



Status Processes in Groups

We both like the *Harry Potter* books. Not only does the author, J. K. Rowling, tell a gripping story from beginning to end, the *Harry Potter* saga also illustrates nicely how status processes, discussed in this chapter, affect behavior in face-to-face interaction. Cathy asked her 10-year-old daughter at the time to tell her who has more status at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry: squibs, pure-bloods, muggle-born, or half-bloods? That is, which category of people are thought to be better, more competent, and more worthy by the Hogwarts students and faculty in general? She said that it would go in this order from high status to low status: pure-bloods (people who possess magical powers and whose parents are both wizards–witches), half-bloods (people who possess magical powers and have one parent who is a wizard or witch and one parent who is a muggle [i.e., not a wizard or witch]), muggle-born (people who possess magical powers even though their parents are not wizards or witches), and squibs (people who do not possess magical powers despite having parents who are both wizards–witches). In this case, wizard–witch (or magical birth) and muggle (nonmagical birth) are two states of a characteristic that are differentially valued at Hogwarts, where those of magical birth are perceived as more valuable, worthy, and competent than nonmagical born. In addition, however, possession of magical powers is also perceived as an important characteristic, and is related to perceptions of worthiness and competence.

These perceptions of status can be seen through the eyes of Malfoy, a pure-blood student, in his disdain for Hermione, a muggle-born student. He does not see her as a worthy student at Hogwarts. But muggle-born like Hermione have higher status and worth than squibs like Argus Filch (the caretaker of Hogwarts) because they possess a specific characteristic even though they are muggle-born—they have magical powers that squibs do not have. These powers are an important and relevant skill to possess at Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry.

There are other status distinctions found at Hogwarts. For example, Dumbledore, the headmaster of the school and the most influential wizard, has the highest status and garners the most respect as the pure-blood wizard who runs Hogwarts. Also, professors at the school have higher status as a group than the students. Interestingly, another character, Hagrid, is part wizard and part giant. He occupies a unique place at Hogwarts, as he is well loved by Dumbledore. Although pure-bloods like Malfoy and Malfoy's father have little respect for Hagrid, having Dumbledore's respect increases Hagrid's status in the eyes of a majority of students.

In contrast to the context of Hogwarts, in the regular, mundane world, those without wizardry heritage or magical powers are thought to have the most worth, while wizards and witches are highly disdained, as clearly professed by Harry's aunt and uncle, Petunia and Vernon Dursley. Petunia and Vernon do not like Harry at all and believe that his magical powers are evil. Harry is given little respect in the Dursley household and treated much like a servant. Dudley, the Dursleys' son and a muggle without magical powers, is treated like a spoiled prince. Perceived status varies, then, across contexts.

This example sets the stage for our discussion of how status processes affect interaction in groups. **Status** is defined as "a position in a set of things that are rank-ordered by a standard of value" (Ridgeway and Walker 1995:281). In this chapter, we focus on the relative rankings of status between individuals in groups. Those who have high status in a group are perceived to be more *worthy and highly esteemed* than members who have low status. We examine how status processes explain much about individual behaviors in groups, how status inequality in groups can be reduced, and how characteristics acquire status value in the first place. Our purpose is to show how status processes often operate in groups to perpetuate and maintain social inequality in society.

Before we examine how status affects interaction, we begin with a definition of the concept, *group*, followed by a discussion of group conformity. Within groups, members exert influence with each other; they also often pressure each other to comply with particular beliefs or actions. This influence and group pressure process was first studied in terms of its consequences: conformity in groups. Later, emphasis shifted to an examination of how status processes in groups affect influence and compliance.

How Are Groups Defined?

We are born into groups; we learn to name things in the world around us, to play, and to work in groups throughout our entire lives. Much of our waking life is spent in groups, be it in dyads with just one other person, in small groups with a few people, or in large groups, such as dorm or sorority or fraternity house meetings. But what are they? Is a bunch of people in a movie theater or individuals in an elevator a group? What about a sports team or a set of friends who go out to dinner?

A **group** is defined as interaction involving at least two people (Forsyth 2014). In addition, groups have the following attributes. First, there must be a **conscious identification of membership**—that is, the group members think of themselves as belonging to the group, and the other members also recognize them as members (Lickel et al. 2000). Second, the members must **interact** with one another, thereby communicating and influencing one another. This communication may be face-to-face, or through other means, such as a chat room or Skype. Third, members have **shared goals**, requiring some level of interdependence with one another in order to attain those goals. The goals may be very diffuse, such as hanging out at a club, or very specific, such as working on a class project. And finally, the members **share a set of expectations, rules, or norms** that limit their behavior and guide their actions (Cartwright and Zander 1968). That is, group norms regulate interaction and often coordinate behavior.

Examples of groups are a set of friends going to a concert together, a committee working on a project, and individuals at a community action meeting. Thus,

groups are not just a collection of individuals; they have a patterned set of relations and behaviors. Individuals in an elevator, then, are not a group by the attributes just named, but if they got stuck in an elevator together, they most likely will become a group!

Much of the research on interaction in groups focuses on **small groups**, defined as having anywhere from 2 to 20 members. In addition, much of the early work in groups focused on conformity in groups.

What Is Conformity, and Why Do People Conform in Groups?

Conformity is defined as a change in behavior or beliefs as a result of real or imagined group pressure. Typically, conformity is said to occur when a group member adheres to the group norms and standards (that is, expected ways of behavior in the group) (DeLamater and Myers 2007). Is conformity bad? Is it good? Is it neither? It depends. Conformity is often associated with a negative connotation in the United States, as it seems contrary to the notion of independence and individuality. Who wants to be called a conformist? But in most of our everyday interaction we conform to norms that tell us how we are expected to behave in certain situations, and this is often a good thing.

For example, there are specific norms that students follow in classrooms, and if they do not, this disrupts class dynamics. Chaos would ensue if people failed to conform to interaction norms, such as those pertaining to waiting in grocery lines, adhering to traffic lights, or conducting meetings. On the other hand, sometimes people's conformity in groups has negative results. For example, a peer group may pressure one of its members to bully someone on the playground or on social media. Or we may throw our glass bottle away in the trash rather than recycle because everyone else around us is doing so, even though we would have recycled if we were alone. Finally, some conformity is neither good nor bad—it just is—such as when a group of 10-year-old boy soccer players sport the same haircut (although this behavior may also increase their identification with the group!).

Why do people conform in small groups working on a task together? Two sets of early laboratory studies set the stage for understanding why people conform under certain conditions. The first set of studies was conducted by Sherif (1935, 1936) in his *autokinetic experiments*. In the first part of the study, participants entered individually into a darkened room in a laboratory to participate on a perceptual task that involved estimating how far a pinpoint of light moves on the wall. This task involves a physical phenomenon called the *autokinetic effect* (which means “moves by itself”). It occurs when an individual stares at a pinpoint of light in a darkened room, and it looks as if the light is moving in an erratic fashion, but it never actually moves (because of the way our eyes are shaped). Sherif first asked participants to estimate how far the light moved over a series of trials when they were alone in the darkened room. This set of estimates provided the basis for a stable range for each individual. Individuals' ranges varied considerably from one another, from a few inches to a foot or more. In effect, Sherif used an **ambiguous task** in his studies, where the correct answer is uncertain.

After establishing a stable range, Sherif had each participant join a group of people and once again asked each individual to estimate the movement of the light. For each group, Sherif saw that a common standard emerged. As a result of

the uncertainty of the task, group members began to use each other's estimates as a basis for defining the situation. In fact, each group developed its own arbitrary standard, and members used this frame of reference in their judgments. Then a week or so later, the participants came back to the laboratory setting alone and were asked to once again estimate the light's movement. The participants used the group standard for their own individual judgments, showing that the group norm still influenced them even though time had passed.

In the Sherif studies, participants were uncertain of the "correct" response and, therefore, used information provided by group members to shape their own response. This type of influence is called **informational influence** and occurs when a group member accepts information from other group members as evidence of reality. Group members use information from others when they are uncertain about the situation and there are no objective standards to guide judgment. Often, informational influence leads to **internalization**; as a consequence of being motivated by the desire to be right, individuals come to actually believe in what the group has influenced the individual to do, and are motivated by the desire to be right. People experience informational influence in contexts where they do not know how to solve complex problems, and rely on others' help, or in crisis situations when decisions must be made quickly. In these cases, people rely on group members who are perceived to be more knowledgeable about the task or decision, as these "experts" are seen as credible. Contexts such as religious groups, self-help groups, political groups, and peer groups provide information to address complex issues and consequently exert change in behavior or beliefs of group members.

The second set of studies is Asch's (1951, 1955, 1957) *line estimate conformity studies*. Asch created groups in a laboratory setting, consisting of eight members, and asked them to perform a task that was very easy and "objective" in the sense that 99% of the time people chose the correct answer when they were alone. The line judgment task involved projecting a standard line and three comparison lines and then asking the participants to judge which one of the comparison lines matched the standard line. Unlike Sherif's ambiguous task, this task was a simple and **unambiguous task** in that the answers were straightforward. Importantly, also in these studies, the experimenter had instructed all but one of the group members on which comparison line to choose. The focal participant (otherwise referred to as the naïve participant) did not know that the other group members were "confederates" working for the experimenter. These confederates all publicly announced an incorrect answer before the participant chose an answer. The task consisted of 18 trials; the confederates gave a correct response on 6 of the trials and incorrectly responded on the other 12 trials. Naïve participants likely knew the correct answer, but they had heard all the other members give a different answer. This situation created pressure on the participant to conform to the incorrect answers.

Indeed, results showed that that in the 12 trials, nearly one third of the participants' responses were incorrect, compared to the individual error rate of less than 1%. Overall, 75% of the participants gave at least one incorrect answer across the 12 trials. This was somewhat surprising, given that the task was unambiguous and the stakes were not high. Interviews were conducted, asking participants why they had conformed. The majority of participants focused on the discrepancy they felt between the group majority's judgment and their own. Most of them complied publicly with the majority but privately disagreed with their view. Some, however, wondered if they had misunderstood the instructions, and some even questioned their eyesight. Many of the participants conformed to the

opinions of the other group members mainly in order to avoid being embarrassed, ridiculed, or laughed at by the majority. They wanted to be accepted by the majority—or at least not publicly rejected.

This type of influence is referred to as **normative influence**. Members conform to the expectations of the other group members in order to avoid punishments or receive social rewards that are contingent on abiding by these expectations (Janes and Olson 2000). Often, normative influence leads to compliance. **Compliance** occurs when a group member's behavior conforms to the behavior of the other group members, even though he or she privately disagrees (i.e., there is no change in his or her private opinion). Compliance is motivated by an individual's desire to gain rewards or avoid punishments; it is often only as long-lived as the promise of reward or the possibility of punishment.

There are three caveats:

1. Replications of Asch studies over time in the United States show that levels of conformity steadily declined from the 1950s through the 1980s. In addition, cross-cultural studies show that levels of conformity are higher in countries that are characterized as more collectivist cultures (e.g., Japan) with emphasis on shared goals than individualist cultures (e.g., United States) with emphasis on personal goals (but see Bond and Smith [1996] for discussion of limitations of these results). More recent studies show that the relationship between culture, preference, and behavior is complicated. For example, in one study Japanese participants conformed to the majority only when the negative social implications for not conforming were clear; when they were not clear and they believed their behavior had no implications for others, they had a preference for nonconforming behavior (Hashimoto, Li, and Yamagishi 2011).
2. Although nearly one third of the participants' responses were incorrect in Asch's studies, this also means that about two thirds of the time participants resisted group pressure. Also, 25% of the participants consistently never went along with majority. We sometimes overemphasize conformity and de-emphasize nonconformity behavior (for a discussion of this trend, see Griggs 2015).
3. Some scholars suggest that because some of Asch's participants said they were uncertain of their answers, this indicates that these participants did not experience normative influence but rather were motivated to adopt the same opinions as others in their group (Turner et al. 1987; see Chapter 12 for a discussion of ingroup–outgroup identification).

In summary, the two types of influence suggest different motivations for conformity. Under informational influence, people want to reduce their uncertainty and have a better understanding of the situation. Under normative influence, people often are motivated to conform in groups when they want to be positively evaluated by the group and/or avoid rejection, and want to have good relationships with others (Hogg and Cooper 2003).

What Are Some Factors That Affect Conformity in Groups?

As a result of this early work on conformity, Asch and other scholars investigated factors that affect whether or not individual members conform in groups.

Importantly, the punchline of all the conformity studies is that **group-level factors** (i.e., specific features of the group, such as the size of the unanimous majority or the status of a group) are much more important than individual-level factors (such as personality characteristics like shyness or intelligence) in predicting conformity.

Imagine that you are in a seminar on American novelists in the second half of 20th century. The class consists of a total of 10 students. The professor asks the class, what American novelist wrote *The Joy Luck Club*? You know this answer: Amy Tan. Before you can answer, however, the other nine students suggest that it is another American novelist, Maxine Hong Kingston. You may begin to doubt your answer, particularly because all the other students suggest Kingston. Suppose that eight students said Kingston, while one other student answered Gish Jen. In this second situation, one other student holds a different answer than the majority besides you. In which context would you be more likely to stand up to group pressure and say, with confidence, Amy Tan?

The Asch studies addressed these types of situations. Indeed, Asch examined the effect of a **unanimous majority** on conformity, where all the group members disagreed with the one lone member. A unanimous majority, even when the task is unambiguous and straightforward, creates strong pressure to conform. A second group factor that affects conformity pressure is the **size of the unanimous majority**. Specifically, as the size of the unanimous majority increases, so too does the strength of conformity pressure and, thereby, also the actual conformity by the individual. Specifically, the pressure to conform is much greater when you have three people who oppose you versus only one other person. Typically, this conformity pressure increases until the majority size reaches three to five members and then levels off (Asch 1955).

Third, group members are less likely to conform when there is a **breach in the majority** opinion than when the group's majority is unanimous. That is, if there is just one other person who holds a different opinion than the majority, even if this opinion is not the same opinion as the minority member (like the Amy Tan example mentioned previously), this reduces the pressure to conform. Why? This breach raises doubt in the majority opinion, and has a liberating effect on the behavior of the members (Allen and Levine 1969). An interesting case related to this factor was a U.S. Supreme Court justice ruling in the case of *Williams v. Florida* (1970). In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that juries composed of 6 jurors were equivalent to juries composed of 12 jurors in terms of things such as verdict ratio, quality of the deliberations, and the ability of dissenters to resist the pressure of the majority. Social scientists criticized this ruling. The Asch studies were cited, stating that a minority of 1 against 5 faces more conformity pressure than a minority of 2 against 10 because in the latter there is a breach in the majority, allowing for a greater possibility for resistance to majority opinion compared to a unanimous majority context. A number of studies argued that a 6-person jury was fundamentally different from a 12-person jury, in part, because of the potential difference in conformity pressure between the two contexts.

Fourth, conformity pressure is stronger in **groups that have high status**. High-status groups are attractive because they are highly prestigious; people are highly motivated to stay in these groups. As a result, they are more likely to conform to group norms in high-status than low-status groups.

Finally, one important individual-level factor that affects conformity in groups is the individual's perceived level of expertise or **perceived competence**

relative to the other group members on the group task. Members who perceive themselves to be more competent and skilled at the group's task relative to the other group members are more likely to resist conformity pressure than those perceived as less skilled, even in situations where multiple less competent people are exerting pressure (Melamed and Savage 2013). Resistance is based on the degree to which they believe themselves to be more competent than other group members (Ettinger et al. 1971). People who perceive themselves as competent at the group's task rely less on the judgment of others. As we shall see in this chapter, however, perceptions of competence that people have of themselves relative to others often stem from a number of social factors external to the group.

What Is the Process of Groupthink?

Groups sometimes make very poor decisions. Unfortunately, in many cases, poor decision-making occurs in very powerful and high-status groups, and these decisions have broad and powerful consequences. For example, the decision by the United States to escalate the Vietnam War is an example of faulty decision-making with extraordinary consequences. Other examples include the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, based on inconclusive information about Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, and the space shuttle *Columbia* disaster in 2003, partly due to a failure to recognize the relevant concerns for safety brought to attention by NASA engineers. Why would such smart people make such gross errors in judgment?

Janis (1982) suggests that a process of groupthink may have, in part, produced these poor decisions. **Groupthink** refers to faulty thinking by group members when their desire to get along with one another and the leader of the group is greater than their desire to evaluate potential solutions realistically. Evaluating reasonable alternatives is overwhelmed by the pressures for unanimity within the group. Members do not want to question group consensus; as a result, they ignore differing opinions and alternatives and fail to weigh carefully the pros and cons of the decision. And the leader is often overly directive, sharing his or her opinion first rather than initially hearing the opinions of the group, including important minority opinions (those ideas that differ from the majority).

In the case of the Iraq War, no weapons of mass destruction and production facilities were discovered. The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (a bipartisan committee) reviewed the evidence and concluded that groupthink was an important factor in this poor decision-making. The committee presumed that Iraq had these weapons; as a result, when they received conflicting evidence, they ignored it, and when they received ambiguous information they interpreted it as showing conclusively the existence of a weapons program. Some also argue that President Bush surrounded himself with people who had ideas and opinions similar to his own instead of people who offered varying or dissenting opinions.

Groupthink draws attention to the availability and processing of opposing viewpoints and contradictory information. More generally, current studies of conformity examine underlying cognitive processes, such as those discussed in Chapter 5. This work includes research on the effects of unconscious priming processes (Pendry and Carrick 2001) and encoding processes in memory (Hoffman et al. 2001). For example, in an experiment, Pendry and Carrick (2001) examined how much participants conformed through a process of priming by exposing their participants to either a "punk" stimulus (representing nonconformity), an "accountant"

stimulus (representing the orderly conformist), or no priming stimulus. They used a task somewhere in between Asch and Sherif's in terms of degree of ambiguity—counting the number of beeps they heard. When participants actually heard 100 beeps, the confederates reported between 120 and 125 beeps. Interestingly, the accountant-primed participants conformed to the confederates' estimates of the number of beeps much more often than the participants in the punk-primed condition and in the no stimulus condition. It may be that being exposed to nonconformists in groups could increase more individualized thinking and behavior.

Group conformity studies enhanced our understanding of when and why group members change their opinions and behavior in groups. More recently, scholars pay attention to group structures that lead to influence in groups. In this chapter, we discuss one of these structures: status structures.

Status Processes in Groups

We focus on the relative rankings of status between individuals in groups. Those who have high status in a group are perceived to be more worthy and highly esteemed than members who have low status. But how can you tell that an individual in a group has more status than another individual? What are some *observable signs of status*?

Cathy is a fairly passionate science fiction fan. She reads quite a bit of science fiction (from science fiction authors such as Orson Scott Card, George R. R. Martin, Marge Piercy, and Ursula K. Le Guin) but also is an avid fan of science fiction shows and films (such as *Babylon 5*, *The X-Files*, *Fringe*, *V*, *Alien*, *The Terminator*, *District 9*, *The Matrix*, and *Avatar*). A few years ago, she ran across a blog for fans who attend one of the largest comic/science fiction/fantasy conventions in the United States, called Comic-Con International. Many science fiction and comic book fans participate in this convention. While online, she read a fan's blog attending the annual Comic-Con in San Diego, 2009. This fan lamented that going in "standard" dress instead of dressing up as a character does not earn you "street cred with the dorks at the Con," nor does it let you interact with them on the same level. The fan vowed to attend next year's Comic-Con in either "full spandex Spiderman" or "Stormtrooper" outfits.

This blog entry illustrates the importance of dressing up in costume as a symbol of status at this convention. From this fan's perspective, if you dress up as Spiderman at the convention instead of standard dress, people will respond to you with a bit more respect than if you do not dress up. Status has much to do with whether or not you are wearing a costume in this particular context. Of course, wearing a Spiderman costume to a board meeting probably will not serve the same purpose, unless it is a board meeting of a comics company. In this context, then, an observable sign of status is the costume.

There are many other observable signs of status. You may detect a person's high status by how articulate she is in her speech, the confidence in her tone, or the fact that she talks the most in the group. You may also notice that her opinions are more positively evaluated and that she uses direct eye contact as she speaks with other group members. It may be that this person indicates something about themselves that also indicates status. She may declare that she has a degree from Princeton, implying high intelligence. Or she may note that she happens to know how to do the group task and has done it before. Or it may be that you notice other characteristics that are related to status, such as the person's gender,

race, education, or social class. Finally, it becomes clear to you that this member has the most influence in the group.

In this section, we will discuss how status structures develop in groups, including key observable signs of status, drawing upon classic and recent studies in status research. **Status structures**, or hierarchies, are “rank-ordered relationships between actors” (Ridgeway and Walker 1995:281). We then explore the consequences of these structures for interaction and decision-making. We will then examine how status structures are maintained and why they are difficult to change. Finally, we will see how characteristics, such as gender or race, may acquire status value—that is, how one category of people is believed to be more worthy and competent in general than another category of people. Importantly, if we understand how status processes operate in groups, we will better understand how social inequality is perpetuated and maintained, and can be changed, in societies. You will find yourself in many types of groups, at work, school, and in your community throughout your life. Understanding how status operates will help you recognize when members of your group are not heard when they should be heard and help you to use procedures in your groups to make good decisions for your group and beyond, rather than poor ones with negative consequences.

Early Studies on Status Structures

While Asch began his conformity studies in the 1940s, in the same decade, Robert Bales (1950) was conducting his seminal studies of interpersonal behavior in small groups. Bales recorded interaction in initially leaderless decision-making groups of three to seven members over multiple-hour periods. All group members consisted of white male sophomores at Harvard University (at this time, a majority of group studies focused on white men or boys only). These sophomores were invited to participate in groups to discuss human relations problems (e.g., a case may involve an adolescent who has committed a serious crime but who comes from a disruptive background; after reading about the adolescent’s history, the group must reach a decision about how this kid should be treated). In effect, Bales’s groups were considered **homogeneous groups** because the members were very socially similar on a number of characteristics, such as gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status (including educational level, income, and occupational prestige). Bales audio recorded these discussions and then analyzed the patterns of conversation in the groups, noting who talked, to whom they talked, and what they were saying. Specifically, he recorded the following categories for each group member: offering opinions or ideas, asking questions, making positive statements such as agreeing or complimenting, and making negative statements such as disagreeing or showing tension.

Bales discovered that even in these homogeneous groups without formally designated leaders, status structures (also referred to as status hierarchies) developed quickly within the groups, where several members acquired more status than other members. That is, members could be ranked on who was perceived as more worthy and esteemed compared to other group members. These hierarchies stabilized and guided continued interaction. In these hierarchies, one or two of the members in the groups talked more than other members, and their ideas were taken more seriously and were more likely to be adopted by the group than ideas of other members. Also, those members who initiated the most participation in

the beginning of the group interaction were more likely to continue this participation throughout the interaction.

Bales's studies were extremely important because they provided systematic empirical evidence of patterned inequalities that arise in groups. Specifically, he found that those members who *participated more* in group discussions were also more likely to be *given opportunities to participate* by other members; *receive positive evaluations of their ideas*; and, importantly, *gain influence* compared to the other group members (Bales 1950, 1970; Correll and Ridgeway 2003). These four behaviors were all positively correlated with one another. That is, members who talked more also received more positive evaluations of their opinions, and gained more influence than other members. These behaviors are considered four key *observable signs of status*. Bales's work stimulated research that focuses on how status structures develop, are maintained, and change in groups, as well as how these structures affect members' behavior and the decisions adopted by groups.

While Bales examined status structures in homogeneous groups, other studies also in the 1950s and 1960s examined status structures in **heterogeneous groups**, where members differed on social characteristics such as gender, occupation, and age. Strodbeck, James, and Hawkins (1957), for example, examined status processes in mock juries. People randomly chosen from a list of those who were eligible to vote in a northeastern city were asked to participate in groups of 12 and deliberate on actual cases (social scientists are typically not allowed to observe actual juries). Specifically, Strodbeck et al. (1957) examined who participated the most in these groups, who were perceived as most helpful in the jury deliberations, and who was picked jury foreperson. The members differed on two social characteristics: (1) gender and (2) occupation (i.e., professionals, clerical workers, skilled laborers, unskilled laborers). Strodbeck et al. (1957) found that men and jurors who were in the most highly prestigious occupations also participated more, were seen as the most helpful, and were most likely to be picked jury foreperson.

Importantly, this study, and many other studies at the time, illustrated that members with higher status in the larger society tend to end up with higher status in groups as well. This process is called the **process of status generalization**. In the jury study, for example, men and professionals had an advantage in these mock juries even though gender and occupation were not related to the jury's task of determining outcomes for plaintiffs. The social characteristics of gender and occupation mattered in determining members' perceptions of who they thought to be the most worthy and competent members. Early research also showed that this process of status generalization is more likely to occur when (1) no member has any special skills relevant to the group task, (2) the members have no other information about the members other than their social characteristics, and (3) they have no prior history of interaction.

Scholars recognized that this process of status generalization is a very important problem for groups. It may be that, for example in the Strodbeck et al. (1957) case, women and members other than professionals were equally or more competent and yet their opinions were not valued. Imagine a neighborhood meeting where neighbors gather to talk about zoning issues or parents talk about school policies at a PTA meeting. Whose opinions will most likely be heard and adopted?

Indeed, much research over the past several decades continues to show that, in specific groups, members who possess a more valued state of a social characteristic in a particular society (e.g., men, whites, and middle or upper class) are likely to be

perceived as more competent and worthy in general than members who possess a less valued state (e.g., women, blacks, Latino/as, or poor or working class). As a result, members who are perceived as more worthy are more likely to offer their opinions and be more influential in decision-making groups and thus become high-status members in the group.

How Do Status Structures Develop, and How Are They Maintained?

Scholars, initially in the 1970s and continuing today, examined the many classic studies of status structures conducted in the 1950s and 1960s and developed and tested theories that explain how status structures develop and how they are maintained. In doing so, they also explained *why* the process of status generalization occurs consistently in many types of task groups in many different contexts such as in schools, businesses, political organizations, health care organizations, and religious organizations.

Expectation States Theory

In particular, Berger and colleagues developed **expectation states theory (EST)** specifically to address how status structures develop and are maintained in groups, with particular attention to the more commonly occurring heterogeneous groups. As you recall, heterogeneous groups are those groups where members differentiate on at least one social characteristic (e.g., gender, age, or race) such as in the mock jury studies (Berger et al. 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). These scholars examine task groups (instead of primary groups such as families and friendship groups), where members are *task-focused* and are *open to taking into account each other's opinions* (they are collectively oriented and want the group to do well on the group task). Examples of task groups are committees, student government organizations, lab teams, and political groups.

In this theory, Berger and others argue that in every society there are **diffuse status characteristics** that people possess. These characteristics have at least two states where one state is more highly valued (i.e., thought to be more worthy and esteemed) than the other in society. Examples are gender, age, race, education, sexual orientation, and physical attraction in the United States (Berger et al. 1980; Lovaglia et al. 1998; Webster and Driskell 1978). Importantly, the status value of social characteristics is historically and culturally dependent. In some cultures, for example, race may not be a status characteristic, while in others race is one. In addition, there is cultural variation in the status value of particular states of diffuse status characteristics. For example, the status value of age groups varies cross-culturally. In the United States, for example, “middle-age” is seen as the most highly valued, while in other societies, “elders” are the most highly valued. Also, as discussed in the introduction of this chapter, at Hogwarts being muggle-born is considered low status compared to half-bloods and pure-bloods, but in the nonmagical world, muggles have the highest status.

Diffuse status characteristics become important in groups only when they become **salient** in the group—that is, when they provide usable information to the members. Characteristics become salient when members differentiate on the characteristic. For example, gender becomes salient in a mixed-sex group where both men and women are interacting (in a mixed-race group race will

become salient). They also become salient when the task is related to the characteristic. For example, gender becomes salient when the group is working on a gender-stereotyped task (such as sewing or changing oil) because it is related to the status characteristic: gender. What tasks can you think of that are not related to gender?

Associated with diffuse status characteristics are implicit general expectations for competence, called **performance expectations**. They are expectations that members form for their own and each other's performance on the group task. They are rough estimates of how well the members think each other will perform on the task, relative to themselves. Key to EST is that members who have a more highly valued state of a diffuse status characteristic are assumed by themselves and other members in the group to be more competent in general *at most things* than those who have a less valued state of that characteristic. The theory presumes an association between states of social characteristics and general competence beliefs; this association is a key **stereotyping process**. For example, if people believe in general that blacks are less competent than whites on most tasks, or even if people think that other people think that blacks are less competent than whites even if they themselves do not believe this, this has clear consequences for interaction in groups.

Specifically, the association between diffuse status characteristics and beliefs about general competence affects behavior in the group. Members for whom people have higher performance expectations (owing to their perceived greater task competence) relative to others in the group will talk more, receive more positive evaluations, receive more attention from others, and be more influential than those members for whom there are lower performance expectations. This differentiated pattern in behavior creates the status hierarchy, where those who talk more and are given more opportunities to participate are also more influential. As a result, they are also seen as more worthy. And, because they are perceived as more worthy, they continue to participate more, get more positive evaluations, and continue to be more influential.

EST explains the link between diffuse status characteristics, the widespread cultural beliefs that particular states of these characteristics are associated with competence beliefs, the behaviors in the group that lead to the development of the status hierarchy, and the perpetuation of the hierarchy. This process describes a **self-fulfilling prophecy**. Recall in Chapter 5 that the self-fulfilling prophecy occurs when one person has expectations (often based on inaccurate information) of another person's abilities and behavior, which leads the first person to act in a way toward the second person, leading the second person to act in a manner confirming the first person's expectations. (For an interesting study on the fulfilling nature of stereotypes regarding physical attractiveness where the perception that "beautiful" people are "good" people, see a classic article by Snyder, Tanke, and Berscheid [1977].) In regard to status processes, certain group members are expected to be more competent at the task; other members act toward them as if they are more competent. These members then talk more, receive more positive feedback and attention, and are more influential in the group; as a result, they are perceived as higher in the status hierarchy, and so the cycle continues.

This process occurs even though a particular group task is unrelated to these diffuse status characteristics—that is, even when these characteristics are not associated with ability on the specific task. In fact, there is a **burden of proof** that

must take place in order for the status characteristic to be dissociated from the task (Berger et al. 1980). Members have to be explicitly told that a particular characteristic is not relevant to ability on the task. For example, in some studies the researcher will specifically state that women and men or blacks and whites perform equally well on a particular task. This explicit claim is used to disrupt the association between a status characteristic and competence beliefs.

Example: A Case of Gender

Several years ago, Harvard Business School revealed that female students were participating less in classes on average than men, and when they spoke, they did so in a tentative manner. Also, the professors were more likely to forget their participation than that of male students. Female students were also much less likely to win prestigious awards. These patterns occurred even though female students had test scores and grades similar to those of the male students. Why?! Look up the response by the first female president, Dr. Drew Gilpin Faust. She created a strategy for reducing this inequality at Harvard Business School. For example, professors were asked to use software tools so that they could instantly check their patterns of whom they called on and who participated. Sessions on respect and civility were also conducted. Why do these patterns occur in the first place?!

EST has the answer. Given that gender is a diffuse status characteristic in society, there are widely held cultural beliefs that men are perceived to have greater value and worth than women and, therefore, are believed to be generally superior and competent at most things relative to women (Fiske et al. 2002; Wagner and Berger 1997). When gender is salient in a situation, gender status beliefs cause men and women to expect or expect that others will expect men to be more competent than women, all else being equal. These expectations for competence shape men and women's assertiveness, judgments of each other's ability, and actual performance (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999; Wagner and Berger 1997; Wood and Karten 1986). Indeed, many studies show that women participate less and get less influence in task groups, on average, than men (even at Harvard Business School!). This cycle continues unless this process is interrupted.

What happens when a member has a specific skill relevant to the group task? Do diffuse status characteristics still matter? For example, who would you expect to be more influential in a group that is working on a math task: a female math major or a male history major? Will the female math major be more influential?

EST helps us address these questions. It states that there are also **specific status characteristics**, defined as characteristics that are associated with specific skills that are relevant to the task. Examples are math ability when the group task is a math problem or skill at ice hockey when the task is a hockey game. These specific status characteristics are associated with specific performance expectations relevant to the specific task at hand. Having a specific skill in say, math, says nothing about ability on other tasks, such as conducting a legal task, fixing cars, or negotiating a marital conflict. In the *Harry Potter* story, an example of specific status characteristic is one's magical abilities, such as using charms or potions. (In the Harvard Business School example, no specific status characteristics were activated in a large classroom setting.)

According to EST, group members use information from both diffuse and specific status characteristics to form expectations of each other's competence. Specific status characteristics are more important than diffuse status characteristics

in determining the status hierarchy because they are more directly relevant to the immediate group task. Information on specific status characteristics is weighted more heavily than information on diffuse status characteristics. For example, having specific math skills is more relevant to perceptions of competence than being a woman or a Latina when the group is working on a math task. Importantly, however, information on diffuse status characteristics is still used to form performance expectations rather than being considered irrelevant, even though it should be. In the example just given, according to EST, the female math major will have more influence than the male history major when working on a math task.

Consider two dyads. In the first, a female math major is working with a male sociology major on the same math task. Once again, we expect that both members will perceive the woman as more competent at the specific task than the man; as a result, she will participate more and be more influential at the task. In the second, there is a male math major and a female sociology major working together on the same math task. In this group, the man will be seen as more competent. In addition, however, the male math major in the second group will be seen as more competent in his group than the female math major in her group. Why? Because the male math major with the female sociology major has the advantage of higher status in terms of both the specific ability of math and of gender. The female math major with the male sociology major, however, has the advantage of higher status in terms of the specific skill but has a disadvantage in terms of gender. Here, EST states that people will act as if they are combining the information from both specific and diffuse status characteristics, called the **combining principle** (Berger et al. 1980; Wood and Karten 1986).

Illustrations of this combining principle occur in everyday interaction. For example, many people do not just see a doctor but see a black doctor or a woman doctor; they do not just see a president but see a black president. They do not just see a Supreme Court judge in Sonia Sotomayor. They see a Latina Supreme Court judge.

The theory makes an important point that these expectations about competence do not have to be conscious in order to operate in the group (Webster and Foschi 1988). In fact, often if you ask group members if people should have higher status in groups because of their race, gender, occupation, or age, for example, they will say absolutely not! The process described previously often occurs outside of people's conscious awareness. Much empirical evidence shows, however, that people act *as if* these status characteristics do matter in decision-making behavior in groups (Berger et al. 1980; Wagner and Berger 2002). These studies indicate that the cultural expectations associated with these characteristics continue to significantly affect our perceptions of who seems the most competent in the group. Status hierarchies are very stable as a result of these subtle stereotypic processes and are very difficult to change. (See Ridgeway and Nakagawa 2014 for an in-depth discussion of all assumptions of the status theories.)

As group members form expectations about each other's task performance for themselves compared to another (we can call them first-order expectations), they also anticipate how other group members will judge their own expected performance. Group members' perceptions of what others in the group expect in regard to their performance are called **second-order performance expectations** (Troyer and Younts 1997; Webster and Whitmeyer 1999). They are group members' rough estimates of how others in the group view their standing in the group.

It is like a working consensus, even though this is not necessarily what the group members want or deserve.

Often first-order and second-order expectations align, but sometimes they do not. That is, sometimes a member perceives that others rank her expected performance capacity differently than she ranks her own performance capacity. There is a conflict between how she thinks of her own performance capacity (i.e., competence at the task) and how she views others' ideas about her performance capacity. When second-order performance expectations about what others expect contradict a member's own first-order expectations, the second-order expectations are more likely to shape the member's behavior in the group. This means that a member's perception of what others expect about her performance has a greater impact on that member's deferential and assertive behaviors than her own view of her performance (as compared to others in the group; Kalkoff, Younts, and Troyer, 2011; Ridgeway and Nakagawa 2014; Troyer and Younts 1997).

In summary, as empirical work in status characteristic theory shows, diffuse and specific status characteristics and their relationship to performance expectations are key in explaining how status structures develop and are maintained in groups. Another factor that affects the development of status structures is resources that people possess.

Reward Expectations Theory

Do you think wealthy people are more competent and intelligent than folks in the middle or working classes? Is someone who owns a large home and a luxury car smarter than someone who owns a modest home and a compact car? Are people who earn higher salaries more competent in general at most things than those who earn lower salaries? How about employees who have corner offices with windows compared to employees with less desirable offices?

Berger and colleagues also developed from EST the **reward expectations theory**, which addresses these types of questions (Berger, Wagner, and Zelditch 1985). It argues that many people assume that people with more resources are also more competent in general than those with comparatively fewer resources—or at least they assume that others assume that this is true. This strong association between possession of resources and competence occurs even when resources (such as money, cars, or titles) have nothing to do with actual ability or skills.

Specifically, this theory argues that the possession of rewards or resources is another factor that can influence performance expectations (i.e., perceptions of competence), even when these resources are irrelevant to the group task. Rewards or resources include monetary rewards like salary, pay, and income as well as symbolic rewards such as an office with windows, a prime parking space, real estate, or an honorary title. Studies show that group members who are given more resources than other members are perceived as more competent at the group task, even though these resources are *not* explicitly connected to the group task.

For example, Cook (1975) showed that members who were paid more than other members were perceived as more competent even though pay was not related to their performance or the group task. Group members presumed that

those who were paid more by a third party also had greater task ability, and those who were paid less were presumed to have less ability (Harrod 1980; Stewart and Moore 1992).

In our culture, those who have higher incomes and more wealth are assumed to have these resources because they are assumed to be more competent than those with lower incomes and less wealth. Of course, this is often not the case. There are many structural barriers to acquiring wealth, historically rooted, for particular groups in the United States, such as inheritance laws (e.g., see Cross [1985]), which have nothing to do with competence. Also, some very wealthy people are not necessarily competent and smart. (This may be one reason that a number of voters perceived Donald Trump as competent to address economic issues—his perceived wealth is associated with the ability to help others increase their own likelihood of prospering.)

In addition to monetary rewards, rewards that have purely symbolic status value (and are not exchangeable like monetary rewards) affect expectations for performance and, hence, the development of the status hierarchy (Hysom 2009). Hysom (2009) showed this process in his experimental study, where participants worked with a partner on a group task, called the contrast sensitivity task. In this task, members saw a series of slides that have portions of black and portions of white on each slide. They were asked to select one of two black-and-white patterns as having more white area. In reality, each pattern has equal proportions of black and white. For each slide, participants made an initial choice and then learned of their partners' choice. The participants were instructed to then reconsider their initial choice and make a final choice, based on this information.

Once they were finished with the task, the experimenter told the participants that an unusual situation had developed. A famous Nobel Prize winner, a Harvard professor, would be visiting their campus soon to consult with the laboratory staff regarding this study. Half the participants were told that they had been chosen to attend an "exclusive private reception" with this professor as well as meet other important guests such as a past U.S. president and a former UN ambassador. The other half were told that they would not be permitted to attend the reception. Importantly, this *symbolic reward was never explicitly connected to how well the participants performed on the task*. Even so, the participants used this information to infer their own and their partner's competence on the task. Indeed, on a subsequent task after learning about the reception, group members who received the symbolic reward were not as easily influenced by their less-rewarded partners. Participants acted as if this exclusive reward was associated with task ability, even though there was never any explicit connection made between the two.

What Is the Role of Emotions in Status Structures?

Group members not only offer opinions, share ideas, and make decisions; in many situations, they also experience felt emotions and sometimes display those emotions to other group members. Have you ever felt angry toward another person in a group because he or she dismissed your idea? Have you ever felt grateful or pleased because your idea was adopted by the group? Have you been in groups that fall apart because members cannot get along or in groups where members feel a close bond to one another? Groups can fall apart if members feel more negative emotions, such as anger, frustration, or resentment than positive emotions, such as satisfaction and pleasure (Bales 1970; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). Vice

versa, groups may stay together longer because there are more felt positive than negative emotions among group members.

Not surprisingly, just as high-status members talk more, receive more positive feedback and attention, and are more influential than low-status members, they also often have different experiences in their felt and expressed emotions. High-status members are more likely to experience positive emotions than low-status members, who are more likely to feel negative emotions (Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Lucas 1999). High-status members have more opportunity to receive positive feedback about their ideas and have more influence and, therefore, are more likely to experience pleasure and happiness. Low-status members, in contrast, are less likely to receive positive feedback and achieve influence; therefore, anger or depression may result. These findings are consistent with Kemper's (1991) work mentioned in Chapter 7; receiving and gaining high status leads to positive emotions of happiness, satisfaction, and often also pride, while receiving low status leads to negative emotions such as anger.

In addition, some research focuses on the emotional reactions of low- and high-status members in groups and how these reactions help maintain the status structure. Specifically, group members with lower status who receive negative feedback about their ideas from other group members are more likely to experience feelings of sadness or even depression rather than annoyance or anger. Even if they do feel anger or frustration, they are less likely to express it toward higher-status members. In contrast, high-status members who receive negative feedback about their opinions are more likely to feel annoyance or anger. Also, they are more likely to express these negative emotions toward lower-status members because they are freer to do so. The expression of negative emotions, then, is one way that high-status members control the interaction and decision-making outcomes (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). (See Chapter 7 for discussion of how relative status affects the emotional experiences and expressions of people at work and in families [e.g., Lively and Powell 2006]; see Webster and Walker [2014] for a thorough discussion of emotions and status processes.)

What Are Some Consequences of Status Structures for Behavior in Groups?

Status structures are based on these consensually accepted status beliefs about competence, where one category is thought to be better, more worthy, and competent than another category. These status beliefs that are associated with diffuse status characteristics have far-reaching effects. First, as with the consequences of groupthink described previously, groups often make bad or less than optimal decisions in their groups as a result of this association. Group members with diffuse status advantages are likely to be more assertive and influential in decisions and become leaders than members with diffuse status disadvantages. Yet this consequence often leads to *inefficient decision-making* because members who are in fact more competent are not always those who are listened to and most influential (Wagner and Berger 2002; Webster and Foschi 1988). Rather, status-disadvantaged members may be the most competent, yet their opinions are undervalued, overlooked, or ignored.

Second, members who have lower status in society and who are, therefore, status-disadvantaged in the group, must work harder and perform better than status-advantaged members to attain status in the group. They have the extra

burden of “proving” themselves competent and worthy. For example, women are held to higher performance standards than men in many situations. People evaluate the contributions of men and women differently in groups; women have to perform better than men to get the same evaluations as men. Obviously, this **double standard** can take a heavy toll, and be physically and emotionally draining (Foschi 1996, 2000; see also Jackson, Thoits, and Taylor [1995]) in regard to black workers in white-dominated workplaces).

Third, these status beliefs create *biases in organizational and labor market practices* (Ridgeway 1997, 2011). For example, in regard to gender status, these beliefs create a *preference of male workers* in the workplace. Often, employers rank male workers as more highly desirable than female workers. When employers interact with applicants during the hiring process, this interaction evokes sex categorization. That is, the employers do not interview or read the résumé of a “gender-neutral” worker. Also, employers often begin the hiring process by either implicitly or explicitly seeking potential workers of a given sex. As a result of this sex categorization of applicants, status beliefs become salient in the hiring process as employers assess applications, interview job candidates, and talk with others in the organization in the hiring process. As discussed previously, gender-status beliefs contain general assumptions that men are more competent than women in general at most things and of course assumptions that men are more competent than women at stereotypically male tasks. As a result, employers often will have a preference for male workers (from auto repair shops to Wall Street), or at least believe that their customers or clients have this preference. These biased preferences affect hiring of women in many professions.

In addition, gender-status beliefs may affect employers’ judgments of applicants’ potential productivity. Male workers appear better or more qualified than equally qualified female workers. As a result of the double standard, two workers, one male and one female, who would perform equally well are judged to be different and are paid accordingly, based on this perceived difference in potential productivity (Ridgeway 1997, 2011).

Even on eBay auction transactions, women sellers receive a smaller number of bids and lower final prices than do men sellers, and this is so even when they are equally qualified and are selling the exact same product (Kricheli-Katz and Regev 2016). Examining data of transactions of the most popular products by private sellers between 2009 and 2012, researchers found that women sellers received about 80 cents for every dollar a man received, on average, even though they were selling the new identical product. They attribute the gap to the fairly successful ability of buyers to discern the gender of users, given that eBay does not reveal the gender of users, as a policy. People are more likely to assign a lower value to products sold by women than by men (Kricheli-Katz and Regev 2016). Not surprisingly, women buyers, on average, are more likely to pay more for the same products than men!

Another biased process in the workplace is described in the **motherhood penalty** (Benard and Correll 2010; Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). Being a parent leads to disadvantages in the workplace for women, but men benefit in the workplace from having children. Mothers are less likely to be hired than women who are not mothers and less likely to be promoted, on average. In contrast, fathers are perceived as more committed to paid work and are offered higher starting salaries on average than childless men. Why? Scholars

explain this pattern by noting that motherhood is a status characteristic. Mothers are evaluated as less competent and less committed to paid work than nonmothers. These cultural beliefs about mothers and fathers and about family wages still shape the allocation of rewards in the workplace (Benard and Correll 2010; Correll et al. 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004).

There are numerous consequences of status structures and status beliefs for interaction in groups and in the workplace, several of which we have mentioned previously. There are times when status structures have positive consequences. Having a clear status hierarchy in an emergency room or in the courtroom, for example, is important for smooth operations. In and of themselves, status hierarchies are not “bad.” Negative consequences occur when these status beliefs erroneously associate entire categories of people with levels of competence.

How Can Status Inequality in Groups Be Reduced?

How can we create situations where all members’ contributions are equally recognized in groups? How can people who possess status characteristics that are associated with less esteem acquire higher status in groups?

One way low-status members may be heard is by presenting their ideas and opinions in a way that demonstrates that they have the group’s interests at heart, rather than a way that demonstrates selfishness. In other words, if these individuals **act group-oriented**, rather than self-oriented, they are more likely to get influence in groups. When a member presents herself as group-oriented, she stresses the importance of cooperating and working together in a group; she presents her ideas for the good of the group, rather than in a way that makes it seem as if she is only looking out for herself. Indeed, Ridgeway (1982) found that when female members with male partners presented themselves as self-oriented, they were not very influential, but when they presented themselves as group-oriented, they were equally influential on their male partners. To acquire status in groups, then, low-status members must not act too uppity when presenting their ideas; they must instead show that they are expressing their ideas for the sake of the group (Ridgeway and Nakagawa 2014).

This strategy can be a pain in the butt, but it is often effective. You may use this technique sometimes (not always consciously) with older siblings, parents, bosses, or professors—you find yourself treading lightly when you disagree with them and want them to see a situation your way. That is, when you offer an opinion that is contrary to their own, you pad your arguments, making sure not to seem too abrasive so that they will listen to your opinion. In addition, Carli (1990, 1991) found that this strategy does work but can create a dilemma in certain situations. For example, she found that when women in all-female groups used a more tentative style with the other female members, they were not very influential, but when they were tentative with their male partners, they were influential. *Tentative speech* includes disclaimers (phrases used while presenting an idea that soften your idea such as, “I’m not really sure, but . . .”, “You know more than me about this, but . . .”, “I’m no expert, but . . .”) and qualifiers (adverbs used to soften the opinion such as maybe or perhaps). Carli shows that women face a dilemma in mixed-sex groups when they want to influence both men and women in the same group.

In an opinion piece in the *Washington Post* (Petri 2015), the author illustrates how a woman would have to say famous quotes during a meeting. For example, for the famous quote by Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” a woman in a meeting would have to say the following (catch all the tentative language!):

I have to say—I’m sorry—I have to say this. I don’t think we should be as scared of non-fear things as maybe we are? If that makes sense? Sorry, I feel like I’m rambling.

When low-status members use a group-motivated style, it helps them get influence in the group (Shackelford, Wood, and Worchel 1996). In addition, members award status to other members who demonstrate group orientation when they make contributions to the group task despite a personal cost (e.g., time and effort; Willer 2009). A member who contributes to the group’s goals signals his or her motivation to help the group. As a result, other group members award esteem to that member, and, in turn, this member continues to contribute to the group’s goals and also views the group more positively (Willer 2009).

A second way for low-status members to acquire status in groups is to **satisfy the burden of proof requirement**. One way to do this is to provide all group members with information that contradicts the performance expectations inferred from the diffuse status characteristic (Berger et al. 1980). But how do you do that? One way is to show to both the low- and high-status members that the low-status members have more relevant skills at the task than the other members. Recall that information on specific status characteristics (possession of skills or abilities relevant to specific group task) is weighted more heavily than information on diffuse status characteristics, although all information is combined. Such weighted combining reveals that a black doctor in a mixed-race medical setting will be more strongly affected by his occupational status than his race, but race will still have an effect on perceptions. It also implies, however, that a black doctor will have higher status than some whites in this medical setting if he is higher than they are on relevant skills.

An example of satisfying the burden of proof requirement is shown in some classic studies by Cohen and her colleagues (Cohen 1982; Cohen and Lotan 1997; Cohen and Roper 1972). They conducted studies in junior high schools and created a situation where they taught black students how to build a radio and then showed them how to teach another student to build a radio. In effect, the researchers created two specific status characteristics that were inconsistent with the students’ perceptions of the diffuse status characteristic: race. The researchers then had the black students teach the white students how to build a radio, thereby establishing the superiority of the black students relative to the white students. Finally, they also told the students that the skills involved in building the radio and teaching others to build it were relevant to another task, a decision-making game. When the students played this game, there was more equality between black and white students in terms of who exercised influence over the decisions. Importantly, this study and subsequent studies show that for this strategy to work, the performance expectations of both low- and high-status members must be changed simultaneously. This technique will not work if you change expectations of the low-status members only (Ridgeway and Nakagawa 2014).

Third, and related to the second technique, when the usual expectations for members with given diffuse status characteristics is challenged, this experience can transfer to the way people treat the next person they encounter with that characteristic. Studies show that when men work with women who are clearly more competent than themselves, this causes them to have somewhat higher performance expectations for the next woman they encounter (Markovsky, Smith, and Berger 1984; Pugh and Wahrman 1983; Wagner, Ford, and Ford 1986). This process is referred to as the **transfer effect**; members bring this challenging information about competence into new interactions. Studies show that this effect diminishes over each transfer if there is not renewed information about competence for status-disadvantaged members, but this effect does provide hope that cultural beliefs about the association between diffuse status characteristics and competence can be moderated over time.

Finally, if you **legitimate** a person in a position, such as a leader, supervisor, or manager of a group, this will help reduce the biased effects of status characteristics associated with low competence beliefs. If a person is legitimated, this means that she is backed up and supported by those above her and given the necessary resources to get her job done and the work of her subordinates. Those above her express that she is the right person to be in the leadership position. Legitimacy typically comes from some higher authority and can aid in reducing status inequality. In Chapter 10, we will see how legitimacy and status processes affect leadership and decision-making in groups and organizations.

Summary

As the previous section on status structures shows, status processes involve a stereotyping process where social characteristics are associated with broad cultural assumptions about who is competent and worthy and who is less competent and worthy. These status beliefs have astounding implications for behavior and decision-making in groups and in organizations. For example, assumptions about who is more worthy and competent affects labor market processes such as who gets hired in types of jobs, who is promoted in their jobs, and who has access to opportunities to get ahead on the job. These processes also operate in classrooms, mortgage lending offices, courtrooms, and doctors' offices, to name a few, as well in corporate boardrooms. Status beliefs are one critical mechanism that underlies the maintenance and perpetuation of social inequality. In order to continue to address how social inequality can be reduced, we have to understand how status processes create and sustain inequality (Ridgeway 2014; Ridgeway and Nakagawa 2014). In the next section, we examine how characteristics acquire status value.

How Do Characteristics Acquire Status Value in the First Place?

How does a social characteristic that distinguishes individuals, like gender or race, become a characteristic with status value instead of just a mere difference? The problem with diffuse status characteristics is not the "characteristic" part of the equation but the status part of the equation. For example, if people perceived

that blacks, whites, Latino/as, and Asians have similarities and differences, this would not be an issue. The problem is that people assume that people in one category (in this case, whites) are superior, more worthy, and more competent than people in other categories (in this case blacks and Latino/as). (This recalls our discussion in Chapter 4 about the social constructs of masculinity and femininity where “masculine” qualities are assumed to be more worthy and “better” than “feminine” qualities in general). The same can be said for other diffuse status characteristics, such as gender, occupation, physical attraction, and sexual orientation, to name a few. How, then, do social characteristics that distinguish people acquire this status value?

Ridgeway (1991, 2006, 2011; Correll and Ridgeway 2003) provides a theoretical explanation for how these recognized social differences become accepted indicators of social status in society so that some categories of people (e.g., whites, men) are perceived as more worthy and competent than other categories of people (e.g., blacks, women). She developed **status construction theory** to explain how the transformation of a mere difference into a widely accepted status characteristic may occur through repeated interactions. If we understand the structural conditions under which status beliefs arise around particular characteristics, then we can see how changes in the social structure can potentially alter these status beliefs over time.

Ridgeway (1991; Blau 1977) argues that there are four structural conditions, all sufficient, that facilitate this transformation. First, there must be *cooperative interdependence between people in the two categories of a social difference*. This means that people from both categories of a social characteristic in the population regularly interact with one another to achieve what they want or need. For example, in our society men and women regularly interact in a cooperatively and interdependent fashion to achieve their needs and goals.

Second, there must be an economic or other such advantage of one category in a population over the other category—that is, one category has more resources (the resource-rich) than another category (the resource-poor), on average. This means that there is a *resource inequality between the categories*. For example, women and people of color are resource disadvantaged relative to men and whites in many societies (e.g., based on wealth, income, and power). Other factors on which one category of people might be advantaged over another could be control of technology or moral evaluations (Webster and Hysom 1998).

Third, the *population is divided into categories that are readily distinguishable*, such as gender, race, or ethnicity. People can identify what category of the social characteristic members are in as they interact with one another. And fourth, there is a *correlation between the resource level and the category of the characteristic*. For example, in a society like the United States, the resource-rich individuals tend to be disproportionately male and white, and resource-poor individuals tend to be disproportionately female and black or Latino/a.

Under these conditions, a process takes place through repeated interactions. As described previously, in virtually all contexts in which people work on a shared task, a status hierarchy is likely to emerge among participants in these interactions in which some members are more active and influential and are thought to be better at the task than others (Berger et al. 1977; Berger et al. 1980). Ridgeway (1991) argues that resource advantage, however gained, is a biasing factor that provides

one category of people (let's refer to them as As) with an advantage over the other category (let's refer to them as Bs) in gaining influence and esteem in their group encounters (Berger et al. 1985).

According to reward expectations theory, as mentioned earlier, this is because people associate the resource advantage with competence; they assume that people with more resources are also better at most tasks than those with fewer resources. For example, in the United States, people assume that those who have more resources (money, land, wealth) are believed to be more competent than those with fewer resources (Berger et al. 1985). Is this true? No, but people assume that this connection is so—or at least assume that other people in general think that this is so. As a result, these resource-advantaged people act more leaderlike and appear more competent, thus creating a correspondence between the difference in a social characteristic and positions in the status hierarchy. In a sufficient number of encounters, it is the case that those individuals with more resources also tend to be of one category (such as men) who interact with people with fewer resources characterized by another category (such as women). These are called doubly dissimilar encounters. As a result, people begin to associate individuals from one category as more competent than those in the other category. Once this occurs, As (say, men) and Bs (say, women) in the population will carry these status beliefs into future encounters, favoring As as more worthy and competent than Bs.

Because more people develop beliefs favoring As than favoring Bs as repeated interactions continue, people who hold beliefs that favor As are more likely to have their beliefs supported in future encounters than people who hold contrary beliefs. As a result of this systematic advantage, status beliefs favoring As over Bs are likely to diffuse widely and become roughly consensual in the population. Once widely held status beliefs develop, they confer independent status value on the A/B characteristic so that As are advantaged over Bs across situations. That is, people believe that most people believe that people in Category A are more competent in general than people in Category B. This advantage occurs even in interactions where Bs are just as economically or otherwise resource privileged as As. Importantly, status beliefs become part of the implicit, taken-for-granted social framework of beliefs that individuals bring into encounters to frame their behavior. People operate as if these assumptions are true. Empirical evidence supports these arguments (Ridgeway and Correll 2006; Ridgeway et al. 1998; Ridgeway et al. 2009).

Brezina and Winder (2003) apply status construction theory to the case of race in the United States. They argue that there is an unequal distribution of economic resources between racial categories in the population; they focus specifically on whites and blacks. In the United States, whites, on average, have higher incomes and have abundantly more wealth (e.g., owning more property and earning more interest on mutual funds and stocks due to historical and legal reasons, such as inheritance laws) than blacks. In addition, the population is easily identified along the characteristic of race. People at least assume that they can identify the race of individuals in interaction. Finally, there is a correlation between resource level and race, where there is an “overrepresentation of blacks among the resource-poor” (Brezina and Winder 2003:406). Importantly, members of the population continually “see” the association between black skin color and resource poverty, both through interactions and through third parties, such as television news and other programs (Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). In fact, people tend to overestimate

this correlation, but it is the *perception* of this relationship between black skin color and poverty that matters. As a result, blacks inherit the relatively low status that is often assigned to resource-poor individuals. People associate blacks with being resource-poor and then associate blacks in general as less worthy and competent than whites.

Brezina and Winder (2003) show that, as a result, there is persistent negative racial stereotyping in the United States, even though traditional racial beliefs have declined in recent decades. Specifically, they find that, “The larger the perceived economic gap between whites and blacks—with blacks seen as relatively disadvantaged—the greater the whites’ tendency to stereotype blacks as lazy as opposed to hard-working” (Brezina and Winder 2003:415). The implication here is that if racial or economic inequalities were reduced, that would also decrease the perceived correlation between being black and low levels of competence. Racial stereotyping could be reduced by “(1) reducing media distortion, which tends to exaggerate the extent of economic failure among blacks, and (2) increasing awareness of structural barriers to economic success” (Brezina and Winder 2003:416).

Segue: Status and Power

In an innovative study, Taylor (2014) examines whether men and women who lose social influence in a group are likely to have a physiological stress response as a result. One of the author’s ideas is that achieving social influence in groups is also a way to achieve “masculinity.” When men do not achieve social influence, particularly with other men, they may experience stress because they fail to achieve masculinity by losing social influence. She refers to this as the “stigma of failed masculinity” (Taylor 2014:58).

Demonstrations of social influence and power are ways of enacting masculinity in everyday interaction (Ridgeway and Correll 2004). As you recall, men have higher status than women in society as discussed in this chapter, and masculinity is more highly valued in society than femininity (see Chapter 4). Taylor (2014) argues that sociologists can study the effects of loss of social influence by measuring cortisol response. Cortisol is a stress hormone that has been shown to be related to threats to social influence and status. Taylor found that men who lost social influence while working on a task with other men exhibited stress measured by a cortisol response. Women, on the other hand, did not have a cortisol response to loss of social influence when they worked on a task with other women or other men. And men who worked on a task with women also did not exhibit a cortisol response. These results show that loss of influence is important to men, especially men interacting with other men. In addition, Taylor (2015:57) notes, “When men’s social influence, and thus masculinity, is compromised they are at risk of stigmatization because masculinity in the U.S. is associated with status, power, and competence.”

In the next chapter, we examine power processes and their link to status processes. Status structures clearly have an impact on behavior in groups, but so do power relations among group members. We all experience power in our relationships, but what is power, and what are the consequences of using power? In the next chapter, we define power and power use and then look at the effects of power relations on behavior in relationships.

Suggested Readings

- Biagas, David E., Jr., and Alison J. Bianchi. 2016. "The Latin Americanization Thesis: An Expectation States Approach." *Social Forces* 94:1335–58.
- Correll, Shelley J., Erin L. Kelly, Lindsey Trimble O'Connor, and Joan C. Williams. 2014. "Redesigning, Redefining Work." *Work and Occupations* 41:3–17.
- King, Ryan D., and Brian D. Johnson. 2016. "A Punishing Look: Skin Tone and Afrocentric Features in the Halls of Justice." *American Journal of Sociology* 122:90–124.
- Kuwabara, Ko, Sigu Yu, Alice J. Lee, and Adam D. Galinsky. 2016. "Status Decreases Dominance in the West but Increases Dominance in the East." *Psychological Science* 27:127–37.
- Lynn, Freda B., Mark H. Walker, and Colin Peterson. 2016. "Is Popular More Likeable? Choice Status by Intrinsic Appeal in an Experimental Music Market." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 79:168–80.
- Rudman, Laurie A., Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, Julie E. Phelan, and Sanne Nauts. 2012. "Status Incongruity and Backlash Effects: Defending the Gender Hierarchy Motivates Prejudice against Female Leaders." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 48:165–79.
- Thebaud, Sarah. 2015. "Status Beliefs and the Spirit of Capitalism: Accounting for Gender Biases in Entrepreneurship and Innovation." *Social Forces* 94:61–86.

References

- Allen, Vernon L., and John M. Levine. 1969. "Consensus and Conformity." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 5(4):389–99. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(69)90032-8
- Asch, Solomon E. 1951. "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments." Pp. 177–90 in *Groups, Leadership, and Men*, edited by H. Guetzkow. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press.
- Asch, Solomon E. 1955. "Opinions and Social Pressure." *Scientific American* 193:31–5. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican1155-31
- Asch, Solomon E. 1957. "An Experimental Investigation of Group Influence." Pp. 17–24 in *Symposium on Preventative and Social Psychiatry*, Part 3, edited by Walter Army Medical Center and the National Research Council. Washington, DC: Walter Reed Army Institute of Research.
- Bales, Robert F. 1950. *Interaction Process Analysis: A Method for the Study of Small Groups*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Bales, Robert F. 1970. *Personality and Interpersonal Behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Benard, Stephen, and Shelley J. Correll. 2010. "Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood Penalty." *Gender & Society* 24:616–46. doi:10.1177/0891243210383142
- Berger, Joseph M., Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and Morris Zelditch. 1977. *Status Characteristics and Social Interaction: An Expectation-States Approach*. New York: Elsevier.
- Berger, Joseph M., Susan J. Rosenholtz, and Morris Zelditch Jr. 1980. "Status Organizing Processes." *Annual Review of Sociology* 6:479–508. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.06.080180.002403

- Berger, Joseph M., David G. Wagner, and Morris Zelditch. 1985. "Expectations States Theory: Review and Assessment." Pp. 1–72 in *Status, Rewards, and Influence: How Expectations Organize Behavior*, edited by J. Berger and M. Zelditch. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Blau, Peter. 1977. *Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Bond, Rod, and Peter B. Smith. 1996. "Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using Asch's (1952b, 1956) Line Judgement Task." *Psychological Bulletin* 119:111–37. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.111
- Brezina, Timothy, and Kenisha Winder. 2003. "Economic Disadvantage, Status Generalization, and Negative Racial Stereotyping by White Americans." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 66:402–18. doi:10.2307/1519837
- Carli, Linda L. 1990. "Gender, Language, and Influence." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59:941–51. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.5.941
- Carli, Linda L. 1991. "Gender, Status, and Influence." Pp. 89–114 in *Advances in Group Processes: Theory and Research*, edited by E. J. Lawler, B. Markovsky, C. Ridgeway, and H. A. Walker. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Cartwright, Dorwin, and Alvin Zander. 1968. "Power and Influence in Groups: An Introduction." Pp. 215–35 in *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, edited by D. Cartwright and A. Zander. New York: Harper & Row.
- Cohen, Elizabeth G. 1982. "Expectation States and Interracial Interaction in School Settings." *Annual Review of Sociology* 8:209–35. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.08.080182.001233
- Cohen, Elizabeth G., and R. A. Lotan. 1997. *Working for Equity in Heterogeneous Classrooms*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Cohen, Elizabeth G., and S. Roper. 1972. "Modification of Interracial Interaction Disability: Application of Status Characteristics Theory." *American Sociological Review* 37:643–55. doi:10.2307/2093576
- Cook, Karen S. 1975. "Expectations, Evaluations, and Equity." *American Sociological Review* 40:372–88. doi:10.2307/2094464
- Correll, Shelley J., Stephen Benard, and In Paik. 2007. "Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?" *American Journal of Sociology* 112:1297–338. doi:10.1086/511799
- Correll, Shelley J., and Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2003. "Expectation States Theory." Pp. 29–51 in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, edited by J. DeLamater. New York: Plenum.
- Cross, Theodore. 1985. *The Black Power Imperative: Racial Inequality and the Politics of Nonviolence*. New York: Faulkner.
- DeLamater, John D., and Daniel J. Myers. 2007. *Social Psychology*. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Ettinger, Ronald F., C. J. Marino, Norman S. Endler, Sheldon H. Geller, and Taras Natiuk. 1971. "Effects of Agreement and Correctness on Relative Competence and Conformity." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 19(2):204–12. doi:10.1037/h0031275
- Fiske, Susan T., Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick, and Jun Xu. 2002. "A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82(6):878–902. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878
- Forsyth, Donelson R. 2014. *Group Dynamics*. 6th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Foschi, Martha. 1996. "Double Standards in the Evaluation of Men and Women." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 59:237–54. doi:10.2307/2787021
- Foschi, Martha. 2000. "Double Standards for Competence: Theory and Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26:21–42. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.21

- Griggs, Richard A. 2015. "The Disappearance of Independence in Textbook Coverage of Asch's Social Pressure Experiments." *Teaching of Psychology* 42:137–42. doi:10.1177/0098628315569939
- Harrod, Wendy J. 1980. "Expectations from Unequal Rewards." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 43:126–30. doi:10.2307/3033756
- Hashimoto, Hirofumi, Yang Li, and Toshio Yamagishi. 2011. "Beliefs and Preferences in Cultural Agents and Cultural Game Players." *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 14:140–47. doi:10.1111/j.1467-839X.2010.01337.x
- Hoffman, Hunter G., Pär Anders Granhag, Sheree T. Kwong See, and Elizabeth F. Loftus. 2001. "Social Influences on Reality-Monitoring Decisions." *Memory & Cognition* 29:394–404. doi:10.3758/BF03196390
- Hogg, Michael A., and Joel Cooper. 2003. *The Sage Handbook of Social Psychology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hysom, Stuart J. 2009. "Status Valued Goal Objects and Performance Expectations." *Social Forces* 87:1623–48. doi:10.1353/sof.0.0160
- Jackson, Pamela Braboy, Peggy A. Thoits, and Howard F. Taylor. 1995. "Composition of the Workplace and Psychological Well-Being: The Effects of Tokenism on America's Black Elite." *Social Forces* 74:543–57. doi:10.2307/2580491
- Janes, Leslie M., and James M. Olson. 2000. "Jeer Pressure: The Behavioral Effects of Observing Ridicule of Others." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26:474–85. doi:10.1177/0146167200266006
- Janis, Irving L. 1982. *Groupthink*. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Kalkoff, Will, C. Wesley Younts, and Lisa Troyer. 2011. "Do Others' Views of Us Transfer to New Groups and Tasks? An Expectation States Approach." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 74:267–90. doi:10.1177/0190272511416105
- Kemper, Theodore D. 1991. "Predicting Emotions from Social Relations." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 54:330–42. doi:10.2307/2786845
- Kricheli-Katz, Tamar, and Tali Regev. 2016. "How Many Cents on the Dollar? Women and Men in Product Markets." *Science Advances* 2(2):e1500599. doi:10.1126/sciadv.1500599
- Lickel, Brian, David L. Hamilton, Grazyna Wierzchowska, Amy Lewis, Steven J. Sherman, and Neville A. Uhles. 2000. "Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 78:223–46. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.2.223
- Lively, Kathryn J., and Brian Powell. 2006. "Emotional Expression at Work and at Home: Domain, Status, or Individual Characteristics?" *Social Psychology Quarterly* 69:17–38. doi:10.1177/019027250606900103
- Lovaglia, Michael J., and Jeffrey A. Houser. 1996. "Emotional Reactions and Status in Groups." *American Sociological Review* 61:867–83. doi:10.2307/2096458
- Lovaglia, Michael J., Jeffrey W. Lucas, Jeffrey A. Houser, Shane R. Thye, and Barry Markovsky. 1998. "Status Processes and Mental Ability Test Scores." *American Journal of Sociology* 68:464–80.
- Lucas, Jeffrey W. 1999. "Behavioral and Emotional Outcomes of Leadership in Task Groups." *Social Forces* 78:747–78. doi:10.2307/3005574
- Markovsky, Barry, Leroy F. Smith, and Joseph Berger. 1984. "Do Status Interventions Persist?" *American Sociological Review* 49:373–82. doi:10.2307/2095281
- Melamed, David, and Scott V. Savage. 2013. "Status, Numbers and Influence." *Social Forces* 91:1085–104. doi:10.1093/sf/sos194
- Pendry, Louise, and Rachael Carrick. 2001. "Doing What the Mob Do: Priming Effects on Conformity." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 31:83–92. doi:10.1002/ejsp.33

- Petri, Alexandra. 2015. "Famous Quotes, The Way a Woman Would Have to Say Them during a Meeting." *Washington Post*, October 13.
- Pugh, Meredith D., and Ralph Wahrman. 1983. "Neutralizing Sexism in Mixed-Sex Groups: Do Women Have to be Better than Men?" *American Journal of Sociology* 88:746–62. doi:10.1086/227731
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 1982. "Status in Groups: The Importance of Motivation." *American Sociological Review* 47:76–88. doi:10.2307/2095043
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 1991. "The Social Construction of Status Value: Gender and Other Nominal Characteristics." *Social Forces* 7(2):367–86.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 1997. "Interaction and the Conservation of Gender Inequality: Considering Employment." *American Sociological Review* 62:218–35. doi:10.2307/2657301
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2006. "Status Construction Theory." Pp. 301–23 in *Contemporary Social Psychological Theories*, edited by P. J. Burke. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2011. *Framed by Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the Modern World*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2014. "Why Status Matters for Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 79:1–16. doi:10.1177/0003122413515997
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., Kristen Backor, Yan E. Li, Justine E. Tinkler, and Kristan G. Erickson. 2009. "How Easily Does a Social Difference Become a Status Distinction? Gender Matters." *American Sociological Review* 74:44–62. doi:10.1177/000312240907400103
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., Elizabeth E. Boyle, Kathy Kuipers, and Dawn Robinson. 1998. "How Do Status Beliefs Develop? The Role of Resources and Interaction." *American Sociological Review* 63:331–50. doi:10.2307/2657553
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Shelley J. Correll. 2004. "Motherhood as a Status Characteristic." *The Journal of Social Issues* 60:683–700. doi:10.1111/j.0022-4537.2004.00380.x
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Shelley J. Correll. 2006. "Consensus and the Creation of Status Beliefs." *Social Forces* 85:431–53. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0139
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Kristan G. Erickson. 2000. "Creating and Spreading Status Beliefs." *American Journal of Sociology* 106:579–615. doi:10.1086/318966
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Cathryn Johnson. 1990. "What Is the Relationship between Socioemotional Behavior and Status in Task Groups?" *American Journal of Sociology* 95:1189–1212. doi:10.1086/229426
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Sandra Nakagawa. 2014. "Status." Pp. 3–26 in *Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality*, edited by J. McLeod, E. Lawler, and M. Schwalbe. New York: Springer.
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1999. "The Gender System and Interaction." *Annual Review of Sociology* 25:191–216. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.191
- Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Henry A. Walker. 1995. "Status Structures." Pp. 281–310 in *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology*, edited by K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine, and J. S. House. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Shackelford, Susan, Wendy Wood, and Stephen Worchel. 1996. "Behavioral Styles and the Influence of Women in Mixed Sex Groups." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 59:284–93. doi:10.2307/2787024
- Sherif, Muzafer. 1935. "A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception." *Archives of Psychology* 187:60.
- Sherif, Muzafer. 1936. *The Psychology of Social Norms*. New York: Harper.
- Snyder, Mark, Elizabeth D. Tanke, and Ellen Berscheid. 1977. "Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 35:656–66. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.656

- Stewart, Penni A., and James C. Moore, Jr. 1992. "Wage Disparities and Performance Expectations." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 55:78–85. doi:10.2307/2786688
- Strodtbeck, Fred L., Rita M. James, and Charles Hawkins. 1957. "Social Status in Jury Deliberations." *American Sociological Review* 22:713–19. doi:10.2307/2089202
- Taylor, Catherine J. 2014. "Physiological Stress Response to Loss of Social Influence and Threats to Masculinity." *Social Science & Medicine* 103:51–9. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.07.036
- Troyer, Lisa, and C. Wesley Younts. 1997. "Whose Expectations Matter? The Relative Power of First- and Second-order Expectations in Determining Social Influence." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:692–732. doi:10.1086/231253
- Turner, John C., Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. Wetherell. 1987. *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
- Wagner, David G., and Joseph Berger. 1997. "Gender and Interpersonal Task Behaviors: Status Expectation Accounts." *Sociological Perspectives* 40:1–32. doi:10.2307/1389491
- Wagner, David G., and Joseph Berger. 2002. "Expectation States Theory: An Evolving Research Program." Pp. 41–76 in *New Directions in Contemporary Sociological Theory*, edited by J. Berger and M. Zelditch. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Wagner, David G., Rebecca S. Ford, and Thomas W. Ford. 1986. "Can Gender Inequalities be Reduced?" *American Sociological Review* 51:47–61. doi:10.2307/2095477
- Webster, Murray, Jr., and James E. Driskell. 1978. "Status Generalization: A Review and Some New Data." *American Sociological Review* 43:220–36. doi:10.2307/2094700
- Webster, Murray, Jr., and Martha Foschi. 1988. *Status Generalization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Webster, Murray, Jr., and Stuart J. Hysom. 1998. "Creating Status Characteristics." *American Sociological Review* 63:351–78. doi:10.2307/2657554
- Webster, Murray, Jr., and Lisa Slattery Walker. 2014. "Emotions in Expectation States Theory." Pp. 127–53 in *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, Vol. 2, edited by Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner. New York: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9130-4_7
- Webster, Murray, Jr., and James Whitmeyer. 1999. "A Theory of Second-order Expectations and Behavior." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 62:17–31. doi:10.2307/2695823
- Willer, Robb. 2009. "Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem." *American Sociological Review* 74:23–43. doi:10.1177/000312240907400102
- Williams v. Florida*, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
- Wood, Wendy, and Steven J. Karten. 1986. "Sex Differences in Interaction Style as a Product of Perceived Sex Differences in Competence." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50:341–47. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.50.2.341

Do not copy, post, or distribute