Origins of Creative Industries Policy

Introducing Creative Industries: The UK DCMS Task Force

The formal origins of the concept of creative industries can be found in the decision in 1997 by the newly elected British Labour government headed by Tony Blair to establish a Creative Industries Task Force (CITF), as a central activity of its new Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). The Creative Industries Task Force set about mapping current activity in those sectors deemed to be a part of the UK creative industries, measuring their contribution to Britain’s overall economic performance and identifying policy measures that would promote their further development. The Creative Industries Mapping Document, produced by the UK DCMS in 1998, identified the creative industries as constituting a large and growing component of the UK economy, employing 1.4 million people and generating an estimated £60 billion a year in economic value added, or about 5 per cent of total UK national income (DCMS, 1998). In some parts of Britain, such as London, the contribution of the creative industries was even greater, accounting directly or indirectly for about 500,000 jobs and for one in every five new jobs created, and an estimated £21 billion in economic value added, making creative industries London’s second largest economic sector after financial and business services (Knell and Oakley, 2007: 7).

The UK Creative Industries Mapping Document defined the creative industries as ‘those activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’ (DCMS, 1998). The Creative Industries Mapping Document identified 13 sectors as constituting the creative industries, shown in Table 1.1:

In launching the Mapping Document, the Minister for Culture and Heritage, Chris Smith, made the observation that:

The role of creative enterprise and cultural contribution … is a key economic issue. … The value stemming from the creation of intellectual capital is becoming increasingly important as an economic component of national wealth. … Industries, many of them
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new, that rely on creativity and imaginative intellectual property, are becoming the most rapidly growing and important part of our national economy. They are where the jobs and the wealth of the future are going to be generated. (Smith, 1998)

This theme that creative industries were vital to Britain’s future was a recurring one for Labour under Tony Blair and, from 2007, Gordon Brown. Tony Blair observed that his government was keen to invest in creativity in its broadest sense because ‘Our aim must be to create a nation where the creative talents of all the people are used to build a true enterprise economy for the twenty-first century – where we compete on brains, not brawn’ (Blair, 1999: 3). Chris Smith, in launching the second DCMS Mapping Document in 2001, argued that ‘The creative industries have moved from the fringes to the mainstream’ (DCMS, 2001: 3), and continuing work in developing the sector saw related policies being developed in areas such as education, regional policy, entrepreneurship, and trade. This theme continued with the change in Prime Ministership, with Gordon Brown arguing that ‘in the coming years, the creative industries will be important not only for our national prosperity, but for Britain’s ability to put culture and creativity at the centre of our national life’ (DCMS, 2008a), although – as we will see later – the economic ground shifts very rapidly in Britain during the time of Gordon Brown’s Prime Ministership.

The DCMS mapping of the UK creative industries played a critical formative role in establishing an international policy discourse for what the creative industries are, how to define them, and what their wider significance constitutes. In Michel Foucault’s (1991b) classic account of discourse analysis, a discourse can be identified in terms of its:

1 Criteria of formation: the relationship between the objects it identified as relevant; the relations between these objects; the concepts through which these relations can be comprehended; and the options presented for managing these relations;
2 Criteria of transformation: how these objects and their relations can be understood differently, in order to generate what Foucault refers to as new rules of formation (Foucault, 1991b: 54);
3 Criteria of correlation: how this discourse is differentiated from other related discourses, and the non-discursive context of institutions, social relations, political and economic arrangements etc. within which it is situated.
In the field of policy studies, discourses are understood as 'patterns in social life, which not only guide discussions, but are institutionalised in particular practices’ (Hajer and Laws, 2006: 260). In this way, as Foucault famously observed, relations between discourses and institutions, or between social reality and the language we use to represent it, become fluid and blurry. From a research point of view, policy discourse analysis enables one to get ‘analytic leverage on how a particular discourse (defined as an ensemble of concepts and categorizations through which meaning is given to phenomena) orders the way in which policy actors perceive reality, define problems, and choose to pursue solutions in a particular direction’ (Hajer and Laws, 2006: 261). Policy discourse constitutes a core element of what Considine (1994) [Q6] refers to as policy cultures, or the relationship within a policy domain between shared and stated values (equity, efficiency, fairness, etc.), key underlying assumptions, and the categories, stories and languages that are routinely used by policy actors in their field, and help to define the policy community, or those who are ‘insiders’ within that policy field.

Understood in terms of policy discourse, we can see some of the central contours of the approach to creative industries adopted by the Blair Labour government and the DCMS in Britain as it emerged in the late 1990s. The new government took the opportunity provided by its election mandate and a large parliamentary majority to reorganise policy institutions. In this case, it took what had been the Department of National Heritage and reorganised it as the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, bringing the arts, broadcast media and (somewhat oddly in retrospect) sport together within the one administrative domain. But such an administrative change would have little significance if it had not been accompanied by a series of related discursive shifts. By bringing together the arts and media within a department concerned with the formation of culture, the Blair government was signalling a move towards more integrated approaches to cultural policy that have characterised European nations, rather than the more fragmented, ad hoc and second-order approaches to cultural policy that have prevailed in much of the English-speaking world (Craik, 1996, 2007; Vestheim, 1996). But the second, and perhaps more significant, discursive shift lay in the way that creative industries drew upon the then-new concept of convergence to argue that the future of arts and media in Britain lay in a transformation of dominant policy discourses towards a productive engagement with digital technologies, to develop new possibilities for the alignment of British creativity and intellectual capital with these new engines of economic growth. This association of creative industries with the modernisation project of Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ was strong, and is discussed in more detail below. The final key point was that creative industries promises a new alignment of arts and media policies with economic policies, and by drawing attention to the contribution of these sectors to job creation, new sources of wealth and new British exports, there would now be a ‘seat at the table’ for the cultural sectors in wider economic discourses that had become hegemonic in British public policy under the previous Conservative governments.

As a policy discourse, creative industries was itself a successful British export. Wang (2008) has identified the term ‘creative industries’ as a successful British marketing exercise, and Ross has observed that ‘few could have predicted that the creative industries model would itself become a successful export’ (Ross, 2008: 18). In the next chapter, we...
The Creative Industries

will consider the take-up of creative industries policy discourse in other parts of the world. What needs to be considered is how in practice the economic value of the creative industries was determined. While the definition of the sectors constituting the creative industries has evolved over time, a list-based approach to creative industries has remained a hallmark of the original DCMS model, where the overall size and significance of the creative industries to the UK economy has been taken to be measurable as the aggregate output of its constituent sub-sectors. Early documents were engaged with mapping the creative industries, but this was more a cognitive mapping than a geographical one, seeking to determine what the objects of creative industries policy were, what were their relationships with one another, and how to relate the measurement of their size and significance with the broader public policy goals which had now been enunciated for arts and media policy under the creative industries policy rubric. How this worked in practice can be seen from the Creative Industries Economic Estimates 2006 data provided below, which measured the size of the UK creative industries in terms of their contribution to national income (Gross Value Added – GVA), their average annual rates of growth, their contribution to exports, and the number of people employed in these industries.

In an early commentary on this list-based approach, I described it as being ad hoc (Flew, 2002), as it was not clear what the underlying threads that linked a seemingly heterogeneous set of sub-sectors as the creative industries were. The categorisation draws together industries that are highly capital-intensive (e.g. film, radio and television) with ones that

### Table 1.2 Economic Contribution of UK Creative Industries, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Contribution to UK GVA (%)</th>
<th>Annual rate of growth 1997-2004</th>
<th>Value of exports (£ million)</th>
<th>Number of people employed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>223,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>108,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and antiques</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>22,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>95,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designer fashion</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>115,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video, film and photography</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>63,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music and the visual and performing arts</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>236,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publishing</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>253,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software, computer games and electronic publishing</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>596,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio and television</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>108,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5% average</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>1,824,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

are highly labour-intensive (art and antiques, crafts, designer fashion, music, the visual and performing arts). It also combines sectors that are very much driven by commercial imperatives and the business cycle, such as advertising and architecture, with those that are not. From a policy point of view, the static economic performance of the UK film industry over 1997–2004 indicated by these figures would be a major concern to government due to the size of Britain's audiovisual trade deficit with the United States, which is not compensated for by a comparatively strong performance in the arts and antiques markets.

Critics of the DCMS approach such as Garnham (2005) argued that inclusion of the software sector in the creative industries artificially inflated their economic significance in order to align the arts to more high-powered 'information society' policy discourses. It is certainly the case from the figures above that the sector defined as ‘Software, computer games and electronic publishing' accounted for 37 per cent of the economic output of the UK creative industries, 36 per cent of its exports, and 33 per cent of creative industries jobs; the question of its inclusion or exclusion bears heavily on wider claims made about the economic significance of the creative industries. As well as questions of inclusion, there are also questions of exclusion, with some asking why sectors such as tourism, heritage, and sport were not in the DCMS list (Hesmondhalgh, 2007a). The exclusion of sport is interesting given that so much energy had been expended on bringing sport within the Department, but perhaps more telling is the reluctance to consider the economic contribution of what has come to be termed the GLAM (Galleries, Libraries, Archives and Museums) sectors in these original policy documents. Since the economic value of Britain's cultural institutions (British Museum, National Gallery, British Library, Tate Modern, Victoria and Albert Museum, etc.) cannot be questioned, one suspects that it reflected the modernisation drive of the Blair era to understand Britain in terms other than those of an 'old country' (Wright, 1985). Finally, there is a well-known paradox in trying to determine the size of the creative industries workforce. Many people working in those industries defined as creative industries are in jobs that would not normally be considered to be 'creative' ones (e.g. an accounts manager at an advertising agency), while there are others who have been termed 'embedded creatives' (Higgs and Cunningham, 2008) who are pursuing creative work in other sectors (e.g. website designers for a bank or financial services company). Many of these issues take us to the utility of the concept of creativity as a definer of industries and sectors, and these debates will be returned to later in this chapter as they have played themselves out in the British context.

**Cultural Planners and Cool Britannia: UK Creative Industries Policy in the Context of ‘New Labour’**

The creative industries concept maintained an ongoing relevance as a policy discourse in the United Kingdom from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s. This period was one of concurrent Labour governments in the UK, headed by Tony Blair from 1997 to 2007, and by Gordon Brown from 2007 to Labour’s electoral defeat in May 2010. It has certainly been the case in the English-speaking world that left-of-centre governments tend to adopt a more activist stance towards questions of cultural policy than conservative ones, as we will see in later
chapters, but at the same time creative industries policies differed significantly from traditional cultural policy in their stronger focus on economic wealth generation, and the significance given to creative entrepreneurs and the private sector rather than publicly funded culture. Creative industries as a concept was consistent with a number of touchstones of the redefining of the British Labour Party as ‘New Labour’, as it was spearheaded by Tony Blair and his supporters within Labour, with its recurring concerns with economic modernisation and Britain’s post-industrial future. Its focus on the role of markets as stimuli to arts and culture was consistent with the notion of a ‘Third Way’ between Thatcher-era free market economics and traditional social democracy, that was nonetheless more accommodating of the role of markets and global capitalism than traditional British Labour Party philosophy and doctrine (Giddens, 1998). Promotion of the creative industries was also consistent with empirical realities of the late 1990s where ‘Britain’s music industry employed more people and made more money than did its car, steel or textile industries’ (Howkins, 2001: vii), and it marked out one response to the common theme of deindustrialisation facing the traditional manufacturing powerhouses of Western Europe.

Labour came to power in Britain after 18 years of Conservative governments, headed by Margaret Thatcher and John Major, that had relentlessly pushed the privatisation of state-run enterprises, user-pays principles for access to government services, a self-reliant enterprise culture, and a general devaluation of the role of the public sector in British economic and social life. This had been a particularly cold climate for the arts, with peak funding bodies such as the Arts Council of Great Britain feeling underfunded and beleaguered. Moreover, artists themselves had become targets for scorn in the popular media, with works that had a critical, counter-cultural or avant-garde element being routinely derided as a ‘waste of taxpayers’ money’. It had no longer been sufficient to defend the value of the arts in their own terms, and from the late 1980s onwards it had become common to argue the case for public support for the arts in terms of their economic contribution (Myerscough, 1988). While the shift in power from the Conservatives to Labour in 1997 was strongly welcomed in the arts and cultural sectors, it had by this time become common to argue for the value of the arts and culture in Britain in economic terms, and creative industries marked in one respect a more innovative and influential way of doing that.

Creative industries also tapped into a wider Zeitgeist of the early Blair years about how to link the question of what would be the jobs and industries that would replace traditional mining and manufacturing sectors with a drive to re-brand Britain as a new nation – ‘Cool Britannia’ to use the parlance of the times – rather than a once-great power whose traditional industries, values and global influence were now in terminal decline (McGuigan, 1998). This modernising project of the Blair government overlapped with an emergent academic and policy literature on the ‘new’ or ‘weightless’ economy, promoted by policy think-tanks such as DEMOS and Comedia, which was identifying creativity as being at the cornerstone of success for post-industrial cities, regions and nations in the globalised economy (Mulgan 1997; Coyle 1998; Landry 2000). One influential book from this period was Charles Leadbeater’s Living on Thin Air: The New Economy (Leadbeater 1999), which pointed to a ‘new economy’ and a ‘knowledge society’ driven by globalisation and information technology, but also by individual creativity, social and cultural entrepreneurship, and a meritocratic spirit.
Yet the concept of creative industries remained significant in Britain even after Tony Blair’s political star began to wane, and as ‘Cool Britannia’ became as passé as ‘Britpop’. Why this has been the case related to two factors. The first was that Britain, like most advanced industrial economies, is continuing to face critical questions about what will be the new industries it can develop as globalisation sees many parts of manufacturing and services shift to lower-wage economies, as improvements in communication and transportation make such shifts more seamlessly integrated into global production networks, and as developing economies such as those of East Asia, China and India are moving up the value chain as their enterprises have become directly competitive with European and North American firms. The Cox Review of Creativity in Business (HM Treasury, 2006) identified the nexus between creativity, innovation and design as an area in which Britain needed to develop a competitive edge over the next five to ten years as a matter of urgency, before the developing economies enhanced their local research, education, technical and creative capacities to the point where they would out-compete Britain not only in low-wage, low-skill industries, but in high-technology industries where skills are at a premium.

The second factor promoting creative industries in the UK was the fact that, at a local level, city and regional governments had been responding to the challenge of a post-industrial future for at least 15 years prior to the Blair government’s election in 1997. As Britain’s industrial cities, such as Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Sheffield and Bradford, faced the loss of traditional manufacturing in the 1980 and 1990s, in many cases they responded with strategies to give culture a new role in the local economy (Lewis 1990; Greenhalgh 1998; O’Connor 1999, 2007). Interestingly, given that creative industries is often criticised for being a surrender of the arts and creativity to neo-liberal values, it is notable that the origins of creative industries policy can be found in local councils in UK cities dominated by left-wing Labour governments in the 1980s, whose approach to the question of democratising cultural policy often led to answers that blurred traditional dichotomies between the arts and commerce, markets and planning, and intervention and enterprise. These have all been hallmarks of creative industries as a policy discourse as it has evolved in the UK from the 1990s to the present.

Local Socialism in the UK: A Precursor to Creative Industries?

The concept of ‘local socialism’ has a history as a minority strand in left-wing British political thought, favouring participatory democracy and local solutions over the dominant post-1945 Labour consensus favouring centrally delivered solutions and national economic planning (Gyford, 1985). The election of the Thatcher Conservative government in 1979 saw a parallel trend towards the election of Labour councils in numerous UK cities, which in many cases were committed to programmes to promote local economic development as well as progressive agendas on women’s rights and those of minority groups.

(Continued)
The most prominent of the left-wing Labour councils was the Greater London Council (GLC), headed by ‘Red’ Ken Livingstone from 1981 to its abolition by the Conservatives in 1986. Bianchini (1987) observed that the GLC developed two distinctive approaches to local cultural policy: promotion of ethnic and community arts to empower under-represented minorities in the cultural sphere; and development of a Cultural Industries Strategy through the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB) to promote new enterprises and more effective public sector intervention in commercial cultural industries and markets. Drawing upon the work of political economist Nicholas Garnham, the Cultural Industries Strategy put forward a number of important changes and provocations in relation to public policy towards the cultural sectors:

1. It argued against deficit financing of existing arts organisations and practices, seeing this as reflective of policies which ‘[place] artists at the centre of the cultural universe … [and] define the policy problem as one of finding audiences for their work … when audiences cannot be found … the market is blamed and the gap is filled by subsidy’ (Garnham, 1987: 24);

2. Such approaches were reflective of an ‘idealist’ tradition in cultural policy that rejected the role played by markets in the allocation of cultural resources. Garnham argued that ‘while this tradition has been rejecting the market, most people’s cultural needs and aspirations are being, for better or worse, supplied by the market as goods and services’ (Garnham, 1987: 25);

3. The alternative approach proposed for cultural policy was to better understand how the cultural industries worked as ‘institutions in our society which employ the characteristic modes of production and organisation of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and services generally, although not exclusively, as commodities’ (Garnham, 1987: 25);

4. Strategies for the media industries needed to have a central role in cultural policy, due to their prominence as employers of cultural labour, their nature as commodities that account for large amounts of consumers’ time spent in cultural consumption, and their relationship to the diffusion of new technologies;

5. Cultural industries strategy should therefore focus upon the whole value chain of cultural production, distribution and consumption, and upon strategies to promote new cultural enterprises, better understand audiences, and better market and promote cultural goods and services that receive public financial support, in order to ‘concentrate … interventions not on production but on distribution in the widest sense’ (Garnham, 1987: 36).

While the impact of the Cultural Industries Strategy within the GLC was ultimately limited (Bianchini, 1987), it was highly influential in rethinking the relationship of the cultural industries to local economic development in cities, and the policy strategies to be adopted by local governments. As many cities in Britain faced the decline of their traditional
manufacturing industries – a process that accelerated under the Thatcher government policies of the 1980s – culture was identified as playing an increasingly important role in both the ‘re-imagining’ of these cities, and the cultural industries were seen as providing new opportunities for economic and employment growth (O’Connor, 2007).

The music industry provided an interesting case study in these new policy approaches. In cities such as Sheffield and Manchester, initiatives were undertaken to harness and promote their vibrant and diverse (and internationally successful) popular music cultures as part of the re-branding of the city as a destination for events, tourism and new investment. Policy initiatives included: the development of council-funded rehearsal spaces; ‘Cultural Industries Quarters’ in parts of the city where clusters of bars, nightclubs and music recording facilities had emerged; and improvements to physical infrastructure and changes to licensing laws that better fitted the notion of a ‘night-time economy’ that was central to the music industry (O’Connor and Lovatt, 1995; Brown et al., 2000). This presented new challenges for economic development policy, as popular music as an industry was often seen as ‘soft’ and ephemeral, lacking in the large-scale investments in physical infrastructure associated with manufacturing and service industries. It also required a rethinking of arts and cultural policy, as popular music industries and scenes developed outside, and sometimes in spite of, the activities of local governments and cultural planners, reflecting both what has been referred to as the ‘Darwinian inheritance’ of popular music – a few succeed commercially, but most don’t – and the fact that it is hooked into national and global cultural circuits as well as having an element that is locally driven. Frith et al. (2009) provide a valuable account of some of the tensions involved in developing policies for music as a creative industries, with particular reference to work undertaken in Scotland.

Critiques of the DCMS Definition of Creative Industries

For a policy document issued from within a new government department, the DCMS Mapping Documents gained remarkable traction and ongoing significance. They were also subject to widespread critique. As creative industries was presented as something of an ex nihilo category capable of encompassing a heterogeneous set of industries and practices, critiques of the DCMS model of creative industries in the UK have often been bundled up with other discussions, such as: whether the arts are, or should be, associated with economic discourses focused on wealth creation (Caust, 2003; O’Connor, 2009); whether or not there exists what urban policy advocate Richard Florida termed the ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002); and the general directions of public policy under ‘New Labour’ in Britain and the political philosophy of the ‘Third Way’. ‘New Labour’ in particular has been subject to a range of caustic critiques, which saw its policies as essentially a continuation of the neo-liberal economic and social programmes of the ‘Thatcher era with a social democratic gloss, or ‘Thatcherism with a human face’. In the words of leading academic critic Stuart Hall, New Labour and the ‘Third Way’ entrenched a neo-liberal project whereby ‘Slowly but surely,
everybody—kicking and screaming to the end—becomes his/her own kind of “manager” [and] the market and market criteria become entrenched as the modus operandi of “governance” and institutional life’ (Hall, 2005: 327). From such a perspective, the UK model of creative industries can be critiqued as “old wine in new bottles” – a glib production of spin-happy New Labourites, hot for naked marketisation but mindful of the need for socially acceptable dress’ (Ross, 2008: 18), or as ‘a reactionary model insofar as it reinforces the status quo of labour relations within a neoliberal paradigm’ (Rossiter, 2006: 111). Some of these root-and-branch issues concerning the legitimacy of the creative industries concept will be considered in later chapters, particularly Chapter Three, where the concept of ‘creative industries’ is counter-posed to that of ‘cultural industries’.

A range of critiques of the DCMS definition of creative industries emerged from an applied, policy-oriented perspective. The most common of these related to the validity of ‘creativity’ as a policy concept capable of bringing together the diverse set of industries and practices associated with the creative industries, and the inherent difficulties involved in differentiating these industries from others on the basis of their application of creativity. Bilton and Leary (2002) observed that the DCMS definition could not in itself explain what was distinctive about the creative industries, since:

Every industry would surely lay claim to some measure of individual creativity, skill and talent; equally, it is difficult to think of a product which does not exploit some intellectual component in the form of patents, design elements or other intangible, symbolic properties which make that product unique. (Bilton and Leary, 2002: 50)

Pratt (2005: 33) echoed this point, observing that ‘it would be difficult to identify a non-creative industry or activity’. The resulting danger was that of stretching the concepts of culture and creativity ‘beyond breaking point’ (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005: 6), since ‘any innovation – including scientific and technical innovations – of any sort in any industry is creative, and, in such terms, any industry is, therefore, potentially a “creative industry”’ (Galloway and Dunlop, 2007: 19). Howkins (2001) was critical of the UK DCMS initiatives in precisely these terms, arguing that it restricted creativity to the domains of the arts and culture, excluding the sciences, engineering and technological innovation more generally.

These were examples of what Pratt (2005) referred to as the breadth question in definitions of cultural and creative industries, and it has two elements. The first is that of inclusion and exclusion. The DCMS definition of the creative industries was seen by critics as being simultaneously too broad and too narrow. O’Regan (2002) questioned the one-sided focus on that which was ‘new’ and commercially oriented, arguing that such an approach risked losing sight of the complex cultural ecology through which commercially-oriented and publicly-subsidised forms of cultural production were linked, as well as the links between digital and tangible arts and media forms. The DCMS approach was sometimes seen as a politically pragmatic one, driven by the way in which the Mapping Documents ‘opened a door to Treasury funding and gained an economic respect for the sector it had never had before as simply “the arts lobby”’ (Pratt, 2005: 33). Pratt observed that the significance of the new creative industries analysis was that it provided a new way of collecting and aggregating data
around the cultural sectors that had been neglected under Standard Industry Classifications (SIC) models, so that:

For policy makers, it is as if suddenly a successful new industry has arrived from nowhere. Although the constituent industries (film, television, advertising etc.) are widely recognised, previously they had been seen either as part of the state-supported sector, or viewed as somewhat peripheral to the ‘real economy’. (Pratt, 2004a: 19)

At the same time, questions remained about what was excluded from the creative industries definition. As noted above, the apparent exclusion of cultural institutions from the GLAM (Galleries, Libraries, Archives and Museums) sector from the list appears odd, as does the exclusion of cultural heritage and cultural tourism, while the focus on crafts and antiques may in itself be more reflective of Britain as an ‘old country’ where TV programmes such as Antiques Roadshow are part of the national patrimony and global image (Wright, 1985; Bonner, 2003), rather than their centrality to national cultural and economic policy. Moreover, it can be argued that the logic of creative industries production and organisational practices extends its trajectory outwards to sectors such as telecommunications, sport and entertainment, and to knowledge-intensive service industries more generally (Cunningham, 2002).

The second element in the breadth question surrounding creative industries is that creative industries policy discourse has emerged in a context where the symbolic and cultural dimensions of all aspects of the economy have acquired a greater significance. Creativity has been identified by businesses worldwide as an increasingly important source of sustainable competitive advantage in a globalised, knowledge-based economy where the barriers to reproduction of ideas, concepts and products have been dramatically reduced. Moreover, the growing significance of cultural and symbolic dimensions to the economy overall has proceeded apace, through processes originally identified by sociologists such as Featherstone (1991) as the ‘aestheticisation of everyday life’, and Lash and Urry described as the ‘culturalisation of the economy’, where ‘ordinary manufacturing industry is becoming more and more like the production of culture’ (Lash and Urry, 1994: 123). The resulting policy problem with the ‘everything is creative’ definitions of the creative industries is that such definitions can fail to identify the distinctive and specific aspects of cultural sectors, and generate a resulting tendency towards a ‘one size fits all’ or generic ‘cookie cutter’ approach to media and cultural policy that lacks specificity and a grounded understanding of the nature of the industries concerned and the most effective policy interventions to further their development (Oakley, 2004; Pratt, 2005; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007).²

Garnham (2005) argued that the DCMS definition of creative industries was developed in such a way that was not only politically pragmatic in promoting the cultural sectors as economically important, but was strategically aligned to the more prestigious policy domains associated with the information society and the knowledge economy. Garnham argued that the focus on creative industries was part of an attempt by the cultural sector and the cultural policy community to share in its relations with the government, and in policy presentation in the media, the unquestioned prestige that now attaches to the information society and to any policy that supposedly favours its development’ (Garnham 2005: 20). Garnham argued that
this definitional shift has had two major consequences for the development of arts, media and cultural policy in the UK. One consequence was that it has promoted a strengthening of copyright protection that has benefited the so-called copyright industries such as the software, media and entertainment industries, through an alliance with cultural workers and small-scale cultural entrepreneurs around the importance of intellectual property (IP) protection to the creative industries generally. This is despite the limited evidence that exists for arguments that such IP protection benefits content creators as distinct from copyright owners, and the possibility that strong IP regimes act as a fetter on innovation, particularly in the digital content domain (Flew, 2006). The propensity to promote stronger intellectual property regimes on the basis that they would assist the British creative industries could also be seen in later policy documents such as Digital Britain, where it was argued that strong intellectual property laws are a pillar of creative industries development since ‘strong rule of law is vital for industries that depend on respect for intellectual property’ (DCMS/DBIS, 2009: 105).

The second consequence, for Garnham, has been that it has shifted the policy focus away from regulation over distribution of cultural products and services towards a supply-side, artist-centred notion of ‘creativity’ as the primary driver of cultural policy, through extrapolating the idea of the artists as a ‘model creative worker’ towards education and human capital formation for the economy as a whole. As well as the observation that this may in fact resurrect the view of ‘creativity based on individual exceptionalism’ that may be least useful for the economic development of the creative industries (Bilton and Leary, 2002; Bilton, 2007), it also runs the risk, as critics such as Andrew Ross have argued, of promoting precarious work and employment conditions that often characterise the position of creative artists into a ‘new entrepreneurial paradigm’ for the knowledge workforce, where ‘long-abiding vulnerability to occupational neglect is now magically transformed, under the new order of creativity, into a model of enterprising, risk-tolerant pluck’ (Ross, 2008: 19).

Further Elaborations of UK Creative Industries Policy: Regionalisation, the Arts, and Mainstreaming

Some of the criticisms made of the DCMS approach to creative industries found in the Mapping Documents were responded to in further elaborations of the policy in Britain in the 2000s. Three major developments in creative industries policies in the UK in the 2000s were:

1. More explicit incorporation of a regional dimension to creative industries policies, in partial recognition of the limits of top-down, ‘one size fits all’ policy prescriptions;
2. A reassertion of the distinctiveness of the arts in cultural and creative industries policy;
3. A mainstreaming of creative industries policy discourse, which sought to establish the relevance of themes and concepts derived from analysis of the creative industries to the British economy as a whole.
In considering these developments, it is notable that there was no turning away from development of the creative industries as a core policy theme in Britain from 1997 to the present. It has survived not only the decline in earlier animating concepts such as ‘Cool Britannia’ and the ‘new economy’, but also the fall in the personal popularity of Tony Blair—particularly after Britain committed troops to the war in Iraq in 2003—and his replacement by Gordon Brown as Prime Minister. How it will be reconfigured in the shift from Labour to the Conservative/Liberal Democrats coalition remains to be seen, but the early signs were that the new government has retained a commitment to developing these sectors in their current institutional form, with the senior Conservative MP Jeremy Hunt being the Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport from May 2010.

Pratt (2004a) argued that the major change in creative industries policy in the UK from 1997 to the early 2000s was regionalisation. He notes that ‘despite the inclusion of “mapping” in the title there are no maps in the UK [DCMS] report; moreover, there was no attempt to address regional or local variations, or to benchmark findings against those of other nation states’ (Pratt, 2004a: 20). This gap was acknowledged in the second Creative Industries Mapping Document in 2001, which coincided with the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly in 1999, as well as the development of new forms of regional governance such as Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). Monitoring of the regional dimensions of public policy was a recurring concern of the Labour governments since 1997, due in part to their electoral strength in Northern England, Scotland and Wales, but also to the perception that the Conservatives had presided over a ‘Two Nations’ Great Britain, with a prosperous south where new service industries were based, and a damaged and de-industrialised north.

The regionalisation agenda, and the associated development of Regional Cultural Consortia by DCMS to work with the RDAs and Regional Arts Boards, produced a plethora of studies into the creative industries in the various UK regions. Significant creative industries networks were identified in various cities and regions, as seen, for example, in work on South-East England (Pratt, 2004a), Northern Ireland (Jeffcutt, 2004) and Nottingham and the East Midlands (Shorthose, 2004a). It also produced a plethora of initiatives to promote cultural quarters and creative clusters (Jayne and Bell, 2004; Roodhouse, 2006). Kate Oakley argued that these were driven by a vision of ‘culture-led regeneration … as the last great hope of cities with economic or social problems’ (Oakley 2004: 68), although she observed that in practice the outcome was often ‘cookie cutter approaches’ to creative industries developed without suitable attention being given to place specificity:

Rather than trying to understand the difference between the creative economy of Glasgow and that of Cornwall, we currently seem hell bent on trying to replicate a single creative industries model across the country. It appears that everywhere needs a university, some incubators and a ‘creative hub’, with or without a café, galleries and fancy shops. (Oakley, 2004: 73)

Where success has been monitored, it was often associated with factors not considered in the standard DCMS policy template, such as the role of ‘vernacular creativity’ in Nottingham.
(Shorthose, 2004a) or tacit knowledge networks in Manchester (O’Connor, 2004), whereas ‘engineered’ attempts by city authorities to develop creative industries quarters in cities such as Leicester and Stoke have been less successful (Jayne 2004; Shorthose, 2004b). At the same time, London continued to be the centre of Britain’s creative industries, being particularly dominant in the media, music, fashion, advertising, electronic games and publishing industries (De Propris et al., 2009). This was not because it had the best policy frameworks, but because its history, infrastructure, status as a global city, and links to the financial and business services sectors meant that ‘it alone can afford to “specialise” in creative industries employment, providing the infrastructure of commissioning, distribution, management and other professional functions that enable these sectors to get their products to market’ (Knell and Oakley, 2007: 8). The inability to redistribute creative industries jobs away from London over the life of the Blair and Brown governments could be seen as a wider metaphor for the failure to redress the class-based and regional inequalities of British society during the ‘New Labour’ years.

A second major development has been the reassertion of priorities associated with developing the arts within DCMS. O’Connor (1999) and Pratt (2004a) alluded to the unresolved question of the relationship between DCMS and its predominantly economic focus and remit, and that of more established bodies such as the Arts Council of Great Britain (now the Arts Council of England), and between ‘the Department’s economic and commercial constituencies’, with the commercial creative industries being ‘considered by many in the arts establishment to be in opposition, in aim and purpose, to “the arts”’ (Pratt, 2004a: 21). The DCMS Mapping Documents was described by some as ‘nothing less than a new manifesto for cultural studies’ (Hartley, 2003: 118), as they flattened the traditional hierarchies of cultural authority and privilege, sitting art alongside architecture, software with Shakespeare, and Big Brother with the British Museum as the advancing global flagships of ‘British creativity’. Alas, it was not to last. Tessa Jowell, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport from 2001 to 2007, sought to disavow DCMS’s reputation as the ‘Ministry for Fun’ – acquired during the Chris Smith years – with a personal essay on ‘Government and the Value of Culture’, where she made it clear that while she did not find the term ‘high culture’ very useful, she did consider ‘great art’ to be an instantiation of the sort of ‘complex culture’ that could lift all Britons out of a ‘poverty of aspiration’, and hence warranted large-scale public subsidy (DCMS, 2004). A distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘entertainment’ thus re-emerged in DCMS policy discourse, and Tessa Jowell’s successor, James Purnell, commissioned a study into excellence into the arts, and how best to ‘free artists and cultural organisations from outdated structures and burdensome targets, which can act as millstones around the neck of creativity’ (DCMS, 2008b). While the recommendations of Supporting Excellence in the Arts – From Measurement to Judgement (the McMaster Report) would enable some in the arts sector to benefit from the capacity to base future funding decisions upon expert judgement of how they had obtained excellence, rather than ‘simplistic targets’, other recipients of DCMS funding would continue to be evaluated against its Performance Indicator Framework, needing to demonstrate a ‘balanced scorecard’ against a range of indices to have their funding renewed from one year to the next (Eckersley, 2008). As Garnham (2005) has suggested, moves towards an artist-centred, supply-side framework for cultural
funding that emphasised creativity would bring the paradigm of excellence and its associated claims for public subsidy independent of public accountability back to the centre of British cultural policy.

The final major development with UK creative industries policy in the 2000s was the development of various strategies to mainstream it around the concept of Britain as a creative economy. There had long been a critique of the creative industries strategy as based upon assumptions that overstated the extent of decline of the manufacturing sector, and with it traditional working-class jobs, in order to promote Britain as a post-industrial economy and more ‘classless’ society (e.g. Heartfield 2000; Elliott and Atkinson, 2007). The Cox Review of Creativity in Business (HM Treasury, 2006) was explicit in its focus on how creative capabilities were at the core of Britain’s capacity to compete with emerging economies over the next five to ten years. It identified the capacity to link creativity and innovation through the effective deployment of design capabilities, combined with the promotion of greater innovation among Britain’s small-to-medium enterprise (SME) sector, as the key supply-side challenges to the British economy as a whole. The 2008 DCMS policy paper, Creative Britain: New Talents for the New Economy (DCMS, 2008a) reinforced the proposition that ‘The creative industries must move from the margins to the mainstream of economic and policy thinking, as we look to create the jobs of the future’ (DCMS, 2008a: 6). It promoted a vision for Britain, backed by targeted policy initiatives, where ‘in ten years’ time … the local economies of our biggest cities are driven by creativity’, and where ‘the creative industries … have become central to our national identity and brand’ (DCMS, 2008a: 6, 63). The 2009 Digital Britain report, jointly developed by the DCMS and the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, had a similar refrain, proposing that policies to promote digital infrastructure could enable Britain to ‘be a global centre for the creative industries in the digital age, delivering an ever wider range of quality content, including public service content, within a clear and fair legal framework’ (DCMS/DBIS, 2009: 1).

Revising Creative Industries: NESTA and The Work Foundation

Having considered a number of the critiques of the list-based approach to creative industries first promulgated by the DCMS, I now want to appraise two reports developed for UK policy makers in the 2000s that sought to provide an alternative analytical framework for evaluating Britain’s creative industries. The first was that of the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) in its 2006 report Creating Growth: How the UK Can Develop World Class Creative Businesses (NESTA, 2006). The second was the 2007 report prepared by The Work Foundation, Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance of the UK’s Creative Industries (Work Foundation, 2007). Both seek to develop a more nuanced and coherent approach to understanding creative industries as being multi-layered and internally differentiated. Of the two, it has been The Work Foundation’s approach, based on what is known as the concentric circles model of the creative industries,
and on a differentiation between cultural and creative industries in terms of their cultural inputs, which has been the more influential model, particularly in the uptake of the concept by the European Union (discussed in Chapter Two). I will argue, however, that The Work Foundation’s concentric circles model presents a set of recurring problems for understanding these sectors, which tend to push the creative industries concept back towards being a form of de facto arts policy.

In its 2006 report Creating Growth: How the UK Can Develop World Class Creative Businesses, the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) developed an approach to mapping the UK creative industries that both builds upon the DCMS framework and modifies it in significant ways (NESTA, 2006). Emphasising that its approach is economically based, and with a focus on the commercial growth potential of creative businesses and commercially focused innovation, NESTA found the DCMS approach to be insufficient in four ways:

1. It found the original 1998 definition to be too broad, and its inclusion of industries such as software and computer services had the effect of artificially inflating the overall figures;
2. Because it did not differentiate between the 13 industry sectors listed, it could not adequately identify those industries whose economic performance was most critical to growth, employment and exports;
3. The creative industries are defined primarily in terms of their outputs, and there is a lack of differentiation between industries in terms of their commercial value chains, market structures, distribution mechanisms and consumption patterns;
4. As a result, the DCMS model did not differentiate between those sectors whose dynamic is primarily commercial, and those whose outputs are partly or primarily generated through public subsidy.

NESTA instead proposed a model that differentiates the creative industries into four interlocking but nonetheless distinct groupings:

1. Creative service providers, who earn revenues for devoting time and applying intellectual property (IP) to other businesses and organisations. These include advertising agencies, design consultancies, architecture practices and new media agencies;
2. Creative content producers, who invest capital up-front to produce IP-protected outputs that are distributed to consumers/audiences, and who earn revenues through a mix of direct sales, advertising and subscriptions. Creative content enterprises include film, television and theatre production companies, computer and video game development studios, music labels, book and magazine publishers, and fashion designers;
3. Creative experience providers, who sell the right for consumers to experience specific activities, performances or locations in a particular time and place. This includes theatre, opera and dance production companies, and live music organisers and promoters, and can be extended to live spectator sports, festivals, cultural institutions and tourist promotions;
Creative originals producers, who are involved in the creation, manufacture or sale of physical artefacts, whose value is derived from their perceived cultural or creative value, exclusivity and authenticity, i.e. they are typically one-offs or produced in limited production runs rather than mass produced. This includes much of the visual arts, crafts and designer-makers (e.g. of specialist clothing).

In developing this four-fold typology, it was argued that, from an economic perspective, there was more scope for growth and profitability to be derived from the creative content providers.
It was argued that this model focuses on the creative industries as industrial sectors rather than as a set of creative activities based on individual talent (NESTA, 2006: 54), and proposed two reasons for focusing upon creative content producers and creative service providers. First, these sectors – and particularly creative content producers – have a greater capacity to create, own and exploit intellectual property through the ability to distribute and reproduce content on a large scale. The Internet has opened up new platforms and channels for global distribution and export growth, while at the same time presenting new challenges for the ownership and control over IP. Second, there was seen to be stronger potential for employment growth, particularly in the creative service providing sectors, where increases in client demand are typically met by increases in the number of staff to service these clients. For these two reasons in particular, NESTA proposed that the model of the creative industries that they have developed ‘better reflects the perspective of private investors’ (NESTA, 2006: 55).
The Work Foundation, in its report Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance of the UK's Creative Industries (Work Foundation, 2007), identified a link between the rise of the creative industries, trends towards a knowledge economy, and demand trends where ‘better educated and richer consumers [who are] looking for experience and psychological reward … are co-architects of the knowledge economy’ (Work Foundation, 2007: 126). In contrast to the NESTA approach, The Work Foundation chose to differentiate creative content, and the industries that produce and distribute it, on the basis of what it referred to as the expressive value of creative products and services. It differentiates between what it refers to as a creative core, the cultural industries, and the creative industries, on the basis of the centrality of expressive value to the resulting outputs, producing what has come to be known as the concentric circles model of the creative industries, pioneered by Australian cultural economist David Throsby (2001, 2008b).

Expressive value is defined as ‘every dimension (in the realm of ideas) which, in its broadest sense, enlarges cultural meaning and understanding’ (Work Foundation, 2007: 96). Derived from the work of cultural economist David Throsby (2001), it is seen as incorporating elements such as aesthetic value, spiritual value, social value, historical value, symbolic value and authenticity value. The term appears to function primarily to differentiate the creative and performing arts from the commercial media on the basis of greater aesthetic value and significance – Shakespeare’s plays and Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony are of greater cultural value and significance than reality TV and heavy metal music – and to justify public investment in the former and not the latter. If this were the case, it would look much like the familiar distinction between high culture and popular culture and how it has worked in arts policy to validate public subsidy of the former but not the latter (Frow, 1995; Bennett et al., 1999). At the same time, The Work Foundation disavows this distinction, arguing that:

In the first decade of the 21st century, expressive value is no longer confined to traditional art forms. Expressive value (in the sense of symbolic value) is represented in software programs and video games such as the Grand Theft Auto and Metal Gear series where engrossing narratives combine with performance-driven play and increasingly naturalistic graphics. Expressive value (in the sense of social value) is represented in the range of interactive, user generated cultural material found on the internet (Work Foundation, 2007: 97).

On the basis of their different levels of expressive value, as compared to functional value, The Work Foundation differentiates between cultural industries, such as film, music, publishing, radio, television and computer games, and creative industries, such as advertising, architecture, design, fashion and computer software. While this distinction has been used in policy document elsewhere, most notably those developed by the European Union, it is a difficult distinction to maintain, and the concept of expressive value does little to clarify the distinction.

The two reports were developed at a time when an inherent tension in the concept of creative industries was becoming apparent in Britain, as to whether it was primarily an economic policy associated with promoting generating successful industries and new forms
of IP, or primarily a policy to support the arts and cultural sectors, particularly those reliant upon public sector funding. The NESTA report takes the former approach, although in doing so it can be accused of neglecting the economic significance of what it terms the creative experience sectors to the British economy. This seems reflective of a general problem in the British creative industries policy discourse of over-estimating Britain’s opportunities in the global digital content industries, and understating the value of events, heritage, cultural infrastructure and built environment, presumably because digital content was seen as representing modernisation whereas cultural heritage was reflective of Britain as an ‘old country’. The Work Foundation’s report was consistent with the directions for DCMS associated with ministers such as Tessa Jowell and policy documents such as the McMaster Report, that sought to reassert the centrality of the arts to creative industries, and public support for cultural excellence rather than being seen as a ‘Ministry for Fun’ or a department of applied cultural studies. In seeking to reconcile a very traditional conception of aesthetics as manifested in the concept of expressive value with recommendations about how to grow British creative industries, The Work Foundation presents a divide between cultural and creative industries that in practice always appears to be highly permeable. Locating the media industries here is particularly problematic, as the question of whether expressive value resides in media content would appear difficult to resolve in terms that are anything other than subjective. Does it reside in genre: in drama and documentary but not in soaps, chat shows or reality TV? Where does British comedy – definitely a successful British cultural export – sit within this schema? If there is expressive value in Metal Gear, then why not in Top Gear?

Creative Industries in Britain: From New Labour to the ConDems

The Labour government, led by Gordon Brown from 2007 to 2010, was soundly defeated in the May 2010 General Election, with a 6 per cent swing against it. This marked the end of the ‘New Labour’ project as it was developed by Blair, Brown, Peter Mandelson and others over the period from the mid 1990s, although the Conservative Party, led by David Cameron, did not gain a majority in its own right, and entered into a coalition with the centre-left Liberal Democrats, headed by Nick Clegg. A key factor in the turn against Labour was the dramatic impact of the global financial crisis on the UK economy, with the collapse and nationalisation of the Northern Rock Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland, Britain experiencing one of the more prolonged recessions of the OECD economies over 2008–2009, and the ballooning level of public sector debt over this period. The extent of public sector debt meant that the new Conservative–Liberal Democrats government saw rapid reductions in the level of government expenditure as its key policy priority, leading to cuts in cultural and creative industries spending, including the abolition of Regional Development Authorities and the UK Film Council, as well as significant reductions in funding to the BBC.
The global financial crisis and the prolonged economic recession in Britain had a deeply pessimistic impact on many involved in the creative industries sectors. The mood is captured in a collection of essays titled After the Crunch (Wright et al., 2009), and by a sign outside a shop window in Hackney, East London, referred to at the beginning of the book, saying ‘Sorry, we’re f***ed’. The crisis also generated a backlash towards many aspects of the ‘New Labour’ years, ranging from the failure to more stringently regulate the big banks in the City of London, to the concept of creative industries itself, seen by critics as sacrificing the radical potential of art to the blandishments of commerce. This mood is captured by the arts columnist in the New Statesman, Alice O’Keeffe, in her last column in February 2009. O’Keeffe argued that the arts in Britain during this period were corrupted by money-worship or, as she puts it, ‘the champagne has flowed and the megabucks have changed hands in ever greater quantities. … Art has always followed the money, and it was inevitable that hedge-funders, Premier League footballers and Russian oligarchs would want pictures for their penthouse walls’. She describes New Labour’s embrace of the creative industries as follows:

I remember, in March 2007, going to see Tony Blair make a speech on the arts at Tate Modern, in which he boldly claimed to have presided over a cultural ‘golden age’. The arts, he told the gathered great and good, were a vital component of Britain’s continued economic success: ‘A nation that cares about art will not just be a better nation. In the early 21st century, it will be a more successful one.’ In New Labour parlance, the arts had become the ‘creative industries’. Like bankers and stockbrokers, artists were expected to prop up the wobbly edifice of consumer capitalism, to generate profit, attract tourists, help Britain market itself as a cultural – and therefore financial – ‘hub’. Placing culture firmly at the service of finance had its advantages for the arts administrators in the audience, too, as it gave them a clear claim on their slice of the government pie. (O’Keeffe, 2009)

O’Keeffe is here identifying the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent job losses in the City of London and the fiscal crisis of the British state as marking the end of this wobbly alliance between the arts and the big end of town. Just as the boom saw art in her eyes being subordinated to the cocaine binges of millionaires grooving to superstar DJs – she quotes one attendee at the Venice Biennale as saying ‘No-one comes to Venice for the art, darling’ – O’Keeffe concluded by expressing the vague hope that ‘the next few years of economic austerity will ring a creative renaissance’ (O’Keeffe, 2009).

At one level, this captures the thinking of a strand of the British left that never bought into ‘New Labour’ ideology, and welcomed the exposure of its failings and its ultimate economic demise. But it was also reflective of a wider cynicism about creative industries prevalent in Britain by the late 2000s, but also apparent elsewhere. In a review of a collection of essays on music titled Sonic Synergies (Bloustein et al., 2008), the Australian writer Graham Preston argued that ‘with the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and its negative impact on creative industries, the material here on the Creative Knowledge Economy seems strangely optimistic and now part of a distinct historical moment which may have passed us
by already’ (Preston, 2009: 143). In academic journals such as the International Journal of Cultural Policy, it was argued that we were in a period ‘after the creative industries’ (Banks and O’Connor, 2009), and that ‘after 10 years, the direction of UK creative industries policy is looking increasingly bleak’ (Banks and Hesmondhalgh, 2009: 428).

What arises here is a vitally important question of the extent to which the creative industries can experience autonomous development – they have their own growth and innovation dynamics – or whether their development is inevitably dependent upon stimulus from elsewhere, be it the hyperactive London financial scene that O’Keeffe refers to, or government support and subsidy? If we take Alice O’Keeffe’s comments first, it is apparent that she has taken a particular snapshot of a highly visible arts scene – the London visual arts world of the 2000s, with its superstars such as Damian Hirst and Tracey Emin – and transposed it on to British culture as a whole. Not only is this realm rather unique in its relationship between money and motivations (although of course symbolically significant for precisely that reason), but it is also very much a metropolitan perspective. While there is considerable evidence that London predominated in the British creative industries through the New Labour years since 1997 (De Propris et al., 2009), it would be expected that the dynamics of arts and cultural markets in the rest of Britain would be less tied to the rhythms of the financial hub of the City of London, and its associated hedge funders, cocaine dealers, Premier League footballers, pneumatic heiresses and Russian oligarchs. Andy Pratt’s early analysis of the impact of the crisis on British cultural and creative industries indicated that they had been among the sectors coming out of the crisis reasonably early, due in part to major projects being fast-tracked as publicly-funded counter-cyclical measures (Pratt, 2009a). Such findings run counter to the assumption that British creative industries rise and sink with British finance capital, that culture is largely associated with consumption rather than production and employment, and that creative industries are not ‘proper’ industries but are rather reliant upon the surpluses produced elsewhere in the ‘real’ economy. For Pratt, the continued vitality of creative industries in the face of downturns elsewhere suggests that policy makers and analysts may still not have fully grasped how central the cultural dimensions of goods and services have become, so that “culture” is not simply an added extra, or candy floss, [but] it is the main action, and as such cannot be removed from the product easily’ (Pratt, 2009a: 496).

In the British case, the future of creative industries will clearly hinge to a significant degree on the view taken towards them by the new Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition. The language of creative industries was one that Conservatives were prepared to use when in opposition, albeit with a tendency to differentiate them from the arts. Such a perspective tended to be associated with the Conservative Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, who has been keen to support industries such as fashion and games as vital elements of a diversified London economy, and has expressed concerns about the impact of large cuts to arts spending. At the same time, the Ingenious Britain report prepared for the Conservatives by Sir James Dyson prior to the May 2010 election is a cri de couer for the importance of the sciences and engineering to the British economy, and warns that ‘terms like “post-industrial” and “creative industries”… render invisible the significant contribution of science and engineering to the economy. They must go’ (Dyson, 2010: 12). The new government’s response
to the Browne Review of Higher Education Funding (Browne, 2010), which proposed withdrawing all public grant funding for teaching in humanities, arts and social sciences (HASS) courses, while retaining some public support for science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) courses, would suggest that they are not convinced by creative industries arguments that claim to put the arts and the sciences on an equal footing in terms of their contributions to national well-being, and that the 2010s will be a tough decade for Britain’s creative industries sectors.

Any sectors in Britain that are strongly reliant on public sector funding will be hard hit by measures to reduce Britain’s government deficit and public sector debt, so the 2010s are unlikely to be a flourishing era for many of these industries in Britain. More generally, it may be the case that we are seeing a Wimbledonisation of the concept of creative industries. The term ‘Wimbledonisation’ refers to areas where Britain retains a strong symbolic association with the field, even where much of the ownership and the action has moved elsewhere (Fay, 1997; Peston, 2009). It was coined in relation to the British financial industry, to describe the role of British figureheads as the public face of banks that were now owned by foreign interests. Its origins lie with the annual spectacle of the Wimbledon tennis tournament, which remains the world’s leading tennis event, even though British players rarely feature in the final rounds of the tournament (Andy Murray’s recent success notwithstanding). It may well be that, like tennis, creative industries has its origins in Britain, but activity associated with it will increasingly shift elsewhere around the globe, even though Britain will retain some sense of ownership of the origins of the concept. To see whether this is what is happening, we need to consider the take-up of creative industries as a policy discourse elsewhere in the world.

Endnotes

1 ‘Britpop’ is a term used to describe the rise of British bands such as Blur, Oasis, Pulp and The Verve in the mid 1990s. These bands were seen as being influenced by past British guitar-based bands such as The Kinks and The Beatles, and rose to prominence during roughly the same period as New Labour came to power. Tony Blair frequently sought to associate himself with Britpop, inviting Oasis guitarist Noel Gallagher to No. 10 Downing Street, and referring to his own past history in rock bands. An excellent account of the rise and fall of Britpop, and its curious relationship to New Labour, can be found in Harris, 2004.

2 This problem becomes most apparent in Howkins’ definition of a creative product as ‘an economic good or service that results from creativity and has economic value’ (Howkins, 2001: x), and his resulting definition of a creative industry as one ‘where brain power is preponderant and where the outcome is intellectual property’ (Howkins, 2005: 119). Howkins makes valid critiques of the DCMS approach to creative industries, such as the nonsensical consequences of including advertising in the creative industries sectors but excluding marketing (the former does not exist without the latter), and the tendency
to define creative industries in opposition to manufacturing, and seeing the rise of the former as evidence of the decline of the latter. At the same time, his approach leads to both inflated figures about the size of the creative economy and a loss of focus on the cultural dimensions of policy. The claim that the creative economy was worth $US2.2 trillion globally in 2000, or 7.3 per cent of global GDP, is made on the basis of including all scientific and technical research and development in the figure as well as all software development: these two sectors are estimated to be worth over $US1 trillion, and account for 46 per cent of the global creative economy as Howkins calculates it (Howkins, 2001: 116). At the same time, areas specifically related to the arts (art, crafts, music and performing arts) largely disappear from the calculus of the creative economy, being worth $139 billion or only 6 per cent of the global creative economy.

An admirably clear statement of such a position, published in the eve of the UK elections, can be found in Wood (2010), which is consistent with the position taken by New Left Review throughout the ‘New Labour’ era.