Television in our world is an increasingly complex system with global, transnational, translocal, national, regional, metropolitan, and local spaces, dynamics, players, and flows. The rapid global extension of economic and technological changes has reframed the possibilities of television around the world. However, the realization of those possibilities is a much more complex historical process, involving the hybridization of various global and local elements and influences over time. What emerges is multiple spaces or levels of television production, flow, and reception, corresponding to multiple levels of culture and identity.

Television is the focus of this book because it continues to be the main source of news and entertainment for most people in the world. Hesmondalgh (in press) noted that cultural industries are still central to our lives because they create the media texts that influence our understanding of the world. And, for most people in most countries, television remains the central element in their consumption of the cultural industries. A television set (or a better television set) is the main consumer priority for most people in the developing world (and still a high priority elsewhere, as large recent spending on digital high-definition television sets in the richer countries also shows).
A key first note is what is meant by television. Allen (2004) mentioned several possibilities for what might be included in studies of television, including technological elements, programming, forms of narrative such as genre, a set of institutions, and a social experience for both producers and audiences. In this book, I look primarily at broadcast television because, taking a global view, that is what the large majority of the world’s television viewers still watch; however, in several chapters, I also discuss satellite, cable, and Internet-based television because those are growing in importance for many. Programming is closely examined in terms of production, flows between cultures, and genres, whereas I include readings of specific television narratives only as examples. Some excellent global television studies books examine specific narratives—for example, Kumar (2006); I take a more systemic focus. I look extensively at the institutions of television, particularly broadcast television, but also transnational satellite television corporations and institutions, such as Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation or the BBC. I also look theoretically and practically at the experience of producers, and I look extensively at audience experience, their identities, their choices, the ideas that inform their choices, and the sense they make of what they watch. So I take a fairly holistic approach, as urged by critical scholars from Schiller (1969) to Miller (2005), except for the close reading of texts. This analysis tries to bridge international communication and cultural studies, as excellent recent work by Kraidy (2005) and others have done, but the approach is probably more sociological than literary.

One of the key arguments of this book is that television, particularly national broadcast television channels, is still the dominant framework for news and for cultural forums (Newcomb & Hirsch, 1994) and discussions, for most people in most cultures and nations. Television still forms a dominant layer of media experience for most people, although admittedly it is supplemented more and more by other layers and other media. Television also means very different things to people in various cultures and countries, as I will begin to map out in this book.

Television is changing, both globally and nationally. The dominance of national public or state broadcasters in most nations has eroded but not disappeared. In particular, Western Europe is making a real effort to hang on to what are often passionately felt to be the benefits of public television. The new technologies for producing and distributing television have expanded to almost all countries in the past few decades, enabling a number of new channels to appear. However, in many of the lowest income countries, very few people have access to more than a few broadcast channels, and many do not even have effective access at home to those. The capitalist or market model of economics
has also expanded to almost all the world, which tends to make television a commercial vehicle for advertising and tilt its content toward entertainment in most countries. However, the meaning of capitalism and commercial media varies a great deal between China, the United States, and Russia, for example. Much of what is called globalization centers on these forces of economy and technology (Castells, 1997), which have expanded quickly across the world, leading many to focus on the recent geographic or spatial extension of global forces. However, as these forces move into a new country or cultural space, they hybridize, becoming part of the ongoing history of that country, interacting with previous forces, and becoming localized, enacted, and received by local people with their own identities, histories, and agendas. New trends in economy and technology can be drastically rolled back; Russia, for example, has converted several major independent commercial television networks back to state enterprises to better control them politically (Mydans, 2004).

Television is a very plural phenomenon for many, with cable and satellite television dominant in the richest countries, having more than 80% penetration in the United States, for example. For the minority who have access to the Internet, television is becoming even more diverse, with all kinds of clips and short programs offered by a wide diversity of amateur as well as professional producers. For many, those new channels often come from outside their nation or culture. However, for many, if not most people around the world, television is still primarily broadcast television coming from national networks, supplemented in some places by regional networks at the provincial or local level. Many of the programs carried on satellite, Internet or DVD originated as nationally based broadcast or satellite/cable programs. However, many national programs are based on global or regional models, so national television itself must be problematized and understood in new hybrid or glocal (local adaptations of global) forms.

Central Issues

This book is divided into chapters that address aspects of an overall argument. This first chapter gives an overview of that argument and lays out some underlying theoretical premises on which the whole book builds.

In the first section of the book, I examine historical patterns of cultural development, patterns of control often referred to as political-economic, and global versus national struggles to define and construct the use of the technologies, economic models, and cultural frameworks that define what television means in a given place and time. It follows this chain of arguments.
1. Nearly all television systems work within long-term patterns of language and culture that sometimes coincide with nation-states but are frequently either larger—the Arabic-speaking world—or smaller—several states in India that have distinctive systems of language, culture, religion, and television. (Chapter 2)

2. As nation-states were created or became independent of colonial powers from the late 1700s on, most of those states tried to create a sense of nationality or imagined national community (Anderson, 1983), using media. Since 1950, television has often been the primary tool in this effort, giving it a national focus. (Chapter 3)

3. That national focus of control has been strongly challenged, but not necessarily overturned, by the processes often referred to as globalization since the 1980s or 1990s. (Chapter 4)

   In the next section, I take a more contemporary focus on specific uses of technology, patterns of program development and flow, genres of television, the interaction of producers and audiences, and patterns of audience choice among emerging alternatives. The book’s chain of arguments resumes:

4. Two potentially contradictory roles of satellite, cable, and Internet technologies have permitted greater flows of television across cultures, with implications often described as cultural imperialism or homogenization. However, computer and other television production technologies have also made it possible for television production and distribution to take place at ever smaller and simpler levels by radically increased numbers of people and groups. For example, Osama bin Laden may be videotaped in a cave in Afghanistan and broadcast by a regional Arabic network, Al-Jazeera, challenging the prior global dominance of both U.S. political and media power. (Chapter 5)

5. Producers and networks have developed diverse production formats and genres that fit their understanding of the cultural nature of their audiences or markets, so that, in effect, culture defines markets, principally at local, national, regional, and cultural linguistic levels. Producers and audiences interact in the production and evolution of genres: globally, within nations, and across cultural-linguistic regions. Television production and flow has changed toward greater national and transnational cultural-linguistic or regional production consumption, particularly in certain specific genres such as variety and talk shows. (Chapter 6)

6. The dominant global exports of the United States and other major exporters are increasingly focused in certain genres, such as action-adventure
television series and drama or feature films, where higher production costs make widespread production prohibitive. Global and transnational satellite channels also cross borders but have to adapt to their audiences. Instead of canned programs, genres and licensed television formats increasingly flow across borders. They are adapted to local, national, and regional cultures but still bring complex transnational influences with them. (Chapter 7)

Finally, the last section of the book examines how the audience for these evolving forms of television is structured, how the audience itself restructures production and genres through its choices and reactions, what cultural patterns underlie audience choices, and how these forces or patterns of television have an impact on both cultural formations and individual identities. The chain of arguments concludes:

7. Audiences feel competing sets of proximities or attractions to programs from different places; the Latin American telenovela is one example. Audiences are structured both by the evolving cultures they live in and by structures of class, race, gender, and cultural geography in terms of the program choices and interpretations they make of local, national, regional, and global television programs. The primary example discussed is the diverse audiences in Brazil, where the author and his colleagues have done fieldwork for 30 years. (Chapter 8)

8. The cultural impacts and uses of television can be understood in terms of a twin process of hybridization and formation of multiple layers of identity among audiences, which guides audience choices and structures impacts on them. The chapter draws on fieldwork by the author and colleagues in Brazil and among Latinos in Texas. (Chapter 9)

Globalization and Culture

Some fear that globalization implies a global cultural homogenization. Appadurai (1996) thought extensive cultural homogenization was unlikely and cited as opposing evidence the anthropological record, what he called the archive of lived actualities, found in all sorts of ethnographies. . . . This archive, and the sensibility that it produces in the professional anthropologist, predisposes me strongly toward the idea that globalization is not the story of cultural homogenization. (p. 11)

More likely is a varied kind of cultural globalization that is perhaps better theorized as hybridization or glocalization. In hybridization, global forces
bring change, but that change is adapted into existing ways of doing things via a historical process in which existing local forces mix with new global ones, producing neither global homogenization nor authentic local culture, but a complex new hybrid with multiple layers of culture, where older, traditional forms may persist alongside new ones. This situation is neither a complete resistance to rejoice about nor a complete loss of identity to despair about, but a complex contradiction of both continuity and change.

Globalization is different in various world regions. For example, although most European and African countries continue to import television programs primarily from the United States and relatively little from each other, that is less true in Latin America and the Middle East, where cultural trade within cultural-linguistic regions is large and growing. East Asian countries, which also used to import television almost exclusively from the United States, have begun to import more from each other in the past few years. Between 2002 and 2006, for example, the hot new phenomenon in television imports in East Asia was dramas from South Korea, not Hollywood. Latin American television markets are more likely to import American production ideas and genres than American programs in prime time, although they still import many U.S. programs to fill up the rest of the 24-hour broadcast day. So they are still engaged in globalization, but in a very different way.

One of the main limits on globalization in media and culture is that relatively few people have a primarily global identity. There is a small, important global professional elite, who move easily between cultures, who probably identify more with the company or nongovernmental organization (NGO) that employs them or the cause they espouse than the nation in which they were born. For most people, however, identity still tends to be based in language, religion, geography, history, ethnicity, collective memory, and political power apparatuses (Castells, 1997). Those elements of identity tend to correspond to smaller, more discrete levels of culture than the global. Many people increasingly have multiple levels of identity, but most are still local, metropolitan, subnational/provincial (like Quebec), or national. However, many are also migrating or otherwise adding strong layers of transitional identity, which can stretch within a geocultural region. For example, a Mexican family migrates to the United States and begins to add a layer of U.S. cultural influence. At the same time, members stretch out or back within a cultural-linguistic space or market, when that family watches Mexican telenovelas on Hispanic U.S. channels to stay in touch with their cultural roots (Rojas, Straubhaar, Fuentes, & Piñon, 2004).

Given the forces for continuity of local and national identities, as well as for globalization, one sees contradictory trends; for example, the expression of local identity via an imported genre, as when the American soap opera is
transformed into the Latin American *telenovela*. Robertson (1995) aptly noted that people now tend to see the global replication of ideas and models for how to express locality and local identity, a process he terms *glocalization*. However, even when a form of television is imported for explicitly commercial purposes, such as the licensing and local production of the reality show *Big Brother* in a number of countries, it may still end up expressing local culture to many in its audience. Young *Big Brother* fans in France, Italy, and Portugal were often pleased to see young people on screen that they felt they could identify with, even though some critics of those versions of *Big Brother* showed that these “local” productions imported global stereotypes in those same characters (based on reviews from those countries).

In many developing countries, media, particularly radio and television, have been powerful recent forces for consolidating national identities that had previously been nascent or fragile. In the second half of the 20th century, television took up and extended the role ascribed to newspapers and novels in the 19th century (Anderson, 1983). This reflects a strong priority by most developing nation-states to try to use electronic media to push or even create a sense of national identity (Katz & Wedell, 1976).

In this book, I argue that national cultures, national markets supported by national governments, and national television networks still dominate the television viewing reality of most audiences. Note that this is more true of television more than other media. In a new study of Brazil, the author is discovering that film, by contrast, tends to be more of a globalizing force and that music, in recordings or on the radio, tends to be a complex force with truly local, national, and global elements all strongly visible.

One can also see the development of regions or markets, based on both geography and cultural-linguistic identity groupings, which are less than global but more than national. In fact, two types of cultural-linguistic spaces or markets can be distinguished. Geocultural markets are cultural-linguistic spaces that are also contiguous or closely linked by geography. Transnational cultural-linguistic markets can be spread all over the planet by colonization—for example, the former Portuguese empire, which has produced the modern Lusophone cultural-linguistic market for television—or by massive migration, such as the Chinese, Indian, or Turkish diasporas across continents. In this book, I argue that in television, this trend toward geocultural and transnational cultural-linguistic regions or spaces is perhaps just as crucial as globalization per se. In Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, hundreds of millions of people regularly watch transnational regional soap operas, comedies, news, and variety shows—far more than watch the truly global channels, such as CNN, Discovery, HBO, or MTV. Although it
is still less important in most countries due to costs, subnational provincial or local television also grows in importance in many larger countries.

Complexity, Structuration, and Cultural Agents

In this book, I propose an analytical structure for understanding global, regional, national, metropolitan, and provincial culture industry systems such as television. The analysis focuses on three main ideas. First, that television creation, flow, and reception are bounded but not determined by political, economic, and institutional structures. Second, those structures, plus similar structures of technology, provide resources as well as constraints for cultural agents, such as television producers and consumers. Third, that rules and patterns grow within those boundaries but are shaped both by institutions and those who work within them. The argument draws on common elements from Raymond Williams’s (1980) analysis of base and superstructure, complexity theory (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Urry, 2003), and Anthony Giddens’s (1984) analysis of structuration.

The main structuring elements for world television are: economic frameworks, technological bases, institutional forms of organization and operation, genres and forms of television content, and enduring cultural definitions and values. In terms of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), these structural elements form boundaries within which cultural forces and agents, such as television producers, distributors, and viewers, operate. The structures of television limit what is possible. For example, commercial television systems tend to produce few documentaries, educational programs, or one-episode dramas. However, within those boundaries, the same structures also provide resources to cultural forces and agents to create and consume quite a few other kinds of television programs and other cultural products (Giddens, 1984).

Complexity theory argues against linear notions of cause and effect. Overly linear and deterministic analyses of both economic structures and technological impacts have hampered understanding (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Urry, 2003). A number of the main theories of international structural and cultural interaction, such as cultural imperialism and cultural dependency, have offered great insight while being at the same time overly linear and deterministic. This characteristic is shared by a number of analyses of the international and domestic impacts of technology, whether of television, satellite and cable television, or, more recently, the Internet. What complexity theory offers is a sense of complex possibilities, hard to predict exactly but bounded by certain factors, such as technology and economics, and patterned by others, such as cultural formations like genres that flow among television systems.
Complexity theory focuses on people, groups, and institutions as agents who employ strategies based on their experience with previous variations of work, watching, producing, interacting with and learning from others, and selecting/refining strategies as they go along (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000). These agents work within boundaries established by structural forces, such as economic and technological change, and previous cultural patterns that accumulate out of the history of their shared group experiences. They work with patterns established over time, which complexity theorists sometimes call fractals, small patterns that reflect larger wholes, the way a soap opera can contain both enjoyable cultural themes and commercial imperatives to buy more soap (González, 1987, 1997). For example, the historical interaction of Latin Americans with Spain and Portugal established a pattern in which media were owned by major elite families. After the nations of Latin America achieved independence, their subsequent interactions with U.S. advertisers, agencies, and networks introduced ideas of how to construct commercial television networks, based on American patterns but adapted over time to Latin American commercial realities. U.S. companies, such as Colgate-Palmolive, introduced specific genres—for example, radio and television soap operas—into Latin America to sell their soap (or other products), but local agents (producers, writers, etc.) mixed that genre with ongoing local traditions of melodrama, testing variations on audiences; over time, this resulted in the telenovela (Martín-Barbero, 1993). The telenovela bears a familial resemblance to U.S. soaps but has emerged over time as a quite distinctive form, innovative to the point where U.S. soap producers now borrow format ideas back from it (Bielby & Harrington, 2005).

Structuration is remarkably similar in key points. This theory is Giddens’s (1984) effort to reconcile the effects of structures and institutions on society with the existence of agency exercised by individuals and groups, which often seem to go against the determining effects of the structures. Giddens “proposes that we consider structure as a duality including constraining rules and enabling resources” (Mosco, 1996). Working within constraining rules or boundaries imposed by structures and institutions, but with enabling resources and guiding patterns often provided by those same structures, individuals and groups produce cultural products like television, move them around the globe, and make meaning of them within other patterns provided by culture.

A complementary set of ideas comes from another sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. He establishes several ideas that I use in this book. One is that agents can acquire and use cultural, economic, and other forms of capital from education, family, and social networks (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986). Another is that people and groups acquire and use such capital competitively.
in certain specific fields of endeavor, such as cultural production (Johnson, 1993) or journalism (Marlière, 1998). Another is that individuals acquire certain dispositions over time about how to acquire and use capital, and groups acquire collective dispositions that Bourdieu (1998) referred to as class or group *habitus*. Many of these ideas are useful for examining both television producers and audiences in terms of how they work within the social structures they inhabit and how they make decisions about what to produce and what to watch.

Another compatible set of ideas comes from Raymond Williams (1980), especially his discussion of classic Marxist and post-Marxist problems of structure or materialism and culture. Williams wanted to rethink Marxist analysis in which the economic bases of society were seen as determining culture outcomes; he thought this view was simplistic. As an alternative, Williams discussed the role of institutions and structures in creating rules and resources for cultural agents; television producers work with them, and audiences interpret cultural products. He also tended to view industrialization and commodification of culture as complex, constraining some forms of culture and enabling others (Hesmondalgh, in press).

Putting several of these ideas from complexity theory, Bourdieu, Giddens, and Williams together, I will emphasize several key underlying theoretical constructs. The first set has to do with different processes in how structures of economy, technology, and institutional organization affect the production of culture for television and its consumption by audiences.

**Boundaries.** A number of kinds of forces tend to create boundaries that limit, guide, and constrain (Urry, 2003). These tend be material, for example, economic or geographic limits, but can be both economic and social, such as the access of different groups of class, age, gender, and ethnicity to certain kinds of media in nonlocal languages. Common boundaries are the wealth available to finance television, access to technology for production or distribution, and limits on producers imposed by institutional models. Complexity theory emphasizes how discovering the key boundaries to a phenomenon enables understanding the limits within which that phenomenon will play out, even if the result is not precisely predictable.

**Cultural constraints or dispositions.** Culture can restrain use of a technology, as Williams (1980) observed, or an economic model. For example, some Islamic ideas on the use of human images restricted the initial use of television in Saudi Arabia and led to its abolition in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Ideology can limit acceptability of a new idea. Social democratic governments in Europe long resisted commercial television in favor of
publicly owned television. Cultural dispositions, building on Bourdieu, can also lead individuals, groups, and societies in certain directions; for example, the policy tradition of the United States tends to prefer private initiatives over public ones, even when either would be acceptable under law.

**Rules.** Cultural systems tend to have either formal rules, as Williams (1980) observed, or patterns of behavior, as described by complexity theory, that condition or guide the way that culture is created. For example, professional socialization of producers/editors, institutional rules by networks or governments, and ground rules set by religion and culture all tend to define what is news or what makes for a good soap opera.

**Enabling forces and conditions.** Although any kind of structure imposes boundaries, limits, and conditions, it also tends to bring with it new ideas or resources (Williams, 1980) for cultural production and broadcasting. Advertising-based, privately owned commercial networks can disrupt an existing public service television system, but they can also bring in new resources to make more production possible, within the new limits.

**Resources.** Similarly, institutions and structures place boundaries and rules around what cultural producers can do, but they also provide resources to work with, an idea common to Williams, Giddens, and complexity theory. So the classic Hollywood studio production system might have seemed a straitjacket on creativity to some, but those who were able to work within that system made quite a remarkable number and variety of films, showing what some called “the genius of the system” (Schatz, 1988).

The second set of processes and actors has to do with how cultural actors, both producers and audiences, work within structures and how actions by those cultural agents or actors cumulate into larger patterns of culture.

**Cultural agents.** These include both producers and consumers of cultural products like television. Although people work within structures, they also constitute and recreate what is thought of as structure (Giddens, 1984). The structures of television require buildings and equipment, but the real structure is the organization and actions, person by person, of the productive processes that use the buildings and equipment.

**Patterns.** Although it isn’t always easy to predict what kinds of cultural forms television will produce or what forms television institutions will take, there are patterns that tend to replicate globally, then adapt to regional, national, or local situations, as complexity theory describes for various
complex systems (Urry, 2003). Patterns can be strong institutional models—for example, the pattern of commercial broadcasting that is being driven globally by economic changes—or they can be smaller patterns within that larger one, for example, the global predominance now of soap operas, music videos, talk shows, reality shows, and variety shows because these work well as program formats with newly commercialized networks and stations.

**Continuity.** Cultural patterns tend to show both stability and change. Much anthropological work tends to show a bias toward continuity in cultures despite global pressures for change (Appadurai, 1996). However, cultures are also constantly changing, both from internal forces and from external ones (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004).

**Emergent change.** Even without radical breakthroughs from outside, cultural systems tend to show gradual change from within (Urry, 2003). This is accomplished both from internal creation as people and institutions change and have ideas and from slow and gradual absorption of ideas from outside, so that change is slow and tends to be incorporated into ongoing continuities. Japan is often cited as an example of deliberate, gradual absorption of changes from outside, as when it takes American cultural forms and adapts them (Iwabuchi, 1997).

**Hybridization.** New elements from outside a culture, whether from slow gradual contact or major threshold change, tend to be adapted to local culture over time. All of the preceding forces tend to interact in a way that fosters hybridization, in most cases. Hybridization can be a genuine synthesis of different culture elements into some new culture, as with the emergence of new Latin American cultures from indigenous, African, and European roots.

**Multilayered cultures and identities.** Instead of genuine synthesis between cultural elements or parallel to it, multilayered cultures and identities can also coexist; older cultural elements survive in somewhat coherent layers while new ones are imposed or adopted over them in new layers. So cultures change in both hybrid and sedimentary ways as layers build, interact, change, and persist.

**Threshold events.** Outside forces of new technology or ideas (what Rogers, 1983, might have called innovations) can cause major ruptures and changes in cultural systems, like other complex systems. The structures shift after a new force enables new infrastructure with new technologies such as satellite distribution, or after new models such as commercial television change how television is conceived of and produced. Analyses of globalization emphasize many recent threshold events.
Cataclysmic change. Complexity theory sees some changes as extremely rapid, completely changing boundaries and patterns. Although cultures tend to persist and hang on, in many cases, change imposed from outside is cataclysmic, such that small fragile cultures simply die out or are absorbed into other larger or more powerful cultures. Dozens of small indigenous languages have died out in the past decade as speakers of the language either die off or are absorbed into other culture and language groups.

In this analysis, the chief structural factors are technological, economic, and institutional. Technology tends to enable new developments. It can also present constraints, but the result over time tends to be a layering, additive effect of new possibilities. New technologies, such as broadcast or satellite television, don’t necessarily eliminate other options based on earlier technologies. For example, although VCRs and satellite/cable television make accessible to developing countries many new U.S. movies and television programs, only a small number can afford access to these technologies, and many of them don’t necessarily use such technologies to watch the “new” U.S. or global content. Economic factors also both enable and limit cultural developments. Economic relations with other countries and economic growth can create new possibilities, such as bringing television broadcasting into a country. However, economic relations can also create dependencies that narrow possibilities.

At the cultural level, I focus on the formation of language and cultural communities and the creation and flow of media, particularly television, within and across those communities. The key elements in the formation of communities are their own historical dynamics, particularly the development of language and cultural themes, the creation and maintenance of group cultural identities as a locus of meaning, and cross-cultural interpersonal interactions such as travel and migration between communities. The media, the main focus of this study, build on, reinforce, and, by dint of the agency of both media producers and consumers, sometimes contradict both this cultural context and the larger structural context of economics, technology, and institutions. Both structuration and complexity emphasize that human agency and even aggregate social forces are sometimes hard to predict based on structural or even cultural forces.

Culture is clearly more than a force acted on by technologies such as television and economic patterns such as advertising. Social forces, such as the migration of people across countries and regions, have powerful effects on the cultural and social context of television, economic actors, and forces. Although these social and cultural forces are driven by economic and political factors, they also have powerful effects of their own, once set in motion. Appadurai (1996), for example, saw the major social ruptures and transformations
attributed to modernization and globalization as driven by migration and media. Chapter 2 explores this process of hybridization, the synthesis of local cultures with the imported elements of culture brought in by globalization, through specific processes such as electronic media, migration, inflow of genres and models, and entrepreneurial action of global or regional companies.

An important question is whether the different levels raised here are relatively independent or whether some are rather more conditioned, if not determined, by others. Appadurai (1996) argued that media interactions diverge—or are disjunct, in his terms—from economics, technology, politics, and people flows. He noted,

Global flows occur in and through the growing disjunctures among ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes and ideoscapes. This formulation, the core of my model of global cultural flow, needs some explanation. First, people, machinery, money, images, and ideas now follow increasingly non-isomorphic paths; of course, there have been some disjunctures in the flows of these things, but the sheer speed, scale, and volume of these flows now are so great that the disjunctures become central to the politics of global culture. (Appadurai, 1996, p. 37)

In this book, I argue, however, that cultural factors such as migration and media content flows are not truly independent from structural factors such as economics, technology, and institutional structures. There are separate developments and relative degrees of autonomy, owing to the kind of complexity and disjuncture that Appadurai perceives. But factors such as economics and technology affect cultural factors such as migration, historical development, and media relatively more often than vice versa. Political economists certainly argue the primacy of economics, and a number of scholars from McLuhan (1994) to Postman (1986) have argued for the primacy of technology as a determining factor.

This current chapter presents a tentative model that summarizes the relative positioning of the structural and cultural factors. In this model, the structural and cultural factors influence each other, but the relative weight of the structural factors is slightly higher. This is deliberately intended to be not a strong statement of determination but a more complex statement of the asymmetric interdependence of factors that influence each other at multiple levels. Structural factors, such as economic conditions or technological changes, are more likely to either limit or enable changes in cultural factors than vice versa. A new technology like the printing press creates a series of new social possibilities. However, cultural factors affect structural factors, too. Some technological changes have been put off by cultures that could not absorb them or found that they clashed too strongly with cultural values.
For example, the printing press was much more revolutionary in Western Europe, where a series of economic and cultural factors favored it, than in China or Korea, where it was also invented but where cultural and other factors did not favor its rapid diffusion. Even more dramatically, Japanese military culture largely gave up use of guns between 1543 and 1879, even after they had been proven decisively useful in battle, because they strongly threatened the dominant samurai culture (Perrin, 1979).

These structural and cultural factors interact. They often affect each other strongly, with some primacy to the structural factors. Both sets of factors influence and condition both structural and cultural interactions. Structural interactions might range from colonialism or imperialism to interdependence. Cultural interactions might range from homogenization to hybridization.

There are several important structural and cultural factors. These factors both bound and enable developments in the cultural factors. Within cultural factors, I emphasize migration, media, and cultural history or internal development of cultures over time. Although these factors are bounded and enabled by the structural factors, the cultural factors also form patterns that can bound or enable structural developments.

There are also a number of possible modes of interaction at both structural and cultural levels. This book examines several possible modes of structural interaction between societies, including colonialism, imperialism, dependency, and the mode that this study sees as ascendant in increasing numbers of interactions between societies, asymmetrical interdependence. These structural forms of interaction also create boundaries that limit forms of culture. This book also examines several possible modes of cultural interaction between and within cultures. These include penetration, one-way flows of products and influences, homogenization, interpenetration or two-way flows, hybridization, and the formation of multiple layers of culture. In complexity terms, these could be seen as patterns of interaction that tend to play out and replicate at different levels of the world television system.

All of these forms of interaction can be found in the relationships between different societies at this time. A few societies are still in a colonial relationship with a dominant state; for example, Guam, Surinam, and a number of small island societies. Many recently independent countries, such as the French-speaking countries of West Africa, still find themselves dependent in both structural and cultural relations with former colonial powers, in this case, France. Even countries with longer histories of independence, such as those of Latin America, often find themselves dependent in many ways, not necessarily on former colonial powers such as Spain or Portugal, but on currently dominant powers such as the United States. However, I argue that although imperialism and dependency may characterize the structural
relations of a significant number of societies, the tendency over time is toward asymmetrical interdependence: relationships that are increasingly interactive or interdependent but often highly unequal. Societies’ relations also change so that a country may well move from colonial status to dependency on the former colonial power to a more interdependent but still unequal or asymmetrical relationship. These trajectories vary. In the early growth period of television in the 1960s, Brazil imported much of its television programming from the United States. Imports declined in the 1970s and 1980s as Brazil’s own productive capacity grew; Brazil produced large numbers of television programs and began to export them. Brazil is now a dominant exporter to Portugal of cultural products. Mozambique, another former Portuguese colony, is far more dependent on Portugal (than is Brazil) and even somewhat dependent, especially in cultural imports, on Brazil.

At the cultural level, interactions between societies also clearly vary. Almost all societies are now penetrated by outside cultures, but many increasingly put some influence back out to those that have penetrated them, in a form of asymmetric cultural interpenetration. Robertson (1995) talked about the cultural interpenetration of the global or universal and the local or particular as one of the predominant cultural patterns of current globalization. Many countries have been and still are on the receiving end of largely one-way flows of culture and information. This was highlighted during the New World Information and Communication Order debate in the 1970s and 1980s, which noted that flows of television, film, music, news, and data between countries tended to be very unequal, even one-way (UNESCO, 1980). In some areas, notably feature film and news, this extremely asymmetric flow still seems to predominate. However, since the 1970s, an increasing number of countries have begun to create more of their own television, video, music, blogs, and Web sites, to produce local, national, or regional cultural goods. In some cases, these smaller producers can export cultural goods back into the world or regional systems. In this book, I argue that few cultures are effectively homogenized by outside forces, but that hybridization of local and foreign cultural elements and forms is increasingly common. This builds on the idea of Robertson (1995) that cultures are increasingly glocal, placing local elements within globalized forms or other combinations of the global and the local.

Structural and Cultural Process
Frameworks for World Television

This book looks at globalizing, regionalizing, nationalizing, and localizing forces that include both structure and culture. At all of these levels, alternative
structural process or interaction frameworks ought to be considered. These include a number of the theoretical models that have been created to analyze international media interactions: colonialism, imperialism, dependency, and asymmetrical interdependence. Several alternative cultural process types have also tried to capture the essence of cross-cultural interaction via media. These include the initial penetration of cultures by outside cultures, homogenization, one-way flow or interaction, interpenetration, cultural proximity, and hybridization.

Colonialism and Imperialism

Cultures have rarely been completely isolated. Even before the European expansion in the 1400s, there was considerable trade and contact between many, if not most cultures. Abu-Lughod (1993) is among the scholars who have argued that, before 1492, there was in fact a world system of loosely interconnected regional empires in what are now Africa, the Arabic world, central Asia, China, Egypt, Europe, India, Iran, Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asia, a point discussed further in Chapter 2 of this book.

From 1492 (or earlier, in the case of Portuguese expansion into Africa) onward, however, the European powers raced to create empires, which in several cases spanned the globe. They colonized many formerly independent areas as well as many that were already parts of other empires. These European empires greatly affected the earlier regional and national cultures, but that impact varied. The European empires went further, in some cases, creating new areas and nations with hybrid cultures, such as English-speaking North America and Spanish-speaking South America. Chapter 2 also describes this cultural hybridization process and how it forms a number of the other major cultural-linguistic markets for television.

Cultural Imperialism

One dominant tendency in international television research has been to examine the global development of media as cultural aspects of U.S. and European imperialism. This builds on the idea that although most countries are now independent of the formal colonialism that once characterized most of the world’s societies, even these technically independent countries are caught up in a postcolonial web of cultural imperialism. In this view, deriving from Marx and from Lenin’s analysis of imperialism, culture and communication are seen as the ideological superstructure of the world capitalist economy’s expansion.

In this relationship of cultural imperialism, the role of culture, including television production, is both economic and ideological. Television can be
seen as another product sold at high prices by First World producers to Third World consumers, although as we shall see, the reality of international television sales and flows is considerably more complex than that. The ideological role of television is to make Third World residents content with their lot as lower paid consumers of First World products.

Cultural imperialism usually makes strong claims about the social or behavioral effects of media, advertising, and other cultural forces. This theoretical concept tends to see culture as only part of a holistic system, in which imported television programs, local adaptations of U.S. genres, local and imported advertising, and commercial media models all combine to produce an attitude favoring increased consumption among viewers (Schiller, 1991). The main specific critiques, according to Tomlinson (1991), are that capitalism is a homogenizing culture force and that capitalism produces and reproduces a culture of consumerism. I agree that these to be very likely macro or high-level effects of the globalization of television within a capitalist world system. However, Chapter 3 argues that these complex effects operate differently among various nations and various classes within nations.

Postcolonial National Television

In almost all countries, television formed part of postcolonial development. Regular television broadcasting began to arrive in the 1940s in some of the world’s most industrialized countries. Some began to pass their patterns of broadcasting on to their colonies or former colonies. However, most countries began television later, as post–World War II economic development permitted them to afford it. This meant that television in most newly independent countries was, in fact, still highly dependent on their former colonial powers or others.

After independence, most countries fell into structural relationships that could be characterized as dependent. Most of the countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East were described this way, as were some smaller European countries. These nations depended on the industrialized world for capital, technology, models, and most imported goods. Speaking primarily of Latin America, Fox (1992) observed that “cultural dependency generally was taken to mean the domination of content, financing, and advertising of the domestic media by foreign, specifically U.S. companies” (p. 4).

Some theorists veered away from the holistic explanations and the degree of economic determinism implied in dependency and cultural imperialism theories, but they wished to build on many of these ideas. Lee (1980) focused on several interrelated factors: financial or ownership involvement by First World companies in Third World media, the adoption and use of First
World media models, the uneven flow of media products (particularly television) from First World to Third World, and the effect of both imported models and programs on Third World cultures. Chapter 3 examines how television developed in a variety of nations, with different levels of dependency or growth and autonomy, along with varying forms of adaptation and hybridization of foreign influences.

Another key research tradition focuses on cultural industries. The original research by Horkheimer and Adorno (2001) focused strongly on the power and integration of what they saw as a monolithic culture industry that tended to change culture into a mass culture that reinforces capitalist consumer ideology. This research analysis had a powerful effect in Latin America, Europe, and the United States, where powerful national cultural industries were growing. Quite a bit of current research on the conglomeration and integration of cultural industries such as Time Warner follows this theme (McChesney, 1999). However, Latin American scholars (Martín-Barbero, 1993) and others have also begun to use this basic framework to look at aspects other than power and conglomeration: the way national production has grown in some countries rather than others and incorporation of global models in national industries (Sinclair, 1995). Chapter 3 also looks at this body of research.

Globalization

Many observers from journalism, industry, and the academy have noticed a rapid global penetration of recent economic and technological changes. For many, and from diverse angles, globalization is now the new dominant paradigm. They look at “flows of goods, people, information, knowledge and images” which “gain autonomy at a global level” and at “third cultures” of people who are more than national or bilateral in orientation (Featherstone, 1990a, p. 1). For those who stress political economy, globalization is the extension to the whole world of capitalism, the consumer economy, advertising, and concentrated ownership of media groups such as Bertelsmann, Sony, and Murdoch (Herman & McChesney, 1997). Featherstone (1990a) saw globalization as “cultural integration and disintegration processes which take place not only on an inter-state level but processes which transcend the state-society unit and can therefore be held to occur on a transnational or transsocietal level” (p. 1). Writing about globalization tends also to incorporate postmodern perspectives in focusing less on homogenizing processes, such as media imperialism or Americanization, and more on a diverse set of processes, codes, symbols, and cultural products that can be both local and globalized (Featherstone, 1990a).
A good example of this process is advertising. The roots of the current global trends in advertising can be traced to the U.S. advertising industry, which created a prototype of organization; models for newspaper, radio, and television ads; and a general model of how advertising might fit into an industrial economy and a consumer society. This model and the specific ad prototypes have been widely diffused, first by U.S. firms moving into new markets where they wanted to advertise, then by U.S. advertising agencies that followed their clients, and finally by professionals from other countries who were trained by U.S. firms and advertising agencies. This process struck a number of observers as direct Americanization and dependency on the United States (Fox, 1975; Janus, 1977). However, various countries, including China and Japan (Iwabuchi, 2002), have modified advertising-based media models and further diffused those modified models to other countries. The modifications feed back into the increasing number of global actors, U.S., European, Japanese, and others. A slightly different global style emerges, along with very different adaptations of the advertising idea. All of these models still serve to promote an increasingly global consumer economy, but they are both generalized to the world and specified to various localities, well beyond direct dependence on the original U.S. companies, agencies, and models.

There is a general movement away from deterministic views of the political economy of television (Martín-Barbero, 1993). In this book, I use complexity theory and structuration as means of considering structural power without falling into determinism. It is important to neither under- nor overestimate structural power because these political economy analyses correctly stress the importance of ownership, class relations, and other economic factors in the shaping of television at world, regional, and local levels. Chapter 4, which discusses the creation of global media firms and the new global patterns and models for television, covers in more depth theories of globalization and presents a model for understanding the asymmetrical interdependence of world television.

Roles and Impacts of Technology

Chapter 4 focuses primarily on the political-economic aspects of globalization, which are usually seen as fundamental for understanding the resulting recent rapid changes. However, equally central to most analyses of globalization is the equally rapid, widespread impact of technologies of communication, covered in Chapter 5. Since the mid-1990s, much of that fascination with technological globalization has focused on the Internet. However, before many knew of the Internet, the new technologies of satellite and cable
television held the world’s attention and fears for decades (de Sola Pool, 1983). Many expected technologies such as satellites to facilitate the next wave of cultural imperialism (de Sola Pool, 1979; Jayakar, 1993; Oliveira, 1986), and indeed, many still fear exactly that, although now most speak of a more complex scenario of both global and regional satellite forces, such as the relationship between global CNN and regional Al-Jazeera (Kraidy, 2002).

Much of the fear of change focused on satellite and cable television distribution, particularly their potential for carrying television programs and channels across borders. However, equally significant is the technological potential in changes that enable much cheaper and more flexible production and distribution. Production technology in video and sound has dropped dramatically in cost and gone up dramatically in quality. For example, a broadcast-quality production camera, which is also portable enough for exterior production, can be had for well under $5,000. A broadcast-quality editing system can be had for $5,000 or less. High-quality sound recording and simple but adequate mixing equipment can be had for under $3,000.

Another key issue with technology impacts as part of globalization is to ascertain who in what culture actually has access to what technology. When speaking of computers and the Internet, statements from world forums like the World Summit on the Information Society (2003–2005) clearly see that most people in the world do not have access to these new communication technologies, which greatly diminishes the potential impact they have as part of globalization (ITU, 2006). However, many of those concerned about impacts of satellite and cable television technology fail to recognize that most people in the world do not have access to them either because they cannot afford them, because governments like China restrict access to them, or because they are sufficiently satisfied with broadcast television that they choose not to pay for access to them.

Asymmetrical Interdependence and Asymmetrical Cultural Interpenetration: A Proposed Model

To move beyond the original limitations of dependency and imperialism theories, some of their main points were incorporated while complexity was added to their approaches. In this book, I reinterpret the term asymmetrical interdependence (Galtung, 1971) to refer to the variety of possible relationships in which countries find themselves unequal but possessing variable degrees of power and initiative in politics, economics, technological capability, and culture (Straubhaar, 1991). This view builds on the concept of dependent development, in which dependency may direct or limit national
growth but growth or development can take place (Cardoso, 1973; Salinas & Paldan, 1979). While the structural context, problems, and constraints for much of the world's media that dependency theory pointed out should be analyzed, consideration must also be given to the development of cultural industries that show increasing aspects of interdependence by creating more cultural products, adapting and changing cultural product models, and exporting both. This concept also builds on ideas of globalization, viewing global, regional, national, and local actors as part of an interdependency that is dynamic but asymmetrical, with growth and change in uneven and changing degrees. Nation-states and national-level actors have a continuing role, but so do local, supranational, regional, and transnational actors.

This vision moves beyond looking at world cultural and economic relations using dichotomies between dependence and independence or narrow typologies, such as core, semiperipheral, and peripheral countries. In this book, I anticipate a broad range of possibilities between relative autonomy of the sort enjoyed by the United States and relatively strong dependence such as that suffered by the smaller countries of the Caribbean. Rather than one range of possibilities, several interrelated levels or kinds of relationships between nations or cultures were considered, on dimensions analogous to Appadurai's (1990) scapes. For example, a nation like Brazil might depend on others for the manufacture of the more sophisticated information and communication technologies, which restricts its possibilities, but still be relatively autonomous in using the communications and cultural content of those imported technologies as enabling tools to create new forms of culture. Other nations might predominantly import both technologies and content, but perhaps from very different countries; for example, the Dominican Republic imports technology from the United States and Japan and content from the United States and Mexico.

Building on Appadurai’s (1990) idea of disjuncture, I propose several levels of interaction between cultures in the world: political-economic, technological, cultural production, content, content flows, and reception of culture. Many previous analyses of these problems fail in part because they look only at one level, such as political economy or media effects, without considering the others. On the other hand, Appadurai’s analysis may overestimate the disjunction or separation between these levels of interaction. There are relationships between political and economic systems, technologies, cultural producers and media institutions, and receivers of cultural and media products. Correspondingly, there is a range of levels of causation or explanation for both structural and cultural issues.

Having reviewed some of the main international structural interaction models, I must examine some of the cultural models or theories that have
tried to capture the essence of cross-cultural interaction via media, including television flows and television genre development, television producer-audience understandings and interactions, cultural proximity, theories of cultural action and choice (such as Bourdieu), hybridization, and the formation of multilayered cultures and identities. The question of the emergence of hybrid and multiple identities among television viewers is covered more thoroughly in Chapter 9.

Imported TV Versus Local and National: Producers Localize, Glocalize, and Hybridize

Nearly all societies and cultures have been affected by outside cultural influences, and few have ever been free from outside cultural influence. Extensive contacts between cultures (Nederveen Pieterse, 2004) have long existed. A combination of economic and technological changes in the 20th century have enabled mass media to reach many, if not most of the people in the world. Radio, film, television, satellite TV, and the Internet have all increased the rate of contact between societies. Radio and television, in particular, have brought most people into greater contact with the worlds outside their culture.

By the 1960s and 1970s, this technological penetration seemed to have resulted in dramatically increased, largely one-way flows of film, music, news, and television programs from the United States and Europe to other countries (Guback & Varis, 1986; Nordenstreng & Schiller, 1979; Nordenstreng & Varis, 1974; Stevenson & Shaw, 1984). In 1974, Nordenstreng and Varis concluded that most of the world imported most its television programming, which was mostly entertainment and mostly from the United States. These one-way flows seemed a primary symptom of cultural dependence and media imperialism (Beltran & Fox de Cardona, 1979; Lee, 1980).

However, there is evidence, as the tables in the Appendix reveal, that the flows of television have changed considerably in the past 30 years. This study of 26 countries in 1962, 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2002 shows that television schedules in most countries, particularly during the prime-time hours, are increasingly filled by programming from within the country in question or from within its cultural-linguistic region or space.

Some commercial program genres in television and music have become relatively cheap to record and produce. Some genres, such as talk shows, live local news, live music, and live variety shows, are often cheaper for a poor country than importing a situation comedy from the United States, according to interviews with producers in the Dominican Republic and Mozambique.
These genres have replicated as patterns across countries and are adapted to fit local circumstances, budgets, and audience interests.

Chapter 6 examines how national or local producers have worked within cultural industries to produce television. It examines several more theories of globalization, localization, glocalization, reconfiguration (Ricoeur, 1984), and hybridization, relating them directly to how television producers and programmers might think about what to produce, what to import, where to import it from, what to export, and how to adapt television produced for one culture to the interests and demands of the audiences in another one.

Chapter 7 looks at the production and exportation of programs, genres and even whole channels, such as MTV or Discovery. It examines some theories of how programs get altered for export, such as delocalization, and it reviews what is still primarily exported from the United States both in terms of total flow and of genres. The turn from exporting programs and channels to exporting formats, such as Jeopardy or American Idol, is also covered.

Increasingly, when poor countries import much of their programming, it no longer primarily comes in a one-way flow from the United States. The Dominican Republic has imported many genres, such as comedies, variety shows, and news, from Mexico (Rogers & Schement, 1984; Straubhaar & Viscasillas, 1991), just as Mozambique imports entertainment from both Brazil and the United States. This constitutes a more complex flow. Programming now flows horizontally from one developing country to another quite frequently. Some programs even flow back to the United States and Europe. Brazilian television now tends to dominate the prime-time programming of its former colonial power, Portugal (Marques de Melo, 1988, 1992; Pinto & Sousa, 2004). Mexico has long dominated the television and radio programming of the Hispanic audience in the United States (Fernández & Paxman, 2001). The overall flow is still asymmetric, but there is now an interpenetration of cultures, both by migration and by media, which flows largely from developed North to the developing South but increasingly flows back as well.

Many countries now import television genres for national production almost as much (or in some cases, more) than they import television programs. Some genre imports come as formal economic contracts, licensing formats such as Big Brother. Others are simply imported and glocalized or adapted by local producers, as Chapters 6 and 7 document. When countries produce more and import less, at least for broadcast television, the flow of television genres such as the soap opera and, recently, prepackaged television formats such as American Idol becomes even more important. Instead of importing an entire canned program, networks today tend to import a genre idea to develop themselves, or a virtually turnkey package for a program like Survivor or Popstars, which provides a complete formula.
for a local production or version. The question, then, is how much global economic or cultural baggage comes along with such a formula and how relevant to local culture the resulting production is. Chapter 7 addresses these issues.

This book reports the decline of importation into many of these countries of television programming from the former centers of media flow, the United States and Europe. A more subtle reading of the pattern over time seems to indicate that relatively new television broadcasting operations, particularly commercial ones, tend to use more imported U.S. programming because it is cheap and they lack programming resources, personnel, and experience. Smaller, poorer markets import more television for the same reasons. As television becomes more firmly established, national stations and networks tend to produce more of their own material. However, since the rise of transnational format licensing, an increasing amount of that local or national production is based on local adaptation of transnational formats, such as *American Idol* (Moran, 2004).

Regional producers also tend to grow in the kinds of major television production centers that Curtin (2003) calls media capitals. These global television centers—Cairo, Hong Kong, Mexico City, and Tokyo—produce for their own national markets but also export to their cultural-linguistic markets and, increasingly, to networks around the world. So for smaller national and local networks, increasing amounts of imported programming tends to come from within their own cultural-linguistic regions (Sinclair, 1994, 1995). Chapters 6 and 7 examine these changing patterns of broadcast television flow.

In film and news, the flows are still more consistently one-way. Film distribution in most countries is still dominated by the United States. Similarly, screen time in most countries is still largely North American (Miller et al., 2005). U.S., British, and French news agencies, plus a few new satellite and television services such as CNN and the BBC, still dominate global news flows, although regional rivals like Al-Jazeera now dominate some cultural-linguistic or regional news spaces. Particularly with the Internet, more diverse flows of news material seems possible, although critics note that many Internet news readers visit the same dominant corporate sites, such as CNN or the *New York Times* (McChesney, 1999). More sources for news stories are available, but it is not clear that news media are really using them yet.

**Cultural Identification and Proximity**

Competing with the idea of cultural imperialism have been the ideas of cultural identification with various cultures, nations, and regions and cultural
proximity (Straubhaar, 1991), which would lead people to choose local, nonimperial cultural products. In some ways, this is the cultural analog of the structural idea of asymmetrical interdependence. Cultures tend to interact, even though unevenly and in conditions of even more unequal political and economic power. Although a powerful culture can impose on a less powerful one, forcing it to adopt certain customs, ideas, and forms such as television programs and genres, the less powerful culture can often still resist and maintain much of its original form and content. This has been discussed even more in terms of hybridity, which is examined below.

One theoretical description and explanation for this change to more local, national, and cultural-linguistic regional program production revolves around cultural proximity. This is a seemingly common attraction audiences feel for cultural products, such as television or music, that are close in cultural content and style to the audience’s own culture(s). Most audiences seem to prefer television programs that are as close to them as possible in language, ethnic appearance, dress, style, humor, historical reference, and shared topical knowledge. This is not necessarily a national phenomenon. Audiences can be attracted or feel proximities to local culture, regional cultures within their nation, national culture, and transnational cultural regions or spaces. This is explored further in Chapters 8 and 9.

The clearest line of demarcation in cultural proximity is language. Schlesinger (1987) showed in Europe, for example, that differences of language and culture create effective barriers to television program trade between countries, even when the larger European Community is promoting intra-European television trade and pan-European productions. For programs that rely more on language-based understanding, such as talk shows, game shows, soap operas, comedies, and variety shows, much of the audience in most cultures does not have the cultural capital to understand and enjoy such programs from another culture or country, even when they are dubbed and language, per se, is not a problem. This kind of cultural capital is the familiarity based in language, education, or travel that enables someone to understand a language- and culture-based (as opposed to more purely visual) program from elsewhere. For example, many Americans just don’t get British humor on television, even when it has a strong visual component, like Monty Python, because the cultural references are beyond their sense of comfort and interest, based in their cultural capital. The author interviewed one Brazilian satellite entrepreneur who planned in the 1980s to create a pan–Latin American television channel in English, based on U.S. talk and news magazine shows such as *Oprah* and *20/20*. When asked about her intended audience, she specified those who had fluent English, traveled once or twice a year to the United States, and had probably lived, worked, or
studied in the United States or those who aspired to do so—in essence, a small and elite group with quite unusual and quite U.S.-focused cultural capital for people within the Latin American cultural context. This intended audience was much too small to be profitable, and her satellite venture failed.

Studies in Brazil (Duarte, 1997; Straubhaar, 1991, 2003), Dominican Republic (Straubhaar, 1991), and Namibia (Veii, 1988) all indicate that aside from a small elite with truly globalized cultural capital, most audiences of the lower middle class and below are more interested in cultural products, particularly television and music (but seemingly not necessarily film), which are as culturally relevant or proximate as possible. This seems to indicate a preference, first, for local, provincial, or national material when available; and second, for material from within a region defined by culture and language, where cultural products will also be more similar to the cultural capital or cultural frame of the audience than cultural imports from outside the region, like those from the United States or Europe.

This tendency toward guiding cultural choices based on cultural proximity seems strong, but most members of a society are also interested in some amount of diversity and difference as well. A certain number of television programs or songs from completely outside seem to continue to be popular, in part because they represent a source of novelty and new ideas. Even in countries with strong production industries and cultural markets strongly oriented toward national products—for example, Brazil—a few imported programs and films can usually be found on television, even in prime time, because they have interest value or competing senses of proximity for the audience, even though they no longer represent a dominant trend of one-way importation. The increasingly complex relationship between audiences with multiple levels or identity and interest, and the multiple genre offerings of different levels of world television, are examined in Chapter 8.

**Cultural Hybridization**

Within certain economic constraints and influenced by successful global patterns, however, regional and national cultures still tend to assert their own content strongly. What emerges is often a strongly localized or hybridized adaptation of global patterns (Kraidy, 2005). For example, there is much current discussion of an Asian approach to modernity. In Taiwan, Iwabuchi (1997, 2002), interviewing young people, found that they were more likely to choose and identify with popular music and television from Japan than from China because the Japanese material was viewed as modern while still recognizably familiar within an Asian context. He argued that Japanese
popular culture successfully adapts or “Asianizes” U.S. popular culture genres into more localized or regionalized forms.

One useful theorization is to reconsider globalization as a set of regionally differentiated patterns of modernization. Japanese popular culture and cultural industry represents a transformation from the perception of the 1970s that “the media are American” (Tunstall, 1977). Instead, globalized and regionalized patterns of modernity build on, but also transform U.S. patterns of modernity, in this case in media, that seemed so specifically American in the first wave of U.S. television program export dominance in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, Iwabuchi (1997), in “The Sweet Scent of Asian Modernity,” described the Japanese adaptation of cultural industry globalization as de-Westernized modernization (Iwabuchi, 1997). This is a hybrid localization or regionalization of a global pattern.

Hybridization has been one of the ideas most strongly developed and argued over within globalization and postcolonial theories about culture. It was formulated in several major variations. The form most worked with in this book is by Canclini (1995), who looked at how hybrid cultures, along with racial miscegenation or mestizaje, had emerged in Latin America throughout its 300 or more years of Spanish and Portuguese colonial history. He observed a great deal of complex blending of cultures that continues, changing as new forms of interaction, such as mass media, come into the process. Another important strand is from Bhabha (1994), who examined the complex hybrid identities and roles of intellectuals and cultural producers in postcolonial situations, where they must deal with multiple cultural forces whether they remained in their homelands or immigrated to economic core nations, such as the United States or Great Britain. Kraidy (2005) saw hybridization as the essential mechanism of cultural globalization.

Notably, some examples that were seen as archetypes of cultural hybridization, or the related syncretism of religions, are being rethought. Brazilian candomblé, for example, was thought to be a classic example of genuine synthesis between some of the religious traditions of West Africa and Portuguese Catholicism (Bastide, 1978). Candomblé, however, is varied. Although some groups intend to make a genuine synthesis of these elements, others see the European elements as a protective covering for African practices, which were useful when the groups were repressed by religious or civil authorities but which can be discarded or minimized now, in favor of a pursuit of a more roots-oriented, Afrocentric practice. That cultural practice and identity exist in parallel to other layers of practice and identity.

In turn, Chapter 9 develops a theoretical notion of multiple cultural strands, television flows and identities that tend to work out alongside
hybridization, or in some cases, in place of hybridization. This reflects the fact that people interviewed for Chapters 8 and 9 often describe their own complex identities as multilayered areas of interest and identification. People are likely to have local television viewing interests, corresponding to local identifications, as well as regional, national, and transnational or global ones. They are also likely to have viewing interests that reflect class, ethnic, gender, religious, and other identities. To some degree, these identifications reflect positions that have been structured for them, such as class. In a post-colonial situation, identities are often structured in interaction with colonial powers, including religious and ethnic identities, whereas other identities may correspond to rapidly changing social movements. All are dynamic, not static. None can be essentialized or frozen in time.