and arguably constitutes a ‘collective ignorance’ towards corporate crime on the part of all social institutions (Box, 1983: 31), there is little doubt that the media are among the most guilty in perpetuating very narrow definitions of crime. In fact, the media might be said to be doubly culpable: first for portraying affluence as the ultimate (anomic) goal and glamorizing images of offending and, second, for pandering to public tastes for drama and immediacy over complexity. As Box says, ‘the public understands more easily what it means for an old lady to have £5 snatched from her purse than to grasp the financial significance of corporate crime’ (1983: 31).

As Chapter 2 will demonstrate, crime is portrayed by the media as a matter of individual pathology which mitigates against the investigation and reporting of wrongdoings in a large organization. On the whole, corporate crimes are not the stuff of catchy headlines and tend to be reported, if at all, in such a way as to reinforce impressions of their exceptional nature and distinction from ‘ordinary crime’ (Slapper and Tombs, 1999; Croall, 2001; Hughes and Langan, 2001). The underdeveloped vocabulary of corporate crime compounds the difficulty of regarding it as an offence. Words such as ‘accident’ and ‘disaster’ appear in contexts where ‘crime’ and ‘negligence’ might be more accurate. Where they succeed in making the news agenda, corporate crimes are frequently treated not as offences, but as ‘scandals’ or ‘abuses of power’, terminology which implies ‘sexy
upper-world intrigue’ (Punch, 1996). Alternatively, they may be presented as ‘acts of God’, thus reinforcing the notion that modern life is beset by risks and that actions that result in casualties and/or fatalities are random or preordained, depending on your religious convictions. The choice of this kind of language not only serves the purposes of a commercial media steeped in circulation and ratings wars, but it also suits corporations themselves who are able to secure powerful political allies and carefully control and manage information about damning incidents [Herman and Chomsky, 1992]. So, while a few journalists uphold the investigative tradition and are prepared to act as whistleblowers when they uncover corporate offences, the vast majority of media institutions – according to radical crime and media theorists – either ignore the crimes of the powerful or misrepresent them. As a consequence, news reporting remains coupled to state definitions of crime and criminal law.

**Pluralism, competition and ideological struggle**

The theoretical models outlined so far share a belief in the omnipresence of the media and hold assumptions about a passive and stratified audience, with those at the bottom of the socio-economic strata being the most vulnerable to media influences, whether they be ‘effects’ caused by media content or, conversely, discrimination at the hands of a powerful élite that uses the mass media as its mouthpiece. By contrast, the ‘competitive’ or ‘pluralist’ paradigm that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s tends to be a more positive reading of the mass media as an embodiment of intellectual freedom and diversity offered to a knowledgeable and sceptical audience. Given this favourable characterization of the media industry, it is unsurprising that, while the ‘dominant ideology’ perspective has been influential within the academy, pluralism has been championed by practitioners and policy-makers [Greer, 2003a].

Pluralists argue that the processes of deregulation and privatization which have gone on over the last two decades in the media industries (especially, although by no means exclusively, in North America and Western Europe) have succeeded in removing the media from state regulation and censorship, and encouraging open competition between media institutions. Advocates of these processes have heralded a new age of freedom in which the greatly increased number of new television and radio channels, magazine titles and computer-based services have offered a previously unimaginable extension of public choice in a media market of plurality and openness. The result of this has been that, in addition to the primary definers already mentioned – politicians, police chiefs and so on – there also exists the possibility of ‘counter definers’; people with views and ideas which conflict with those of official commentators, and
which are given voice by the media. Consequently it is suggested, while we can still identify a dominant economic class in an abstract, materialistic sense, it rarely acts as a coherent political force and is consistently challenged by individuals and organizations which campaign for policy changes in areas such as criminal justice. Furthermore, traditional ideological inequalities formed along lines of class, gender and race no longer inhabit the static positions suggested by those who favour the dominant ideology approach outlined previously. Thanks to mass education, social mobility and the rise of the ‘celebrity culture’, the contemporary ‘ruling class’ is more culturally diverse than at any time previously, and the modern media has been at the forefront of the erosion of traditional élitist values (McNair, 1998).

The expansion and proliferation of media channels has certainly made more accessible the views and ideas of a greater diversity of people. However, the pluralist perspective could be said to be limited by its sheer idealism. Although the media may be regarded as a potential site of ideological struggle, proponents of the competitive, pluralist paradigm believe that all minority interests can be served by the plurality of channels of communication available. While theoretically true, this is a somewhat unrealistic vision because it does not take account of the many vested interests in media ownership and control or of the fact that, for all the proliferation of new channels, media industries are still predominantly owned and controlled by a small handful of white, wealthy, middle-class men (or corporations started by such men). Nor does this perspective pay much attention to the increasingly profit-oriented nature of much media output which denies a form of public participation to those who cannot afford to pay for it. It might also be argued that competition and deregulation pose a serious threat to informed, analytical programming. An accusation frequently directed at media organizations in the increasingly commercial marketplace is that the competition for audience share leads to ‘soundbite’ journalism, in which there is little room for background, explanation or context. Consequently, it is argued, while there may be greater public engagement with shocking or visually dramatic events, there is little evidence of extensive public participation in the issues of policy, politics and reform that underlie such stories, or of a media willing to communicate such a context to the public (Barak, 1994b; Manning, 2001). Public participation in mediated discourse may appear to be more inclusive: after all, more people can air their views on the serious issues of the day via talk radio, television audience shows and newspaper polls, while telephone and computer resources have broadened traditional channels of communication to the extent where even television news broadcasts now encourage viewers to phone, text or e-mail their thoughts and opinions into the studio to be transmitted almost instantaneously on air. But the 20- or 30-second viewer contribution has arguably been introduced at the expense of complex analysis or detailed critique, and media pluralism – that is, many channels – does not necessarily result in message
pluralism – diversity of content (Barak, 1994b; Manning, 2001). Critics argue that the media continue to provide homogenized versions of reality that avoid controversy and preserve the status quo. Consequently, ignorance among audiences is perpetuated, and the labelling, **stereotyping** and criminalization of certain groups (often along lines of class, race and gender) persists.

Political economists have also highlighted the potential disadvantages of a market-based system for the facilitation of democratic participation, arguing that the increasingly commercialized character of media institutions results in tried and tested formulae, with an entertainment bias, aimed at a ‘lowest common denominator’ audience who are easily identifiable and potentially lucrative targets for advertisers. The tendency to ‘play it safe’ by offering the shocking, the sensational and the ‘real’ is becoming increasingly evident in the British television schedules where mainstream programming is dominated by seemingly endless and increasingly stale imitations of once innovative ideas. Even 24-hour rolling news services on cable and satellite, such as CNN, are restricted by the news values to which they have to conform (see Chapter 2) and by the pressures of having to succeed in a commercial environment. As Blumler observes of American broadcast news media, while they may have a tradition of professional political journalism, it can nonetheless be the case that ‘heightened competition tempts national network news … to avoid complexity and hit only those highlights that will gain and keep viewers’ attention’ (Blumler, 1991: 207). These ‘highlights’ will rarely involve in-depth political commentary or sustained analysis. Instead, viewers are fed a diet of ‘infotainment’ which may have a strong ‘human interest’ angle or a particularly dramatic or violent component. This trend – often described by its critics as the ‘dumbing down’ of news and current affairs media – privileges audience ratings over analysis and debate and results in ‘a flawed process of public accountability, with few forums in which issues can be regularly explored from multiple perspectives’ (1991: 207). Crime is a subject that is especially limited and constrained by a media agenda on an endless quest for populist, profitable programming. One of the few strands of ‘documentary’ film making that has survived the wave of deregulation celebrated by pluralists is the ‘true crime’ genre where a serious criminal case is re-examined via a predictable formula, starting with a dramatized reconstruction of the crime itself and then a smug-with-hindsight examination of the sometimes bungled, frequently tortuous police investigation, before the dramatic denouement when the culprit is captured and convicted. These programmes – which are commonly concerned with highly unusual yet high-profile cases involving rapists and serial killers – pander to the thrill-seeking, **voyeuristic** element of the audience, while at the same time quenching their thirst for retribution.

Although computer-based technologies such as the Internet might seem to support the pluralist belief in a media that facilitates dialogue and the free exchange of ideas and ideologies, they are only available to those who can afford
the necessary hardware, software and subscription fees. For critics of deregulation and privatization, information becomes a commodity for sale to those who are able to purchase it, rather than a public service available to all, and infotainment is all that is on offer to the masses. Furthermore, the Internet arguably encourages the public to retreat from arenas of national debate and reject the messages of the traditional political parties, preferring instead to inhabit specialist communities rooted in identity, lifestyle, subculture or single-issue politics. While this might be seen as a positive outcome of pluralism, new social movements and identity politics may be more vulnerable to media sensationalism and stigmatization (Manning, 2001). Pluralism, then, might best be viewed as an expression of how things could be, rather than how things are. On the other hand, pluralism reminds us that a degree of openness is achievable; albeit that it is an openness that must be squared with a recognition of dominant groups enjoying structural advantages and that there are ongoing conflictual processes both inside social institutions and within the media themselves (Schlesinger et al., 1991; Manning, 2001).

**Realism and reception analysis**

Throughout the 1980s established theories were being challenged by new approaches which turned on their heads some previously held assumptions and altered the focus of scholars in both criminology and media studies. In criminology a new perspective called ‘left realism’ emerged as both a product of, and reaction to, what it saw as the idealistic stance of the left represented in works like *Policing the Crisis* (Hall et al., 1978). Accusing writers on the left of adopting reductionist arguments about crime, and romanticizing working-class offenders, left realists claimed that the political arena had been left open to conservative campaigns on law and order which chose to overlook the fact that most crime is not inter-class (that is, perpetrated by working-class people on middle-class victims), but is *intra*-class (that is, largely perpetrated on members of one’s own class and community). Writers such as Lea and Young (1984) urged criminologists to ‘get real’ about crime, to focus on the seriousness of its effects – especially for women and ethnic minorities – and to elevate the experiences of victims of crime in their analyses (see section on ‘The mass media and fear of crime’, Chapter 6). After all, if there was no rational core to the proposition that crime is a serious problem, the media would have no power of leverage to the public consciousness, and the numerous attempts to theorize the relationship between media and crime, as discussed in this chapter, would simply never have materialized (Young, 1992).

Meanwhile in media and cultural studies a form of audience research called ‘reception analysis’ dominated the agenda throughout the early 1980s and early
1990s. Researchers reconceptualized media influence, seeing it no longer as a force beyond an individual’s control, but as a resource that is consciously used by people (Morley, 1992). In the modern communications environment where there is a proliferation of media, and the omniscience of any single medium or channel has diminished, most audience members will select images and meanings that relate to their wider experiences of work, family and social relationships. Furthermore, in an age of democratic, interactive, technology-driven communications, it is argued that media and popular culture are made from ‘within’ and ‘below’, not imposed from without and above as has been traditionally conceptualized (Fiske, 1989). By the mid-1990s, researchers had dismissed concerns about what the media do to people, and turned the question around, asking instead, ‘what do people do with the media?’

**Postmodernism and cultural criminology**

There is a clear trajectory that links the theories discussed so far, even if development has come from antagonism as well as agreement between different schools of thought. **Postmodernism** is the latest paradigm shift in social science and can be seen as a response to significant new patterns in global cultural, political and economic life, which are replacing the structural characteristics associated with ‘modern’ society; class structure, capitalism, industrialism, militarism, the nation state and so on. Postmodernism is thus frequently presented as a decisive break with what went before. Large-scale theories such as Marxism are rejected for their all-embracing claims to knowledge and ‘truth’, and their failure to address the ways in which control of language systems privileges some viewpoints over others. For example, the ‘dominant’ language of the courts can lead defendants to experience the system as alienating and oppressive (Walklate, 2001; Bowling and Phillips, 2002).

However, traces of earlier theories can be found in postmodern accounts. Like reception analysts, postmodernist writers view audiences as active and creative meaning-makers. In common with realists, they share a concern with fear of crime and victimization, and make problematic concepts such as ‘crime’ and ‘deviance’ just as labelling theorists did in an earlier period. Furthermore, like advocates of the pluralist approach, postmodernists suggest that the media market has been deregulated, leading to an explosion of programmes, titles and formats to choose from. All tastes and interests are now catered for, and it is the consumer who ultimately has the power to choose what he or she watches, listens to, reads and engages with, but equally what he or she ignores or rejects. In this glossy, interactive media market place, anything goes – so long as it doesn’t strain an attention span of three minutes, and is packaged as ‘entertainment’.
Postmodernism, then, is concerned with the excesses of information and entertainment now available, and it emphasises the style and packaging of media output in addition to the actual substance of its content. This is the ‘society of the spectacle’ (Debord, 1967/1997) a hyperreality in which media domination suffuses to such an extent that the distinction between image and reality no longer exists (Baudrillard, 1981; 1983). Mass media and the collapse of meaning have produced a culture centred on immediate consumption and sensationalized impact but with little depth of analysis or contextualization (Osborne, 2002). It is the fragmentary, ephemeral and ambiguous that are observed, and pleasure, spectacle, pastiche, parody and irony are the staples of postmodern media output. It is the media’s responsibility to entertain, and audience gratification is the only impact worth striving for.

This abandonment of a distinction between information and entertainment raises two problems, however. The first is the threat to meaningful debate that postmodernism seems to imply. A media marketplace based on a pluralist model of ideological struggle may suffice as a forum for debate, but it relies on the public’s ability to discriminate between what is true and what is not; between fact and interpretation. In an early critique of postmodernism, Dick Hebdige warns that:

The idea of a verifiable information order, however precarious and shifting, however subject to negotiation and contestation by competing ideologies, does not survive the transition to this version of new times … today aliens from Mars kidnap joggers, yesterday Auschwitz didn’t happen, tomorrow who cares what happens? Here the so-called ‘depthlessness’ of the postmodern era extends beyond … the tendency of the media to feed more and more greedily off each other, to affect the function and status of information itself. (1989: 51)

The second difficulty with postmodernism lies in how we define ‘entertainment’. As Hall et al. (1978) suggest, violence – including violent crime – is often regarded as intrinsically entertaining to an audience who, it is argued, have become more emotionally detached and desensitized to the vast array of visual images bombarding them from every corner of the world. Many see this as an escalating problem. Jerry Mander sums it up thus:

Press conferences got coverage once. Rallies brought more attention than press conferences. Marches more than rallies. Sit-ins more than marches. Violence more than sit-ins. A theory evolved: accelerate the drama of each successive action to maintain the same level of coverage. (1980: 32)

It is usually organizations that fall outside mainstream consensus politics which best understand this theory of acceleration. Groups with a radical political agenda are well practised in the art of manipulating the media and will frequently ‘create’
a story through the use of controversial, but stage-managed, techniques, knowing
that it will make ‘good copy’. Greenpeace, the Animal Liberation Front and anti-
globalization, anti-capitalist movements are examples of pressure groups which
have been extremely successful in garnering media attention and ensuring attention-
grabbing headlines. Even the police have adopted the techniques of heightened
drama and suspense to produce spectacular, even voyeuristic television, with
stage-managed press conferences involving ‘victims’ of serious crimes whom they
suspect of foul play, and dramatic raids on the homes of suspected burglars and
drug dealers in which police officers are accompanied by television cameras.

But it is arguably terrorists who have taken the lesson of sensationalized
impact to heart to the greatest and most devastating effect:

The spectacularly violent acts of terrorists can be viewed as performances
for the benefit of a journalistic culture addicted to high drama … the ter-
rorist act is the ultimate ‘pseudo-event’ – a politically and militarily mean-
ingless act unless it receives recognition and coverage in the news media.
(McNair, 1998: 142)

However, the desire to ‘play up to the cameras’ may be no less true of state
aggressors as it is terrorists and dissidents. For example, military campaigns may
also be planned as media episodes, as was witnessed in the 2003 Allied War on
Iraq when journalists were ‘embedded’ with military personnel and were
allowed unprecedented access to troops and operations. Similarly:

When President Reagan bombed Libya [in 1986], he didn’t do it at the most
effective time of day, from a military point of view. The timing of the raid was
principally determined by the timing of the American television news; it was
planned in such a way as to maximize its television impact. It was timed
to enable Reagan to announce on the main evening news that it had ‘just
happened’ – it was planned as a television event. (Morley, 1992: 63–4)

But the most compelling example to date of a postmodern media ‘performance’
occurred on 11 September 2001. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
took place when millions of Americans would be tuned into the breakfast news
programmes on television. The timing of the actions ensured that viewers across the
world who missed the terrifying aftermath of the first attack on the north tower
would tune in to see ‘live’ pictures of the second hijacked aircraft being flown into
the south tower 16 minutes later. The television pictures from that day – transmitted
immediately around the globe – have arguably become the most visually arresting
and memorable news images ever seen, evoking countless cinematic representations
from The Towering Inferno to Independence Day. The ‘event that shook the world’ had
such an overwhelming impact because of the immediacy and dramatic potency of
its image on screen; it was truly a postmodern spectacle.
Terrorist attacks on ‘innocent’ civilians chime with the postmodern idea that we are all potential victims. Postmodern analyses reject traditional criminological concerns with the causes and consequences of crime, pointing instead to the fragmentation of societies, the fear that paralyses many communities, the random violence that seems to erupt at all levels of society, and the apparent inability of governments to do anything about these problems. This concern with a lurking, unpredictable danger is fortified by an omnipresent media. Postmodernist critic Richard Osborne suggests that the ubiquity of mediated crime reinforces our sense of being victims: ‘media discourses about crime now constitute all viewers as equally subject to the fragmented and random danger of criminality, and in so doing provide the preconditions for endless narratives of criminality that rehearse this everpresent danger’ (Osborne, 1995: 27). Perversely, then, the media’s inclination to make all audience members equal in their potential ‘victimness’ lies at the core of the postmodern fascination with crime. For Osborne, there is ‘something obsessive in the media’s, and the viewer’s, love of such narratives, an hysterical replaying of the possibility of being a victim and staving it off’ (1995: 29).

Another aspect of the hysteria that surrounds criminal cases, fusing the fear of becoming a victim with the postmodern imperative for entertaining the audience, is the media’s inability, or unwillingness, to separate the ordinary from the extraordinary. The audience is bombarded in both factual media and in fictional representations, by crimes that are very rare, such as serial killings and abductions of children by strangers. The presentation of the atypical as typical serves to exacerbate public anxiety and deflect attention from much more commonplace offences such as street crime, corporate crime and abuse of children within the family. Reporting of the ‘ever-present danger’ of the predatory paedophile or young thug who preys on pensioners and is prepared to kill for a handful of change are the stock in trade of a media industry which understands that shock, outrage and fear sell newspapers. In recent years, interest has turned to the collective outpouring of grief that has been witnessed in relation to certain violent and/or criminal acts, which has resulted in them occupying a particular symbolic place in the popular imagination. It has been suggested that the ‘coming together’ of individuals to express collective anguish and to gaze upon the scene of crimes in a gesture of empathy and solidarity with those who have been victimized, is a sign of the desire for community; a hearkening back to pre-mass society collectivity or to use the parlance of New Labour – an assertion of ‘people power’ (Blackman and Walkerdine, 2001: 2). But equally it might be regarded as a voyeuristic desire to be part of the hyperreal, to take part in a globally mediated event and say ‘I was there’.

The populist, entertainment imperative of the postmodernist approach is central to the developing perspective known as *cultural criminology* (Ferrell and Sanders, 1995; Fenwick and Hayward, 2000; Presdee, 2000). This approach seeks to understand both the public’s fascination with violence and crime via the mass media, and also the enactment of violence and crime as pleasure or spectacle. Its
debt to earlier work by Stuart Hall, Stanley Cohen, Phil Cohen, Jock Young and
others is evident in its proposition that all crime is grounded in culture and that
cultural practices are embedded in dominant processes of power. It therefore
supports the early Marxist-influenced, critical criminological view that criminal
acts are acts of resistance to authority. But unlike earlier accounts that conceptu-
alized resistance as something that was internalized and expressed through per-
sonal and subcultural style [Hall and Jefferson, 1975; Hebdige, 1979], cultural
criminologists emphasize the externalization of excitement and ecstasy involved
in resistance. Many criminal activities involve risk-taking and danger, but may in
fact represent an attempt to break free of one’s demeaning and restraining cir-
cumstances, to exercise control and take responsibility for one’s own destiny. In
a world in which individuals find themselves over-controlled and yet without
control, crime offers the possibility of excitement and control (Fenwick and
Hayward, 2000; cf. Morrison, 1995). The rising number of gun crimes and gang-
land style killings in the UK might be conceived in these terms; as an act of self-
expression which, somewhat ironically, makes the individuals involved feel alive.

In cultural criminology crime becomes a participatory performance, a ‘carni-
val’, and the streets become theatre [Presdee, 2000]. Some commentators have
found this a refreshing antidote to Marxist-inspired studies such as Policing the
Crisis, in so far as cultural criminology avoids the ‘condescension of criminal-as-
victim (of disadvantageous circumstances)’ [Jefferson, 2002]. One of the most
compelling examples from Britain of the carnival of crime is that of joyriding.
Describing the large-scale ritualized joyriding that occurred on the Blackbird
Leys estate in Oxford in the early 1990s, Mike Presdee comments:

[T]heir joyriding became a celebration of a particular form of car culture that
was carnivalesque in nature, performance centred and criminal. The sport of
joyriding went something like this: a team of local youths would spot a hot
hatch (the car of choice) and steal it (or arrange with others to have it stolen).
It would be delivered to another team who would do it up, delivering it finally
to the drivers. In the evenings, the cars were raced around the estate, not
aimlessly but in a way designed to show off skill. Furthermore, two compet-
ing groups (teams) attempted to outdo the other. These displays were
watched by certain residents of the estate who, the story goes, were charged
a pound for the pleasure, sitting in picnic chairs at the sides of the road.
Often after these races the cars were burned on deserted land. (2000: 49)

Riots, protests and other outbreaks of disorder can also be viewed in this way.
It is not the case that all carnivalesque performances involve crime, but it can
be said with some certainty that participation in them can lead to criminalization.
Raves and dance culture, the weekly rollerblade rally through the streets of
Paris, and the annual protests against global capitalism in London and other
major cities around the world, are all examples of carnival performances that
the authorities continue to try and prohibit via the law. It is therefore not just the cultural significance of crime, but the criminalization of certain cultural practices that postmodern cultural criminologists are interested in.

Cultural criminology is still in its relative infancy and its long-term influence remains to be seen. However, it is already having a significant impact on the ways in which connections between crime, media and culture are made. For example, the subject of policing remains central to criminological inquiry, but the theoretical and empirical frameworks within which policing is understood have been broadened to encompass the complex, reciprocal dynamics of power between criminal justice and mediated texts. As Ferrell observes, policing has increasingly come to be understood not simply in its political or social context, but as a set of semiotic practices entangled with ‘reality’ television programmes, everyday public surveillance, and the symbolism and aesthetics of police subcultures themselves (in McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001: 76; see also Leishman and Mason, 2003, and Chapter 6 of this volume).

Criminologists are thus encouraged to look beyond the traditional boundaries of their field and broaden their intellectual horizons to include the worlds of art, media, culture and style (South, 1997). Cultural criminology celebrates postmodern notions of difference, discontinuity and diversity, and breaks down restrictive stereotypes. What were formerly regarded as unconventional interest groups have been embraced amid a renewed verve for ethnographic enquiry (see, for example, Ferrell and Sanders, 1995; Ferrell and Webdale, 1999; Ferrell and Hamm, 1998). At the same time, the postmodern project of diversity and alternative voices has enfranchised a ‘new body of intellectuals … [who] are increasingly speaking from positions of difference’ (Whiteacre, undated: 21). In part, the emergence of a postmodernist paradigm within criminology can be characterized as a challenge to the lingering influence of positivism which, it is suggested, has led to a vacuum in so-called ‘expert’ knowledge surrounding the pursuit of pleasure. The overriding concern with reason and scientific rationality means that traditional criminology has been unable to account for ‘feelings’ such as excitement, pleasure and desire. For example, some critics have called for the establishment of a ‘gay criminology’ on the grounds that criminology has historically ignored gay people, other than constructing a positivistic discourse that unites homosexuality with a genetic predisposition to deviance (Groombridge, 1999; Taylor, undated). Meanwhile, in a study that has echoes of Jock Young’s earlier (1971) work on marijuana users, Kevin Whiteacre argues that the idea that people use drugs unproblematically and without regrets is anathema to a science embedded in cultural expectations about proper fulfilment of desire (Ian Taylor also attempted to open up the debate on the omnipresence and normalization of recreational drugs; see Taylor, 1999: 81–6).
Postmodernist theory suggests that aspects of identity such as sexuality and lifestyle choices have superseded traditional identifications based on gender, class and ethnicity, rendering the latter irrelevant and redundant. The growth and expansion of computer mediated communications such as the Internet have provided a playground for experimenting with aspects of identity and thus also open up new areas of interest for criminologists. As I describe elsewhere, cyber-space facilitates infinitely new possibilities to the deviant imagination:

With the right equipment and sufficient technical know-how you can – if you are so inclined – buy a bride, cruise gay bars, go on a global shopping spree with someone else’s credit card, break into a bank’s security system, plan a demonstration in another country and hack into the Pentagon – all on the same day … Anonymity, disembodiment, outreach and speed are the hallmarks of Internet communication and combined, they can make us feel daring, liberated, infallible. (Jewkes, 2003a: 2)

These activities convey the sense of excitement and desire that are at the heart of many cybercrimes, but also hint at the possibility that such pleasures can be transmuted into something darker and more distorted. Postmodern media merge ‘fun’ and ‘hate’, ‘cruelty’ and ‘playfulness’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘exploitative’, ‘accessible’ and ‘extremist’ (Presdee, 2000; Jewkes, 2003a). The Internet celebrates a world of entertainment, spectacle, narcissism and performance, and – when it comes to privatized pleasure – is surely the cardinal site of the carnival of crime.

Summary

While of necessity a distillation of the historical development of two fields of inquiry (in addition to noting the importance of the broader terrain of sociology), this chapter has traced the origins and development of the major theories that have shaped the contours of both criminology and media studies, and attempted to provide a broad overview of points of convergence and conflict between the two. In so doing, it has established that there is no body of relatively consistent, agreed upon and formalized assertions that can readily be termed ‘media theory’ or ‘criminological theory’. Although such phrases are widely used, neither field has been unified by the development of a standard set of concepts, an inter-related body of hypotheses or an overall explanatory framework. However, it has proposed that a sense of progressive development is nevertheless evident in ideas concerning media and crime. Despite their obvious aetiological and methodological differences, the theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter have clear points of convergence which have enabled us to locate them in the
wider context of social, cultural, political and economic developments that were concomitantly taking place. In summary, the theoretical ‘pegs’ upon which our analysis has been hung are as follows:

• **Media effects:** Early theories connecting media and crime were characterized by an overwhelmingly negative view of both the role of the media and the susceptibility of the audience. In an age of uncertainty and instability, when it was believed that social action was heavily determined by external forces rather than being a matter of personal choice, the emerging mass media became the focus of many theories about the harmful effects of powerful stimuli. Like Martians with their ray guns, the new media of mass communications were perceived through early 20th century eyes as alien invaders injecting their messages directly into the minds of a captive audience. Although academic researchers in the UK have strongly resisted attempts to assert the existence of a causal link between media and crime, rendering the debate all but redundant in media scholarship, notions of a potentially harmful media capable of eliciting negative or anti-social consequences remain at the heart of popular or mainstream discourses, including those that have been incorporated into policy.

• **Strain theory and anomie:** Merton’s development of anomie helps us to understand the strain caused by a disjuncture between the cultural goals of wealth and status, and legitimate means of achieving those goals. For those with few means of attaining success through normal, legal channels, the mass media – especially the advertising industry – might be said to place incalculable pressure, creating a huge ungratified well of desire with little opportunity of fulfilment. It is in such circumstances that some individuals pursue the culturally desirable objectives of success and material wealth via illegitimate paths. Merton’s work follows Durkheim’s theories concerning the characteristics of society and how individuals struggle to achieve social solidarity despite the atomization they face. Recent commentators on anomie have suggested that disaffected individuals overcome feelings of isolation and normlessness by forming communities based on shared tastes and opinions, and that the Internet has, for some, countered the sense of dislocation that gaps in wealth and status inevitably produce.

• **Dominant ideology:** With the rediscovery of Marx’s writings on social structure, scholars in the 1960s and 1970s focused their attentions on the extent to which consent is ‘manufactured’ by the powerful along ideological lines. According to the dominant ideology approach, the power to criminalize and decriminalize certain groups and behaviours lies with the ruling élite who – in a process known as ‘hegemony’ – win popular approval for their actions via social institutions, including the media. In short, powerful groups achieve public consensus on definitions of crime and deviance, and gain mass support for increasingly draconian measures of control and containment, not by force or coercion, but by using the media to subtly construct a web of meaning from a number of ideological threads which are then articulated into a coherent popular discourse (Stevenson, 1995). Crime and deviance could potentially pose a
dilemma for the authorities and threaten to destroy their careful construction of consensus. But hegemony ensures that anything that threatens the status quo (as crime, deviance and disorder do) will be regarded as a temporary interlude in a world otherwise at one with itself.

- **Pluralism**: This perspective emerged as a challenge to hegemonic models of media power. Pluralism emphasizes the diversity and plurality of media channels available, thus countering the notion that any ideology can be dominant for any length of time if it does not reflect what people experience to be true. Although there is undoubtedly a firm alliance between most politicians and sections of the journalistic media (indeed the Labour government of Tony Blair has taken media manipulation to a degree where political ‘spin’ is itself often the subject of news reports) the public like defiance, and counter-ideologies will always emerge (Manning, 2001). Pluralists argue that the media’s tendency to ignore, ridicule or demonize those whose politics and lifestyle lie beyond the consensual norm is changing, precisely because public sentiments have changed. There is growing antipathy to the apparatus of political communication and people’s responses to crime will always be much more complex and diverse than any headline or soundbite might suggest (Sparks, 2001). In addition, it might be argued that the quantity and rapidity of contemporary news-making undermines the notion of élite power and ensures that governments are accountable and responsive to their electorate (McNair, 1993; 1998).

- **Postmodernism and cultural criminology**: Postmodernism is a notoriously difficult subject to grasp. As far as we can state that there are ‘defining characteristics’ of postmodernism, they include: the end of any belief in an overarching scientific rationality; the abandonment of empiricist theories of truth; and an emphasis on the fragmentation of experience and the diversification of viewpoints. The postmodernist rejection of claims to truth proposed by the ‘grand theories’ of the past, challenges us to accept that we live in a world of contradictions and inconsistencies which are not amenable to objective modes of thought. Within criminology, postmodernism implies an abandonment of the concept of crime and the construction of a new language and mode of thought to define processes of criminalization and censure. It is often suggested that, for postmodernists, there are no valid questions worth asking, and Henry and Milovanovic (1996) insist that crime will only stop being a problem once the justice system, media and criminologists stop focussing attention on it.

  Media and culture are central to a postmodern analysis; style is substance and meaning resides in representation. Consequently, crime and crime control can only be understood as an ongoing spiral of inter-textual, image-driven, media loops (Ferrell, 2001). Cultural criminology embraces these postmodern ideas and underpins them with some more ‘radical’ yet established concerns, borrowing especially from the work of British scholars in the 1970s on subcultures and mediated forms of social control. And, in a decisive break with traditional, ‘positivist’ criminologies which have been unconcerned with ‘feeling’ and ‘pleasure’, cultural criminology also draws attention to the fact that crime can have a carnivalesque quality; it is exhilarating, performative and dangerous.
STUDY QUESTIONS

1 Choose one of the theories discussed in this chapter and discuss the contribution it has made to our understanding of the relationship between media and crime.

2 As the War of the Worlds radio broadcast demonstrates, concerns about media effects frequently reflect or crystallise deeper anxieties in periods of social upheaval. What examples of contemporary concerns about the effects of the media can you think of, and in what ways might they be attributed to wider anxieties about social change?

3 Conduct a content analysis of a week’s news. What evidence can you find for the proposition that news is ideology and that the mass media are effectively assimilated into the goals of government policy on crime, law and order?

4 In a challenge to Marxist-inspired critiques, some cultural theorists (for example, Fiske, 1989) argue that all popular culture is the ‘people’s culture’ and emerges from ‘below’ rather than being imposed from ‘above’. It is thus seen to be independent of, and resistant to, the dominant hegemonic norms. What implications does this have for those who hold deviant or oppositional viewpoints? Can ‘popular’ culture really be described as non-hierarchical when it celebrates power and violence for men, and sexual availability and victimization among women and children?

5 At the heart of postmodern analyses lies the thorny question of why crime is threatening and frightening, yet at the same time popular and ‘entertaining’. How would you attempt to answer this question?

FURTHER READING