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**Stopping Terrorism -
The Problems Posed by the Organizational
Infrastructure of Terrorist Organizations**

by

Wayman C. Mullins

ABSTRACT

Law enforcement agencies have had little success in combating terrorism. This paper explores the premise that the reason law enforcement agencies are ineffectual in dealing with terrorists is because of the unique organizational structure of terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations do not employ a bureaucratic style of organization. Rather they use a circular, or closed, organizational structure which is unfamiliar to law enforcement agencies. Specific aspects of this circular organizational structure which hinder law enforcement efforts are discussed.

A major emphasis is given by all law enforcement agencies to intelligence gathering activities. In fact, it might be argued that over 90% of a law enforcement agency's crime fighting efforts are devoted to intelligence gathering. For organized criminal activities, the amount of effort given to intelligence gathering may approach 100%. By organized criminal activities, it is meant that two or more persons who, with continuity of purpose engage in (1) supplying illegal goods and services, and/or (2) engage in predatory crime (State of California; in Task Force on Organized Crime, 1976; 214). Burglary rings, loansharking operations, fencing operations, gangs, drug cartels, subversive groups, racketeering organizations, and terrorist organizations are all examples of organized crime operations.

For the majority of organized crime operations, intelligence gathering efforts have been quite successful. The use of tax records, business records, electronic surveillance, inter-agency file-sharing, informants, and undercover operations have all been used by law enforcement agencies to arrest, indict, and convict persons engaged in organized crime activities (see for example, Stewert, 1980). One form of organized crime activity has, however, proved to be virtually unaffected by repeated intelligence gathering efforts - terrorism.

To many people, terrorism and terrorist organizations are nonexistent in the United States. This is true not only of citizens, but is also true of law enforcement personnel. Recently, the author gave a presentation on the terrorist problem in the United States to a group of over 100 law enforcement personnel. Members of the audience included patrol officers, investigators, supervisors, and chiefs. The vast majority were amazed at the breadth and scope of the terrorist problem in the United States, and at the number of separate terrorist organizations operating in this country. Table 1 gives a listing of several of the larger terrorist organizations active in the United States. In total, there are over 150 terrorist organizations operating in the United States. Many of these organizations are small, having only three to five members, while others claim membership in the thousands (such as the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations). As shown in Table 1, the United States has both right and left-wing terrorist organizations. Right-wing organizations tend to espouse a philosophy of racial and/or religious superiority, while left-wing organizations argue for the overthrow of the government and a replacement government couched in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Most of the terrorist organizations in the United States are comprised of United States citizens. Very few foreign terrorist personnel or terrorist organizations operate in the United States.

Table 1. A partial listing of United States terrorist organizations

Left-wing Organizations

Armed Forces of National Liberation
Communist Party USA
Ejercito Popular Boricua Army
Irish Republican Army¹
May 19 Communist Organization
New Afrikan Freedom Fighters
League
OVRP
Red Guerrilla Resistance
Republic of New Afrika

Revolutionary Youth Movement
United Freedom Front

Notes:

¹Most members of the IRA in the United States are American citizens.

²The Ku Klux Klan consists of several different Klan organizations.

Right-wing Organizations

American First Committee
Arizona Patriots
Aryan Brotherhood
Aryan Nations
Christian Defense League
Christian Patriots Defense

Ku Klux Klan²
Mountain Church of Jesus Christ
Neo-Nazis
American Nazi Party
National Socialist League
National socialist White
People's Party
National State's Rights Party
Security Services Action
Group
The Order
White American Resistance
Yahweh Church

Intelligence gathering activities against these terrorist organizations have for the most part been unsuccessful. Between 1980-1986, 190 terrorist incidents occurred within the United States, accounting for 18 deaths and 82 injuries (Mullins, 1988). There have been isolated law enforcement successes. For example, the FBI claimed to have prevented over 25 terrorist incidents in 1986 (and there is no reason to doubt this claim). The FBI, however, like other law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual members of the terrorist organization from conducting a tactical operation. They do not put the terrorist organization out of business (a crucial distinction). Mostly, law enforcement efforts to halt terrorism have been accidental. For example, in 1972, in Chicago, Illinois, members of The Order of the Rising Sun were arrested en route to poison the Chicago water supply with typhoid bacillus (Clark, 1980). The arrest of these terrorists was accidental and came as the result of a routine traffic stop, not intelligence activities. When intelligence activities result in the arrest of terrorists, it is usually because the terrorists have engaged in some other criminal activity. As an example, in 1984, Robert Mathews, leader of the Order, was killed in a shootout with the FBI on Whidbey Island, Washington. The FBI was investigating Mathews because of his suspected participation in a Brinks Armored truck robbery. In the largest case in history, 14 leaders and members of various white supremacist organizations were indicted in Fort Smith, Arkansas, in 1987 on charges of sedition (Haddigan, 1987). In 1988, in a trial that lasted less than four months, all 14 persons were acquitted. The government's intelligence gathering activities were for naught.

If law enforcement intelligence gathering activities are successful with other types of organized crime syndicates, why do they fail when it comes to the terrorist organization? First, some types of intelligence gathering activities as delineated by Stewart (1980) do not apply to the terrorist organization. For example, terrorist organizations do not pay taxes (many avoid this by claiming to be a religious organization), do not operate illegitimate or illegal businesses, and maintain a low criminal profile. Law enforcement agencies cannot rely on informants, as the members of a terrorist organization tend to be fanatical to the cause of the organization (whether religious or political). The primary avenue open to law enforcement intelligence gathering activities is the undercover operative. The structure of the terrorist organizations makes undercover infiltration virtually impossible. Regardless of the type of intelligence gathering mechanism, the organizational structure of terrorist organizations successfully prevents compromise and successfully thwarts law enforcement intelligence gathering activities.

The Closed Organization

Most organized crime operations are similar in organizational structure to classic bureaucracies. Abadinsky (1987) for example, discussed the bureaucratic structure and format of Italian-American crime families. Salerno and Tompkins (1969), in discussing organizational flow-charts of organized crime syndicates, have stated; "The major difference between the diagram of an organized crime family and the chart of a major corporation is that the head of the enterprise-the boss-does not have a box over him labeled 'stockbroker'. Many of the other boxes are paralleled in the underworld". Part of the reason law enforcement agencies have been able to gather intelligence and infiltrate these organized crime units is that the law enforcement official is familiar with working in and under the constraints of a bureaucracy. The law enforcement official is familiar with the organizational workings of a bureaucracy and can deal with the organization dynamics of the organized crime syndicate. In addition, organized crime bureaucracies, like the bureaucracies in private and public business are very loose-knit organizations, with formal chains-of-command, excessive personnel, diverse missions, and people far removed from the core of the organization. It is very often the persons at the extremes of the organization that provide information to law enforcement personnel, and is at the extremes of the organization that law enforcement has been able to covertly enter the organization as undercover operatives.

The terrorist organization is totally dissimilar to the bureaucratic organization. The terrorist organization has been compared to a solar system (Zawodny, 1983), with the leader as the sun and the members as the planets surrounding him (the use of "him" to refer to the leader is illustrative of the fact that almost all terrorist leaders in the United States are male). Unlike the open-ended bureaucratic organization, the circular terrorist organization is a closed system which makes it almost impossible for law enforcement to conduct intelligence gathering activities. In addition to being a close organizational system, the circular structure of the organization provides certain other benefits for the organization (while providing additional detriments to law enforcement intelligence gathering efforts).

One, it is easy for the terrorist organization to remain anonymous to outsiders. The terrorist organization is its own support network. Other bureaucratic organized crime syndicates rely on outsiders, whether in loansharking, fencing, prostitution, drugs, etc. Terrorist organizations in the United States seldom engage in these types of organized crime activities, and thus, they do not have to deal with nonmember citizens. As such, law enforcement personnel find it difficult to make contacts with the terrorists for the purpose of intelligence gathering.

Two, the leaders of the terrorist organization are active participants in the organization's activities. In other organized crime syndicates the leaders seldom take an active part in activities. There are literally hundreds of instances where the underlings in organized crime syndicates have been caught engaging in illegal activities and sentenced by a court. Very seldom are the top "bosses" caught, much less sentenced since the bureaucratic organizational structure of the syndicate provides buffer layers of other people for the "bosses" protection. On the few occasions when terrorists are arrested, the leaders are typically arrested along with the members. This is the only potential benefit of the circular organization to law enforcement personnel. Should the law enforcement agency intercede in the terrorist's activities, the terrorist leader is sure to be involved. Even though it is difficult to gather intelligence on the terrorist organization, when law enforcement agencies do successfully catch terrorists, the leader is often caught along with the workers. In 1985, the FBI raided and arrested members of the right-wing terrorist organization, the Cross, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord. Arrested and sentenced with the members was the leader of the CSA, Jim Ellison (Mullins, 1988).

Related to the above, the circular organization allows for the power of the leader to be directly reinforced to the members of the organization. As mentioned previously, very seldom does a terrorist turn informant. Part of the reason for this is obviously due to the fanaticism of the terrorist. The terrorist who is an idealist is trying to tear down the old world and rebuild an ideal, perfect world (Steinhoff, 1976). To the idealist, law enforcement personnel exemplify the old, established order and are a mortal enemy (Coleman, 1976). The true idealist is the minority member of the terrorist organization. Many terrorists do not start their careers in terrorism as fanatical idealists. Most are followers. That is, they are individuals looking for a purpose to life, and the terrorist organization has given them that purpose. Followers have a distorted sense of reality, perceive themselves to be inferior, helpless, and an outsider, are insecure, hostile, and believe the world is conspiring against them (see for example, Freedman, 1974; Kaplan, 1981; Freedman, 1983; Wilkinson, 1983; Crenshaw, 1985; & Strentz, 1987). Once they join the terrorist organization, the daily and direct contact with the leader soon turns the followers into fanatics. Most terrorists perceive their leader as a messiah, or god-like figure. The leader tries to foster this perception (Wilson, 1973). The clearest and most well-known example of this is the Manson family. The members of the Manson family truly believed that Charles Manson was operating on a higher level of existence than other mortals. Some members in fact, perceived Manson not as human, but as a supernatural figure. This messianism does not occur in other organized crime syndicates. Very often the lower level workers in these syndicates

have never met the leader, much less come in daily contact. Unlike syndicates, in the circular organizational system, it is almost impossible to convince a member to turn against a leader.

Three, and of critical importance in any explanation of why terrorist organization remain impervious to intelligence gathering efforts, is that the terrorist leader is the member of the organization who recruits new members. No person can join the organization (or even be admitted for consideration) without the leader's direct intervention. Some terrorist organizations even use a polygraph exam on potential members. Robert Mathews of the Order gave all potential members a voice-stress analyzer test to insure that the potential member was not an undercover law enforcement operative and to determine that candidate's sincerity of beliefs. Some members were periodically reanalyzed to ensure that they had not become informants. To date, no other organized crime syndicates have resorted to measures such as these to screen potential members and it is unlikely that they will do so. The organized crime syndicate is not concerned with the political or religious beliefs of its members, but are only concerned with the member's knowledge of criminal conduct.

Four, the leader of the terrorist organization has direct control over the members, and can administer punishment rapidly and directly. In some respects, this is also true for other organized crime syndicates. These syndicates exercise close control over their members and use extreme punishment against those who deviate from the norm. But, members of the terrorist organization have the perception of this punishment that persons in other organized crime syndicates do not have, because of the leader being involved directly. In the terrorist organization, the leader administers punishment, usually within sight of the other members so as to reinforce the lesson. Again, this serves to produce a high degree of paranoia and fear in the membership, so that even if inclined to do so, the members will not turn against the organization.

Five, the terrorist organization does not need support networks. All members share in all tasks and the group as a whole does whatever work needs to be done, whether the work is legitimate or criminal. Other organized crime syndicates must rely on outside persons and businesses for certain tasks and operations. For example, many activities of the "mafia" (i.e., drugs, prostitution, loan sharking, etc.) require nonmembers as consumers. Without the nonmember consumers, the "mafia", drug cartels, fences, etc. cannot do business. This is not the case with the terrorist organization. If the organization needs weapons, the members (as a group) perform the necessary activities to obtain the weapons. In the United States, activities of this nature often involve a criminal activity such as burglarizing a weapons armory. To raise money for terrorist operations, the Order conducted a series of bank and

armored car robberies (Mullins, 1988). It was, by the way, these criminal activities which led to the arrest, indictment, and conviction of several Order members, and not their terrorist activities.

Six, the terrorist organization can operate against targets of opportunity. This is not to imply that terrorist organizations do not plan their operations, but rather that terrorist organizations can rapidly and easily change operational plans to fit the situation. Because all members (including the leaders) take part in operations, the terrorist organization can change operational plans as the situation dictates. Security consultants advise their clients to make themselves secure targets primarily because terrorists will choose a different, easier target to conduct an operation against. In Italy, Aldo Moro was not the initial target of the terrorist kidnapping (Scotti, 1986). The terrorists kidnapped Aldo Moro because the primary target of the terrorists made himself too secure. If law enforcement does manage to obtain intelligence concerning a terrorist tactical operation, the ability of the terrorist organization to change targets on the "spur-of-the-moment" can make the intelligence worthless. Other organized crime syndicates do not have this tactical flexibility, and once they make an operational plan they must then stick with that plan to fruition.

Seven, the terrorist organization is extremely efficient as an organization. There are no paper trails for law enforcement to follow, and no bureaucratic administrative details by which to build an intelligence case. Many organized crime syndicates, including "Mafia" families and drug cartels have been put out of business by law enforcement personnel because of bureaucratic paperwork. The most obvious examples of this have been the numerous syndicates members convicted on income tax evasion charges. In other instances, law enforcement can build a case against the syndicate by building a paper trail (i.e., bank deposit slips, cash withdrawals, etc.). This is not the case with the terrorist organization. No terrorist organization in the United States has been shut down because of a bureaucratic intelligence trail.

Eight, the terrorist organization has a very efficient communications network which does not involve paperwork or telecommunications. Communications in the terrorist organization flow vertically, not horizontally. Orders from the leader, or suggestions made to the leader are done verbally and directly. Other organized crime syndicates rely on typical bureaucratic chain-of-command communications. Very often this involves the use of standard type business communications (phone calls, letters, memos, etc.). When these types of communications are used, law enforcement can again build a paper trail or use electronic surveillance/eavesdropping equipment to build an intelligence case against the syndicate. Law enforcement cannot do this with the terrorist organization.

Nine, terrorist organizations only seek support from other terrorist organizations (Anable, 1978). Right-wing terrorist organizations in the United States have developed elaborate techniques for sharing information, manpower, equipment, and finances. All of this interaction is done within a close society, and even more important, each organization involved has a common purpose. Other organized crime syndicates do rely on each other for support, but by the same token, they also rely on outsiders for support. In many cases, these syndicates will turn informant on another syndicate to enhance their own activities and position. Once an outsider is used, that outsider becomes the weak link in the chain and can be used by law enforcement personnel to compromise the syndicate.

Ten, the terrorist organization is able to relieve internal stress quickly and efficiently. If stress begins to build up among the members of the organization, the leader can take immediate steps (such as conduct a quick operation) to relieve that stress (Zawodny, 1978). As a side benefit, these successful operations serve to increase group cohesiveness (Hacker, 1983). In bureaucratic organized crime syndicates, the leaders cannot do that. In many instances, the leaders are not even aware that there is a problem. Many members of these syndicates have become informants because of dissatisfaction with the organization due to a build-up of this internal stress.

Organizational Structure

In addition to having a unique circular structure, the structural make-up of the terrorist organization is highly specialized. Although individual members of the organization may be required to have many skills and be able to perform highly diverse functions, the organizational units will be highly specialized. The members assigned to an organizational unit can then be expected to concentrate on a specialty function. Members of a bureaucratic organized crime syndicate may be assigned to one unit but may be required to perform, on an ongoing basis, many other functions. A person involved in loansharking, for example, may be required to collect the "numbers", deliver drugs, arrange customers for prostitutes, etc. The terrorist, in contrast, once assigned to a specialized unit, can concentrate on the specific tasks expected of that unit. The terrorist organization employs two types of units; operational units and nonoperational units. Operational units are those organizational units entrusted with tactical responsibilities, while nonoperational units are responsible for performing nontactical functions, but functions necessary to keep the organization operating. It is important to mention at this point that only the larger terrorist organizations have as detailed an organizational structure as will be described.

Operational Units - The cell is the major organizational component of the terrorist organization (Sterling, 1982). The cell is the unit of the terrorist organization which engages in acts of terrorism. Cells are generally limited to between three and ten persons. The small size of the cell works to prevent infiltration by law enforcement personnel (Michel, 1972). Small terrorist organizations may only have one or two cells for the entire organization, and these cells may be multi-purpose. By multi-purpose it is meant that the cell will perform whatever type of operation the organization engages in. As the organization grows, cells become more and more specialized, until cells become operationally specialized. Dalager (1984) and Wolf (1978) have identified these specialized cells. The terrorist organization may have specialized cells which engage only in activities of assassination, communication, escape and evasion, intelligence, passive resistance, propaganda, sabotage, supply and finance, surveillance and security, and terrorist operations (bombing, hijacking, etc.). An assassination cell, for example, would do nothing but conduct tactical operations of assassination. This cell would not even plan their target acquisition or escape and evasion. This would be the task for the intelligence and escape and evasion cells.

Once the terrorist organization begins to specialize and fragment into different cells, each cell becomes autonomous. One cell does not know of the existence of any other cell. Thus, if law enforcement personnel are able to compromise one cell, other organizational units will be compromised. This is not the case with bureaucratic organized crime syndicates. Very often, the lowest members know of and are aware of the entire bureaucratic structure and the names of the personnel who occupy each position of the hierarchy. Thus, if one member of the syndicate informs to law enforcement personnel, that member can easily identify a large group of syndicate members. Or, if law enforcement undercover personnel infiltrate the syndicates, the undercover operative will rapidly learn who's who in the bureaucracy.

Non-operational Units - As terrorist organizations grow in size, it is necessary for them to add non-operational personnel and form non-operational units. By non-operational, it is meant that the organization has personnel assigned to non-tactical or non-critical tasks. These personnel do, however, perform essential services for the organization. Non-operational personnel are not outsiders enlisted to perform these non-operational functions, but are trusted members of the organization. Additionally, these personnel, unlike in the bureaucratic organized crime syndicate, do not know who the other members of the organization are.

One non-operational unit may be the clandestine press unit. This unit is responsible for the preparation of and dissemination of the organization's propaganda releases, press releases (terrorist organizations often employ the press to take responsibility for a tactical operation, spread the organization's

philosophy, and/or deny culpability for some operation), and disseminate general information about the organization. In some terrorist organizations, the clandestine press unit employs sophisticated satellite telecommunications to spread their philosophy. The Aryan Nations produces and airs a radio show to espouse their philosophy (Staff, 1987). Thomas Metzger, former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, produces and hosts a television show for the White Armed Resistance. This television show, beamed over satellite call *Race and Reason*, is for the purpose of spreading the message of racial hatred and racial supremacy. The clandestine press may not even be aware of the organization's tactical operations until after the fact. Terrorist organizations are the only type of organized crime organization which employs a press unit. Other organized crime syndicates prefer to remain low key. Even with the terrorist organization's need to publicize their activities and become high profile, law enforcement agencies still find it almost impossible to build intelligence cases against terrorist organizations.

Terrorist organizations also make use of couriers. Couriers are highly trusted individuals who relay messages and information between cells. Couriers may only know two or three members of the terrorist organization. The use of drop points or cut-outs are commonly employed, so that the courier never comes into actual contact with any members of the terrorist organization. Drop points or cut-outs are locations where messages and communications are traded by members of the terrorist organization. Drop points help the organization to insure that members from the various cells never have to come in contact with one another. These drop points or cut-outs are constantly being changed and moved for the express purpose of thwarting law enforcement efforts to collect information and build a case (or capture a member of the organization) against the terrorist organization.

The terrorist organization may also make use of supporters. Supporters are individuals who voluntarily assist the terrorist organization and primarily provide monetary support to the organization. In many instances, supporters will not even be aware of the true nature and purpose of the terrorist organization, but will be given a false cover story. As an example of how supporters may be enlisted, the author recently received a letter asking for donations to support a congressional lobby concerned with pressuring Congress to demand a search for Vietnam MIA's. As it turned out, any money donated would have gone to a right-wing terrorist organization devoted to the subversion of blacks, Jews, and other minorities, and to overthrowing the United States government and replacing it with a white supremacist government.

The terrorist organization may also make use of umbrella businesses. The primary purpose of these businesses is to provide financial support for the terrorist organization. Many organized crime syndicates make use of

umbrella businesses. The major difference lies in who operates these businesses. In the case of organized crime syndicates, many of the umbrella businesses are operated by nonmembers. For example, the “mafia” often makes loans to nonmember citizens to open legitimate businesses (Anderson, 1979). These businesses are then used by the “mafia” to turn a profit, launder money, provide a meeting place, provide a tax shelter, dispose of stolen merchandise, hire syndicate members who are on parole or probation, etc. The nonmember owner may tire of being under “mafia” control or of the illegal activities and turn informant. Even the supporting businesses the syndicate controls directly will be used in the same manner for illegal activities. Thus, law enforcement personnel can build an intelligence case using the operating records of these businesses. The terrorist organization, on the other hand, uses its members in the supporting business, and avoids direct involvement of the business in the operational aspects of the organization. Primarily, the umbrella business is used legitimately for the purpose of raising funds for the organization. Very seldom will the business be used for illegal purposes. The only exceptions are when the business is used as a drop point or cut-out (only in dire emergencies), to store equipment or supplies (never has one of these businesses been found to contain weapons or other essential material), or meeting places. For the terrorist organization, the umbrella business will most likely be a bookstore or an Army surplus-type store.

On rare occasions, the terrorist organization may employ mercenaries. Although this has not yet occurred in the United States (at least to anyone’s knowledge), it is a possibility. Mercenaries are individuals who are not members of the organization, but are hired by the organization to conduct a specific tactical operation. Mercenaries are typically hired by the courier or some other representative of the organization’s leader and do not know of the organization or the goals of the organization. Mercenaries are nothing more than “hired guns”. Typically, mercenaries are hired only for larger tactical operations or when a specific area of expertise is needed. No other organized crime syndicate employ mercenaries (with the possible exception of Colombian drug cartels).

The Terrorist Organization Hierarchy

As the terrorist organization increases in size, the organization develops a limited hierarchical structure. Even the largest organizations, however, have a much more limited hierarchy than do other organized crime syndicates.

As the terrorist organization grows in size and develops specialized cells, the organization will make use of group leaders. Group leaders are

trusted members of the organization who operate one or more cells. The number of cells a group leader is responsible for is limited, as the more cells a group leader commands, the more members that leader could compromise if captured by law enforcement personnel. The responsibility of the group leader is to not only command cells, but also to make detailed plans for tactical operations. The group leaders do not select the targets for operations, but only make the operational plans. Group leaders do not know of the overall objectives their tactical operation is supposed to accomplish. In contrast, supervisors in bureaucratic organized crime syndicates (analogous to group leaders) are aware of the overall objective of their operations within the syndicates' organizational framework and for the accomplishment of organizational goals. Thus, if compromised, these supervisors can reveal much more information about the syndicate organization than can the terrorist group leader.

The larger terrorist organizations also have organizers. Organizers are responsible for making tactical target selections and making recommendations to the leader. Organizers are comparable to the executive vice-president in the legitimate bureaucratic organization or underbosses and caporegime in organized crime syndicates (Cressey, 1967). Organizers are persons who have been long-standing members of the terrorist organization, are highly trusted, and are highly motivated to the terrorist's cause. When caught (on the rare occasions that this occurs) by law enforcement personnel, organizers will not provide information concerning the terrorist organization.

The central operations committee of the terrorist organization is comprised of the organizers and leaders. The central operations committee is similar to the board of directors in the normal bureaucratic organization. The central operations committee is responsible for establishing the short and long-term goals of the terrorist organization. At times, the central operations committees of similar terrorist organizations (i.e., same philosophies and goals) will meet together to plan joint strategy. This occurred in 1982, in Hayden Lake, Idaho, when the leaders and organizers from several different right-wing organizations met to draft a new "Constitution". Representatives from the Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, Mountain Church of Michigan, and Texas Emergency Reserves were present at that meeting (Sapp, 1986).

DISCUSSION

From strictly an organizational standpoint, the terrorist organization presents a formidable foe for law enforcement. The closed, or solar system, circular organization, the close personal contacts between the leader and members, the small size of organizational units (cells), and the autonomy and

specialization of the units are all factors which work in harmony to make the terrorist organization virtually impenetrable to law enforcement efforts.

Law enforcement personnel are not only at a decided disadvantage with the terrorist organization, they are also often not sure of how to deal with the terrorist organization. The law enforcement official knows only the bureaucratic organization and how to function within the constraints of that organizational system. Like any person in any endeavor, when faced with the unknown and unfamiliar the law enforcement official does not know what to do. Law enforcement officials try to combat terrorism under the constraints of bureaucracy, and it does not work.

It is not being suggested that law enforcement suspend the rules of conduct and operate with no constraints, not that constitutional and legal requirements be discarded, not that force be met with force. To do any of the above would reduce the law enforcement official to the same level as the terrorist. What is being suggested is education and training concerning the organization structure of terrorism. American law enforcement personnel receive as much training as their foreign counterparts concerning the motivation of terrorists, terrorist philosophy and doctrine, terrorist operations and tactics, and terrorist training. Yet, American law enforcement is not nearly as effective as their foreign counterparts in dealing with terrorism. The Israeli Mossad, the English SAS, and the German GS-G9 (to name just three) anti-terrorist units have scored impressive victories against terrorist organizations. The success of these counter-terrorist units is due in large part to their understanding of the organizational dynamics of terrorist organizations. These counter-terrorist units are not only effective in collecting intelligence data on the individual terrorists, but are also effective in compromising the terrorist organization. To be effective, American law enforcement personnel must learn about and understand the ramifications concerning the uniqueness of the terrorist organizational structure. Only then will law enforcement make a significant impact on terrorism in this country.

About the Author

The author received his Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Arkansas. He is presently an Associate Professor at Southwest Texas State University. He has published several articles in leading psychology and criminal justice journals and has presented numerous papers at national, professional conferences. In addition, he has just had a book published on terrorism in the United States. Requests for reprints should be sent to the author at the Department of Criminal Justice, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas, 78666.

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