Charlotte Perkins Gilman
(1860–1935)

Key Concepts
- Gender inequality
- Women’s economic independence

Source: Courtesy of the Library of Congress.
The labor of women in the house, certainly, enables men to produce more than they otherwise could; and in this way women are economic factors in society. But so are horses.

(Gilman 1898/1998:7)

In 1980, the United Nations summed up the burden of gender inequality: Women comprised half the world’s population, did two thirds of the world’s work, earned one tenth of the world’s income, and owned one hundredth of the world’s property. In the past 20 years, not that much has changed. Even in one of the most developed nations in the world, the United States, significant economic gender inequities continue: According to the United States Department of Labor, in 2000 American women earned approximately 77% of what men with similar educational and other qualifications earned. Imagine, then, what life was like for women in the nineteenth century, when, legally speaking, women were analogous to children, without the right either to own property or to vote.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American and European women were not only legally prevented from owning property or voting; they also were denied access to higher education. Yet, despite this absence of equality, since at least the 1800s a number of self-educated women have done remarkable scholarly work. In this chapter, we consider one of these extraordinary women: Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1860–1935). Gilman was an accomplished writer, feminist, and sociologist—though in her own day she was not widely recognized as a sociologist. However, despite her lack of institutional credentials, there are a number of reasons for regarding Gilman as a “sociologist.” As Deegan (1997:11) points out, Gilman

1. identified herself as a sociologist;
2. was identified by others as a sociologist;
3. taught sociology courses (though she declined an academic appointment in sociology, she was a frequent freelance lecturer on college campuses);
4. wrote sociological books and articles, some of which were published in the influential American Journal of Sociology;
5. was a charter member of the American Sociological Society and remained a member for 25 years.

In addition, Gilman is a pivotal feminist theorist, for she was one of the first to seek to explain how women and men came to have their respective societal roles and why societies developed gender inequalities. Significantly, the three main theoretical traditions from which Gilman drew—social Darwinism, symbolic interactionism, and Marxist theory (and their offshoots)—are the main traditions around which feminist social theories still revolve today. It is for these reasons, then, that we consider Gilman a core classical theorist.

1These women include Harriet Martineau (1802–1876, see box below), Jane Addams (1860–1953), Anna Julia Cooper (1858–1964), Marianne Weber (1870–1954), and Beatrice Potter Webb (1858–1943). In addition to this brief list of “first wave” (i.e., nineteenth- and early twentieth-century) feminists who wrote sociologically about the origins and dynamics of gender inequality, are the many feminist activists devoted to remedying gender inequality, e.g., Sojourner Truth (1797–1883), Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815–1902), Susan B. Anthony (1820–1906), and Ida B. Wells-Barnett (1862–1931).
Charlotte Perkins was born on July 3, 1860, to Mary Wescott Perkins and Frederic Beecher Perkins. She was the third of four children, although the Perkins’s first child died at birth, and their fourth child died in infancy. Charlotte’s mother, Mary, was said to be an attractive woman who had had many suitors. Charlotte’s father, Frederic, was part of the distinguished New England Beecher clan. His grandfather was the influential theologian Lyman Beecher; his uncle was the famous clergyman and abolitionist, Henry Ward Beecher; and his aunt was the famous abolitionist and author of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin*, Harriet Beecher Stowe. Frederic Beecher Perkins himself was a librarian and writer of some distinction, but he abandoned the family soon after Charlotte was born. Though Frederic provided some financial support to his family, Charlotte and her brother and mother suffered financially.

**Harriet Martineau (1802–1876): The First Woman Sociologist**

Harriet Martineau was born the sixth of eight children in a well-to-do English family. Her father was a successful textile manufacturer and a devout Unitarian whose relatively progressive views allowed Harriet to pursue academic subjects normally reserved for men. Despite the comforts her father's career afforded the family, Martineau’s life was far from idyllic. By the age of 12, she was deaf, and she did not possess the sense of smell or taste. Her father died in 1826, and shortly thereafter the family business closed. During this period, her fiancé died as well, and Martineau was left without financial support.

As it would turn out, Martineau’s misfortunes thrust her into the world of professional writing as a means of earning a living. In keeping with her upbringing, she began her career by publishing articles for the Unitarian journal, the *Monthly Repository*, as well as writing religious books. However, she quickly expanded her range by publishing works on political economy, sociology, and English history; novels; travel books; and children’s stories. Moreover, she worked as a journalist for the *Daily News* where over the course of some 15 years she contributed over 1,500 articles. In much of her writing and public life, she proved to be a staunch advocate for women’s rights and the abolition of slavery. As for her more sociological writings, she examined many of the issues that would later occupy the attention of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, including class relations, suicide, religion, and social science methodology. Her analyses of these subjects are particularly noteworthy, given that the discipline of sociology had not yet been born at the time of her writing. Of her works, two stand out for their impact on the field: *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (1853), a translation and condensing of Comte’s six-volume opus, and *Society in America* (1837). Considered by many to be a masterpiece study of American life, *Society in America* was based on Martineau’s two-year stay in the United States. In it, she compared the democratic principles of equality and freedom on which the young nation was founded with its actual institutionalized practices. Certainly, were it not for the sexism of the Victorian era and its lingering effects in academia, Martineau’s position in the discipline would be more secure.

Note: This account is based largely on Valerie K. Pichanick’s *Harriet Martineau, The Woman and Her Work, 1802–76* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980).
They moved 19 times in 18 years; 14 of the moves were from city to city. Though a lack of money prevented Charlotte from receiving much in the way of a formal education, she attended the Rhode Island School of Design in 1878–79. The training she received there enabled her to earn money as a commercial artist. But most of Charlotte’s education was gained through her voracious reading, some of which was overseen by her father. Although he was only an “occasional visitor,” he sent Charlotte books and catalogues of books, as well as lists of books to read (Gilman 1935/1972:5; Degler 1966:viii-ix).

Charlotte was known as a very “willful” child. She had little interest in the pursuits deemed proper for a girl, and as she matured, Charlotte spurned the traditional roles assigned to women. She refused to play the part of the precious and frail coquette, choosing instead to exercise vigorously and develop her physical strength (Degler 1966:x).

Charlotte cherished her independence and vowed never to marry. However, a young artist named Charles Walter Stetson fell in love with Charlotte and proposed to her, and despite some initial reluctance, Charlotte agreed to marry him in 1884. But her reservations about marriage proved to be well founded. In the course of the first year of their marriage, she became increasingly and inexplicably despondent. The birth of a daughter, Katharine, just 10 and a half months after her marriage, seemed to make her depression even more severe. At the time, the prescribed remedy for women’s melancholia was rest and no intellectual activity, which nearly drove the young, spirited, intellectually curious Perkins into madness. In a now famous passage in her autobiography, Perkins described the “rest cure” that nearly did her in: “Live as domestic a life as possible. Have your child with you all the time. . . . Lie down an hour after each meal. Have but two hours’ intellectual life a day. And never touch pen, brush or pencil again” (1935/1972: 96).

A trip away from her daughter and her husband made Perkins recognize that it was not rest but activity she needed. In 1890, Charlotte decided to separate from Stetson and move to California: “Better for that dear child [Katharine] to have separated parents than a lunatic mother,” she wrote in her autobiography (ibid.: 97).

Life in California was very difficult for Perkins. She undertook what work she could find—lecturing on women’s rights, writing for small periodicals, and even managing a boarding house after her destitute mother came to live with her in Oakland (Degler 1966:xii). Yet, during this time, Perkins published several important works. In 1892, “The Yellow Wallpaper” was published. This poignant, semiautobiographical account of her experience with depression would become one of her most well-known and highly acclaimed stories. The following year, Perkins’s In This Our World was published. This sensational book of poems “enjoyed a near cult following in the United States and England” (Golden and Zangrando 2000:11).

In 1894, Charlotte Perkins and Charles Walter Stetson were divorced, and Stetson married one of Charlotte’s closest friends, Grace Channing. Charlotte freely gave the couple her blessing, and she permitted her daughter, Katharine, to live with Stetson and his new wife. This was a flagrant departure from the accepted attitude of the day, and Perkins was pilloried in the newspapers for giving away both her husband and her child to another woman. Nevertheless, she remained on close terms with Stetson and Channing (Degler 1966:xi-xii).

With her daughter no longer her direct responsibility, Perkins expanded her lecturing tours from California to the rest of the nation. She became well known in women’s suffrage circles for her provocative ideas about women’s rights as well as other social issues. After the publication of Women and Economics in 1898, her reputation as a feminist was secured. In this book, which was translated into seven languages, Perkins denounced women’s economic dependence on men and advocated for public day care and cooperative kitchens.
Not surprisingly, Perkins was allied with progressive political movements. Most noteworthy was her commitment to Fabian socialism, a brand of socialism that called for the collective ownership and democratic control of resources. While advocating equality for all, Fabian socialists, nevertheless, rejected the classical Marxist theory of revolutionary class struggle in favor of peaceful and gradual social change.

In conjunction with Fabian socialism, Perkins emphasized how the insular, nuclear family was dysfunctional for women. Gilman believed in communal kitchens and child care, rather than individual mothers “doing it all”—cooking, cleaning, and childrearing—while isolated in their own homes. Incidentally, this same inefficient individualism is readily apparent today, for instance, in the gridlock of SUVs in suburban school parking lots as mothers (and some fathers) arrive en masse—each in her (or his) own car—to drop off and pick up children.

In 1900, at the age of 40, Perkins married George Houghton Gilman, a man seven years her junior. Between her second marriage and 1914, Gilman reached the peak of her public activity and fame. She published nine books during this period, including *Concerning Children* (1900), *The Home* (1903), *Human Work* (1904), and *The Man-Made World* (1911). She also founded the journal *Forerunner* (1909–16), in which she published feminist stories and articles. In 1932, Gilman was diagnosed with breast cancer. She continued to write and lecture for a few more years, but, unfortunately, the cancer could not be arrested. On August 17, 1935, Charlotte Perkins Gilman took her own life, writing in her suicide note that she “preferred chloroform to cancer” (Degler 1966:xvii). Gilman’s autobiography, *The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman* (1935/1972), was published shortly after her death.

As noted above, Gilman’s approach to gender reflects the basic building blocks that inform feminist theory to this day: She drew from a variety of theoretical wells including Marxism, symbolic interactionism, and social Darwinism. In this section, we outline her indebtedness to each of these frameworks. As you will see, her multidimensional theory of gender inequality combines (1) a Marxist emphasis on the economic and political basis for gender inequality, (2) a symbolic interactionist emphasis on how these gender differences are reinforced and institutionalized through the process of socialization, and (3) a sociobiological emphasis on the sociobiological underpinnings of gender differences.

First, following the Marxist tradition, Gilman analyzed the political and economic factors that produce and reproduce gender inequality. Gilman sought to show that the division of labor of the traditional family (breadwinner husband/stay-at-home wife) was inherently problematic because it makes women economically dependent on men. To be sure, Gilman did not focus on the evils of capitalism as did Marx. However, just as Marx considered the system of capitalism inherently exploitative because workers do not own the means of production, Gilman considered the traditional family structure inherently exploitative because the economic compensation of women bears absolutely no relation to her labor. Regardless of how much work she actually does (or doesn’t do) in the home, the housewife’s social and economic standing comes from her husband; thus, her labor belongs to her husband, not to her. This is the major point of the selection, *Women and Economics*, that you will read below.

Second, in conjunction with the Chicago School and the symbolic interactionist tradition (discussed further in Chapter 7), Gilman emphasized how differential socialization leads to and sustains gender inequality. In doing so, she challenged the longstanding assumption that inherent biological differences precluded men and women
from effectively pursuing overlapping social activities (Degler 1966:xii–xxiii). Instead, Gilman maintained that from the earliest age, young girls were encouraged, if not forced, to act, think, look, and talk differently from boys, though their interests and capabilities at that age might be identical. For instance, Gilman states,

One of the first things we force upon the child’s dawning consciousness is the fact that he is a boy or that she is a girl, and that, therefore, each must regard everything from a different point of view. They must be dressed differently, not on account of their personal needs, which are exactly similar at this period, but so that neither they, nor any one beholding them, may for a moment forget the distinction of sex. (1898/1998:28)

Ironically, differential gender socialization is not only evident today as in Gilman’s time—in some ways, it is even more apparent. Because of consumerism and marketing, as well as the fact that parents often find out the sex of their child even before he or she is born, there is a huge array of gendered baby paraphernalia (up to and including pink and blue diapers). Today, children are subjected to extensive marketing campaigns, most notably by fast food restaurants and toy manufacturers, which from a very early age “force upon the child” a sense of being a “boy” or a “girl.” All one need do is stroll down the toy aisle at a local department store to see how children are not taught to view themselves (and each other) as human beings; rather, they are taught to view themselves (and view each other) as “boys” and “girls.”

However, despite her emphasis on differential socialization, Gilman did not deny that biological differences exist between men and women. On the contrary, Gilman borrowed theoretically not only from Fabian socialism (with its origins in Marxism) and symbolic interactionism, but also from social Darwinism. Social Darwinists, such as Herbert Spencer in England and William Graham Sumner in America, applied Darwin’s theory

![Photo 5.1 One of the Most Gendered Sites Today: The Toy Store](Source: Bettman/Corbis; used with permission.)
of evolution to human societies and maintained that human existence was based on "survival of the fittest." Like many social Darwinists, Gilman was fascinated by the animal world, and she used animal analogies to explain the human condition as well as biological and behavioral differences between the sexes. Specifically, Gilman contended that women and men, in general, have different biological "principles" to which they adhere. She maintained that women’s unique capabilities—particularly their love and concern for others—have tremendous social value, though they are grossly underappreciated.

Indeed, Gilman went so far as to assert the natural superiority of the female sex. She enthusiastically endorsed the “scientifically” based gynocentric theory promoted by the Harvard sociologist Lester Ward, suggesting that the civilizing capacities of women could compensate for the destructive combative nature of men. As Gilman notes,

The innate underlying difference [between the sexes] is one of principle. On the one hand, the principle of struggle, conflict, and competition. . . . On the other, the principle of growth, of culture, of applying services and nourishment in order to produce improvement. (as cited in Hill 1989:45)

Thus, Gilman maintained that, in contrast to men, women did not want to fight, to take, to oppress, but rather to love. Women exhibited “the growing altruism of work, founded in mother love, in the antiselfish instinct of reproduction” (ibid.).

However, as the acclaimed Gilman historian Mary Hill (1989:45) notes, Gilman’s view of women as “saintly givers” and men as “warring beasts” is problematic. For when she glorifies the female “instincts” of love and service, her radical feminist theory dissolves into a “sentimental worship of the status quo.” Her insistence on the “giving” nature of women as compared to the “combative” nature of men seems to indicate that women must be and should be the primary caretaker of children, and that there is only so far a man can go in his role as nurturer. In short, Gilman’s biological determinism seems quite antiquated today. Many contemporary fathers are far more nurturing toward their children than were their fathers, though they have the same basic biological constitution.

Despite significant shortcomings in her biological arguments, however, Gilman raised interesting issues that today are being explored by brain researchers. Contemporary neuroscientists, geneticists, evolutionary psychologists, and others are breathing new life into some of the same gender differences that Gilman noted more than a century ago. For instance, researchers today find that females tend to be more highly sensitive to touch, sound, and smell than males. In one study of day-old infants, researchers found that though both male and female infants reacted most intensely to the sound of another’s trouble (as opposed to other sounds), infant females reacted more strongly than males. The researchers suggested that the infant girls were more finely attuned to an empathetic response, and that this sensitivity would run like an “underground stream” throughout their entire lives (Blum 1997:66–7).

Most importantly, in contrast to the static “nature-versus-nurture” debates of the past, contemporary neurological research illuminates the interconnectedness of nature and nurture. Researchers now are investigating the complex ways in which the environment sparks significant neurological or chemical changes and developments, and vice versa. Nature is understood to be more malleable and more of a process than social Darwinists ever imagined. For example, even genetic instructions that are often thought to be determinate, such as height, are known to be influenced by the environment. A baby whose genes blueprint him to grow six feet tall, but who does not receive adequate nutrition, will fall short by an inch or more. Some researchers even suggest that stress in childhood can interfere with height by suppressing growth hormones (ibid.:21–2). To be sure, it is outside the scope of this chapter to delve into these highly complex and contentious
neurological arguments here, but the point is that the questions about nature versus nurture that Gilman raised continue to be at the heart of gender theory and research today.

Far more problematic than her biological arguments about gender were Gilman’s biological arguments about race. Drawing not only on social Darwinist theories of “survival of the fittest” but also on the “commonsense” notions of “manifest destiny” and the “white man’s burden” dominant in her day (see Chapter 7; and Edles 2002:9), Gilman made patent[ly] racist remarks. For instance, she maintained that some races combine well, making a good blend, [but] some do not. We are perfectly familiar in this country with the various blends of black and white, and the wisest of both races prefer the pure stock. The Eurasian mixture is generally considered unfortunate by most observers. (1923; see also Scharnhorst 2000:69)

Less insidiously, but no less problematic, Gilman also implicitly assumed she was speaking about all women when she was really referring to white women. Certainly, Gilman did not discuss or consider the resources or situations of nonwhite women (though, to be sure, this implicit privileging of “white lives” was typical of all of sociology’s white classical figures).

For instance, in her discussion of the isolation of traditional housewives, Gilman ignored the fact that African American women may have had traditions of support and community that white women did not (see Stack 1974). And, of course, the entire notion of the isolated stay-at-home mom is out of sync with the fact that paid work has long been “an important and valued dimension of Afrocentric definitions of Black motherhood” (Collins 1987:5). Yet, despite her racist assumptions, Gilman often made pointedly antiracist comments too. She decried slavery and the continued oppression of African Americans, and she spoke out against the genocide and ill treatment of Native Americans and Native Hawaiians.

**Figure 5.1 Gilman’s Basic Theoretical Orientation**

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INDIVIDUAL

RATIONAL
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Given that Gilman melds the distinct traditions of neo-Marxism, symbolic interactionism, and social Darwinism, it should come as no surprise that Gilman’s approach to gender is theoretically multidimensional. Specifically, as shown in Figure 5.2, Gilman highlights differential gender socialization (i.e., how boys and girls are taught to behave differently) as well as the distinct sex “principles” with which they are born. These concerns reflect a nonrational orientation to action at the individual level. At the collective level, she highlights both (rationalist) political and economic structures—most importantly, those that prohibit women’s economic independence—and the (nonrationalist) normative, symbolic structures or codes that ensure differential socialization.

Nevertheless, in her sociological work, especially Women and Economics, it is the structural, institutional basis of inequality with which Gilman is most concerned. Hence, as shown in Figure 5.1, we situate her at the more rational/collective end of the theoretical continuum. As indicated previously, Figure 5.1 and the related figures in other chapters reflect our perception of each major theorist’s overall or most basic theoretical orientation. The point is not that each theorist is situated in a particular “box.” Rather, each of these figures is a heuristic device with which to compare and contrast the theoretical orientation of each sociologist discussed in this book (and it can be applied to any other theorist). These positions can and should be discussed and contested; that is why there are no fixed points in these figures.

In any case, Gilman’s particular theoretical approach (as well as her similarities with Marx) is readily apparent in the following passage on women’s corsets, which can be considered a metaphor for the general constraints placed on women:
Put a corset, even a loose one, on a vigorous man or woman who never wore one, and there is intense discomfort, and a vivid consciousness thereof. The healthy muscles of the trunk resent the pressure, the action of the whole body is checked in the middle, the stomach is choked, the process of digestion is interfered with; and the victim says, “how can you bear such a thing?” (1898/1998:40)

Just as the corset “choke” the stomach, so, too, do the traditional institutional features of the family “choke” women. Just as “healthy muscles” resent the “pressure,” so, too, do healthy women. In short, the metaphor of the corset reflects that the constraints placed on women originate outside her; as such, Gilman views these as external pressures, thus pointing to the rationalist aspect of her theory.

Yet, at the same time, Gilman argues that women learn to accept and internalize such pressures. In fact, women are so indoctrinated that they resist their own “freedom.” As Gilman goes on to note,

But the person habitually wearing a corset does not feel these evils. They exist, assuredly, the facts are there, the body is not deceived; but the nerves have become accustomed to these disagreeable sensations, and no longer respond to them. The person “does not feel it.” In fact, the wearer becomes so used to the sensations that when they are removed,—with the corset,—there is a distinct sense of loss and discomfort. (ibid.)

Photo 5.2 In this famous scene from the 1939 film Gone With the Wind, Scarlett O’Hara (played by Vivien Leigh) insists that her corset be pulled even tighter to achieve her enviable 18-inch waist. The juxtaposition of white Scarlett O’Hara and her black “Mammy” (played by Hattie McDaniel) reflects the racial as well as class dimensions of this standard of beauty.

Source: Bettman/Corbis; used with permission.
Thus, Gilman’s metaphor of the corset is similar to Marx’s notion of false consciousness. In both cases, “the facts are there”—the inequality is there—but the person “does not feel it”; he does not see or know of it. She has internalized the pressures and constraints as her own. This view reflects Gilman’s incorporation of a more nonrationalist theoretical position. In addition, Gilman acknowledges that women may be resistant to developing a “true” consciousness because of the safety and familiarity provided by false consciousness. Gilman argues that women not only accept but also believe in the legitimacy of the traditional division of labor; thus, it should be no surprise that they feel discomfited by any other reality.

In terms of order, Gilman acknowledges that social patterns exist prior to any individual; that is, the traditional gendered division of labor is a long established social structure. However, she also emphasizes that it is in individual interactions that this social structure is maintained. On the other hand, it is at the individual level of “free will” that such social structures can be resisted and changed. Yet, the exertion of individual will against existing conditions or the forces of “natural law” is not a common trait. Instead, it takes an “advanced” individual to see through the taken-for-granted symbolic codes that legitimate social hierarchies and oppression. As Gilman remarks,

In the course of social evolution there are developed individuals so constituted as not to fit existing conditions, but to be organically adapted to more advanced conditions. These advanced individuals respond in sharp and painful consciousness to existing conditions, and cry out against them according to their lights. The history of religion, of political and social reform, is full of familiar instances of this. The heretic, the reformer, the agitator, these feel what their conpeers do not, see what they do not, and naturally, say what they do not. The mass of the people are invariably displeased by the outcry of these uneasy spirits. In simple primitive periods they were promptly put to death. (ibid.:41)

The autobiographical bent of this passage is readily apparent. Much more so than other social scientists who challenged existing dogma, feminists such as Gilman challenged and threatened core, sacred “family values.” As indicated previously, Gilman was perceived as “giving away” both her husband and her daughter, and Gilman was publicly skewered for her actions—not only for her beliefs. No doubt Gilman felt very much like the isolated heretic.

Nevertheless, theoretically, Gilman’s assumption that social change rests entirely at the level of the individual is problematic. Gilman did not recognize that it was not solely individual “free will” or social “advancement” but the examination and study of alternative social and cultural schemas (e.g., Fabian socialism) that allowed her to see through and cast off the “corsets” of her day. Moreover, because intellectuals are no different from anyone else, except that they may have more intellectual “wells” from which to draw, Gilman fails to acknowledge that there might be a wealth of other social “corsets” that the intellectual herself never sees and rejects. For instance, as we have seen, in some of her essays that draw on social Darwinism, Gilman reinforces some of the racist assumptions common in her day. In sum, all individuals are necessarily affected by their environment, not just those who are not “advanced.” But social change can arise when people—intellectuals or not—begin to see their lives in a new way. This process occurs not just because of revelations at the level of the individual, but because of new social and cultural conditions. The virtue of social theorists, and intellectuals and social activists more generally, is that they can produce and disseminate new ideas and symbolic schemes that potentially can lead to positive social change.
In this section, you will read Gilman’s most influential nonfictional as well as fictional work. We begin with Gilman’s sociological treatise, *Women and Economics: A Study of the Economic Relation Between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution* (1898). We then turn to her pivotal semi-autobiographical story, “The Yellow Wallpaper”, first published in 1892. The story is followed by a brief statement that Perkins Gilman wrote in 1913, in response to the many queries she fielded about why she wrote “The Yellow Wallpaper”.

**Introduction to Women and Economics**

*Women and Economics* is Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s most sociological, as well as most theoretical, work of nonfiction. In this highly acclaimed book, Gilman seeks to show that the traditional division of labor (breadwinner husband/stay-at-home wife) is inherently problematic. Contrary to the (still prevalent) commonsense rhetoric, which holds that in the traditional division of labor women are equal partners to men (or that both the man and the woman are dependent on each other), Gilman maintains that the traditional division of labor renders women economically dependent on men and, hence, necessarily strips women of their freedom. In this arrangement, the woman receives both her social status and her economic viability not through her own labor, but through that of her husband. This makes her labor not her “own,” but a property of the male. Indeed, as the opening quote in this chapter reflects, rather than viewing the woman in the traditional family as an “equal partner” to her husband, Gilman compares the traditional position of the woman to the domesticated horse: Neither the horse nor the woman is “free.”

Specifically, Gilman argues that if women were actually compensated for their work in the home (and not “given” the status of their husband), poor women with lots of children would get the most money (for they are doing the most work), while women with no children and those who do no work in the home (i.e., those who have nannies, maids, etc.) would get no compensation. But, of course, the fact is that poor women (i.e., women married to unemployed or working-class men) do the most amount of work and get the least amount of money. They work long and hard, cleaning, cooking, and raising children. Meanwhile, rich women (women married to wealthy men) do the least amount of work and get the most money; for these women have domestic help, servants, and nannies who perform the household and childrearing labor for them. As Gilman (1898/1998:8) states,

> Whatever the economic value of the domestic industry of women is, they do not get it. The women who do the most work get the least money, and the women who have the most money do the least work. Their labor is neither given nor taken as a factor in economic exchange. It is held to be their duty as women to do this work; and their economic status bears no relation to their domestic labors, unless an inverse one.

For those who argue that “a woman’s place is in the home” because of her childbearing responsibilities, Gilman argues that “women’s work” is actually mostly house service (cooking, cleaning, mending, etc.), not child service (bearing children, breastfeeding, etc.). Thus, Gilman contends that the traditional division of labor is not biologically driven. On this point, Gilman asserts,
The poor man’s wife has far too much of other work to do to spend all her time in waiting on her children. The rich man’s wife could do it, but does not, partly because she hires some one to do it for her, and partly because she, too, has other duties to occupy her time. (ibid.:94).

Most provocatively, however, Gilman maintains that her economic dependency makes the woman more akin to a horse than an equal partner in traditional marriage. As Gilman states,

The horse, in his free natural condition, is economically independent. He gets his living by his own exertions irrespective of any other creature. The horse, in his present condition of slavery, is economically dependent. He gets his living at the hands of his master; and his exertions, though strenuous, bear no direct relation to his living.... The horse works, it is true; but what he gets to eat depends on the power and will of his master. His living comes through another. He is economically dependent. (ibid.:4)

Translated into the human condition, Gilman remarks,

From the day laborer to the millionaire, the wife’s worn dress or flashing jewels, her low roof or her lordly one, her weary feet or her rich equipage,—these speak of the economic ability of the husband. The comfort, the luxury, the necessities of life itself, which the woman receives, are obtained by the husband and given her by him. And, when the woman, left alone with no man to “support” her, tries to meet her own economic necessities, the difficulties which confront her prove conclusively what the general economic status of the woman is. (ibid.:5)

In short, like a horse, women are subject to the “power and will of another” because their domestic labor, for which no wages are received in return, belongs not to themselves but to their husbands. Women are thus rendered economically dependent.

Consequently, Gilman argues, rather than develop her own capabilities, women reduce themselves to attracting a viable life partner. Economically, this makes sense for women, because “their profit comes through the power of sex-attraction,” not through their own talents (ibid.:33). As evidence for this state of affairs, Gilman remarks that when we honestly care as much for motherhood as we pretend, we shall train the woman for her duty, not the girl for her guileless maneuvers to secure a husband. We talk about the noble duties of the mother, but our maidens are educated for economically successful marriage. (ibid.:100)

Thus, the problem with women’s economic dependence on men is that their energies are focused on “catching” a man rather than on being productive citizens. Gilman saw it as a tragic waste that women were forced to spend their time and energy on grooming and “finding a man” rather than on intellectual concerns. Moreover, in denying her capabilities, she reduces herself to being, literally, the “weaker sex.” As Gilman states,

The degree of feebleness and clumsiness common to women, the comparative inability to stand, walk, run, jump, climb, and perform other race-functions common
to both sexes, is an excessive sex-distinction; and the ensuing transmission of this relative feebleness to their children, boys and girls alike, retards human development... The relative weakness of women is a sex-distinction. It is apparent in her to a degree that injures motherhood, that injures wifehood, that injures the individual. (ibid.:24)

This brings us back to the issue of socialization with which we began this section. Women (especially middle- and upper-class women) are encouraged not to use, but to deny, their talents and capabilities:

The daughters and wives of the rich fail to perform even the domestic service expected of the women of poorer families. They are from birth to death absolutely nonproductive in goods of labor of economic value, and consumers of such goods and labor to an extent limited only by the purchasing power of their male relatives. (ibid.:85)

This is the sociobiological tragedy that Gilman perceives: She contends that women are not “underdeveloped men, but the feminine half of humanity in undeveloped form.” Women are “oversexed,” there is too much emphasis on their sex distinction. Rather than a healthy “survival of the fittest” in which women would be taught to be strong and productive, bourgeois women are mandated to be soft and weak, dependent, emotional, and frail.

It is this emphasis on economic dependency that distinguishes Gilman’s perspective from that of Marx. While Marx implies that bourgeois women are privileged because of their economic status, Gilman sees bourgeois women as economically dependent and, therefore, also oppressed (though she fully recognizes that bourgeois women are economically privileged in comparison to poor women). To be sure, Marxist theorists would be quick to point out that in The Origin of Family, Private Property, and the State (1884), Marx’s coauthor, Friedrich Engels, maintains that in traditional marriage, the man “is the bourgeois; the wife represents the proletariat” (in Tucker 1978:744); in other words, just as the proletariat are exploited by the bourgeoisie, so, too, women are exploited by men. Nevertheless, whether it was because of their own division of labor or his intellectual predisposition, it was Engels and not Marx who developed an explicit theory of gender oppression.

Despite significant institutional advances in educational and professional opportunities, legal rights, and other spheres, some of the social and cultural gender inequities that Gilman discussed are still readily apparent today. Women are still encouraged to “catch” a man using their bodies rather than their minds, to focus on their looks at the expense of what Gilman considered “matters of real importance.” Indeed, one might argue that this male-oriented preoccupation is even more prevalent in the media today than in previous eras (although, confusingly, women also are encouraged to pursue a career and to be athletic). Of course, sadly, there also are many contemporary societies where women still lack basic legal and civil rights, in addition to enduring major cultural and social inequality. For instance, M. Steven Fish (2003) finds that while the average literacy gap between the sexes in most non-Muslim countries is 7 percentage points; it is 20 percentage points in Iran, 23 in Egypt, and 28 in Syria. Many women in these countries also are confronted with significantly inferior health care and restricted educational opportunities, while being denied basic legal rights.
PREFACE

This book is written to offer a simple and natural explanation of one of the most common and most perplexing problems of human life,—a problem which presents itself to almost every individual for practical solution, and which demands the most serious attention of the moralist, the physician, and the sociologist—

To show how some of the worst evils under which we suffer, evils long supposed to be inherent and ineradicable in our natures, are but the result of certain arbitrary conditions of our own adoption, and how, by removing those conditions, we may remove the evil resultant—

To point out how far we have already gone in the path of improvement, and how irresistibly the social forces of to-day are compelling us further, even without our knowledge and against our violent opposition,—an advance which may be greatly quickened by our recognition and assistance—

To reach in especial the thinking women of to-day, and urge upon them a new sense, not only of their social responsibility as individuals, but of their measureless racial importance as makers of men.

It is hoped also that the theory advanced will prove sufficiently suggestive to give rise to such further study and discussion as shall prove its error or establish its truth.

Charlotte Perkins Stetson

I

Since we have learned to study the development of human life as we study the evolution of species throughout the animal kingdom, some peculiar phenomena which have puzzled the philosopher and moralist for so long, begin to show themselves in a new light. We begin to see that, so far from being inscrutable problems, requiring another life to explain, these sorrows and perplexities of our lives are but the natural results of natural causes, and that, as soon as we ascertain the causes, we can do much to remove them.

In spite of the power of the individual will to struggle against conditions, to resist them for a while, and sometimes to overcome them, it remains true that the human creature is affected by his environment, as is every other living thing. The power of the individual will to resist natural law is well proven by the life and death of the ascetic. In any one of those suicidal martyrs may be seen the will, misdirected by the ill-informed intelligence, forcing the body to defy every natural impulse,—even to the door of death, and through it.

But, while these exceptions show what the human will can do, the general course of life shows the inexorable effect of conditions upon humanity. Of these conditions we share with other living things the environment of the material universe. We are affected by climate and locality, by physical, chemical, electrical forces, as are all animals and plants. With the animals, we farther share the effect of our own activity, the reactionary force of exercise. What we do, as well as what is done to us, makes us what we are. But, beyond these forces, we come under the effect of a third set of conditions peculiar to our human status; namely, social conditions. In the organic interchanges which constitute social life, we are affected by each other to a degree beyond what is found even among the most gregarious of animals. This third factor, the social environment, is of enormous force as a
modifier of human life. Throughout all these environing conditions, those which affect us through our economic necessities are most marked in their influence.

Without touching yet upon the influence of the social factors, treating the human being merely as an individual animal, we see that he is modified most by his economic conditions, as is every other animal. Differ as they may in color and size, in strength and speed, in minor adaptation to minor conditions, all animals that live on grass have distinctive traits in common, and all animals that eat flesh have distinctive traits in common,—so distinctive and so common that it is by teeth, by nutritive apparatus in general, that they are classified, rather than by means of defence or locomotion. The food supply of the animal is the largest passive factor in his development; the processes by which he obtains his food supply, the largest active factor in his development. It is these activities, the incessant repetition of his exertions by which he is fed, which most modify his structure and develope his functions. The sheep, the cow, the deer, differ in their adaptation to the weather, their locomotive ability, their means of defence; but they agree in main characteristics, because of their common method of nutrition.

The human animal is no exception to this rule. Climate affects him, weather affects him, enemies affect him; but most of all he is affected, like every other living creature, by what he does for his living. Under all the influence of his later and wider life, all the reactive effect of social institutions, the individual is still inexorably modified by his means of livelihood: “the hand of the dyer is subdued to what he works in.” As one clear, world-known instance of the effect of economic conditions upon the human creature, note the marked race-modification of the Hebrew people under the enforced restrictions of the last two thousand years. Here is a people rising to national prominence, first as a pastoral, and then as an agricultural nation; only partially commercial through race affinity with the Phoenicians, the pioneer traders of the world. Under the social power of a united Christendom—united at least in this most unchristian deed—the Jew was forced to get his livelihood by commercial methods solely.

Many effects can be traced in him to the fierce pressure of the social conditions to which he was subjected: the intense family devotion of a people who had no country, no king, no room for joy and pride except the family; the reduced size and tremendous vitality and endurance of the pitilessly selected survivors of the Ghetto; the repeated bursts of erratic genius from the human spirit so inhumanly restrained. But more patent still is the effect of the economic conditions,—the artificial development of a race of traders and dealers in money, from the lowest pawnbroker to the house of Rothschild; a special kind of people, bred of the economic environment in which they were compelled to live.

One rough but familiar instance of the same effect, from the same cause, we can all see in the marked distinction between the pastoral, the agricultural, and the manufacturing classes in any nation, though their other conditions be the same. On the clear line of argument that functions and organs are developed by use, that what we use most is developed most, and that the daily processes of supplying economic needs are the processes that we most use, it follows that, when we find special economic conditions affecting any special class of people, we may look for special results, and find them.

In view of these facts, attention is now called to a certain marked and peculiar economic condition affecting the human race, and unparalleled in the organic world. We are the only animal species in which the female depends on the male for food, the only animal species in which the sex-relation is also an economic relation. With us an entire sex lives in a relation of economic dependence upon the other sex, and the economic relation is combined with the sex-relation. The economic status of the human female is relative to the sex-relation.

It is commonly assumed that this condition also obtains among other animals, but such is not the case. There are many birds among which, during the nesting season, the male helps the female feed the young, and partially feeds her; and, with certain of the higher carnivora, the male helps the female feed the young, and partially feeds her. In no case does she depend on him absolutely, even during this season, save in that of the hornbill, where the female, sitting
on her nest in a hollow tree, is walled in with clay by the male, so that only her beak projects; and then he feeds her while the eggs are developing. But even the female hornbill does not expect to be fed at any other time. The female bee and ant are economically dependent, but not on the male. The workers are females, too, specialized to economic functions solely. And with the carnivora, if the young are to lose one parent, it might far better be the father: the mother is quite competent to take care of them herself. With many species, as in the case of the common cat, she not only feeds herself and her young, but has to defend the young against the male as well. In no case is the female throughout her life supported by the male.

In the human species the condition is permanent and general, though there are exceptions, and though the present century is witnessing the beginnings of a great change in this respect. We have not been accustomed to face this fact beyond our loose generalization that it was “natural,” and that other animals did so, too.

To many this view will not seem clear at first; and the case of working peasant women or females or savage tribes, and the general household industry of women, will be instanced against it. Some careful and honest discrimination is needed to make plain to ourselves the essential facts of the relation, even in these cases. The horse, in his free natural condition, is economically independent. He gets his living by his own exertions, irrespective of any other creature. The horse, in his present condition of slavery, is economically dependent. He gets his living at the hands of his master; and his exertions, though strenuous, bear no direct relation to his living. In fact, the horses who are the best fed and cared for and the horses who are the hardest worked are quite different animals. The horse works, it is true; but what he gets to eat depends on the power and will of his master. His living comes through another. He is economically dependent. So with the hard-worked savage or peasant women. Their labor is the property of another: they work under another will; and what they receive depends not on their labor, but on the power and will of another. They are economically dependent. This is true of the human female both individually and collectively.

In studying the economic position of the sexes collectively, the difference is most marked. As a social animal, the economic status of man rests on the combined and exchanged services of vast numbers of progressively specialized individuals. The economic progress of the race, its maintenance at any period, its continued advance, involve the collective activities of all the trades, crafts, arts, manufactures, inventions, discoveries, and all the civil and military institutions that go to maintain them. The economic status of any race at any time, with its involved effect on all the constituent individuals, depends on their world-wide labors and their free exchange. Economic progress, however, is almost exclusively masculine. Such economic processes as women have been allowed to exercise are of the earliest and most primitive kind. Were men to perform no economic services save such as are still performed by women, our racial status in economics would be reduced to most painful limitations.

To take from any community its male workers would paralyze it economically to a far greater degree than to remove its female workers. The labor now performed by the women could be performed by the men, requiring only the setting back of many advanced workers into earlier forms of industry; but the labor now performed by the men could not be performed by the women without generations of effort and adaptation. Men can cook, clean, and sew as well as women; but the making and managing of the great engines of modern industry, the threading of earth and sea in our vast systems of transportation, the handling of our elaborate machinery of trade, commerce, government,—these things could not be done so well by women in their present degree of economic development.

This is not owing to lack of the essential human faculties necessary to such achievements, nor to any inherent disability of sex, but to the present condition of woman, forbidding the development of this degree of economic ability. The male human being is thousands of years in advance of the female in economic status. Speaking collectively, men produce and distribute wealth; and women receive it at their hands. As men hunt, fish, keep cattle, or raise corn, so do women eat game, fish, beef, or corn.
As men go down to the sea in ships, and bring coffee and spices and silks and gems from far away, so do women partake of the coffee and spices and silks and gems the men bring.

The economic status of the human race in any nation, at any time, is governed mainly by the activities of the male: the female obtains her share in the racial advance only through him.

Studied individually, the facts are even more plainly visible, more open and familiar. From the day laborer to the millionaire, the wife’s worn dress or flashing jewels, her low roof or her lordly one, her weary feet or her rich equipage,—these speak of the economic ability of the husband. The comfort, the luxury, the necessities of life itself, which the woman receives, are obtained by the husband, and given by him. And, when the woman, left alone with no man to “support” her, tries to meet her own economic necessities, the difficulties which confront her prove conclusively what the general economic status of the woman is. None can deny these patent facts,—that the economic status of women generally depends upon that of men generally, and that the economic status of women individually depends upon that of men individually, those men to whom they are related. But we are instantly confronted by the commonly received opinion that, although it must be admitted that men make and distribute the wealth of the world, yet women earn their share of it as wives. This assumes either that the husband is in the position of employer and the wife as employee, or that marriage is a “partnership,” and the wife an equal factor with the husband in producing wealth.

Economic independence is a relative condition at best. In the broadest sense, all living things are economically dependent upon others,—the animals upon the vegetables, and man upon both. In a narrower sense, all social life is economically interdependent, man producing collectively what he could by no possibility produce separately. But, in the closest interpretation, individual economic independence among human beings means that the individual pays for what he gets, works for what he gets, gives to the other an equivalent for what the other gives him. I depend on the shoemaker for shoes, and the tailor for coats; but, if I give the shoemaker and the tailor enough of my own labor as a house-builder to pay for the shoes and coats they give me, I retain my personal independence. I have not taken of their product, and given nothing of mine. As long as what I get is obtained by what I give, I am economically independent.

Women consume economic goods. What economic product do they give in exchange for what they consume? The claim that marriage is a partnership, in which the two persons married produce wealth which neither of them, separately, could produce, will not bear examination. A man happy and comfortable can produce more than one unhappy and uncomfortable, but this is as true of a father or son as of a husband. To take from a man any of the conditions which make him happy and strong is to cripple his industry, generally speaking. But those relatives who make him happy are not therefore his business partners, and entitled to share his income.

Grateful return for happiness conferred is not the method of exchange in a partnership. The comfort a man takes with his wife is not in the nature of a business partnership, nor are her frugality and industry. A housekeeper, in her place, might be as frugal, as industrious, but would not therefore be a partner. Man and wife are partners truly in their mutual obligation to their children,—their common love, duty, and service. But a manufacturer who marries, or a doctor, or a lawyer, does not take a partner in his business, when he takes a partner in parenthood, unless his wife is also a manufacturer, a doctor, or a lawyer. In his business, she cannot even advise wisely without training and experience. To love her husband, the composer, does not enable her to compose; and the loss of a man’s wife, though it may break his heart, does not cripple his business, unless his mind is affected by grief. She is in no sense a business partner, unless she contributes capital or experience or labor, as a man would in like relation. Most men would hesitate very seriously before entering a business partnership with any woman, wife or not.

If the wife is not, then, truly a business partner, in what way does she earn from her husband the food, clothing, and shelter she receives at his hands? By house service, it will be instantly replied. This is the general misty idea upon the subject,—that women earn all they get, and more, by house service. Here we
come to a very practical and definite economic ground. Although not producers of wealth, women serve in the final processes of preparation and distribution. Their labor in the household has a genuine economic value.

For a certain percentage of persons to serve other persons, in order that the ones so served may produce more, is a contribution not to be overlooked. The labor of women in the house, certainly, enables men to produce more wealth than they otherwise could; and in this way women are economic factors in society. But so are horses. The labor of horses enables men to produce more wealth than they otherwise could. The horse is an economic factor in society. But the horse is not economically independent, nor is the woman. If a man plus a valet can perform more useful service than he could minus a valet, then the valet is performing useful service. But, if the valet is the property of the man, is obliged to perform this service, and is not paid for it, he is not economically independent.

The labor which the wife performs in the household is given as part of her functional duty, not as employment. The wife of the poor man, who works hard in a small house, doing all the work for the family, or the wife of the rich man, who wisely and gracefully manages a large house and administers its functions, each is entitled to fair pay for services rendered.

To take this ground and hold it honestly, wives, as earners through domestic service, are entitled to the wages of cooks, housemaids, nursemaids, seamstresses, or housekeepers, and to no more. This would of course reduce the spending money of the wives of the rich, and put it out of the power of the poor man to “support” a wife at all, unless, indeed, the poor man faced the situation fully, paid his wife her wages as house servant, and then she and he combined their funds in the support of their children. He would be keeping a servant: she would be helping keep the family. But nowhere on earth would there be “a rich woman” by these means. Even the highest class of private housekeeper, useful as her services are, does not accumulate a fortune. She does not buy diamonds and sables and keep a carriage. Things like these are not earned by house service.

But the salient fact in this discussion is that, whatever the economic value of the domestic industry of women is, they do not get it. The women who do the most work get the least money, and the women who have the most money do the least work. Their labor is neither given nor taken as a factor in economic exchange. It is held to be their duty as women to do this work; and their economic status bears no relation to their domestic labors, unless an inverse one. Moreover, if they were thus fairly paid,—given what they earned, and no more,—all women working in this way would be reduced to the economic status of the house servant. Few women—or men either—care to face this condition. The ground that women earn their living by domestic labor is instantly forsaken, and we are told that they obtain their livelihood as mothers. This is a peculiar position. We speak of it commonly enough, and often with deep feeling, but without due analysis.

In treating of an economic exchange, asking what return in goods or labor women make for the goods and labor given them,—either to the race collectively or to their husbands individually,—what payment women make for their clothes and shoes and furniture and food and shelter, we are told that the duties and services of the mother entitle her to support.

If this is so, if motherhood is an exchangeable commodity given by women in payment for clothes and food, then we must of course find some relation between the quantity or quality of the motherhood and the quantity and quality of the pay. This being true, then the women who are not mothers have no economic status at all; and the economic status of those who are must be shown to be relative to their motherhood. This is obviously absurd. The childless wife has as much money as the mother of many,—more; for the children of the latter consume what would otherwise be hers; and the inefficient mother is no less provided for than the efficient one. Visibly, and upon the face of it, women are not maintained in economic prosperity proportioned to their motherhood. Motherhood bears no relation to their economic status. Among primitive races, it is true,—in the patriarchal period, for instance,—there was some truth in this position. Women being of no value whatever save as bearers of children, their favor and indulgence did bear direct relation to maternity; and they had reason to exult on more grounds than one when...
they could boast a son. To-day, however, the maintenance of the woman is not conditioned upon this. A man is not allowed to discard his wife because she is barren. The claim of motherhood as a factor in economic exchange is false to-day. But suppose it were true. Are we willing to hold this ground, even in theory? Are we willing to consider motherhood as a business, a form of commercial exchange? Are the cares and duties of the mother, her travail and her love, commodities to be exchanged for bread?

It is revolting so to consider them; and, if we dare face our own thoughts, and force them to their logical conclusion, we shall see that nothing could be more repugnant to human feeling, or more socially and individually injurious, than to make motherhood a trade. Driven off these alleged grounds of women’s economic independence; shown that women, as a class, neither produce nor distribute wealth; that women, as individuals, labor mainly as house servants, are not paid as such, and would not be satisfied with such an economic status if they were so paid; that wives are not business partners or co-producers of wealth with their husbands, unless they actually practise the same profession; that they are not salaried as mothers, and that it would be unspeakably degrading if they were,—what remains to those who deny that women are supported by men? This (and a most amusing position it is),—that the function of maternity unfits a woman for economic production, and, therefore, it is right that she should be supported by her husband.

The ground is taken that the human female is not economically independent, that she is fed by the male of her species. In denial of this, it is first alleged that she is economically independent,—that she does support herself by her own industry in the house. It being shown that there is no relation between the economic status of woman and the labor she performs in the home, it is then alleged that not as house servant, but as mother, does woman earn her living. It being shown that the economic status of woman bears no relation to her motherhood, either in quantity or quality, it is then alleged that motherhood renders a woman unfit for economic production, and that, therefore, it is right that she be supported by her husband. Before going farther, let us seize upon this admission,—that she is supported by her husband.

Without going into either the ethics or the necessities of the case, we have reached so much common ground: the female of genus homo is supported by the male. Whereas, in other species of animals, male and female alike graze and browse, hunt and kill, climb, swim, dig, run, and fly for their livings, in our species the female does not seek her own living in the specific activities of our race, but is fed by the male.

Now as to the alleged necessity. Because of her maternal duties, the human female is said to be unable to get her own living. As the maternal duties of other females do not unfit them for getting their own living and also the livings of their young, it would seem that the human maternal duties require the segregation of the entire energies of the mother to the service of the child during her entire adult life, or so large a proportion of them that not enough remains to devote to the individual interests of the mother.

Such a condition, did it exist, would of course excuse and justify the pitiful dependence of the human female, and her support by the male. As the queen bee, modified entirely to maternity, is supported, not by the male, to be sure, but by her co-workers, the “old maids,” the barren working bees, who labor so patiently and lovingly in their branch of the maternal duties of the hive, so would the human female, modified entirely to maternity, become unfit for any other exertion, and a helpless dependant.

Is this the condition of human motherhood? Does the human mother, by her motherhood, thereby lose control of brain and body, lose power and skill and desire for any other work? Do we see before us the human race, with all its females segregated entirely to the uses of motherhood, consecrated, set apart, specially developed, spending every power of their nature on the service of their children?

We do not. We see the human mother worked far harder than a mare, laboring her life long in the service, not of her children only, but of men; husbands, brothers, fathers, whatever male relatives she has; for mother and sister also; for the church a little, if she is allowed; for society, if she is able; for charity and education and reform,—working in many ways that are not the ways of motherhood.

It is not motherhood that keeps the housewife on her feet from dawn till dark; it is house
service, not child service. Women work longer and harder than most men, and not solely in maternal duties. The savage mother carries the burdens, and does all menial service for the family tribe. The peasant mother toils in the fields, and the workingman’s wife in the home. Many mothers, even now, are wage-earners for the family, as well as bearers and rearers of it. And the women who are not so occupied, the women who belong to rich men,—here perhaps is the exhaustive devotion to maternity which is supposed to justify an admitted economic dependence. But we do not find it even among these. Women of ease and wealth provide for their children better care than the poor woman can; but they do not spend more time upon it themselves, nor more care and effort. They have other occupation.

In spite of her supposed segregation to maternal duties, the human female, the world over, works at extra-maternal duties for hours enough to provide her with an independent living, and then is denied independence on the ground that motherhood prevents her working!

If this ground were tenable, we should find a world full of women who never lifted a finger save in the service of their children, and of men who did all the work besides, and waited on the women whom motherhood prevented from waiting on themselves. The ground is not tenable. A human female, healthy, sound, has twenty-five years of life before she is a mother, and should have twenty-five years more after the period of such maternal service as is expected of her has been given. The duties of grandmothers are surely not alleged as preventing economic independence.

The working power of the mother has always been a prominent factor in human life. She is the worker par excellence, but her work is not such as to affect her economic status. Her living, all that she gets,—food, clothing, ornaments, amusements, luxuries,—these bear no relation to her power to produce wealth, to her services in the house, or to her motherhood. These things bear relation only to the man she marries, the man she depends on,—to how much he has and how much he is willing to give her. The women whose splendid extravagance dazzles the world, whose economic goods are the greatest, are often neither houseworkers nor mothers, but simply the women who hold most power over the men who have the most money. The female of genus homo is economically dependent on the male. He is her food supply.

II

Knowing how important a factor in the evolution of species is the economic relation, and finding in the human species an economic relation so peculiar, we may naturally look to find effects peculiar to our race. We may expect to find phenomena in the sex-relation and in the economic relation of humanity of a unique character,—phenomena not traceable to human superiority, but singularly derogatory to that superiority; phenomena so marked, so morbid, as to give rise to much speculation as to their cause. Are these natural inferences fulfilled? Are these peculiarities in the sex-relation and in the economic relation manifested in human life? Indisputably these are,—so plain, so prominent, so imperiously demanding attention, that human thought has been occupied from its first consciousness in trying some way to account for them. To explain and relate these phenomena, separating what is due to normal race-development from what is due to this abnormal sexuo-economic relation, is the purpose of the line of study here suggested.

As the racial distinction of humanity lies in its social relation, so we find the distinctive gains and losses of humanity to lie also in its social relation. We are more affected by our relation to each other than by our physical environment.

Disadvantages of climate, deficiencies in food supply, competition from other species,—all these conditions society, in its organic strength, is easily able to overcome or to adjust. But in our inter-human relations we are not so successful. The serious dangers and troubles of human life arise from difficulties of adjustment with our social environment, and not with our physical environment. These difficulties, so far, have acted as a continual check to social progress. The more absolutely a nation has triumphed over physical conditions, the more successful it has become in its conquest of physical enemies and obstacles, the more it has
given rein to the action of social forces which have ultimately destroyed the nation, and left the long ascent to be begun again by others.

There is the moral of all human tales: 'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past,— First Freedom, and then Glory; when that fails, Wealth, Vice, Corruption,—barbarism at last. And History, with all her volumes vast, Hath but one page.¹

The path of history is strewn with fossils and faint relics of extinct races,—races which died of what the sociologist would call internal diseases rather than natural causes. This, too, has been clear to the observer in all ages. It has been easily seen that there was something in our own behavior which did us more harm than any external difficulty; but what we have not seen is the natural cause of our unnatural conduct, and how most easily to alter it.

Rudely classifying the principal fields of human difficulty, we find one large proportion lies in the sex-relation, and another in the economic relation, between the individual constituents of society. To speak broadly, the troubles of life as we find them are mainly traceable to the heart or the purse. The other horror of our lives—disease—comes back often to these causes,—to something wrong either in economic relation or in sex-relation. To be ill-fed or ill-bred, or both, is largely what makes us the sickly race we are. In this wrong breeding, this maladjustment of the sex-relation in humanity, what are the principal features? We see in social evolution two main lines of action in this department of life. One is a gradual orderly development of monogamous marriage, as the form of sex-union best calculated to advance the interests of the individual and of society. It should be clearly understood that this is a natural development, inevitable in the course of social progress; not an artificial condition, enforced by laws of our making. Monogamy is found among birds and mammals: it is just as natural a condition as polygamy or promiscuity or any other form of sex-union; and its permanence and integrity are introduced and increased by the needs of the young and the advantage to the race, just as any other form of reproduction was introduced. Our moral concepts rest primarily on facts. The moral quality of monogamous marriage depends on its true advantage to the individual and to society. If it were not the best form of marriage for our racial good, it would not be right. All the way up, from the promiscuous horde of savages, with their miscellaneous matings, to the lifelong devotion of romantic love, social life has been evolving a type of sex-union best suited to develope and improve the individual and the race. This is an orderly process, and a pleasant one, involving only such comparative pain and difficulty as always attend the assumption of new processes and the extinction of the old; but accompanied by far more joy than pain.

But with the natural process of social advancement has gone an unnatural process,—an erratic and morbid action, making the sex-relation of humanity a frightful source of evil. So prominent have been these morbid actions and evil results that hasty thinkers of all ages have assumed that the whole thing was wrong, and that celibacy was the highest virtue. Without the power of complete analysis, without knowledge of the sociological data essential to such analysis, we have sweepingly condemned as a whole what we could easily see was so allied with pain and loss. But, like all natural phenomena, the phenomena of sex may be studied, both the normal and the abnormal, the physiological and the pathological; and we are quite capable of understanding why we are in such evil case, and how we may attain more healthful conditions.

So far, the study of this subject has rested on the assumption that man must be just as we find him, that man behaves just as he chooses, and that, if he does not choose to behave as he does, he can stop. Therefore, when we discovered that human behavior in the sex-relation was productive of evil, we exhorted the human creature to stop so behaving, and have continued so to exhort for many centuries. By law and religion, by education and custom, we have sought to enforce upon the human individual the kind of behavior which our social sense so clearly showed was right.

¹Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, Canto IV., cviii.
But always there has remained the morbid action. Whatever the external form of sex-union to which we have given social sanction, however Bible and Koran and Vedas have offered instruction, some hidden cause has operated continuously against the true course of social evolution, to pervert the natural trend toward a higher and more advantageous sex-relation; and to maintain lower forms, and erratic phases, of a most disadvantageous character.

Every other animal works out the kind of sex-union best adapted to the reproduction of his species, and peacefully practises it. We have worked out the kind that is best for us,—best for the individuals concerned, for the young resultant, and for society as a whole; but we do not peacefully practise it. So palpable is this fact that we have commonly accepted it, and taken it for granted that this relation must be a continuous source of trouble to humanity. “Marriage is a lottery,” is a common saying among us. “The course of true love never did run smooth.” And we quote with unction Punch’s advice to those about to marry,—“Don’t!” That peculiar sub-relation which has dragged along with us all the time that monogamous marriage has been growing to be the accepted form of sex-union—prostitution—we have accepted, and called a “social necessity.” We also call it “the social evil.” We have tacitly admitted that this relation in the human race must be more or less uncomfortable and wrong, that it is part of our nature to have it so.

Now let us examine the case fairly and calmly, and see whether it is as inscrutable and immutable as hitherto believed. What are the conditions? What are the natural and what the unnatural features of the case? To distinguish these involves a little study of the evolution of the processes of reproduction.

Very early in the development of species it was ascertained by nature’s slow but sure experiments that the establishment of two sexes in separate organisms, and their differentiation, was to the advantage of the species. Therefore, out of the mere protoplasmic masses, the floating cells, the amorphous early forms of life, grew into use the distinction of the sexes,—the gradual development of masculine and feminine organs and functions in two distinct organisms. Developed and increased by use, the distinction of sex increased in the evolution of the species. As the distinction increased, the attraction increased, until we have in all the higher races two markedly different sexes, strongly drawn together by the attraction of sex, and fulfilling their use in the reproduction of species. These are the natural features of sex-distinction and sex-union, and they are found in the human species as in others. The unnatural feature by which our race holds an unenviable distinction consists mainly in this,—a morbid excess in the exercise of this function.

It is this excess, whether in marriage or out, which makes the health and happiness of humanity in this relation so precarious. It is this excess, always easily seen, which law and religion have mainly striven to check. Excessive sex-indulgence is the distinctive feature of humanity in this relation.

To define “excess” in this connection is not difficult. All natural functions that require our conscious co-operation for their fulfilment are urged upon our notice by an imperative desire. We do not have to desire to breathe or to digest or to circulate the blood, because that is done without our volition; but we do have to desire to eat and drink, because the stomach cannot obtain its supplies without in some way spurring the whole organism to secure them. So hunger is given us as an essential factor in our process of nutrition. In the same manner sex-attraction is an essential factor in the fulfilment of our processes of reproduction. In a normal condition the amount of hunger we feel is exactly proportioned to the amount of food we need. It tells us when to eat and when to stop. In some diseased conditions “an unnatural appetite” sets in; and we are impelled to eat far beyond the capacity of the stomach to digest, of the body to assimilate. This is an excessive hunger.

We, as a race, manifest an excessive sex-attraction, followed by its excessive indulgence, and the inevitable evil consequence. It urges us to a degree of indulgence which bears no relation to the original needs of the organism, and which is even so absurdly exaggerated as to react unfavorably on the incidental gratification involved; an excess which tends to pervert and exhaust desire as well as to injure reproduction.

The human animal manifests an excess in sex-attraction which not only injures the race
through its morbid action on the natural processes of reproduction, but which injures the happiness of the individual through its morbid reaction on his own desires.

What is the cause of this excessive sex-attraction in the human species? The immediately acting cause of sex-attraction is sex-distinction. The more widely the sexes are differentiated, the more forcibly they are attracted to each other. The more highly developed becomes the distinction of sex in either organism, the more intense is its attraction for the other. In the human species we find sex-distinction carried to an excessive degree. Sex-distinction in humanity is so marked as to retard and confuse race-distinction, to check individual distinction, seriously to injure the race. Accustomed as we are simply to accept the facts of life as we find them, to consider people as permanent types instead of seeing them and the whole race in continual change according to the action of many forces, it seems strange at first to differentiate between familiar manifestations of sex-distinction, and to say: “This is normal, and should not be disturbed. This is abnormal, and should be removed.” But that is precisely what must be done.

Normal sex-distinction manifests itself in all species in what are called primary and secondary sex-characteristics. The primary are those organs and functions essential to reproduction; the secondary, those modifications of structure and function which subserve the uses of reproduction ultimately, but are not directly essential,—such as the horns of the stag, of use in sex-combat; the plumage of the peacock, of use in sex-competition. All the minor characteristics of beard or mane, comb, wattles, spurs, gorgeous color or superior size, which distinguish the male from the female,—these are distinctions of sex. These distinctions are of use to the species through reproduction only, the processes of race-preservation. They are not of use in self-preservation. The creature is not profited personally by his mane or crest or tail-feathers: they do not help him get his dinner or kill his enemies.

On the contrary, they react unfavorably upon his personal gains, if, through too great development, they interfere with his activity or render him a conspicuous mark for enemies. Such development would constitute excessive sex-distinction, and this is precisely the condition of the human race. Our distinctions of sex are carried to such a degree as to be disadvantageous to our progress as individuals and as a race. The sexes in our species are differentiated not only enough to perform their primal functions; not only enough to manifest all sufficient secondary sexual characteristics and fulfil their use in giving rise to sufficient sex-attraction; but so much as seriously to interfere with the processes of self-preservation on the one hand; and, more conspicuous still, so much as to react unfavorably upon the very processes of race-preservation which they are meant to serve. Our excessive sex-distinction, manifesting the characteristics of sex to an abnormal degree, has given rise to a degree of attraction which demands a degree of indulgence that directly injures motherhood and fatherhood. We are not better as parents, nor better as people, for our existing degree of sex-distinction, but visibly worse. To what conditions are we to look for the developing cause of these phenomena?

Let us first examine the balance of forces by which these two great processes, self-preservation and race-preservation, are conducted in the world. Self-preservation involves the expenditure of energy in those acts, and their ensuing modifications of structure and function, which tend to the maintenance of the individual life. Race-preservation involves the expenditure of energy in those acts, and their ensuing modifications of structure and function, which tend to the maintenance of the racial life, even to the complete sacrifice of the individual. This primal distinction should be clearly held in mind. Self-preservation and race-preservation are in no way identical processes, and are often directly opposed. In the line of self-preservation, natural selection, acting on the individual, develops those characteristics which enable it to succeed in “the struggle for existence,” increasing by use those organs and functions by which it directly profits. In the line of race-preservation, sexual selection, acting on the individual, develops those characteristics which enable it to succeed in what Drummond has called “the struggle for the existence of others,” increasing by use those organs and functions by which its young are to profit, directly or indirectly. The individual has been not only modified to its environment,
under natural selection, but modified to its mate, under sexual selection, each sex developing the qualities desired by the other by the simple process of choice, those best sexed being first chosen, and transmitting their sex-development as well as their racial development.

The order mammalia is the resultant of a primary sex-distinction developed by natural selection; but the gorgeous plumage of the peacock’s tail is a secondary sex-distinction developed by sexual selection. If the peacock’s tail were to increase in size and splendor till it shone like the sun and covered an acre,—if it tended so to increase, we will say,—such excessive sex-distinction would be so inimical to the personal prosperity of that peacock that he would die, and his tail-tendency would perish with him. If the pea-hen, conversely, whose sex-distinction attracts in the opposite direction, not by being large and splendid, but small and dull,—if she should grow so small and dull as to fail to keep herself and her young fed and defended, then she would die; and there would be another check to excessive sex-distinction. In herds of deer and cattle the male is larger and stronger, the female smaller and weaker; but, unless the latter is large and strong enough to keep up with the male in the search for food or the flight from foes, one is taken and the other left, and there is no more of that kind of animal. Differ as they may in sex, they must remain alike in species, equal in race-development, else destruction overtakes them.

The force of natural selection, demanding and producing identical race-qualities, acts as a check on sexual selection, with its production of different sex-qualities. As sexes, they perform different functions, and therefore tend to develop differently. As species, they perform the same functions, and therefore tend to develop equally.

And as sex-functions are only used occasionally, and race-functions are used all the time,—as they mate but yearly or tri-monthly, but eat daily and hourly,—the processes of obtaining food or of opposing constant enemies act more steadily than the processes of reproduction, and produce greater effect.

We find the order mammalia accordingly producing and suckling its young in the same manner through a wide variety of species which obtain their living in a different manner. The calf and colt and cub and kitten are produced by the same process; but the cow and horse, the bear and cat, are produced by different processes. And, though cow and bull, mare and stallion, differ as to sex, they are alike in species; and the likeness in species is greater than the difference in sex. Cow, mare, and cat are all females of the order mammalia, and so far alike; but how much more different they are than similar!

Natural selection developes race. Sexual selection developes sex. Sex-development is one throughout its varied forms, tending only to reproduce what is. But race-development rises ever in higher and higher manifestation of energy. As sexes, we share our distinction with the animal kingdom almost to the beginning of life, and with the vegetable world as well. As races, we differ in ascending degree; and the human race stands highest in the scale of life so far.

When, then, it can be shown that sex-distinction in the human race is so excessive as not only to affect injuriously its own purposes, but to check and pervert the progress of the race, it becomes a matter for most serious consideration. Nothing could be more inevitable, however, under our sexuo-economic relation. By the economic dependence of the human female upon the male, the balance of forces is altered. Natural selection no longer checks the action of sexual selection, but co-operates with it. Where both sexes obtain their food through the same exertions, from the same sources, under the same conditions, both sexes are acted upon alike, and developed alike by their environment. Where the two sexes obtain their food under different conditions, and where that difference consists in one of them being fed by the other, then the feeding sex becomes the environment of the fed. Man, in supporting woman, has become her economic environment. Under natural selection, every creature is modified to its environment, developing perforce the qualities needed to obtain its livelihood under that environment. Man, as the feeder of woman, becomes the strongest modifying force in her economic condition. Under sexual selection the human creature is of course modified to its mate, as with all creatures. When the mate becomes also the master, when economic necessity is added to sex-attraction, we have the two great evolutionary forces acting together to the same end; namely, to develop sex-distinction.
in the human female. For, in her position of economic dependence in the sex-relation, sex-distinction is with her not only a means of attracting a mate, as with all creatures, but a means of getting her livelihood, as is the case with no other creature under heaven. Because of the economic dependence of the human female on her mate, she is modified to sex to an excessive degree. This excessive modification she transmits to her children; and so is steadily implanted in the human constitution the morbid tendency to excess in this relation, which has acted so universally upon us in all ages, in spite of our best efforts to restrain it. It is not the normal sex-tendency, common to all creatures, but an abnormal sex-tendency, produced and maintained by the abnormal economic relation which makes one sex get its living from the other by the exercise of sex-functions. This is the immediate effect upon individuals of the peculiar sexuo-economic relation which obtains among us.

III

In establishing the claim of excessive sex-distinction in the human race, much needs to be said to make clear to the general reader what is meant by the term. To the popular mind, both the coarsely familiar and the over-refined, “sexual” is thought to mean “sensual”; and the charge of excessive sex-distinction seems to be a reproach. This should be at once dismissed, as merely showing ignorance of the terms used. A man does not object to being called “masculine,” nor a woman to being called “feminine.” Yet whatever is masculine or feminine is sexual. To be distinguished by femininity is to be distinguished by sex. To be over-feminine is to be over-sexed. To manifest in excess any of the distinctions of sex, primary or secondary, is to be over-sexed. Our hypothetical peacock, with his too large and splendid tail, would be over-sexed, and no offence to his moral character!

The primary sex-distinctions in our race as in others consist merely in the essential organs and functions of reproduction. The secondary distinctions, and this is where we are to look for our largest excess—consist in all those differences in organ and function, in look and action, in habit, manner, method, occupation, behavior, which distinguish men from women. In a troop of horses, seen at a distance, the sexes are indistinguishable. In a herd of deer the males are distinguishable because of their antlers. The male lion is distinguished by his mane, the male cat only by a somewhat heavier build. In certain species of insects the male and female differ so widely in appearance that even naturalists have supposed them to belong to separate species. Beyond these distinctions lies that of conduct. Certain psychic attributes are manifested by either sex. The intensity of the maternal passion is a sex-distinction as much as the lion’s mane or the stag’s horns. The belligerence and dominance of the male is a sex-distinction: the modesty and timidity of the female is a sex-distinction. The tendency to “sit” is a sex-distinction of the hen: the tendency to strut is a sex-distinction of the cock. The tendency to fight is a sex-distinction of males in general: the tendency to protect and provide for is a sex-distinction of females in general.

With the human race, whose chief activities are social, the initial tendency to sex-distinction is carried out in many varied functions. We have differentiated our industries, our responsibilities, our very virtues, along sex lines. It will therefore be clear that the claim of excessive sex-distinction in humanity, and especially in woman, does not carry with it any specific “moral” reproach, though it does in the larger sense prove a decided evil in its effect on human progress.

In primary distinctions our excess is not so marked as in the farther and subtler development; yet, even here, we have plain proof of it. Sex-energy in its primal manifestation is exhibited in the male of the human species to a degree far greater than is necessary for the processes of reproduction,—enough, indeed, to subvert and injure those processes. The direct injury to reproduction from the excessive indulgence of the male, and the indirect injury through its debilitating effect upon the female, together with the enormous evil to society produced by extra-marital indulgence,—these are facts quite generally known. We have recognized them for centuries; and sought to check the evil action by law, civil, social, moral. But we have treated it always as a field of voluntary action, not as a condition of morbid development. We have held
it as right that man should be so, but wrong that
man should do so. Nature does not work in that
way. What it is right to be, it is right to do. What
it is wrong to do, it is wrong to be. This inordinate
demand in the human male is an excessive sex-
distinction. In this, in a certain over-coarseness and
hardness, a too great belligerence and pride, a
too great subservience to the power of sex-
atraction, we find the main marks of excessive sex-
distinction in men. It has been always
checked and offset in them by the healthful
activities of racial life. Their energies have been
called out and their faculties developed along all
the lines of human progress. In the growth of
industry, commerce, science, manufacture, gov-
ernment, art, religion, the male of our species
has become human, far more than male. Strong
as this passion is in him, inordinate as is his
indulgence, he is a far more normal animal than
the female of his species,—far less over-sexed.
To him this field of special activity is but part of
life,—an incident. The whole world remains
besides. To her it is the world. This has been
well stated in the familiar epigram of Madame
de Staël,—“Love with man is an episode, with
woman a history.” It is in woman that we find
most fully expressed the excessive sex-distinction
of the human species,—physical, psychical,
social. See first the physical manifestation.

To make clear by an instance the difference
between normal and abnormal sex-distinction,
look at the relative condition of a wild cow and
a “milch cow,” such as we have made. The wild
cow is a female. She has healthy calves, and milk
enough for them; and that is all the femininity
she needs. Otherwise than that she is bovine
rather than feminine. She is a light, strong, swift,
sinewy creature, able to run, jump, and fight, if
necessary. We, for economic uses, have arti-
ficially developed the cow’s capacity for pro-
ducing milk. She has become a walking
milk-machine, bred and tended to that express
end, her value measured in quarts. The secretion
of milk is a maternal function,—a sex-function.
The cow is over-sexed. Turn her loose in natural
conditions, and, if she survive the change, she
would revert in a very few generations to the
plain cow, with her energies used in the general
activities of her race, and not all running to milk.

Physically, woman belongs to a tall, vigorous,
beautiful animal species, capable of great and
varied exertion. In every race and time when she
has opportunity for racial activity, she develops
accordingly, and is no less a woman for being a
healthy human creature. In every race and time
where she is denied this opportunity,—and few,
indeed, have been her years of freedom,—she
developed in the lines of action to which she
was confined; and those were always lines of
sex-activity. In consequence the body of woman,
speaking in the largest generalization, manifests
sex-distinction predominantly.

Woman’s femininity—and “the eternal femi-
nine” means simply the eternal sexual—is more
apparent in proportion to her humanity than the
femininity of other animals in proportion to their
caninity or felinity or equinity. “A feminine
hand” or “a feminine foot” is distinguishable
anywhere. We do not hear of “a feminine paw”
or “a feminine hoof.” A hand is an organ of pre-
hension, a foot an organ of locomotion: they are
not secondary sexual characteristics. The com-
parative smallness and feebleness of woman is a
sex-distinction. We have carried it to such an
excess that women are commonly known as “the
weaker sex.” There is no such glaring difference
between male and female in other advanced
species. In the long migrations of birds, in the
ceaseless motion of the grazing herds that used
to swing up and down over the continent each
year, in the wild, steep journeys of the breed-
ing salmon, nothing is heard of the weaker sex.
And among the higher carnivora, where longer
maintenance of the young brings their condi-
tion nearer ours, the hunter dreads the attack
of the female more than that of the male. The
disproportionate weakness is an excessive sex-
distinction. Its injurious effect may be broadly
shown in the Oriental nations, where the female
in curtained harems is confined most exclusively
to sex-functions and denied most fully the exercise
of race-functions. In such peoples the weakness,
the tendency to small bones and adipose tissue of
the over-sexed female, is transmitted to the male,
with a retarding effect on the development of the
race. Conversely, in early Germanic tribes the
comparatively free and humanly developed
women—tall, strong, and brave—transmitted to
their sons a greater proportion of human power
and much less of morbid sex-tendency.

The degree of feebleness and clumsiness
common to women, the comparative inability
to stand, walk, run, jump, climb, and perform
other race-functions common to both sexes, is
an excessive sex-distinction; and the ensuing
transmission of this relative feebleness to their
children, boys and girls alike, retards human
development. Strong, free, active women, the
sturdy, field-working peasant, the burden-
bearing savage, are no less good mothers for
their human strength. But our civilized “femi-
nine delicacy,” which appears somewhat less
delicate when recognized as an expression of
sexuality in excess,—makes us no better
mothers, but worse. The relative weakness of
women is a sex-distinction. It is apparent in
her to a degree that injures motherhood, that
injures wifehood, that injures the individual.
The sex-usefulness and the human usefulness of
women, their general duty to their kind, are
greatly injured by this degree of distinction. In
every way the over-sexed condition of the
human female reacts unfavorably upon herself,
her husband, her children, and the race.

In its psychic manifestation this intense
sex-distinction is equally apparent. The primal
instinct of sex-attraction has developed under
social forces into a conscious passion of enor-
mous power, a deep and lifelong devotion,
overwhelming in its force. This is excessive in both
sexes, but more so in women than in men,—not
so commonly in its simple physical form, but in
the unreasoning intensity of emotion that
refuses all guidance, and drives those possessed
by it to risk every other good for this one end. It
is not at first sight easy, and it may seem an
irreverent and thankless task, to discriminate
here between what is good in the “master pas-

Such is the condition of humanity, involving
most evil results to its offspring and to its own
happiness. And, while in men the immediate
dominating force of the passion may be more
conspicuous, it is in women that it holds more
universal sway. For the man has other powers
and faculties in full use, whereby to break loose
from the force of this; and the woman, specially
modified to sex and denied racial activity, pours
her whole life into her love, and, if injured
here, she is injured irrevocably. With him it is
frequently light and transient, and, when most
intense, often most transient. With her it is a
deep, all-absorbing force, under the action of
which she will renounce all that life offers, take
any risk, face any hardships, bear any pain. It is
maintained in her in the face of a lifetime of
neglect and abuse. The common instance of the
police court trials—the woman cruelly abused
who will not testify against her husband—
shows this. This devotion, carried to such a
degree as to lead to the mismating of individu-
als with its personal and social injury, is an
excessive sex-distinction.

But it is in our common social relations that
the predominance of sex-distinction in women
is made most manifest. The fact that, speaking
broadly, women have, from the very beginning,
been spoken of expressively enough as “the
sex,” demonstrates clearly that this is the main
impression which they have made upon
observers and recorders. Here one need attempt
no farther proof than to turn the mind of the
reader to an unbroken record of facts and feel-

ings perfectly patent to every one, but not hith-
ereto looked at as other than perfectly natural and
right. So utterly has the status of woman been
accepted as a sexual one that it has remained for
the woman’s movement of the nineteenth cen-
tury to devote much contention to the claim that
women are persons! That women are persons as
well as females,—an unheard of proposition!

In a “Handbook of Proverbs of All Nations,”
a collection comprising many thousands, these
facts are to be observed: first, that the proverbs
concerning women are an insignificant minority
compared to those concerning men; second,
that the proverbs concerning women almost
invariably apply to them in general,—to the sex.
Those concerning men qualify, limit, describe,
specialize. It is “a lazy man,” “a violent man,” “a
man in his cups.” Qualities and actions are predicated of man individually, and not as a sex, unless he is flatly contrasted with woman, as in “A man of straw is worth a woman of gold,” “Men are deeds, women are words,” or “Man, woman, and the devil are the three degrees of comparison.” But of woman it is always and only “a woman,” meaning simply a female, and recognizing no personal distinction: “As much pity to see a woman weep as to see a goose go barefoot.” “He that hath an eel by the tail and a woman by her word hath a slippery handle.” “A woman, a spaniel, and a walnut-tree,—the more you beat ‘em, the better they be.” Occasionally a distinction is made between “a fair woman” and “a black woman”; and Solomon’s “virtuous woman,” who commanded such a high price, is familiar to us all. But in common thought it is simply “a woman” always. The boast of the profligate that he knows “the sex,” so recently expressed by a new poet,—“The things you will learn from the Yellow and Brown, they’ll ’elp you an’ ’eap with the White”; the complaint of the angry rejected that “all women are just alike!”—the consensus of public opinion of all time goes to show that the characteristics common to the sex have predominated over the characteristics distinctive of the individual,—a marked excess in sex-distinction.

From the time our children are born, we use every means known to accentuate sex-distinction in both boy and girl; and the reason that the boy is not so hopelessly marked by it as the girl is that he has the whole field of human expression open to him besides. In our steady insistence on proclaiming sex-distinction we have grown to consider most human attributes as masculine attributes, for the simple reason that they were allowed to men and forbidden to women.

A clear and definite understanding of the difference between race-attributes and sex-attributes should be established. Life consists of action. The action of a living thing is along two main lines,—self-preservation and race-preservation. The processes that keep the individual alive, from the involuntary action of his internal organs to the voluntary action of his external organs,—every act, from breathing to hunting his food, which contributes to the maintenance of the individual life,—these are the processes of self-preservation. Whatever activities tend to keep the race alive, to reproduce the individual, from the involuntary action of the internal organs to the voluntary action of the external organs; every act from the development of germ-cells to the taking care of children, which contributes to the maintenance of the racial life,—these are the processes of race-preservation. In race-preservation, male and female have distinctive organs, distinctive functions, distinctive lines of action. In self-preservation, male and female have the same organs, the same functions, the same lines of action. In the human species our processes of race-preservation have reached a certain degree of elaboration; but our processes of self-preservation have gone farther, much farther.

All the varied activities of economic production and distribution, all our arts and industries, crafts and trades, all our growth in science, discovery, government, religion,—these are along the line of self-preservation: these are, or should be, common to both sexes. To teach, to rule, to make, to decorate, to distribute,—these are not sex-functions: they are race-functions. Yet so inordinate is the sex-distinction of the human race that the whole field of human progress has been considered a masculine prerogative. What could more absolutely prove the excessive sex-distinction of the human race? That this difference should surge over all its natural boundaries and blazon itself across every act of life, so that every step of the human creature is marked “male” or “female,”—surely, this is enough to show our over-sexed condition.

Little by little, very slowly, and with most unjust and cruel opposition, at cost of all life holds most dear, it is being gradually established by many martyrdoms that human work is woman’s as well as man’s. Harriet Martineau must conceal her writing under her sewing when callers came, because “to sew” was a feminine verb, and “to write” a masculine one. Mary Somerville must struggle to hide her work from even relatives, because mathematics was a “masculine” pursuit. Sex has been made to dominate the whole human world,—all the main avenues of life marked “male,” and the female left to be a female, and nothing else.

But while with the male the things he fondly imagined to be “masculine” were merely
human, and very good for him, with the female the few things marked “feminine” were feminine, indeed; and her ceaseless reiteration of one short song, however sweet, has given it a conspicuous monotony. In garments whose main purpose is unmistakably to announce her sex; with a tendency to ornament which marks exuberance of sex-energy, with a body so modified to sex as to be grievously deprived of its natural activities; with a manner and behavior wholly attuned to sex-advantage, and frequently most disadvantageous to any human gain; with a field of action most rigidly confined to sex-relations; with her overcharged sensibility, her prominent modesty, her “eternal femininity,”—the female of genus homo is undeniably over-sexed.

This excessive distinction shows itself again in a marked precocity of development. Our little children, our very babies, show signs of it when the young of other creatures are serenely asexual in general appearance and habit. We eagerly note this precocity. We are proud of it. We carefully encourage it by precept and example, taking pains to develop the sex-instinct in little children, and think no harm. One of the first things we force upon the child’s dawning consciousness is the fact that he is a boy or that she is a girl, and that, therefore, each must regard everything from a different point of view. They must be dressed differently, not on account of their personal needs, which are exactly similar at this period, but so that neither they, nor any one beholding them, may for a moment forget the distinction of sex.

Our peculiar inversion of the usual habit of species, in which the male carries ornament and the female is dark and plain, is not so much a proof of excess indeed, as a proof of the peculiar reversal of our position in the matter of sex-selection. With the other species the males compete in ornament, and the females select. With us the females compete in ornament, and the males select. If this theory of sex-ornament is disregarded, and we prefer rather to see in masculine decoration merely a form of exuberant sex-energy, expending itself in non-productive excess, then, indeed, the fact that with us the females manifest such a display of gorgeous adornment is another sign of excessive sex-distinction. In either case the forcing upon girl-children of an elaborate ornamentation which interferes with their physical activity and unconscious freedom, and fosters a premature sex-consciousness, is as clear and menacing a proof of our condition as could be mentioned. That the girl-child should be so dressed as to require a difference in care and behavior, resting wholly on the fact that she is a girl,—a fact not otherwise present to her thought at that age,—is a precocious insistence upon sex-distinction, most unwholesome in its results. Boys and girls are expected, also, to behave differently to each other, and to people in general,—a behavior to be briefly described in two words. To the boy we say, “Do”; to the girl, “Don’t.” The little boy must “take care” of the little girl, even if she is larger than he is. “Why?” he asks. Because he is a boy. Because of sex. Surely, if she is the stronger, she ought to take care of him, especially as the protective instinct is purely feminine in a normal race. It is not long before the boy learns his lesson. He is a boy, going to be a man; and that means all. “I thank the Lord that I was not born a woman,” runs the Hebrew prayer. She is a girl, “only a girl,” “nothing but a girl,” and going to be a woman,—only a woman. Boys are encouraged from the beginning to show the feelings supposed to be proper to their sex. When our infant son bangs about, roars, and smashes things, we say proudly that he is “a regular boy!” When our infant daughter coquettes with visitors, or wails in maternal agony because her brother has broken her doll, whose sawdust remains she nurses with piteous care, we say proudly that “she is a perfect little mother already!” What business has a little girl with the instincts of maternity? No more than the little boy should have with the instincts of paternity. They are sex-instincts, and should not appear till the period of adolescence. The most normal girl is the “tom-boy,”—whose numbers increase among us in these wiser days,—a healthy young creature, who is human through and through, not feminine till it is time to be. The most normal boy has calmness and gentleness as well as vigor and courage. He is a human creature as well as a male creature, and not aggressively masculine till it is time to be. Childhood is not the period for these marked manifestations of sex. That we exhibit them, that we admire and encourage them, shows our over-sexed condition.
Having seen the disproportionate degree of sex-distinction in humanity and its greater manifestation in the female than in the male, and having seen also the unique position of the human female as an economic dependant on the male of her species, it is not difficult to establish a relation between these two facts. The general law acting to produce this condition of exaggerated sex-development was briefly referred to in the second chapter. It is as follows: the natural tendency of any function to increase in power by use causes sex-activity to increase under the action of sexual selection. This tendency is checked in most species by the force of natural selection, which diverts the energies into other channels and develops race-activities. Where the female finds her economic environment in the male, and her economic advantage is directly conditioned upon the sex-relation, the force of natural selection is added to the force of sexual selection, and both together operate to develop sex-activity. In any animal species, free from any other condition, such a relation would have inevitably developed sex to an inordinate degree, as may be readily seen in the comparatively similar cases of those insects where the female, losing economic activity and modified entirely to sex, becomes a mere egg-sac, an organism with no powers of self-preservation, only those of race-preservation. With these insects the only race-problem is to maintain and reproduce the species, and such a condition is not necessarily evil; but with a race like ours, whose development as human creatures is but comparatively begun, it is evil because of its check to individual and racial progress. There are other purposes before us besides mere maintenance and reproduction.

It should be clear to any one accustomed to the working of biological laws that all the tendencies of a living organism are progressive in their development, and are held in check by the interaction of their several forces. Each living form, with its dominant characteristics, represents a balance of power, a sort of compromise. The size of earth’s primeval monsters was limited by the tensile strength of their material. Sea monsters can be bigger, because the medium in which they move offers more support. Birds must be smaller for the opposite reason. The cow requires many stomachs of a liberal size, because her food is of low nutritive value; and she must eat large quantities to keep her machine going. The size of arboreal animals, such as monkeys or squirrels, is limited by the nature of their habitat: creatures that live in trees cannot be so big as creatures that live on the ground. Every quality of every creature is relative to its condition, and tends to increase or decrease accordingly; and each quality tends to increase in proportion to its use, and to decrease in proportion to its disuse. Primitive man and his female were animals, like other animals. They were strong, fierce, lively beasts; and she was as nimble and ferocious as he, save for the added belligerence of the males in their sex-competition. In this competition, he, like the other male creatures, fought savagely with his hairy rivals; and she, like the other female creatures, complacently viewed their struggles, and mated with the victor. At other times she ran about in the forest, and helped herself to what there was to eat as freely as he did.

There seems to have come a time when it occurred to the dawning intelligence of this amiable savage that it was cheaper and easier to fight a little female, and have it done with, than to fight a big male every time. So he instituted the custom of enslaving the female; and she, losing freedom, could no longer get her own food nor that of her young. The mother ape, with her maternal function well fulfilled, flees leaping through the forest,—plucks her fruit and nuts, keeps up with the movement of the tribe, her young one on her back or held in one strong arm. But the mother woman, enslaved, could not do this. Then man, the father, found that slavery had its obligations: he must care for what he forbade to care for itself, else it died on his hands. So he slowly and reluctantly shouldered the duties of his new position. He began to feed her, and not only that, but to express in his own person the thwarted uses of maternity: he had to feed the children, too. It seems a simple arrangement. When we have thought of it at all, we have thought of it with admiration. The naturalist defends it on the ground of advantage to the species through the freeing of the mother from all other cares and confining her unreservedly to the duties of maternity. The poet and novelist,
the painter and sculptor, the priest and teacher, have all extolled this lovely relation. It remains for the sociologist, from a biological point of view, to note its effects on the constitution of the human race, both in the individual and in society.

When man began to feed and defend women, she ceased proportionately to feed and defend herself. When he stood between her and her physical environment, she ceased proportionately to feel the influence of that environment and respond to it. When he became her immediate and all-important environment, she began proportionately to respond to this new influence, and to be modified accordingly. In a free state, speed was of as great advantage to the female as to the male, both in enabling her to catch prey and in preventing her from being caught by enemies; but, in her new condition, speed was a disadvantage. She was not allowed to do the catching, and it profited her to be caught by her new master. Free creatures, getting their own food and maintaining their own lives, develop an active capacity for attaining their ends. Parasitic creatures, whose living is obtained by the exertions of others, develop powers of absorption and of tenacity,—the powers by which they profit most. The human female was cut off from the direct action of natural selection, that mighty force which heretofore had acted on male and female alike with inexorable and beneficial effect, developing strength, developing skill, developing endurance, developing courage,—in a word, developing species. She now met the influence of natural selection acting indirectly through the male, and developing, of course, the faculties required to secure and obtain a hold on him. Needless to state that these faculties were those of sex-attraction, the one power that has made him cheerfully maintain, in what luxury he could, the being in whom he delighted. For many, many centuries she had no other hold, no other assurance of being fed. The young girl had a prospective value, and was maintained for what should follow; but the old woman, in more primitive times, had but a poor hold on life. She who could best please her lord was the favorite slave or favorite wife, and she obtained the best economic conditions.

With the growth of civilization, we have gradually crystallized into law the visible necessity for feeding the helpless female; and even old women are maintained by their male relatives with a comfortable assurance. But to this day—save, indeed, for the increasing army of women wage-earners, who are changing the face of the world by their steady advance toward economic independence—the personal profit of women bears but too close a relation to their power to win and hold the other sex. From the odalisque with the most bracelets to the débutante with the most bouquets, the relation still holds good,—woman's economic profit comes through the power of sex-attraction.

When we confront this fact boldly and plainly in the open market of vice, we are sick with horror. When we see the same economic relation made permanent, established by law, sanctioned and sanctified by religion, covered with flowers and incense and all accumulated sentiment, we think it innocent, lovely, and right. The transient trade we think evil. The bargain for life we think good. But the biological effect remains the same. In both cases the female gets her food from the male by virtue of her sex-relationship to him. In both cases, perhaps even more in marriage because of its perfect acceptance of the situation, the female of genus homo, still living under natural law, is inexorably modified to sex in an increasing degree.

Followed in specific detail, the action of the changed environment upon women has been in given instances as follows: In the matter of mere passive surroundings she has been immediately restricted in her range. This one factor has an immense effect on man and animal alike. An absolutely uniform environment, one shape, one size, one color, one sound, would render life, if any life could be, one helpless, changeless thing. As the environment increases and varies, the development of the creature must increase and vary with it; for he acquires knowledge and power, as the material for knowledge and the need for power appear. In migratory species the female is free to acquire the same knowledge as the male by the same means, the same development by the same experiences. The human female has been restricted in range from the earliest beginning. Even among savages, she has a much more restricted knowledge of the land she lives in. She moves with the camp, of course, and
follows her primitive industries in its vicinity; but the war-path and the hunt are the man’s. He has a far larger habitat. The life of the female savage is freedom itself, however, compared with the increasing constriction of custom closing in upon the woman, as civilization advanced, like the iron torture chamber of romance. Its culmination is expressed in the proverb: “A woman should leave her home but three times,—when she is christened, when she is married, and when she is buried.” Or this: “The woman, the cat, and the chimney should never leave the house.” The absolutely stationary female and the wide-ranging male are distinctly human institutions, after we leave behind us such low forms of life as the gypsy moth, whose female seldom moves more than a few feet from the pupa moth. She has aborted wings, and cannot fly. She waits humbly for the winged male, lays her myriad eggs, and dies,—a fine instance of modification to sex.

To reduce so largely the mere area of environment is a great check to race-development; but it is not to be compared in its effects with the reduction in voluntary activity to which the human female has been subjected. Her restricted impression, her confinement to the four walls of the home, have done great execution, of course, in limiting her ideas, her information, her thought-processes, and power of judgment; and in giving a disproportionate prominence and intensity to the few things she knows about; but this is innocent in action compared with her restricted expression, the denial of freedom to act. A living organism is modified far less through the action of external circumstances upon it and its reaction thereto, than through the effect of its own exertions. Skin may be thickened gradually by exposure to the weather; but it is thickened far more quickly by being rubbed against something, as the handle of an oar or of a broom. To be surrounded by beautiful things has much influence upon the human creature: to make beautiful things has more. To live among beautiful surroundings and make ugly things is more directly lowering than to live among ugly surroundings and make beautiful things. What we do modifies us more than what is done to us. The freedom of expression has been more restricted in women than the freedom of impression, if that be possible. Something of the world she lived in she has seen from her barred windows. Some air has come through the purdah’s folds, some knowledge has filtered to her eager ears from the talk of men. Desdemona learned somewhat of Othello. Had she known more, she might have lived longer. But in the ever-growing human impulse to create, the power and will to make, to do, to express one’s new spirit in new forms,—here she has been utterly debared. She might work as she had worked from the beginning,—at the primitive labors of the household; but in the inevitable expansion of even those industries to professional levels we have striven to hold her back. To work with her own hands, for nothing, in direct body-service to her own family,—this has been permitted,—yes, compelled. But to be and do anything further from this she has been forbidden. Her labor has not only been limited in kinds, but in degree. Whatever she has been allowed to do must be done in private and alone, the first-hand industries of savage times.

Our growth in industry has been not only in kind, but in class. The baker is not in the same industrial grade with the house-cook, though both make bread. To specialize any form of labor is a step up: to organize it is another step. Specialization and organization are the basis of human progress, the organic methods of social life. They have been forbidden to women almost absolutely. The greatest and most beneficent change of this century is the progress of women in these two lines of advance. The effect of this check in industrial development, accompanied as it was by the constant inheritance of increased racial power, has been to intensify the sensations and emotions of women, and to develop great activity in the lines allowed. The nervous energy that up to present memory has impelled women to labor incessantly at something, be it the veriest folly of fancy work, is one mark of this effect.

In religious development the same dead-line has held back the growth of women through all the races and ages. In dim early times she was sharer in the mysteries and rites; but, as religion developed, her place receded, until Paul commanded her to be silent in the churches. And she has been silent until to-day. Even now, with all the ground gained, we have but the beginnings—the slowly forced and disapproved beginnings—of religious equality for the sexes. In some
nations, religion is held to be a masculine attribute exclusively, it being even questioned whether women have souls. An early Christian council settled that important question by vote, fortunately deciding that they had. In a church whose main strength has always been derived from the adherence of women, it would have been an uncomfortable reflection not to have allowed them souls. Ancient family worship ran in the male line. It was the son who kept the sacred grandfathers in due respect, and poured libations to their shades. When the woman married, she changed her ancestors, and had to worship her husband’s progenitors instead of her own. This is why the Hindu and the Chinaman and many others of like stamp must have a son to keep them in countenance,—a deep-seated sex-prejudice, coming to slow extinction as women rise in economic importance.

It is painfully interesting to trace the gradual cumulative effect of these conditions upon women: first, the action of large natural laws, acting on her as they would act on any other animal; then the evolution of social customs and laws (with her position as the active cause), following the direction of mere physical forces, and adding heavily to them; then, with increasing civilization, the unbroken accumulation of precedent, burnt into each generation by the growing force of education, made lovely by art, holy by religion, desirable by habit; and, steadily acting from beneath, the unwavering pressure of economic necessity upon which the whole structure rested. These are strong modifying conditions, indeed.

The process would have been even more effective and far less painful but for one important circumstance. Heredity has no Salic law. Each girl-child inherits from her father a certain increasing percentage of human development, human power, human tendency; and each boy as well inherits from his mother the increasing percentage of sex-development, sex-power, sex-tendency. The action of heredity has been to equalize what every tendency of environment and education made to differ. This has saved us from such a female as the gypsy moth. It has held up the woman, and held down the man. It has set iron bounds to our absurd effort to make a race with one sex a million years behind the other. But it has added terribly to the pain and difficulty of human life,—a difficulty and a pain that should have taught us long since that we were living on wrong lines. Each woman born, re-humanized by the current of race activity carried on by her father and re-womanized by her traditional position, has had to live over again in her own person the same process of restriction, repression, denial; the smothering “no” which crushed down all her human desires to create, to discover, to learn, to express, to advance. Each woman has had, on the other hand, the same single avenue of expression and attainment; the same one way in which alone she might do what she could, get what she might. All other doors were shut, and this one always open; and the whole pressure of advancing humanity was upon her. No wonder that young Daniel in the apocryphal tale proclaimed: “The king is strong! Wine is strong! But women are stronger!”

To the young man confronting life the world lies wide. Such powers as he has he may use, must use. If he chooses wrong at first, he may choose again, and yet again. Not effective or successful in one channel, he may do better in another. The growing, varied needs of all mankind call on him for the varied service in which he finds his growth. What he wants to be, he may strive to be. What he wants to get, he may strive to get. Wealth, power, social distinction, fame,—what he wants he can try for.

To the young woman confronting life there is the same world beyond, there are the same human energies and human desires and ambition within. But all that she may wish to have, all that she may wish to do, must come through a single channel and a single choice. Wealth, power, social distinction, frame,—not only these, but home and happiness, reputation, ease and pleasure, her bread and butter,—all must come to her through a small gold ring. This is a heavy pressure. It has accumulated behind her through heredity, and continued about her through environment. It has been subtly trained into her through education, till she herself has come to think it a right condition, and pours its influence upon her daughter with increasing imetus. Is it any wonder that women are over-sexed? But for the constant inheritance from the more human male, we should have been queen bees, indeed, long before this. But the daughter of the soldier and the sailor, of
the artist, the inventor, the great merchant, has inherited in body and brain her share of his development in each generation, and so stayed somewhat human for all her femininity.

All morbid conditions tend to extinction. One check has always existed to our inordinate sex-development,—nature’s ready relief, death. Carried to its furthest excess, the individual has died, the family has become extinct, the nation itself has perished, like Sodom and Gomorrah. Where one function is carried to unnatural excess, others are weakened, and the organism perishes. We are familiar with this in individual cases,—at least, the physician is. We can see it somewhat in the history of nations. From younger races, nearer savagery, nearer the healthful equality of pre-human creatures, has come each new start in history. Persia was older than Greece, and its highly differentiated sexuality had produced the inevitable result of enfeebling the racial qualities. The Greek commander stripped the rich robes and jewels from his Persian captives, and showed their unmanly feebleness to his men. “You have such bodies as these to fight for such plunder as this,” he said.

In the country, among peasant classes, there is much less sex-distinction than in cities, where wealth enables the women to live in absolute idleness; and even the men manifest the same characteristics. It is from the country and the lower classes that the fresh blood pours into the cities, to be weakened in its turn by the influence of this unnatural distinction until there is none left to replenish the nation.

The inevitable trend of human life is toward higher civilization; but, while that civilization is confined to one sex, it inevitably exaggerates sex-distinction, until the increasing evil of this condition is stronger than all the good of the civilization attained, and the nation falls. Civilization, be it understood, does not consist in the acquisition of luxuries. Social development is an organic development. A civilized State is one in which the citizens live in organic industrial relation. The more full, free, subtle, and easy that relation; the more perfect the differentiation of labor and exchange of product, with their correlative institutions,—the more perfect is that civilization. To eat, drink, sleep, and keep warm,—these are common to all animals, whether the animal couches in a bed of leaves or one of eiderdown, sleeps in the sun to avoid the wind or builds a furnace-heated house, lies in wait for game or orders a dinner at a hotel. These are but individual animal processes. Whether one lays an egg or a million eggs, whether one bears a cub, a kitten, or a baby, whether one broods its chickens, guards its litter, or tends a nursery full of children, these are but individual animal processes. But to serve each other more and more widely; to live only by such service; to develope special functions, so that we depend for our living on society’s return for services that can be of no direct use to ourselves,—this is civilization, our human glory and race-distinction.

All this human progress has been accomplished by men. Women have been left behind, outside, below, having no social relation whatever, merely the sex-relation, whereby they lived. Let us bear in mind that all the tender ties of family are ties of blood, of sex-relationship. A friend, a comrade, a partner,—this is a human relative. Father, mother, son, daughter, sister, brother, husband, wife,—these are sex-relatives. Blood is thicker than water, we say. True. But ties of blood are not those that ring the world with the succeeding waves of progressive religion, art, science, commerce, education, all that makes us human. Man is the human creature. Woman has been checked, starved, aborted in human growth; and the swelling forces of race-development have been driven back in each generation to work in her through sex-functions alone.

This is the way in which the sexuo-economic relation has operated in our species, checking race-development in half of us, and stimulating sex-development in both.

V

The facts stated in the foregoing chapters are familiar and undeniable, the argument seems clear; yet the mind reacts violently from the conclusions it is forced to admit, and tries to find relief in the commonplace conditions of every-day life. From this looming phantom of the over-sexed female of genus homo we fly back in satisfaction to familiar acquaintances and relatives,—to Mrs. John Smith and Miss
Imogene Jones, to mothers and sisters and daughters and sweethearts and wives. We feel that such a dreadful state of things cannot be true, or we should surely have noticed it. We may even perform that acrobatic feat so easy to most minds,—admit that the statement may be theoretically true, but practically false!

Two simple laws of brain action are responsible for the difficulty of convincing the human race of any large general truths concerning itself. One is common to all brains, to all nerve sensations indeed, and is cheerfully admitted to have nothing to do with the sexuo-economic relation. It is this simple fact, in popular phrase,—that what we are used to we do not notice. This rests on the law of adaptation, the steady, ceaseless pressure that tends to fit the organism to the environment. A nerve touched for the first time with a certain impression feels this first impression far more than the hundredth or thousandth, though the thousandth be far more violent than the first. If an impression be constant and regular, we become utterly insensible to it, and only respond under some special condition, as the ticking of a clock, the noise of running water or waves on the beach, even the clatter of railroad trains, grows imperceptible to those who hear it constantly. It is perfectly possible for an individual to become accustomed to the most disadvantageous conditions, and fail to notice them.

It is equally possible for a race, a nation, a class, to become accustomed to most disadvantageous conditions, and fail to notice them. Take, as an individual instance, the wearing of corsets by women. Put a corset, even a loose one, on a vigorous man or woman who never wore one, and there is intense discomfort, and a vivid consciousness thereof. The healthy muscles of the trunk resent the pressure, the action of the whole body is checked in the middle, the stomach is choked, the process of digestion interfered with; and the victim says, “How can you bear such a thing?”

But the person habitually wearing a corset does not feel these evils. They exist, assuredly, the facts are there, the body is not deceived; but the nerves have become accustomed to these disagreeable sensations, and no longer respond to them. The person “does not feel it.” In fact, the wearer becomes so used to the sensations that, when they are removed,—with the corset,—there is a distinct sense of loss and discomfort. The heavy folds of the cravat, stock, and neckcloth of earlier men’s fashions, the heavy horse-hair periuke, the stiff high collar of to-day, the kind of shoes we wear,—these are perfectly familiar instances of the force of habit in the individual.

This is equally true of racial habits. That a king should rule because he was born, passed unquestioned for thousands of years. That the eldest son should inherit the titles and estates was a similar phenomenon as little questioned. That a debtor should be imprisoned, and so entirely prevented from paying his debts, was common law. So glaring an evil as chattel slavery was an unchallenged social institution from earliest history to our own day among the most civilized nations of the earth. Christ himself let it pass unnoticed. The hideous injustice of Christianity to the Jew attracted no attention through many centuries. That the serf went with the soil, and was owned by the lord thereof, was one of the foundations of society in the Middle Ages.

Social conditions, like individual conditions, become familiar by use, and cease to be observed. This is the reason why it is so much easier to criticise the customs of other persons or other nations than our own. It is also the reason why we so naturally deny and resent the charges of the critic. It is not necessarily because of any injustice on the one side or dishonesty on the other, but because of a simple and useful law of nature. The Englishman coming to America is much struck by America’s political corruption; and, in the earnest desire to serve his brother, he tells us all about it. That which he has at home he does not observe, because he is used to it. The American in England finds also something to object to, and omits to balance his criticism by memories of home.

When a condition exists among us which began in those unrecorded ages back of tradition even, which obtains in varying degree among every people on earth, and which begins to act upon the individual at birth, it would be a miracle past all belief if people should notice it. The sexuo-economic relation is such a condition. It began in primeval savagery. It exists in all nations. Each boy and girl is born into it, trained into it, and has to live in it. The world’s progress
in matters like these is attained by a slow and painful process, but one which works to good ends.

In the course of social evolution there are developed individuals so constituted as not to fit existing conditions, but to be organically adapted to more advanced conditions. These advanced individuals respond in sharp and painful consciousness to existing conditions, and cry out against them according to their lights. The history of religion, of political and social reform, is full of familiar instances of this. The heretic, the reformer, the agitator, these feel what their compeers do not, see what they do not, and, naturally, say what they do not. The mass of the people are invariably displeased by the outcry of these uneasy spirits. In simple primitive periods they were promptly put to death. Progress was slow and difficult in those days. But this severe process of elimination developed the kind of progressive person known as a martyr; and this remarkable sociological law was manifested: that the strength of a current of social force is increased by the sacrifice of individuals who are willing to die in the effort to promote it. “The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.” This is so commonly known to-day, though not formulated, that power hesitates to persecute, lest it intensify the undesirable heresy. A policy of “free speech” is found to let pass most of the uneasy pushes and spurts of these stirring forces, and lead to more orderly action. Our great anti-slavery agitation, the heroic efforts of the “women’s rights” supporters, are fresh and recent proofs of these plain facts: that the mass of the people do not notice existing conditions, and that they are not pleased with those who do. This is one strong reason why the sexuo-economic relation passes unobserved among us, and why any statement of it will be so offensive to many. . . .

Introduction to “The Yellow Wallpaper”

“The Yellow Wallpaper” is a chilling, semiautobiographical story about a woman’s descent into madness. “The Yellow Wallpaper” was first published in The New England Magazine in 1892, after having been rejected by numerous other publishers. In the 1890s, the notion that literature should be morally uplifting was dominant, and editors, such as A. E. Scudder of the Atlantic Monthly, found the story entirely too depressing for publication (Hedges 1973:40). Indeed, as you will see, the poignancy of “The Yellow Wallpaper” lies in its directness. The reader experiences the protagonist’s mental breakdown from the inside out.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, white middle-class women were discouraged from developing either their minds or their bodies. Physically as well as intellectually, they were cherished for being childlike and “fragile.” Gilman’s main point in “The Yellow Wallpaper” is that these constraints placed on women simply because they are women drive healthy, independent women to insanity.

Though it initially received mixed reviews, “The Yellow Wallpaper” soon became widely read and known, and it was republished numerous times. In the 1970s, “The Yellow Wallpaper” received a “second wave” of acclaim, as it became a keystone in newly developing women’s studies programs.

Ironically, however, when it was first printed no one seems to have made the connection between the main character’s descent into madness and societies’ gender roles. As Hedges (1973:39) notes, “The Yellow Wallpaper” is one of the rare pieces of literature in the nineteenth century to directly confront the sexual politics of male-female and husband-wife relationships. Yet it is extremely significant that upon its
debuted, this linkage between the “personal” and the “political” was overlooked. In this sense, “The Yellow Wallpaper” was ahead of its time. It was not until Gilman’s work was rediscovered in the 1960s and 1970s that Gilman’s eloquent insights into the intertwined nature of the personal and the political would be completely appreciated.

As you will shortly see, the main character in “The Yellow Wallpaper” is prohibited from intellectual activity and kept socially isolated in order to cure her of her “hysteria.” This is one of the critical “semiautobiographical” aspects of “The Yellow Wallpaper.” Gilman wrote the story shortly after recovering from a severe case of postpartum depression—a depression she overcame precisely by disobeying the advice of her well-known and respected physician, Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, who had prescribed for her the “rest cure” (Wagner-Martin 1989:52). Mitchell’s treatment for Gilman included seclusion, immobility, and overfeeding. Isolated for up to six weeks, Gilman was prohibited from using her mind toward any intellectual pursuits of any sort. In her autobiography, Gilman attests to how the rest cure drove her to the brink of insanity.

The “rest cure”—at the heart of both Gilman’s personal descent into madness as well as that of her protagonist in “The Yellow Wallpaper”—was the most widely accepted treatment for “female” ailments in the Victorian era. In “The Yellow Wallpaper” (as well as her other works), Gilman poignantly demonstrates that this social isolation has dire mental consequences for women. Interestingly, Gilman’s main point—that social bonds are absolutely essential to mental health—coincides with that made by Durkheim in Suicide (see Chapter 3). Recall that Durkheim maintained that social and moral isolation (anomie) could in severe cases result in suicide. Recall, too, that Durkheim found that women had lower rates of suicide than men because they were more likely to have tighter social bonds—through both formal religion and informal social relationships. Yet, ironically, American doctors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries attempted to cure “hysterical” women by disallowing social intimacy.

A second, vital, interrelated feminist point contained in “The Yellow Wallpaper” concerns masculinist logic. In the story, truth is the domain both of science and of men. The protagonist in the story is at the mercy of her husband not only because he is “The Man,” but also because he is “The Doctor.” This dual legitimacy means that it is his—and only his—assessment of the protagonist’s health and treatment that counts. The undergirding assumption is that women’s finely tuned emotions and sensibility prevent her from rational, scientific thought. As Gilman (1892/1973:10) states,

If a physician of high standing, and one’s own husband, assures friends and relatives that there is really nothing the matter with one but temporary nervous depression—a slight hysterical tendency—what is one to do?

My brother is also a physician, and also of high standing, and he says the same thing.

So I take phosphates or phospites—whichever it is, and tonics, and journeys, and air, and exercise, and am absolutely forbidden to “work” until I am well again.

Personally, I disagree with their ideas.

Personally, I believe that congenial work, with excitement and change, would do me good.

But what is one to do?

Most important, the assumed intellectual inferiority of women places them in a childlike relationship with their husbands. This childlike status is revealed in the above quote (as well as in numerous other places in the story) with the phrase “So I take phosphates or phospites—whichever it is” (emphasis added). Like the “good” child who dutifully carries out her parents’ wishes, the woman in the story is supposed to do what she’s
told by her doctor/husband, regardless of whether or not she agrees—or understands—at all. In other words, the problem with patriarchy is not only that, at the rational level, women are not able to do as they please. The even more profound problem is at the level of the nonrational: Women are not encouraged to think. Nowhere is this interrelation between the rationalist and nonrationalist levels of oppression more readily apparent than in suffrage. The dominant nineteenth-century attitude toward women’s suffrage was simply that it was not necessary. There was simply no need for women to vote, as each household would “best” be represented by the vote of the husband/father.

Yet, one of the most insidious aspects of patriarchy is that, despite the assumption that women were “incapable” of rational, scientific, logical thought, women were not valued for their “feminine” ways of knowing either. Rational, logical, scientific thought was (is?) deemed superior to intuition, emotion, or feeling, and the latter “ways of knowing” were (are?) roundly eschewed. Of course, since the 1960s, feminists have forcefully challenged this assumption. Thus, for instance, the medium of the fictional, semiautobiographical short story became valued as a source of “truth.” This brings us to the issue of why this fictional short story is included in this theory reader. By including this story in this volume, we are aligning ourselves with the idea that formally nontheoretical material can have theoretical relevance. In addition, however, we include this story in this volume for an important historical reason. Women were largely prohibited, both formally and informally, from becoming scientists and sociologists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a result, many women with provocative sociological theories turned to other means (e.g., the short story) for expressing their ideas. Thus, in order to gain access to their ideas, we need to include such stories as “The Yellow Wallpaper.” We cannot leave theory to the institutionally acknowledged “scientists” if we want to uncover nineteenth- and early twentieth-century women’s thoughts, even if these ideas are expressed in modes that seem contrary to “standard” sociological theorizing.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman

It is very seldom that mere ordinary people like John and myself secure ancestral halls for the summer.

A colonial mansion, a hereditary estate, I would say a haunted house and reach the height of romantic felicity—but that would be asking too much of fate!

Still I will proudly declare that there is something queer about it.

Else, why should it be let so cheaply? And why have stood so long untenanted?

John laughs at me, of course, but one expects that.

John is practical in the extreme. He has no patience with faith, an intense horror of superstition, and he scoffs openly at any talk of things not to be felt and seen and put down in figures.

John is a physician, and perhaps—(I would not say it to a living soul, of course, but this is dead paper and a great relief to my mind)—perhaps that is one reason I do not get well faster.

You see, he does not believe I am sick! And what can one do?

If a physician of high standing, and one’s own husband, assures friends and relatives that there is really nothing the matter with one but temporary nervous depression—a slight hysterical tendency—what is one to do?

My brother is also a physician, and also of high standing, and he says the same thing.

So I take phosphates or phospites—whichever it is—and tonics, and air and exercise, and journeys, and am absolutely forbidden to “work” until I am well again.

Personally, I disagree with their ideas. Personally, I believe that congenial work, with excitement and change, would do me good.

But what is one to do?

I did write for a while in spite of them; but it does exhaust me a good deal—having to be so sly about it, or else meet with heavy opposition.

I sometimes fancy that in my condition, if I had less opposition and more society and stimulus—but John says the very worst thing I can do is to think about my condition, and I confess it always makes me feel bad.

So I will let it alone and talk about the house. The most beautiful place! It is quite alone, standing well back from the road, quite three miles from the village. It makes me think of English places that you read about, for there are hedges and walls and gates that lock, and lots of separate little houses for the gardeners and people.

There is a delicious garden! I never saw such a garden—large and shady, full of box-bordered paths, and lined with long grape-covered arbors with seats under them.

There were greenhouses, but they are all broken now.

There was some legal trouble, I believe, something about the heirs and coheirs; anyhow, the place has been empty for years.

That spoils my ghostliness, I am afraid, but I don’t care—there is something strange about the house—I can feel it.

I even said so to John one moonlight evening, but he said what I felt was a draught, and shut the window.

I get unreasonably angry with John sometimes. I’m sure I never used to be so sensitive. I think it is due to this nervous condition.

But John says if I feel so I shall neglect proper self-control; so I take pains to control myself—before him, at least, and that makes me very tired.

I don’t like our room a bit. I wanted one downstairs that opened onto the piazza and had roses all over the window, and such pretty old-fashioned chintz hangings! but John would not hear of it.

He said there was only one window and not room for two beds, and no near room for him if he took another.

He is very careful and loving, and hardly lets me stir without special direction.

I have a schedule prescription for each hour in the day; he takes all care from me, and so I feel basely ungrateful not to value it more.

He said he came here solely on my account, that I was to have perfect rest and all the air I could get. “Your exercise depends on your strength, my dear,” said he, “and your food somewhat on your appetite; but air you can absorb all the time.” So we took the nursery at the top of the house.

It is a big, airy room, the whole floor nearly, with windows that look all ways, and air and sunshine galore. It was nursery first, and then playroom and gymnasium, I should judge, for the windows are barred for little children, and there are rings and things in the walls.

The paint and paper look as if a boys’ school had used it. It is stripped off—the paper—in great patches all around the head of my bed, about as far as I can reach, and in a great place on the other side of the room low down. I never saw a worse paper in my life.

One of those sprawling, flamboyant patterns committing every artistic sin.

It is dull enough to confuse the eye in following, pronounced enough constantly to irritate and provoke study, and when you follow the lame uncertain curves for a little distance they suddenly commit suicide—plunge off at outrageous angles, destroy themselves in unheard-of contradictions.
The color is repellent, almost revolting: a smouldering unclean yellow, strangely faded by the slow-turning sunlight.

It is a dull yet lurid orange in some places, a sickly sulphur tint in others.

No wonder the children hated it! I should hate it myself if I had to live in this room long.

There comes John, and I must put this away—he hates to have me write a word.

We have been here two weeks, and I haven’t felt like writing before, since that first day.

I am sitting by the window now, up in this atrocious nursery, and there is nothing to hinder my writing as much as I please, save lack of strength.

John is away all day, and even some nights when his cases are serious.

I am glad my case is not serious!

But these nervous troubles are dreadfully depressing.

John does not know how much I really suffer. He knows there is no reason to suffer, and that satisfies him.

Of course it is only nervousness. It does weigh on me so not to do my duty in any way!

I meant to be such a help to John, such a real rest and comfort, and here I am a comparative burden already!

Nobody would believe what an effort it is to do what little I am able—to dress and entertain, and order things.

It is fortunate Mary is so good with the baby. Such a dear baby!

And yet I cannot be with him, it makes me so nervous.

I suppose John never was nervous in his life. He laughs at me so about this wallpaper!

At first he meant to repaper the room, but afterward he said that I was letting it get the better of me, and that nothing was worse for a nervous patient than to give way to such fancies.

He said that after the wallpaper was changed it would be the heavy bedstead, and then the barred windows, and then that gate at the head of the stairs, and so on.

“You know the place is doing you good,” he said, “and really, dear, I don’t care to renovate the house just for a three months’ rental.”

“Then do let us go downstairs,” I said. “There are such pretty rooms there.”

Then he took me in his arms and called me a blessed little goose, and said he would go down cellar, if I wished, and have it whitewashed into the bargain.

But he is right enough about the beds and windows and things.

It is as airy and comfortable a room as anyone need wish, and, of course, I would not be so silly as to make him uncomfortable just for a whim.

I’m really getting quite fond of the big room, all but that horrid paper.

Out of one window I can see the garden—those mysterious deep-shaded arbors, the riotous old-fashioned flowers, and bushes and gnarly trees.

Out of another I get a lovely view of the bay and a little private wharf belonging to the estate. There is a beautiful shaded lane that runs down there from the house. I always fancy I see people walking in these numerous paths and arbors, but John has cautioned me not to give way to fancy in the least. He says that with my imaginative power and habit of story-making, a nervous weakness like mine is sure to lead to all manner of excited fancies, and that I ought to use my will and good sense to check the tendency. So I try.

I think sometimes that if I were only well enough to write a little it would relieve the press of ideas and rest me.

But I find I get pretty tired when I try.

It is so discouraging not to have any advice and companionship about my work. When I get really well, John says we will ask Cousin Henry and Julia down for a long visit; but he says he would as soon put fireworks in my pillow-case as to let me have those stimulating people about now.

I wish I could get well faster.

But I must not think about that. This paper looks to me as if it knew what a vicious influence it had!

There is a recurrent spot where the pattern lolls like a broken neck and two bulbous eyes stare at you upside down.

I get positively angry with the impertinence of it and the everlastingness. Up and down and sideways they crawl, and those absurd unblinking eyes are everywhere. There is one place where two breaths didn’t match, and the eyes go
all up and down the line, one a little higher than the other.

I never saw so much expression in an inanimate thing before, and we all know how much expression they have! I used to lie awake as a child and get more entertainment and terror out of blank walls and plain furniture than most children could find in a toy-store.

I remember what a kindly wink the knobs of our big, old bureau used to have, and there was one chair that always seemed like a strong friend.

I used to feel that if any of the other things looked too fierce I could always hop into that chair and be safe.

The furniture in this room is no worse than inharmonious, however, for we had to bring it all from downstairs. I suppose when this was used as a playroom they had to take the nursery things out, and no wonder! I never saw such ravages as the children have made here.

The wallpaper, as I said before, is torn off in spots, and it sticketh closer than a brother—they must have had perseverance as well as hatred.

Then the floor is scratched and gouged and splintered, the plaster itself is dug out here and there, and this great heavy bed, which is all we found in the room, looks as if it had been through the wars.

But I don't mind it a bit—only the paper.

There comes John's sister. Such a dear girl as she is, and so careful of me! I must not let her find me writing.

She is a perfect and enthusiastic housekeeper, and hopes for no better profession. I verily believe she thinks it is the writing which made me sick!

But I can write when she is out, and see her a long way off from these windows.

There is one that commands the road, a lovely shaded winding road, one that just looks off over the country. A lovely country, too, full of great elms and velvet meadows.

This wallpaper has a kind of sub-pattern in a different shade, a particularly irritating one, for you can only see it in certain lights, and not clearly then.

But in the places where it isn't faded and where the sun is just so—I can see a strange, provoking, formless sort of figure, that seems to skulk about behind that silly and conspicuous front design.

There's sister on the stairs!

Well, the Fourth of July is over! The people are all gone, and I am tired out. John thought it might do me good to see a little company, so we just had Mother and Nellie and the children down for a week.

Of course I didn't do a thing. Jennie sees to everything now.

But it tired me all the same.

John says if I don't pick up faster he shall send me to Weir Mitchell in the fall.

But I don't want to go there at all. I had a friend who was in his hands once, and she says he is just like John and my brother, only more so!

Besides, it is such an undertaking to go so far.

I don't feel as if it was worthwhile to turn my hand over for anything, and I'm getting dreadfully fretful and querulous.

I cry at nothing, and cry most of the time.

Of course I don't when John is here, or anybody else, but when I am alone.

And I am alone a good deal just now. John is kept in town very often by serious cases, and Jennie is good and lets me alone when I want her to.

So I walk a little in the garden or down that lovely lane, sit on the porch under the roses, and lie down up here a good deal.

I'm getting really fond of the room in spite of the wallpaper. Perhaps because of the wallpaper. It dwells in my mind so!

I lie here on this great immovable bed—it is nailed down, I believe—and follow that pattern about by the hour. It is as good as gymnastics, I assure you. I start, we'll say, at the bottom, down in the corner over there where it has not been touched, and I determine for the thousandth time that I will follow that pointless pattern to some sort of a conclusion.

I know a little of the principle of design, and I know this thing was not arranged on any laws of radiation, or alternation, or repetition, or symmetry, or anything else that I ever heard of.

It is repeated, of course, by the breadths, but not otherwise.
Looked at in one way, each breadth stands alone; the bloated curves and flourishes—a kind of “debased Romanesque” with delirium tremens—go waddling up and down in isolated columns of fatuity.

But, on the other hand, they connect diagonally, and the sprawling outlines run off in great slanting waves of optic horror, like a lot of wallowing seaweeds in full chase.

The whole thing goes horizontally, too, at least it seems so, and I exhaust myself trying to distinguish the order of its going in that direction.

They have used a horizontal breadth for a frieze, and that adds wonderfully to the confusion.

There is one end of the room where it is almost intact, and there, when the crosslights fade and the low sun shines directly upon it, I can almost fancy radiation after all—the interminable grotesque seems to form around a common center and rush off in headlong plunges of equal distraction.

It makes me tired to follow it. I will take a nap, I guess.

I don’t know why I should write this. I don’t want to. I don’t feel able.

And I know John would think it absurd. But I must say what I feel and think in some way—it is such a relief!

But the effort is getting to be greater than the relief.

Half the time now I am awfully lazy, and lie down ever so much.

John says I mustn’t lose my strength, and has me take cod liver oil and lots of tonics and things, to say nothing of ale and wine and rare meat.

Dear John! He loves me very dearly, and hates to have me sick. I tried to have a real earnest reasonable talk with him the other day, and tell him how I wish he would let me go and make a visit to Cousin Henry and Julia.

But he said I wasn’t able to go, nor able to stand it after I got there; and I did not make out a very good case for myself, for I was crying before I had finished.

It is getting to be a great effort for me to think straight. Just this nervous weakness, I suppose.

And dear John gathered me up in his arms, and just carried me upstairs and laid me on the bed, and sat by me and read to me till it tired my head.

He said I was his darling and his comfort and all he had, and that I must take care of myself for his sake, and keep well.

He says no one but myself can help me out of it, that I must use my will and self-control and not let any silly fancies run away with me.

There’s one comfort—the baby is well and happy, and does not have to occupy this nursery with the horrid wallpaper.

If we had not used it, that blessed child would have! What a fortunate escape! Why, I wouldn’t have a child of mine, an impressionable little thing, live in such a room for worlds.

I never thought of it before, but it is lucky that John kept me here after all; I can stand it so much easier than a baby, you see.

Of course I never mention it to them any more—I am too wise—but I keep watch of it all the same.

There are things in that wallpaper that nobody knows about but me, or ever will.

Behind that outside pattern the dim shapes get clearer every day.

It is always the same shape, only very numerous.

And it is like a woman stooping down and creeping about behind that pattern. I don’t like it a bit. I wonder—I begin to think—I wish John would take me away from here!

It is so hard to talk with John about my case, because he is so wise, and because he loves me so.

But I tried it last night.

It was moonlight. The moon shines in all around just as the sun does.

I hate to see it sometimes, it creeps so slowly, and always comes in by one window or another.

John was asleep and I hated to waken him, so I kept still and watched the moonlight on that undulating wallpaper till I felt creepy.

The faint figure behind seemed to shake the pattern, just as if she wanted to get out.

I got up softly and went to feel and see if the paper did move, and when I came back John was awake.

Charlotte Perkins Gilman  235
What is it, little girl?” he said. “Don’t go walking about like that—you’ll get cold.”

I thought it was a good time to talk, so I told him that I really was not gaining here, and that I wished he would take me away.

“Why, darling!” said he. “Our lease will be up in three weeks, and I can’t see how to leave before.

“The repairs are not done at home, and I cannot possibly leave town just now. Of course, if you were in any danger, I could and would, but you really are better, dear, whether you can see it or not. I am a doctor, dear, and I know. You are gaining flesh and color, your appetite is better, I feel really much easier about you.”

“I don’t weigh a bit more,” said I, “nor as much; and my appetite may be better in the evening when you are here but it is worse in the morning when you are away!”

“Bless her little heart!” said he with a big hug. “She shall be as sick as she pleases! But now let’s improve the shining hours by going to sleep, and talk about it in the morning!”

“And you won’t go away?” I asked gloomily.

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“Why, how can I, dear? It is only three weeks more and then we will take a nice little trip of a few days while Jennie is getting the house ready. Really, dear, you are better!”

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“Why, how can I, dear? It is only three weeks more and then we will take a nice little trip of a few days while Jennie is getting the house ready. Really, dear, you are better!”

“My darling,” said he, “I beg of you, for my sake and for our child’s sake, as well as for your own, that you will never for one instant let that idea enter your mind! There is nothing so dangerous, so fascinating, to a temperament like yours. It is a false and foolish fancy. Can you not trust me as a physician when I tell you so?”

So of course I said no more on that score, and we went to sleep before long. He thought I was asleep first, but I wasn’t, and lay there for hours trying to decide whether that front pattern and the back pattern really did move together or separately.

On a pattern like this, by daylight, there is a lack of sequence, a defiance of law, that is a constant irritant to a normal mind.

The color is hideous enough, and unreliable enough, and infuriating enough, but the pattern is torturing.

You think you have mastered it, but just as you get well under way in following, it turns a back-somersault and there you are. It slaps you in the face, knocks you down, and tramples upon you. It is like a bad dream.

The outside pattern is a florid arabesque, reminding one of a fungus. If you can imagine a toadstool in joints, an interminable string of toadstools, budding and sprouting in endless convolutions—why, that is something like it.

That is, sometimes!

There is one marked peculiarity about this paper, a thing nobody seems to notice but myself, and that is that it changes as the light changes.

When the sun shoots in through the east window—I always watch for that first long, straight ray—it changes so quickly that I never can quite believe it.

That is why I watch it always.

By moonlight—the moon shines in all night when there, is a moon—I wouldn’t know it was the same paper.

At night in any kind of light, in twilight, candlelight, lamplight, and worst of all by moonlight, it becomes bars! The outside pattern, I mean, and the woman behind it is as plain as can be.

I didn’t realize for a long time what the thing was that showed behind, that dim sub-pattern, but now I am quite sure it is a woman.

By daylight she is subdued, quiet. I fancy it is the pattern that keeps her so still. It is so puzzling. It keeps me quiet by the hour.

I lie down ever so much now. John says it is good for me, and to sleep all I can.

Indeed he started the habit by making me lie down for an hour after each meal.

It is a very bad habit, I am convinced, for you see, I don’t sleep.

And that cultivates deceit, for I don’t tell them I’m awake—oh, no!

The fact is I am getting a little afraid of John. He seems very queer sometimes, and even Jennie has an inexplicable look.

It strikes me occasionally, just as a scientific hypothesis,—that perhaps it is the paper!

I have watched John when he did not know I was looking, and come into the room suddenly on the most innocent excuses, and I’ve caught him several times looking at the paper! And Jennie too. I caught Jennie with her hand on it once.
She didn’t know I was in the room, and when I asked her in a quiet, a very quiet voice, with the most restrained manner possible, what she was doing with the paper—she turned around as if she had been caught stealing, and looked quite angry—asked me why I should frighten her so!

Then she said that the paper stained everything it touched, that she had found yellow smooches on all my clothes and John’s, and she wished we would be more careful!

Did not that sound innocent? But I know she was studying that pattern, and I am determined that nobody shall find it out but myself!

Life is very much more exciting now than it used to be. You see, I have something more to expect, to look forward to, to watch. I really do eat better, and am more quiet than I was.

John is so pleased to see me improve! He laughed a little the other day, and said I seemed to be flourishing in spite of my wallpaper.

I turned it off with a laugh. I had no intention of telling him it was because of the wallpaper— he would make fun of me. He might even want to take me away.

I don’t want to leave now until I have found it out. There is a week more, and I think that will be enough.

I’m feeling ever so much better! I don’t sleep much at night, for it is so interesting to watch developments; but I sleep a good deal during the daytime.

In the daytime it is tiresome and perplexing.

There are always new shoots on the fungus, and new shades of yellow all over it. I cannot keep count of them, though I have tried conscientiously.

It is the strangest yellow, that wallpaper! It makes me think of all the yellow things I ever saw—not beautiful ones like buttercups, but old, foul, bad yellow things.

But there is something else about that paper—the smell! I noticed it the moment we came into the room, but with so much air and sun it was not bad. Now we have had a week of fog and rain, and whether the windows are open or not, the smell is here.

It creeps all over the house.

I find it hovering in the dining-room, skulking in the parlor, hiding in the hall, lying in wait for me on the stairs.

It gets into my hair.

Even when I go to ride, if I turn my head suddenly and surprise it—there is that smell!

Such a peculiar odor, too! I have spent hours in trying to analyze it, to find what it smelled like.

It is not bad—at first—and very gentle, but quite the subtlest, most enduring odor I ever met.

In this damp weather it is awful. I wake up in the night and find it hanging over me.

It used to disturb me at first. I thought seriously of burning the house—to reach the smell.

But now I am used to it. The only thing I can think of that it is like is the color of the paper! A yellow smell.

There is a very funny mark on this wall, low down, near the mopboard. A streak that runs round the room. It goes behind every piece of furniture, except the bed, a long, straight, even smooch, as if it had been rubbed over and over.

I wonder how it was done and who did it, and what they did it for. Round and round and round—round and round and round—it makes me dizzy!

I really have discovered something at last.

Through watching so much at night, when it changes so, I have finally found out.

The front pattern does move—and no wonder! The woman behind shakes it!

Sometimes I think there are a great many women behind, and sometimes only one, and she crawls around fast, and her crawling shakes it all over.

Then in the very bright spots she keeps still, and in the very shady spots she just takes hold of the bars and shakes them hard.

And she is all the time trying to climb through. But nobody could climb through that pattern—it strangles so; I think that is why it has so many heads.

They get through, and then the pattern strangles them off and turns them upside down, and makes their eyes white!

If those heads were covered or taken off it would not be half so bad.

I think that woman gets out in the daytime!

And I’ll tell you why—privately—I’ve seen her!
I can see her out of every one of my windows!
It is the same woman, I know, for she is always creeping, and most women do not creep by daylight.
I see her on that long road under the trees, creeping along, and when a carriage comes she hides under the blackberry vines.
I don’t blame her a bit. It must be very humiliating to be caught creeping by daylight!
I always lock the door when I creep by daylight. I can’t do it at night, for I know John would suspect something at once.
And John is so queer now, that I don’t want to irritate him. I wish he would take another room! Besides, I don’t want anybody to get that woman out at night but myself.
I often wonder if I could see her out of all the windows at once.
But, turn as fast as I can, I can only see out of one at one time.
And though I always see her, she may be able to creep faster than I can turn!
I have watched her sometimes away off in the open country, creeping as fast as a cloud shadow in a wind.
If only that top pattern could be gotten off from the under one! I mean to try it, little by little.
I have found out another funny thing, but I shan’t tell it this time! It does not do to trust people too much.
There are only two more days to get this paper off, and I believe John is beginning to notice. I don’t like the look in his eyes.
And I heard him ask Jennie a lot of professional questions about me. She had a very good report to give.
She said I slept a good deal in the daytime.
John knows I don’t sleep very well at night, for all I’m so quiet!
He asked me all sorts of questions, too, and pretended to be very loving and kind.
As if I couldn’t see through him!
Still, I don’t wonder he acts so, sleeping under this paper for three months.
It only interests me, but I feel sure John and Jennie are affected by it.

Jennie wanted to sleep with me—the sly thing! but I told her I should undoubtedly rest better for a night all alone.
That was clever, for really I wasn’t alone a bit! As soon as it was moonlight and that poor thing began to crawl and shake the pattern, I got up and ran to help her.
I pulled and she shook. I shook and she pulled, and before morning we had peeled off yards of that paper.
A strip about as high as my head and half around the room.
And then when the sun came and that awful pattern began to laugh at me, I declared I would finish it today!

We go away tomorrow, and they are moving all my furniture down again to leave things as they were before.
Jennie looked at the wall in amazement, but I told her merrily that I did it out of pure spite at the vicious thing.
She laughed and said she wouldn’t mind doing it herself, but I must not get tired.
How she betrayed herself that time!
But I am here, and no person touches this paper but me—not alive!
She tried to get me out of the room—it was too patent! But I said it was so quiet and empty and clean now that I believed I would lie down again and sleep all I could; and not to wake me even for dinner—I would call when I woke.
So now she is gone, and the servants are gone, and the things are gone, and there is nothing left but that great bedstead nailed down, with the canvas mattress we found on it.
We shall sleep downstairs tonight, and take the boat home tomorrow.
I quite enjoy the room, now it is bare again.
How those children did tear about here!
This bedstead is fairly gnawed!
But I must get to work.
I have locked the door and thrown the key down into the front path.
I don’t want to go out, and I don’t want to have anybody come in, till John comes.
I want to astonish him.
I’ve got a rope up here that even Jennie did not find. If that woman does get out, and tries to get away, I can tie her!
But I forgot I could not reach far without anything to stand on!
“This bed will not move!”
I tried to lift and push it until I was lame, and then I got so angry I bit off a little piece at one corner—but it hurt my teeth.
Then I peeled off all the paper I could reach standing on the floor. It sticks horribly and the pattern just enjoys it! All those strangled heads and bulbous eyes and waddling fungus growths just shriek with derision!
I am getting angry enough to do something desperate. To jump out of the window would be admirable exercise, but the bars are too strong even to try.
Besides I wouldn’t do it. Of course not. I know well enough that a step like that is improper and might be misconstrued.
I don’t like to look out of the windows even—there are so many of those creeping women, and they creep so fast.
I wonder if they all come out of that wallpaper as I did?
But I am securely fastened now by my well-hidden rope—you don’t get me out in the road there!
I suppose I shall have to get back behind the pattern when it comes night, and that is hard!
It is so pleasant to be out in this great room and creep around as I please!
I don’t want to go outside. I won’t, even if Jennie asks me to.
For outside you have to creep on the ground, and everything is green instead of yellow.

But here I can creep smoothly on the floor, and my shoulder just fits in that long smooch around the wall, so I cannot lose my way.
Why, there’s John at the door!
It is no use, young man, you can’t open it!
How he does call and pound!
Now he’s crying for an axe.
It would be a shame to break down that beautiful door!
“John, dear!” said I in the gentlest voice, “the key is down by the front steps, under a plantain leaf!”
That silenced him for a few moments.
Then he said—very quietly indeed, “Open the door, my darling!”
“I can’t,” said I. “The key is down by the front door under a plantain leaf!”
And then I said it again, several times, very gently and slowly, and said it so often that he had to go and see, and he got it of course, and came in. He stopped short by the door.
“What is the matter?” he cried. “For God’s sake, what are you doing!”
I kept on creeping just the same, but I looked at him over my shoulder.
“I’ve got out at last,” said I, “in spite of you and Jane. And I’ve pulled off most of the paper, so you can’t put me back!”
Now why should that man have fainted?
But he did, and right across my path by the wall, so that I had to creep over him every time!

Why I Wrote “The Yellow Wallpaper”

Many and many a reader has asked that. When the story first came out, in the New England Magazine about 1891, a Boston physician made protest in The Transcript. Such a story ought not to be written, he said; it was enough to drive anyone mad to read it.
Another physician, in Kansas I think, wrote to say that it was the best description of incipient insanity he had ever seen, and—begging my pardon—had I been there?

Now the story of the story is this:
For many years I suffered from a severe and continuous nervous breakdown tending to melancholia—and beyond. During about the third year of this trouble I went, in devout faith and some faint stir of hope, to a noted specialist in nervous diseases, the best known in the country. This wise man put me to bed and applied the rest cure, to which a still-good physique responded so promptly that he

concluded there was nothing much the matter with me, and sent me home with solemn advice to “live as domestic a life as far as possible,” to “have but two hours’ intellectual life a day,” and “never to touch pen, brush, or pencil again” as long as I lived. This was in 1887.

I went home and obeyed those directions for some three months, and came so near the borderline of utter mental ruin that I could see over.

Then, using the remnants of intelligence that remained, and helped by a wise friend, I cast the noted specialist’s advice to the winds and went to work again—work, the normal life of every human being; work, in which is joy and growth and service, without which one is a pauper and a parasite—ultimately recovering some measure of power.

Being naturally moved to rejoicing by this narrow escape, I wrote “The Yellow Wallpaper,” with its embellishments and additions, to carry out the ideal (I never had hallucinations or objections to my mural decorations) and sent a copy to the physician who so nearly drove me mad. He never acknowledged it.

The little book is valued by alienists and as a good specimen of one kind of literature. It has, to my knowledge, saved one woman from a similar fate—so terrifying her family that they let her out into normal activity and she recovered.

But the best result is this. Many years later I was told that the great specialist had admitted to friends of his that he had altered his treatment of neurasthenia since reading “The Yellow Wallpaper.”

It was not intended to drive people crazy, but to save people from being driven crazy, and it worked.

Discussion Questions

1. One of Gilman’s main points is that women cannot be equal unless they are economically independent. Do you agree or disagree? Why or why not? Use concrete examples to explain and support your point of view.

2. For Gilman, “women’s work” was lonely and demeaning. Do you think “parentwork” and housework has to be this way? Why or why not? What specific measures, institutions, and/or practices might help prevent or combat these tendencies?

3. Discuss the specific advances in gender equality that have occurred since Gilman’s day. What specific issues highlighted by Gilman do you consider still problematic, and which problems do you consider “eradicated” (at least in the United States)?

4. Compare and contrast Gilman’s theory as to the oppression of women in patriarchy with Marx’s theory as to how and why workers are oppressed under capitalism. What similarities do you see in their arguments? What are the differences in these two theories of oppression?

5. Compare and contrast Gilman’s discussion of social bonds and mental health with that of Durkheim. Does each theorist conceive of social bonds as working in the same way? How so or why not? Discuss how each theorist would construe the social bonds between (1) mothers and their children, and (2) husbands and wives.