My efforts are to work the ruins of a confident social science as the very ground from which new practices of research might take shape.

—Lather (1999:152)

This chapter briefly traces grounded theory (GT) from its inception in 1967 to the present, including development of the extension of GT called situational analysis (SA). We begin with a synopsis of GT, the first manifesto of the continuing renaissance of qualitative inquiry. We then offer a genealogy of the varieties of grounded theories in practices today including SA, focusing on the first and second generations of practitioners.

Next we frame the interpretive turn, the central feature of the “changing landscape” (Denzin & Lincoln 2011) of qualitative inquiry theoretically and methodologically since GT was created half a century ago. This includes both the postmodern and poststructural turns and their critiques. We then present the grounding rationales for SA as a new GT method developed after the interpretive turn and partially in response to it. Next we discuss what “the situation” is in situational analysis. We then discuss the analytic strategies of SA mapping and memoing, including defining, constructing and bounding the empirical situation under study. In concluding, we note how SA makes the social features of a situation more visible through mapping.

WHAT IS GROUNDED THEORY?

Grounded theory is not a description of a kind of theory. Rather it represents a general way of generating theory (or, even more generically, a way of having ideas on the basis of empirical research).

—Atkinson, Coffey, and Delamont (2003:150)

This section is especially for those unfamiliar with GT. It situates GT as a deeply empirical qualitative research approach to the study of social life. GT was born in 1967 during a progressive political moment in US history as the Cold War eased and 1960s movements for civil rights, feminism, sexual liberation, and LGBT rights were emerging. One of its
originators, Anselm Strauss, was a Chicago School sociologist trained by Herbert Blumer (1959), who named symbolic interactionism, among others. Strauss was a social constructivist qualitative researcher deeply committed to interactionism throughout his career.1 GT’s other originator, Barney Glaser, was trained in more positivist functionalist sociology and largely in quantitative survey research at Columbia by Robert King Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld.

Their core challenge—which they ably met—was to articulate a new qualitative methodology in the belly of the haute positivist quantitative social science beast of the 1960s. Their emphases in the early works cited were on taking a naturalistic approach to research, having initially modest (read substantively focused) theoretical goals, and being systematic in what we might today call the interrogation of qualitative research data in order to work against what they and others then saw as the “distorting subjectivities” of the researcher in the concrete processes of interpretive analysis.2

Writing in the mid-1960s, Strauss and Glaser sought to make qualitative sense of social life within the increasingly quantitative and scientistically oriented discipline of sociology that was reliant upon mechanistic methods (Bryant & Charmaz 2007b). They sought to do so by providing what was most obviously then missing from the social science toolbox—a reasonable approach to analyzing qualitative data that seriously attempts to be faithful to the understandings, interpretations, and perspectives of the people studied on their own terms, and as expressed through their actions as well as their words.

Another fundamental desire of Strauss and Glaser was for a method that could travel across some of the usual divides of the academy without violating core disciplinary and/or social science/humanities concerns. In this too they succeeded, probably beyond their wildest dreams. GT became one of the major approaches in qualitative research on the planet both transdisciplinarily and transnationally.3

**A Focus on Coding and the “Basic Social Process”**

Since its inception (Glaser 1978; Glaser & Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987), GT analysis has largely focused on generating the “basic social process” occurring in the data concerning the phenomenon being studied—the basic form of human action pursued. Research has been done, for example, on living with chronic illness (Charmaz 1991), disciplining the scientific study of reproduction (Clarke 1998), classifying and its consequences (Bowker & Star 1999; Star 1989), embracing one’s mixed-race heritage (Tashiro 2013), organizing the specialty of pain medicine (Baszanger 1998a), cloning endangered species (Friese 2013a), queering reproduction (Mamo 2007), and creating a new social actor—the unborn patient—via fetal surgery (Casper 1998a,b).

In a GT study, the key or basic social process is typically articulated in gerund form connoting ongoing action, and at an abstract level. Around this basic process, the analyst then constellates the particular and distinctive conditions, strategies, actions, and practices engaged in by actors involved in the process and their consequences. For example, subprocesses of disciplining the scientific study of reproduction included formalizing a scientific discipline, establishing stable access to research materials, gleaning fiscal support for research, producing hormones and other technoscientific products, and handling social controversies the science provoked (e.g., vis-à-vis contraception).
In practice, data for GT projects have largely been generated through in-depth interviews, ethnographic observations, and field notes. The analyst initially codes the data (open coding)—word by word, segment by segment—and gives temporary more abstract and conceptual labels called codes to particular phenomena. The analyst then assesses whether codes generated through one data source appear elsewhere, and if so, elaborates their properties in memos with examples from the data.

Related codes that have been sustained across the analysis (rather than being collapsed into others or deemed irrelevant) are then densified into more enduring and analytically ambitious conceptual categories. That is, categories include densely related codes. Ultimately, these categories are integrated into a theoretical analysis of the substantive area (which may include an analytic diagram), usually focused on human action.

Thus a “GT” of a particular phenomenon is composed of the analytic codes and categories generated in the analysis and explicitly integrated to form a theory of the substantive area that is the focus of the research project—an empirically based substantive theory. Traditionally in GT, over time, after multiple substantive theories of a particular area of interest have been generated through an array of empirical GT research projects, more formal theory could be developed (e.g., Glaser 2006; Kearney 2007; Strauss 1995).

Several GT practices are distinctive if not unique to this approach to qualitative inquiry. First, GT requires that researchers begin analyzing as soon as there are data. Coding begins immediately, and theorizing based on that coding does as well, however provisionally (e.g., Glaser 1978). Second, “sampling” in GT is driven not necessarily (or not only) by attempts to be “representative” of some social body or population or its heterogeneities but especially and explicitly by theoretical concerns that have emerged in the provisional analysis to date. Such “theoretical sampling” focuses on finding new data sources (persons or things—and not theories) that can best explicitly address specific, theoretically interesting facets of the emergent analysis.

Theoretical sampling has been integral to GT from the outset, remains a fundamental strength of this analytic approach, and is also crucial in SA. In fact, “The true legacy of Glaser and Strauss is a collective awareness of the heuristic value of developmental research designs [through theoretical sampling] and exploratory data analytic strategies, not a ‘system’ for conducting and analyzing research” (Atkinson, Coffey, & Delamont 2003:162-163).

A GENEALOGY OF GROUNDED THEORY AND SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Social phenomena are complex. Thus they require complex grounded theory.

—Strauss (1987:1)

Over the half century that GT has been a method of qualitative inquiry, its practitioners have generated several different emphases within the tradition. We sketch the major ones in this genealogy of GT and SA, distinguishing between Glaser and Strauss as the first generation, and
other scholars, ourselves included, as part of the second generation. Please look at Figure 1.1, A Genealogy of Grounded Theory and Situational Analysis, which traces the major strands of GT in practice today as demonstrated by sustained methods-focused publications.5

The First Generation

Grounded theory emerged through the collaborative research of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss pursued at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF), in the

![Figure 1.1: A Genealogy of Grounded Theory and Situational Analysis](chart)

Source: Adapted from Morse (2009).
Strauss had been hired by the Dean of the School of Nursing to head an initiative to further professionalize nursing through research—quite radically through qualitative inquiry—and Glaser was among the initial project staff. Glaser and Strauss’s (1965b, 1966) first two methods publications, “Discovery of Substantive Theory: A Basic Strategy Underlying Qualitative Research” and “The Purpose and Credibility of Qualitative Research,” laid out the arguments at the core of their (1967) *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. This book directly challenged the then-dominant theory/methods package of positivism and quantitative survey research in the United States. The *Discovery* book was Glaser and Strauss’s final methods publication together.

Glaser’s next major GT publication was *Theoretical Sensitivity* in 1977. It is foundational for what has come to be known as Glaserian GT, which largely sustains the positivist functionalist traditions in which he was originally trained. Glaser has since published many books and articles on GT, many if not most of which argue against the other forms of GT discussed here, especially constructivist (e.g., Glaser 2002b), as do the writings of those who follow Glaser’s approach.

After the *Discovery* book, Strauss published extensively in medical sociology interactionist social theory, and methods, including a book on doing field research (Schatzman & Strauss 1973). Strauss’s main constructivist/interactionist statement on GT was *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* in 1987. Near the end of his life, Strauss (1991b, 1993) published two capstone books, both largely on his social theory of action—always at the core of his work and his GT. He also collaborated extensively with Juliet Corbin, including two editions of a more “how-to” GT methods book, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques* (1990, 1998), which she has sustained since his death in 1996. Strauss and Corbin (1997) also coedited a GT reader. We call this approach Straussian GT.

### The Second Generation

Strauss’s approach was the major source of inspiration for most but not all of what Morse (Morse et al. 2009) called the second generation of developers of GT including Juliet Corbin (discussed above), Barbara Bowers, Kathy Charmaz, and Adele Clarke with her SA. Glaserian GT is represented by Stern, Holton, Walsh, and others. Strauss’s former student and UCSF faculty colleague Leonard Schatzman (1991) developed an offshoot of GT called “dimensional analysis.” Elaborated especially by Barbara Bowers, it centers on dimensions of the codes in GT coding. We call this *dimensional GT*.

Taught by and tracing her GT roots to both Glaser and Strauss at UCSF, Kathy Charmaz has always been deeply committed to symbolic interactionism and has become increasingly constructivist in her approach to GT since circa 1995. Charmaz (2014:6-10) sees the grounds for constructivist GT as lying in its “tools for understanding empirical worlds” that can be used in “more open-ended practice[s]” as “flexible, heuristic strategies rather than as formulaic procedures.” In fact, Bryant (2009:14) credits Kathy Charmaz’s (1995, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2009) push for a more fully constructivist GT with resurrecting a method characterized by many as “naively inductivist.” Probably the most prolific GT practitioner, Charmaz has also published extensively in medical sociology, interactionist theory, and beyond. Charmaz leads *constructivist GT*. 
Adele Clarke was already a feminist, constructivist, and interactionist when she became a student of Strauss in 1980. His interactionist social worlds/arenas and negotiated order theories quickly became integral to her perspective. However, during the 1990s, she also added postmodern, poststructural, and interpretive concerns to her theoretical toolkit and began generating what became SA, on which she has published since 2003. Clarke has been joined by Carrie Friese, Rachel Washburn and others in this approach to GT called Situational Analysis (SA).

In sum, the different approaches to GT in practice today include Glaserian, Strauss-ian, dimensional, constructivist, and situational. “Yet underneath there are commonalities: flexible guidelines for data collection and data analysis, commitments to remain close to the world being studied, and the development of integrated theoretical concepts grounded in the data that show process, relationships and social world connectedness. . . .” (Denzin 2007:455). Overall, a number of scholars assert that recent GT work has shifted toward more constructivist assumptions and epistemologies. While having different analytic foci, constructivist and situational GT are highly compatible and can quite comfortably be used together in the same project.

Many superb projects have been done using GT, and this action-centered approach continues to be fundamentally important in research. But the “landscape of qualitative inquiry” (Denzin & Lincoln 2011) has also changed dramatically since GT was created half a century ago. In the next section we describe those theoretical and methodological changes as culminating in “the interpretive turn.”

THE INTERPRETIVE TURN

The practices of interpretation involve storytelling, different ways of organizing and representing the world, and different ways of making the world appear real.

—Denzin (2007:459)

The interpretive turn began during the mid to late 20th century across the academy in the social sciences, humanities, and professional schools (e.g., nursing, education, business, social work). It also permeated other sites of knowledge production such as the media, and creative areas such as the arts, film, and architecture. A major pioneer of the interpretive turn in the social sciences, Geertz (1973:5), noted the fundamental contrast between positivism as an “experimental science in search of laws” and an “interpretive science in search of meaning.” In their definitive work, Rabinow & Sullivan (1987:20-21; emphasis added) asserted that the interpretive turn was based on

the realization that all human inquiry is necessarily engaged in understanding the human world from within a specific situation. This situation is always and at once historical, moral, and political. . . . It means that science [natural and social], like all
human endeavors, is rooted in a context of meaning which is itself a social reality, a particular organization of human action defining a moral and practical world.

Thus the situation—context writ large—has long held great import in the interpretive turn.

Many historically minded qualitative scholars assert that Thomas Wilson (1970:701; emphasis added) captured the key distinction within social science research when he wrote, “In the interpretive view of social interaction, in contrast with the normative paradigm, . . . the meanings of situations and actions are interpretations formulated on particular occasions and . . . subject to reformulation.” Moreover, and at the very core of SA, he said, “Much more careful attention needs to be given to the way in which a particular interaction is embedded in larger social contexts” (Wilson 1970:706). For Wilson and others, then, the key distinction within research per se is between normative and interpretive approaches rather than between quantitative and qualitative methods.

But the interpretive turn is rooted not only in the century-plus-long qualitative research tradition focused on interpretation toward enhanced understanding that long opposed positivism (e.g., Steinmetz 2005), but also more recently in postmodern and poststructural theories (e.g., Hiley, Bowman, & Schusterman 1991; Rabinow & Sullivan 1987). Each of these terms is challenging to pin down, but it is important to provide some historical background and to define our use of the terms in this book.

Framing the Turns

Postmodernism consists of many things and interpretations, today essentially ubiquitous if also contested in qualitative inquiry (e.g., Lather 2001a; 2007) and elsewhere. Postmodern social theory is often associated with the work of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari. As “the as yet unnamable which begins to proclaim itself” (Derrida quoted in Lather 1991:160), it privileges no single authority, method, or paradigm. For some, postmodernism was a diagnosis of the epoch following the high modernism of the postwar decades. “It was as if the crystal palace of grand theories had been shattered and postmodernists proceeded to study the myriad of fragments left” (Fontana 2005:241).

If modernism emphasized universality, generalization, simplification, permanence, stability, wholeness, rationality, regularity, homogeneity, and sufficiency, then postmodernism shifted emphasis to partialities, positionalities, complications, tenuousness, instabilities, irregularities, contradictions, heterogeneities, situatedness, and fragmentation—in all their methodologically challenging glory.

Postmodernism itself is not a unified system of beliefs or assumptions but rather an always already elaborating array of possibilities, “a series of fragments in continuous flux . . . abandoning overarching paradigms and theoretical and methodological metasystems” (Fontana 2002:162). It involves us in “the ontological politics of staying true to complexity” (Landstrom 2000:475), however partial and contradictory. Indeed, Dean (1994:4; emphasis added) asserts that postmodernism can be “defined as the restive problematisation of the given.”

Poststructural scholarship seeks to address “almost unthinkably complex, interrelated and interactive global” situations while simultaneously acknowledging the “ungraspable of
Part I • Framing and Grounding Situational Analysis

this world” (Usher 1997:30). It initially developed as a critique of structuralism, a systems approach to linguistics emphasizing (supposedly) universal oppositional categories. Poststructural scholars such Romans Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida abandoned the search for universal structures in language, assuming instead that language is an unstable system of referents that can never be wholly captured. They explored how language itself operates as a rhetoric or a discourse to create unquestioned practices (standardized ways of being and doing). This became known as “the linguistic turn” (Jaworski & Coupland 2014:3), a movement in both theory and methods. For example, Foucault demonstrated how medical knowledge shapes and delimits how we can imagine our selves and our bodies, and thus how we can mould a sense of self. But in turn he also showed us how medical discourse is itself bounded with particular historical moments in medicine and governance.

Significantly, the distinctions between postmodern and poststructural are often blurred by shared concerns and perspectives. One fundamental issue—particularly pertinent to research and taken up across postmodern, poststructural, and interpretive literatures—is the nature of knowledge. “ ‘Postmodernism’ is the continuation of modernism except that confidence in the extension of reason has been abandoned” (Latour 1999:308). In the mid-to late-20th century, poststructuralism offered a description of the relentless challenges to Western Enlightenment, humanism, and positivist sciences as the assumed pinnacles of human achievement globally.

Interpretive perspectives view all knowledges (including the natural and social sciences and humanities, “lay” knowledges of all sorts, and knowledges from all sites globally) as socially and culturally produced (e.g., Berger & Luckman 1966; McCarthy 1996). Thus key questions of both these turns feature the sociology of knowledge assumption that knowledges of all kinds are related to the sites of their production and consumption—their situations of origin and use (Mannheim 1959). In taking this shared assumption further, a major goal is to understand relations in such situations—the “ecologies of knowledge” (Rosenberg 1979; Star 1995).

Within postmodernism, poststructuralism, and interpretivism, then, all knowledges are understood by major segments of scholarly worlds and beyond as situated knowledges (e.g., Haraway 1991b)—produced and consumed by particular groups of people, historically and geographically locatable. Claims of universality are considered naive at best and more commonly as hegemonic strategies seeking to silence or erase other perspectives (Gramsci 1971). Genealogies of knowledges, their discourses and practices—tracing histories of the present back to their sites of origin—are routinely undertaken (e.g., Foucault 1972, 1973, 1980, 1991).

Other distinctive projects in the sociology of knowledge salient to qualitative inquiry often focus on how particular racial, gendered, and related social formations have been involved in or excluded from knowledge production (e.g., Alexander 2017; Omi & Winant 2014; Phellas 2012; Poovey 1998). Over recent decades, many ruptures of “difference” have been asserted through postcolonial, feminist, diasporic, ethnic, queer, multicultural, disability, and “other” theories and studies. Each of these innovative approaches examines knowledge production to challenge the kinds of discourses and truth claims circulating about differently situated people, things, and issues, often produced by those situated in positions of greater power, legitimacy, and/or authority. Such projects ask: Who is authorized and not authorized to make what kinds of knowledge claims about whom/what, and under what conditions? Together they have initiated a disruptive and truly stunning appreciation of the
complexities and heterogeneities of our individual and collective situations and discourses, and of our knowledge production—our interpretations of those situations.

The interpretive turn thus denotes how social researchers have reflexively embraced postmodern and poststructural social theories toward understanding their own knowledge practices as situated. This turn often assumes researchers have the responsibility to produce knowledge that can make better worlds, specifically antiracist, antisexist, and anticolo-nial worlds. If knowledge is to be productive instead of merely representative, we must be responsible to the kinds of worlds our knowledge practices enable and facilitate. As part of the interpretive turn, SA goes beyond much GT.

**Strands of Critique**

But postmodernisms, poststructuralisms, and interpretation have not been unopposed, and there are several strands of critique. The main one is, of course, the positivist denial of the sociology of knowledge, of the socially constructed nature of all categories, and of the theory of linguistic indeterminacy that undergirds poststructural theory (e.g., Stein-metz 2005). Softer versions of such positivist realisms are also common among qualitative researchers and remain problematic. A second strand of critique objects to slick, quick, and trendy “pomo” framings and statements that lack depth and attention to history and context, though (thankfully) such assertions have abated.

A third critical edge concerns the “collapse of optimism of the modernist project” (Jenkins 1997:5), and of belief in human progress. That is, some critics believe nihilism inherently flows from the abandonment of realism and the acceptance of the partiality of knowledges. While we sympathize with the latter two critiques, we can only make sense of the world through using the tools of the sociology of knowledge and constructivism (e.g., McCarthy 1996), and we seek through SA to add to those tools. Nihilism is neither required nor productive. This is not to say that very disheartening readings indeed of the human condition today are “wrong.” It is to say that when, with Foucault (1991:84), we ask, “What is to be done?” we need to engage with the realities of oppression and violence now and historically, proceed in the face of them, and take them into account rather than pretend such situations don’t exist.

To address the challenges of doing research with greater awareness of the partialities of our understanding, our research assumptions and processes need enhanced capacities to empirically grasp and interpret the complexities and heterogeneities of social life (e.g., Haraway 1999; Lather 2001b, 2007, 2013). We need methods for research and analysis that support our yearnings (hooks 1990), our desires to know (savoir), and our will to know (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller 1991; Foucault 1972, 1973). We need both the knowledge itself and the potential such knowledge may offer for making life on the planet better. We need methods that support research on social suffering and anguish that also enable the hope that dwells at the bottom of Pandora’s Box to emerge, nourish, and be nourished.

But that hope cannot be naive. In Richardson’s (2000:928; final emphasis added) terms, at the core of the contemporary moment lies

the doubt that any method or theory, discourse or genre, tradition or novelty, has a universal claim as the “right” or the privileged form of authoritative knowledge.
Postmodernism suspects all truth claims of masking and serving particular interests in local, cultural and political struggles. But it does not automatically reject conventional methods of knowing and telling as false or archaic. Rather it opens those standard methods to inquiry and introduces new methods, which are also, then, subject to critique.

Thus not only are more scientistic, positivist, quantitative approaches challenged through postmodernism, poststructuralism, and the sociology of knowledge, but so too are qualitatively interpretive approaches to knowledge production. The interpretation that postmodernism and poststructuralism meant “the end of research” (e.g., Clough 1998; Latour 2004) has been challenged (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln 2011, 2017; Keller 2017). Research per se is much too valuable politically as both commodity and pacificatory strategy to disappear.

To us, it is methods lacking reflexivity and acknowledgment of partialities and other complexities that are no longer acceptable. Research after the turns now subsumed under the rubric “interpretive” needs to take into account the still profound and haunting—if also heterogeneous and challenging—insights of those contributions to the human sciences. “The best practitioners of interpretive social science are seeking... to construct a more adequate understanding of the world so as to keep open the possibility of public discussion guided by practical reason” (Rabinow & Sullivan 1987:30).

GROUND FOR A NEW METHOD

My interest is in a less comfortable social science, one appropriate to a postfoundationalist era characterized by the loss of certainties and absolute frames of reference.

—Lather (2001a:221)

To address the need and desire for empirical understandings of the increasingly complex and heterogeneous worlds emerging through new world orderings, new methods are requisite (Haraway 1999; Lather 2007). Some should be epistemologically rooted in the pragmatist philosophical soil that historically nurtured symbolic interactionism and GT. GT has always had the capacity to be distinctly perspectival in ways fully compatible with what are now understood as situated knowledges. This fundamental always already poststructural edge of a GT grounded in interactionism makes it worth renovating (discussed in Chapter 2).

Many problematics of methodology have been clarified by the interpretive turn: recognition of the always already political nature of practices of research and interpretation; reflexivity by researchers—and increasingly by those studied—about research processes and products; the “crisis of representation”; questions regarding the legitimacy and authority of research and researchers; and repositioning the researcher from “all-knowing analyst” to “acknowledged participant” in the production of always partial knowledges (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln 1994, 2017). All of these challenges are engaged by SA.
To us, the *methodological* implications of the interpretive turn primarily require taking situatedness, variation, differences of all kinds, positionality and relationality very seriously in all their complexities, multiplicities, instabilities, and contradictions. This differs from most social science research that instead has relentlessly sought *commonalities* of various kinds in social life while evading and avoiding representations of *differences and contradictions*—the mess of actual situations (Law 2004). Variance or difference is even called “noise” or “dirty data” in some approaches. Simplifying and universalizing strategies abound (e.g., Hornstein & Star 1990; Star 1983, 1986). Furthermore, positions have been “correlated” with persons and groups in rigid and monolithizing ways that erase ambivalences, contradictions, multiplicities, and the shifting relationalities through which we negotiate social life.

But what do *we* mean by the complexities of “situatedness” after the interpretive turn? In fact, we are quite specific (see also Chapters 2 and 3). Many methodological moves in qualitative inquiry since the interpretive turn have centered on enhancing individual “voice” and its representation: autoethnography, interpretive ethnography, new biographies/life stories, interpretive phenomenologies, various forms of narrative analysis and feminist inquiry. While SA fully engages individual materials, that is not its main focus.

The most innovative part of SA as a project is to *also* bring the social—the full situation of inquiry—further around the interpretive turn and to ground it in new analytic approaches. Specifically, SA attempts to do methodological justice to particular insights of poststructural theory, especially aspects of Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, and science studies. With Denzin (1989:66-82, 2001c), we are deeply committed to “situating interpretation.” We agree with Hall and McGinty (2002:304) that “interactionists can and should expand their theoretical environment, [and] broaden their perspective to be sensitive to and analyze more general, larger domains of social action.” Yet *action is not enough.* Analytic focus needs to go beyond “the knowing subject” to center fully on the situation of inquiry broadly conceived, including the turn to discourse.

Some years ago, Katovich and Reese (1993:400-405) interestingly argued that Strauss’s negotiated order and related work recuperatively pulled the social around the postmodern turn through its methodological (grounded theoretical) recognition of the partial, tenuous, shifting, and unstable nature of the empirical world and its constructedness. Clarke strongly agreed, arguing that Strauss furthered this “postmodernization of the social” through his conceptualizations of social worlds and arenas as modes of understanding the deeply situated yet always also fluid *organizational* facets of commitments, negotiations, and discourses.

Strauss’s social worlds theory foreshadowed what later came to be known as postmodern assumptions: the instability of situations; the characteristic changing, porous boundaries of both social worlds and arenas; social worlds as mutually constitutive, as coproduced in the ongoing negotiations taking place in arenas; negotiations as central social processes hailing, as Hughes (1971b:552) taught us, that “things can always be otherwise”; and so on. Negotiations also signal micropolitics of power and the powers of discourses—decentering the subject and power in its more fluid and discursive forms (e.g., Foucault 1979, 1980)—blurring if not wholly erasing boundaries among “the usual” micro/meso/macro structural elements.

Through integrating the social worlds/arenas framework with GT as part of a new conceptual infrastructure for SA, Clarke both sustained and extended the methodological contributions of GT. Thus SA is especially useful for understanding and elaborating what has
been meant by “the social” in social life. This is valuable precisely because the social has too often been analytically elusive if not ignored in research in the social sciences, professions, and even organizations research.

There are several key methodological issues here. First, a method is needed that intentionally elucidates the complexities of situations as the grounds of social life. That is, the method must aim at capturing complexities rather than simplifying, must elucidate uneven processes of change as well as stabilities, and must untangle agents and positions sufficiently to make contradictions, ambivalences, and even irrelevances clear. Second, a method is needed that encourages the analyst to elucidate marginalized perspectives and subjugated knowledges of social life that may even be illegitimate. We need to lucidly communicate what it means to dwell heterogeneously all over this planet in complicated and often highly unstable situations.

Third, methods are needed that go beyond “the knowing subject” (usually the interviewee) as the featured knower and decision maker to also address and analyze salient discourses within the situation of inquiry. We are all, like it or not, constantly awash in seas of discourses constitutive of life itself. SA therefore follows Foucault’s poststructural “footsteps” (Prior 1997) into historical, narrative/textual, and visual discourses to integrate the decentering of “the knowing subject” more deeply into empirical research.

Further, if the subject is decentered, other “things” come into view. Fresh methodological attention needs to be paid to objects in situations: cultural objects, technologies, media—all the nonhuman, animate, and inanimate things that also constitute the situations we study. Some are products of human action (and we can study the production processes); others are construed as “natural” (and we can study how they have been constructed as such). In the contemporary moment, studying action is far from enough.

Clarke also argued that we need methodologies that take individual and collective difference(s) into account in social life in order to generate more just and equitable social policies from education and welfare reform to health coverage, from caregiving to social security in old age or disability. Such visionary Deweyian aspects of pragmatist philosophy are again lively after the interpretive turn for good reason—because they are sorely needed. But they also need to be grounded through empirical research to effect more equitable policies through the explicit acknowledgment and incorporation of the complexities of situatedness and difference(s) rather than their erasure through subtly coerced assimilations or hopes for transcendence through shared education or beliefs. At the same time, we cannot assume that our research will lead directly or indirectly to the changes we envision and desire. Herein lies the rub. We must pursue our research “as if”—in hopes that it will make a difference, and that doing research differently will help it matter more (e.g., Keller 2017; Lather 2013).

SITUATIONAL MAPS AND ANALYSIS

All aspects of human being and knowing are situated.

—McCarthy (1996:107)
Clarke’s goal was to revise and regenerate the GT method toward new approaches to grounded theorizing that take the interpretive turns in social theory and qualitative inquiry more fully into account. Specifically, she sought to do so by

- Disarticulating GT from its remaining positivist roots in 1950s and 1960s social science and enhancing its always already present but often muted poststructural capacities and affordances;
- Supplementing the GT root metaphor of social processes and action with an ecological root metaphor of the situation as an alternative conceptual infrastructure;
- Supplementing GT analysis of a basic social process (action) with alternatives centered on cartographies of situations—SA maps of key elements; maps of social worlds and their arenas of commitment; and maps of different positions on important issues in the situation; together these constitute the situation of inquiry broadly construed;
- Framing systematic and flexible means of research design that facilitate doing multisite or multimodal research that includes analysis of discursive textual, visual, and archival historical materials and documents, as well as ethnographic (interview and observational) transcripts and field notes; and
- Generating sensitizing concepts and theoretical integration toward provocative yet provisional analytics and grounded theorizing as an ongoing process, rather than the development of substantive and formal theories, as the ultimate goal.

Because epistemology and ontology are joined at the hip, we view methods as “theory/methods packages” (Star 1989, discussed in Chapter 2). Thus we view Straussian GT as explicitly grounded in Chicago School sociology, pragmatist philosophy, and symbolic interactionism. Most Straussian grounded theorists have shifted to more fully constructivist framings, which we seek to further in SA. This book therefore not only offers SA as an extension of constructivist interpretivist grounded theorizing but also elaborates the key methodological and theoretical shifts that undergird it (see Chapters 2 and 3).

SA as a new method was developed by Adele Clarke, who learned GT from Strauss as he wrote his *Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists* (1987) and elaborated his social worlds/arenas theory. Thus Clarke was raised in what Miller (1997:2) calls the “institutional studies tradition” of interactionism. SA was also generated through her own engagements with feminism, interactionism, Foucault and other poststructuralists, cultural and postcolonial studies, and science, technology, and medicine studies (especially women’s health). These engagements are manifest in certain tendencies in SA, discussed next.

First, while an emphasis on difference clearly was not part of Strauss’s or Glaser’s agendas, it was central to Clarke’s and became integral to SA. Specifically, in SA, the GT strategy of theoretical sampling can be directed to include the broadest range of variation within salient data sources to pursue particular aspects of situatedness, difference(s), and variations. Heterogeneous elements and their relations can be sought out and analyzed, in vivid contrast with their erasure through simplification strategies. Such purposive theoretical sampling involves particular attention to research design (see Chapter 5 and passim).
Second is an enhanced focus on the analytic importance of “things” in our complex situatedness. Nonhuman things—living and not, including technologies—are emphasized throughout this book (see Chapter 3). Methods that ignore the materialities of existence are today inadequate. Material entities in our situations of concern deserve explicit and intentional analytic inclusion. Humans and things “make each other up”—are coconstitutive (e.g., Haraway 2007; Latour 1987; Mead 1934/1962). Particularly significant here, materiality is also relational (Law 1999:4).

Third, although Glaser and Strauss (1967) did not initially emphasize context or situatedness, Strauss (e.g., 1987:77-81) later did so—another source of provocation of SA. Specifically, Strauss and Corbin developed conditional matrices—analytic devices intended to push grounded theorists to consider how various contextual elements “condition” the action that is the central analytic focus in a GT analysis. However, Clarke found the conditional matrices inadequate to the task. Together, these issues and others pushed Clarke to generate the situation-centered analytics of SA, including a new situational matrix (presented in Chapter 2, Figure 2.3).

In addition to its differences, SA also shares many facets of GT. Most important, the core analytic goal of both GT and SA is generating what Blumer (1969:147-148) called “sensitizing concepts”:

A definitive concept refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects . . . or fixed benchmarks. . . . A sensitizing concept . . . instead gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look.

Both Glaser and Strauss sought to turn these concepts into formal theory (e.g., Glaser 2006; Strauss 1995). In contrast, Clarke eschews formal theory building in SA, arguing that, given the pace of social and material change, thoughtful, integrated analyses using sensitizing concepts both suffice and allow more flexible further theorizing downstream to take further changes in the situation into account.

**Defining and Bounding “the Situation”**

But what is “the situation” in situational analysis? This significant issue is taken up many times in this book. Here we briefly introduce it. In Chapter 2, we discuss methodological grounds of the concept of situation in qualitative inquiry past and present. In Chapter 3, a new section traces its theoretical roots as we use it in SA. And in Chapter 4, we discuss practical aspects of dealing with the situation empirically in the SA research process.

Why study “the situation”? First and deeply important to Clarke in developing SA was that historically, qualitative inquiry has tended to ignore the situatedness of phenomena studied (Denzin 1970, 1989; Haraway 1991b). It has concentrated instead on action and interaction (in GT), selves (in autoethnography and social psychology), specific cultures (in anthropological ethnography), and so on. Inspired about the concept of “situation” by W. I. Thomas, Dorothy Thomas, John Dewey, Karl Mannheim, C. Wright Mills, Norman Denzin, Paul duGay, Donna Haraway, and Brian Massumi (see Chapter 3), Clarke sought
to create a method that emphasizes the situatedness of phenomena and their social relations and engagements as a needed corrective.

But, you may next ask, why “the situation” and not “the context”? The word context clearly denotes that which surrounds something, but assuredly is not part of it. In fact, Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) developed “conditional matrices” as a means of analyzing important “contexts” in GT that condition the action, much like Foucault’s (1975) “conditions of possibility.” However, through interactionism and science and technology studies, Clarke had come to understand “coconstitutiveness”—that entities in relation to each other are constitutive of each other. They help make each other up through their relations in the situation that “matter most.” Clarke created SA toward generating understanding of precisely what coconstitutes what else in a given situation—analyzing the relationalities involved and their ecologies.

Yet “the situation” can seem elusive. To clarify, in SA, a situation is not merely a moment in time, a narrow spatial or temporal unit or a brief encounter or event (or at least rarely so). Rather it usually involves a somewhat enduring arrangement of relations among many different kinds and categories of elements that has its own ecology. It usually includes a number of events over at least a short period of time, and can endure considerably longer. For example, in doing an historical SA project, one actually compares the situations at two or more times by mapping them separately (e.g., for Time 1 and Time 2) and comparing the two maps as a means of systematically analyzing changes (see Chapter 13).

Thus as a qualitative method, SA is distinctively relational and ecologically minded. The situational maps detail relations among all the elements. The Strauss-inspired social worlds/arenas maps center on the relational ecology of collective organizational and institutional entities in the empirical situation under study. Last, positional maps offer ecologies of the positions taken and not taken on contested issues in the situation.

But how does the analyst know when and where to stop constructing the situation? How is the situation bounded empirically in a research project? This is a challenging question for two main reasons. First, there can be no firm rules, as the analyst needs to be able to follow their empirical nose throughout a project. Second, “the situation” is elastic—capable of stretching to be broad and inclusive or narrowing down to a high-resolution focus. To analyze a specific phenomenon, SA mapping is pursued. In deciding whether something in the broader situation is worth exploring, a helpful rule of thumb is whether it would “matter”—make a serious difference—in the situation empirically. In SA, as in GT, when in doubt one returns to the empirical materials (see also Chapter 4).

**Constructing the Situation by Mapping**

In SA, *the situation of inquiry itself broadly conceived becomes the key unit of analysis.* The situation of inquiry is empirically constructed through making three kinds of maps and following through with analytic work and memos of various kinds. All the maps are updated across the trajectory of the project as further data are gathered.

The first maps are **situational maps** that lay out major human, nonhuman, discursive, historical, symbolic, cultural, political, and other elements in the research situation of concern. Once constructed, the situational maps provoke analysis of relations among these elements. These maps capture the messy complexities of the situation in their dense relations
and permutations. They intentionally work against simplification (Star 1983, 1986) in particular poststructural ways.

Second, **social worlds/arenas maps** lay out all of the collective actors and the arena(s) of commitment within which they are engaged in ongoing discourse and negotiations. Such maps explicitly analyze social, organizational, and institutional dimensions of the situation relying on interpretive assumptions: We cannot assume directionality of influence; boundaries are open and porous; negotiations are fluid; discourses are multiple and potentially contradictory. Negotiations of many kinds (from bargaining to coercion) are the “basic social processes” that construct and constantly destabilize the social worlds/arenas maps (Strauss 1993). Things could always be otherwise—not only individually but also collectively/organizationally/institutionally. These maps portray such possibilities.

Third, **positional maps** lay out the major positions taken and not taken in the discursive data found in the situation vis-à-vis particular axes of concern and controversy. Significantly, positional maps are not articulated with persons or groups but rather seek to represent the full range of discursive positions on particular issues—allowing multiple positions and even contradictory positions held by both individuals and collectivities to be articulated. Complexities are themselves heterogeneous, and positional maps seek to represent them.

All three kinds of maps are keyed to taking the nonhuman—including discourses—in the situation of inquiry seriously as active, coconstitutive elements. In doing initial situational maps, the analyst is asked to specify the nonhuman elements in the situation, thus making pertinent materialities and discourses visible from the outset. The flip side of the second kind of map, the social worlds/arenas map, is a discourse/arenas map. Social worlds are “universes of discourse” routinely producing discourses about elements of concern in the situation and about the other social worlds in it and about their own world (Strauss 1978, 1993:209-262). Discourses in the situation (often major nonhuman actors) can be mapped and analyzed, and SA does that through positional maps. These maps open up the discourses by analyzing positions taken and not taken on key analytic axes. Discourses are disarticulated from their sites of production, affording SA further analytic bite.

Part II of this book takes up how to do SA projects including all three kinds of maps, from project design stages to final write-ups in detail with exemplars.

**REFLECTIONS AND ANTICIPATIONS**

Grounded theory’s ground, and the spaces it encompasses, are always constructed, never bedrock solid, always nuanced, and potentially dangerous.

—Denzin (2007:458)

In sum, SA supplements Straussian constructivist action-focused GT with a situation-focused approach that explicitly centers on the analysis of the full situation, including its discourses—narrative, visual, and historical. Such work can enrich research by addressing and engaging the important complexities of poststructural theoretical and methodological
concerns. In many ways, as we argue more elaborately in Chapter 2, GT was always already around the interpretive turn, while in other ways it was not particularly so, and/or not clearly so. Situational maps and analyses, generated through the old and new theoretical roots described in Chapter 3, make it so.

Bowker and Star (1999:10) discuss “infrastructural inversion,” wherein the infrastructure of something is (unusually) revealed and even featured. An example would be the Pompidou Center in Paris, where all the pipes, stanchions, conduits, and other building innards are instead “outards”—exposed by being attached to the exterior walls rather than hidden in between interior and exterior walls. Situational maps do a kind of “social inversion” in making the usually invisible and inchoate social features of a situation more visible through mapping them: all the key elements in the situation and their interrelations; the social worlds and arenas in which the phenomena of interest are embedded; the discursive positions taken and not taken by actors (human and nonhuman) on key issues; and the discourses themselves as constitutive of the situation. This is the poststructuralization of a GT grounded in pragmatist philosophy, interactionism, science and technology studies, Foucaultian analytics, and DeLeuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics and assemblages.

Situational maps and analyses are interpretive approaches to research in a wide variety of ways elaborated throughout this book. Let us end this introductory moment by emphasizing that an analysis of any kind is no more than one or a few readings of a situation—understandings or interpretations. After the interpretive turn, we assume that an analysis or reading no longer claims adequacy or validity in the modern methodological usages of those terms. Instead, analyses are understood to be partial, historical, situated. Obviously, we believe the analytic strategies of SA are worthy of attention and useful in terms of doing the kinds of work in research worlds that we think need doing. But other approaches are always already available and may also be provocative and interesting, perhaps in combination with situational analyses if epistemologically compatible.

Our project, then, is to regenerate GT in ways that can support researchers from the social sciences, humanities, professions, and beyond in a wide array of projects drawing on visual, textual, historical, ethnographic, and interview materials. Here the researcher becomes not only analyst and bricoleur (Denzin & Lincoln 2011), but also a cartographer of sorts. The new mapping approaches are especially useful for multisite or multimodal research. Thus SA is useful on its own or in combination with constructivist GT for small or large interview-based research as well as ethnographic field projects and analyses of extant discourses of many kinds.

Everything is situated, and SA maps elucidate this facet of interpretive understanding. What we hope you will bring to your mapping efforts is a developing “ethnographic sensibility” (Prainsack & Wahlberg 2013) and a commitment to “thick analysis” (Fosket 2015).

NOTES

1. We largely use the term constructivist rather than constructionist in this book based on Charmaz’s (2000, 2014:13-14) argument that those calling themselves constructionists do not necessarily view their own work as constructed interpretations, while constructivists do so. We do so as well, viewing most everything as constructed and interpreted, integral to interactionism. On Strauss, see Baszanger (1998b),


3. A Web of Science database search on “grounded theory” (done 1/9/17) found 11,504 citations, 7380 of which were after 2010. GT is renowned not only in sociology (e.g., Strauss & Corbin 1997) and nursing (e.g., Stern 1994, 2007), where it was originally taught, but also in cultural studies (e.g., Gelder & Thornton 2005), organization and management studies (e.g., Locke 2001; Fendt & Sachs 2008; O’Reilly, Paper & Marx 2012), education (e.g., Cresswell & Plano Clarke 2007), library and information science (e.g., Star & Bowker 2007; Urquhart, Lehmann & Myers 2010), psychology and counseling (e.g., Charmaz & Henwood 2008; Fassinger 2005), computer and information science (e.g., Bryant 2006; Star & Strauss 1998; Urquhart 2007), social work (e.g., Gilgun 2013), public health (e.g., Dahlgren, Emmelin, & Winkvist 2007), science, technology, and medicine studies (e.g., Clarke & Star 2008), queer studies (e.g., Plummer 2005), mixed-methods research (e.g., Cresswell & Plano Clarke 2007), social justice research (Charmaz 2005, 2011; Charmaz, Thornberg, & Keane 2017), and indigenous research (Bainbridge, Whiteside, & McCalman 2013).


7. Others on that project included Fred Davis and Virginia Olesen.

8. Per Strauss's CV (revised in 2003), their last joint publication was in 1975. See http://dne2.ucsf.edu/public/anselmstrauss/cc.html (accessed 11/14/16). Their other collaborative publications were on death, dying, and chronic illness.


16. Denzin (2007:494-455) adds another category, computer-generated GT. However, we have found such work at best thematic and too often based merely on word counts (content analysis) rather than integrated conceptual analyses—actual grounded theories.

17. These include Charmaz (2014), Clarke (2007), Lucke (2001), Bryant & Charmaz (2007), Denzin (2007), Morse et al. (2009), and others.


21. This is also a common goal in science and technology studies. See also Sismondo (2015).

22. On perspective in interactionism, see especially Mead (1927/1964) and Cefaï (2016). The phrase “always already” is from Derrida (1978). It implies that the roots of present phenomena can always already be discerned in the past. We enter “always already” ongoing flows later constructed as histories.


25. Some threads of interactionism moved toward interpretive cultural studies in ways Clarke sought to extend through SA (e.g., Denzin 1989, 1991, 2001). See also Ferguson, Gever, Minh-Ha, & West (1990) and Denzin & Lincoln (2011, 2017).


28. See, e.g., Marcus (1995), and Dicks, Soyinka, & Coffey (2006). The term multisite research is often but not only used to refer to research undertaken in different geographic or physical locations. Multimodal often refers to having different kinds of data, but may refer to using different research methods (multiple methods or mixed methods). In practice, the usages are blurred. We use the term multisite for the inclusion of different kinds of data (e.g., interview, visual, documentary, observational).


31. On theoretical sampling, see note 4.

32. Distinctively, GT analysis does not center on properties of persons or “variables,” common in social science. Therefore it has never been limited to the study of humans, but can easily accommodate nonhuman elements (technologies, animals, discourses, historical documents, visual representations, etc.). Clarke was, in fact, initially attracted to this openness of Straussian GT to analyze a wide range of nonhuman objects and began doing GT studies of discourses—historical materials and visual cultures—as a grad student. This later provoked her to draw deeply on Foucault in developing SA (see Chapter 3).


34. Mathar (2008:30-31) and others have mistakenly thought this was what Clarke meant by situation, provoking this important clarification.

35. Both Chicago pragmatist philosophy and sociology were actively concerned with ecologies—relations among elements of various kinds—human, plant, animal, nonhuman. Mapmaking was part of the early Chicago sociology tradition (see Chapter 3 and Clarke 2005:39-45).

36. Strauss’s social worlds/arenas theorizing was undertaken over many years at the same time that he developed GT, though he never drew them explicitly together as SA does. See note 24 for references.

37. While there are many different disciplinary mapping traditions, the only prior version of an SA map is Anselm Strauss’s social worlds/arenas maps. Clarke created situational maps from her form of maintaining teaching notes on students’ pilot qualitative projects and the concepts of rhizome and assemblage from Deleuze & Guattari (discussed in Chapter 3).

38. On validity after poststructuralism, see Lather’s (1993) brilliant summary.